straup + surveillance   340

Shinseungback Kimyonghun: Aposematic Jacket
'Aposematic Jacket' is a wearable camera for self-defense. The lenses on the jacket give off the warning signal, “I can record you”, to prevent possible attack. When the wearer pushes a button under threat, the jacket records the scene in 360 degrees and sends the images to the Web.
camera  fashion  surveillance 
november 2014 by straup – the social laboratory singapore surveillance state #9d7e0b3cb25130af117352933626cf7e
Ten years after its founding, the RAHS program has evolved beyond anything Poindexter could have imagined. Across Singapore's national ministries and departments today, armies of civil servants use scenario-based planning and big-data analysis from RAHS for a host of applications beyond fending off bombs and bugs. They use it to plan procurement cycles and budgets, make economic forecasts, inform immigration policy, study housing markets, and develop education plans for Singaporean schoolchildren -- and they are looking to analyze Facebook posts, Twitter messages, and other social media in an attempt to "gauge the nation's mood" about everything from government social programs to the potential for civil unrest.
surveillance  motive  singapore  highlights  from:dogeared  url:f085be621d9d91bb27ddbabce7bf8c05  dt:year=2014  dt:month=08  dt:day=05  dt:timestamp=1407243639 
august 2014 by straup – tor spooks #9b4c693c6bcae5eac1820a01f0e7ec48
Back in 2007, a Swedish hacker/researcher named Dan Egerstad showed that just by running a Tor node, he could siphon and read all the unencrypted traffic that went through his chunk of the Tor network. He was able to access logins and passwords to accounts of NGOs, companies, and the embassies of India and Iran. Egerstad thought at first that embassy staff were just being careless with their info, but quickly realized that he had actually stumbled on a hack/surveillance operation in which Tor was being used to covertly access these accounts.
tor  surveillance  highlights  from:dogeared  url:f0477eabdd2ed0929656cd0bbd63b258  dt:year=2014  dt:month=07  dt:day=20  dt:timestamp=1405889908 
july 2014 by straup – tor spooks #8db75adec55bdc9ad03af2dbb52cca5f
To avoid taking a final exam he wasn’t prepared for, Kim hit up on the idea of sending in a fake bomb threat. То cover his tracks, he used Tor, supposedly the best anonymity service the web had to offer. But it did little mask his identity from a determined Uncle Sam. A joint investigation, which involved the FBI, the Secret Service and local police, was able to track the fake bomb threat right back to Kim — in less than 24 hours. As the FBI complaint explained, “Harvard University was able to determine that, in the several hours leading up to the receipt of the e-mail messages described above, ELDO KIM accessed TOR using Harvard’s wireless network.” All that Tor did was make the cops jump a few extra steps. But it wasn’t hard, nothing that a bit of manpower with full legal authority to access network records couldn’t solve. It helped that Harvard’s network logging all metadata access on the network — sorta like the NSA.
tor  surveillance  motive  highlights  from:dogeared  url:f0477eabdd2ed0929656cd0bbd63b258  dt:year=2014  dt:month=07  dt:day=20  dt:timestamp=1405889841 
july 2014 by straup – 93d2ac22 0b93 11e4 b8e5 d0de80767fc2 story #50b1f9d66f410411bb2579858c095c10
When I started at the State Department, I took an oath to protect the Constitution of the United States. I don’t believe that there is any valid interpretation of the Fourth Amendment that could permit the government to collect and store a large portion of U.S. citizens’ online communications, without any court or congressional oversight, and without any suspicion of wrongdoing. Such a legal regime risks abuse in the long run, regardless of whether one trusts the individuals in office at a particular moment.
nsa  surveillance  law  highlights  from:dogeared  url:59e8b7fa596d91e1ed5c0a3b4909322a  dt:year=2014  dt:month=07  dt:day=20  dt:timestamp=1405841001 
july 2014 by straup – 93d2ac22 0b93 11e4 b8e5 d0de80767fc2 story #b0b1da2a69ec45e7607539b6251233b9
Executive Order 12333 contains no such protections for U.S. persons if the collection occurs outside U.S. borders. Issued by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 to authorize foreign intelligence investigations, 12333 is not a statute and has never been subject to meaningful oversight from Congress or any court. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, has said that the committee has not been able to “sufficiently” oversee activities conducted under 12333. Unlike Section 215, the executive order authorizes collection of the content of communications, not just metadata, even for U.S. persons. Such persons cannot be individually targeted under 12333 without a court order. However, if the contents of a U.S. person’s communications are “incidentally” collected (an NSA term of art ) in the course of a lawful overseas foreign intelligence investigation, then Section 2.3(c) of the executive order explicitly authorizes their retention. It does not require that the affected U.S. persons be suspected of wrongdoing and places no limits on the volume of communications by U.S. persons that may be collected and retained.
nsa  surveillance  law  highlights  from:dogeared  url:59e8b7fa596d91e1ed5c0a3b4909322a  dt:year=2014  dt:month=07  dt:day=19  dt:timestamp=1405838768 
july 2014 by straup
New America New York City: The Future of Getting Lost
"In this era of near constant tracking and data gathering by cellphones, sensors, CCTV cameras, or even social media, it feels as if anyone, anywhere, should be easily findable at any moment. But as Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 has demonstrated, it is still possible for significant, and tragic, disappearances to occur. What is the future of finding lost people in this time of exponentially increasing data? What can data offer us in terms of anticipatory and real-time disaster relief? And can we balance this measurable need—one that saves lives—with our desire to sometimes stray and purposefully lose ourselves"
july 2014 by straup – 8139adf8 045a 11e4 8572 4b1b969b6322 story #cf1b44e77610cf5faa18243bb4a29e5f
Apart from the fact that tens of millions of Americans live and travel overseas, additional millions use simple tools called proxies to redirect their data traffic around the world, for business or pleasure. World Cup fans this month have been using a browser extension called Hola to watch live-streamed games that are unavailable from their own countries. The same trick is routinely used by Americans who want to watch BBC video. The NSA also relies routinely on locations embedded in Yahoo tracking cookies, which are widely regarded by online advertisers as unreliable.
nsa  surveillance  yahoo  highlights  from:dogeared  url:a38f8d565a1044aedadceb87d60594e7  dt:year=2014  dt:month=07  dt:day=05  dt:timestamp=1404611184 
july 2014 by straup – 8139adf8 045a 11e4 8572 4b1b969b6322 story #790fbba105988a7f9ea107f1f7f4b483
The NSA treats all content intercepted incidentally from third parties as permissible to retain, store, search and distribute to its government customers. Raj De, the agency’s general counsel, has testified that the NSA does not generally attempt to remove irrelevant personal content, because it is difficult for one analyst to know what might become relevant to another.
motive  nsa  surveillance  highlights  from:dogeared  url:a38f8d565a1044aedadceb87d60594e7  dt:year=2014  dt:month=07  dt:day=05  dt:timestamp=1404610960 
july 2014 by straup – 8139adf8 045a 11e4 8572 4b1b969b6322 story #43876981d1fd6357cf9b3aa0f3f10de3
The surveillance files highlight a policy dilemma that has been aired only abstractly in public. There are discoveries of considerable intelligence value in the intercepted messages — and collateral harm to privacy on a scale that the Obama administration has not been willing to address.
nsa  surveillance  highlights  from:dogeared  url:a38f8d565a1044aedadceb87d60594e7  dt:year=2014  dt:month=07  dt:day=05  dt:timestamp=1404610769 
july 2014 by straup – 373918 #78d04ed0883b85a707815b0d8a94aa29
One of them is a company out of Austin, Texas, called SnapTrends, founded in 2012. They provide a “social listening” service that analyzes posts to provide insights about the circumstances of the poster, one of the most important of which is the poster’s location. The company uses cell tower density, social network knowhow, and various other elements to figure out who is posting what and where. Are you someone who refuses to geo-tag your tweets out of concerns for privacy? Do you turn off your phone’s GPS receiving capability to stay under the proverbial radar? It doesn’t matter to SnapTrends.
surveillance  highlights  from:dogeared  url:7d9843e5cdc21921dfb4e2b79da26125  dt:year=2014  dt:month=07  dt:day=05  dt:timestamp=1404581391 
july 2014 by straup – 373918 #5f3b9b634efef429dec303406dfc0530
Open-source intelligence can take a variety of forms, but among the most voluminous, personal and useful is Facebook and Twitter data. The availability of that sort of information is changing the way that DIA trains intelligence operatives. Long gone are the spooks of old who would fish through trash for clues on targets. Here to stay are the eyes looking through your vacation pictures.
surveillance  highlights  from:dogeared  url:7d9843e5cdc21921dfb4e2b79da26125  dt:year=2014  dt:month=07  dt:day=05  dt:timestamp=1404579869 
july 2014 by straup – Trusting Browser Code #0f599714519162d4ad6359d15e1a47f5 , a secure-offline-backup provider, has a more so­phis­ti­cat­ed war­rant ca­nary ; a doc­u­men­t, signed with their key, as­sert­ing that no war­rants have been served on them, con­tain­ing headlines-of-the-day scraped from a well-known news­pa­per
surveillance  security  motive  highlights  from:dogeared  url:2bd7809cabb86c732b128ab308186421  dt:year=2014  dt:month=06  dt:day=10  dt:timestamp=1402420225 
june 2014 by straup
Internet Giants Erect Barriers to Spy Agencies -
“Just as there are technological gaps, there are legal gaps,” he said, speaking at the Wilson Center in Washington, “that leave a lot of gray area” governing what companies could turn over.

In the past, he said, “we have been very successful” in getting that data. But he acknowledged that for now, those days are over, and he predicted that “sooner or later there will be some intelligence failure and people will wonder why the intelligence agencies were not able to protect the nation.”

Companies respond that if that happens, it is the government’s own fault and that intelligence agencies, in their quest for broad data collection, have undermined web security for all.
network  security  surveillance 
june 2014 by straup
How the NSA Could Bug Your Powered-Off iPhone, and How to Stop Them | Threat Level | WIRED
To enter DFU mode, plug your iPhone in any power outlet or computer USB port. Then hold the power button. After three seconds, start holding the home button, too. Keep both buttons pressed for 10 seconds, then release the power button while continuing to hold the home button for another ten to fifteen seconds.

That intermediate step of holding the power button and the home button together, McDonald says, sends a “hardware reset” to the phone’s power management unit that overrides any running software, including any malware designed to fake a shutdown. “It’s a feature burned into the hardware,” says David Wang, another iPhone hacker and member of the Evad3rs. “As far as I know, there’s nothing that can stop that hard power-off.”

If you’ve successfully entered DFU mode, the phone won’t turn on when someone holds the power button, nor will it power up when the phone is plugged into a power source. With your phone in this temporary undead state, you can go about your private conversation with the closest thing possible to full assurance that your phone isn’t listening. To power the phone back on, hold the the power button and home button together until the Apple logo appears.
iphone  surveillance 
june 2014 by straup – the anxieties of big data #a848fda26b23063fed694b126521370b
Still, the rapid rise of the term normcore is an indication of how the cultural idea of disappearing has become cool at the very historical moment when it has become almost impossible because of big data and widespread surveillance. Blending in gives you a particular kind of power when standing out means being put on the no-fly list for 10 years or a predictive-policing heat list in Chicago , or earns you a chilling anonymous SMS for attending a street protest in Ukraine
surveillance  community  normcorehighlights  from:dogeared  url:07ba2d0c38e75e319879c77b11e5f0af  dt:year=2014  dt:month=06  dt:day=03  dt:timestamp=1401798272 
june 2014 by straup – the anxieties of big data #5ecac53df6348c5c6fbde8e01a0534cf
Of course, this was just one of many en masse data-collection programs exposed in Edward Snowden’s smuggled haul. But the Squeaky Dolphin PowerPoint deck reveals something more specific. It outlines an expansionist program to bring big data together with the more traditional approaches of the social and humanistic sciences: the worlds of small data. GCHQ calls it the Human Science Operations Cell, and it is all about supplementing data analysis with broader sociocultural tools from anthropology, sociology, political science, biology, history, psychology, and economics
motive  gchq  surveillance  highlights  from:dogeared  url:07ba2d0c38e75e319879c77b11e5f0af  dt:year=2014  dt:month=06  dt:day=03  dt:timestamp=1401798273 
june 2014 by straup
N.S.A. Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images -
"While once focused on written and oral communications, the N.S.A. now considers facial images, fingerprints and other identifiers just as important to its mission of tracking suspected terrorists and other intelligence targets, the documents show.


The N.S.A. can now compare spy satellite photographs with intercepted personal photographs taken outdoors to determine the location. One document shows what appear to be vacation photographs of several men standing near a small waterfront dock in 2011. It matches their surroundings to a spy satellite image of the same dock taken about the same time, located at what the document describes as a militant training facility in Pakistan."
nsa  surveillance  computervision  roboteyes  voicefromabove 
june 2014 by straup
‘We Kill People Based on Metadata’ by David Cole | NYRblog | The New York Review of Books #d0240ab5cc48a41027f141b132c943ec
It’s actually much easier as a technological matter to search huge amounts of metadata than to listen to millions of phone calls, and our metadata reveals a great deal about the pattern of our lives and our most intimate associations and interests. As NSA General Counsel Stewart Baker has said, “metadata absolutely tells you everything about somebody’s life. If you have enough metadata, you don’t really need content.” When I quoted Baker at a recent debate at Johns Hopkins University, my opponent, General Michael Hayden, former director of the NSA and the CIA, called Baker’s comment “absolutely correct,” and raised him one, asserting, “We kill people based on metadata.”
motive  surveillance  nsa  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=05  dt:day=12  url:7008867b8f5a013623ee388d581cbde3 
may 2014 by straup
Michael Geist - Canadian Telcos Asked to Disclose Subscriber Data Every 27 Seconds #216fd3f2917058a167cf19e5444c3c68
In most warrantless cases, the telecommunications companies were entitled to say no. The law says that telecom companies and Internet providers may disclose personal information without a warrant as part of a lawful investigation or they can withhold the information until law enforcement has obtained a warrant. According to newly released information, three telecom providers alone disclosed information from 785,000 customer accounts in 2011, suggesting that the actual totals were much higher. Moreover, virtually all providers sought compensation for complying with the requests.
law  surveillance  canada  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=05  dt:day=02  url:5b61f4c84459f291ef71914634ba2d0b 
may 2014 by straup
Meet Swarm: Foursquare's ambitious plan to split its app in two | The Verge
But how can Foursquare personalize its users' results if they are no longer collecting check-ins, the foundation of Foursquare’s recommendation engine? Crowley smiles and says something a bit shocking. He no longer needs check-ins, the meat and potatoes of Foursquare’s entire business and data collection engine for the last five years.

Not only has Foursquare collected 5 billion check-ins, he says, but it has collected five billion signals to help it map out over 60 million places around the world. Each place is a shape that looks like a hot zone of check-ins — of times when people have said "I’m here." Foursquare’s "Pilgrim" location-guessing engine factors in everything from your GPS signal, to cell tower triangulation, to the number of bars you have, to the Wi-Fi networks, in order to create these virtual shapes.

Now that it has this data, Foursquare can make a very accurate guess at where you are when you stop moving, even without a check-in, it's a technology it hopes will allow it to keep its database of places fresh and accurate. Foursquare calls these implicit check-ins "p-check-ins," or Neighborhood Status. Take your phone into four or five different Japanese restaurants over the course of six months and without a single check-in Foursquare will learn that you like Japanese food and start making recommendations for you based on that data.
foursquare  surveillance  whosonfirst 
may 2014 by straup
Eyes Over Compton: How Police Spied on a Whole City #e8e382cb175c27697b0de5dfbb32caec
Sgt. Douglas Iketani acknowledges that his agency hid the experiment to avoid public opposition. “This system was kind of kept confidential from everybody in the public,”he said. ”A lot of people do have a problem with the eye in the sky, the Big Brother, so to mitigate those kinds of complaints we basically kept it pretty hush hush.”
surveillance  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=04  dt:day=21  url:5788a2abc842fb6054c67085532e8cdf 
april 2014 by straup
State photo-ID databases become troves for police #50a87450a738f3df515d56a230782d4b
A detective in Carlisle, Pa., attempting to learn the real name of a suspect known on the street as “Buddha the Shoota” compared a Facebook page picturing the man with the mug-shot database and got a promising lead.

“Facebook is a great source for us,” said Detective Daniel Freedman, who can do facial searches from his department-issued smartphone. “He was surprised when we walked in and said, ‘How you doin’, Buddha?’  ”

He said the suspect responded, “How you know that?” — to which Freedman replied simply, “We’re the police.”

Safeguards and trends
surveillance  facebook  peopletagging  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=04  dt:day=16  url:b9442c4e3953426debe4920a2a2f99e4 
april 2014 by straup
State photo-ID databases become troves for police #f2228fffc363781021b8e15c18ea5b92
The most widely used systems were honed on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq as soldiers sought to identify insurgents. The increasingly widespread deployment of the technology in the United States has helped police find murderers, bank robbers and drug dealers, many of whom leave behind images on surveillance videos or social-media sites that can be compared against official photo databases.
surveillance  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=04  dt:day=16  url:b9442c4e3953426debe4920a2a2f99e4 
april 2014 by straup
NSA Said to Have Used Heartbleed Bug, Exposing Consumers - Bloomberg
While many Internet companies rely on the free code, its integrity depends on a small number of underfunded researchers who devote their energies to the projects.

In contrast, the NSA has more than 1,000 experts devoted to ferreting out such flaws using sophisticated analysis techniques, many of them classified. The agency found the Heartbeat glitch shortly after its introduction, according to one of the people familiar with the matter, and it became a basic part of the agency’s toolkit for stealing account passwords and other common tasks.
nsa  surveillance  heartbleed 
april 2014 by straup
Alien Squad
"alien squad", aka: surveillance photos of 1930s communist and nazi groups in nyc city
nyc  surveillance  archive 
april 2014 by straup
Surveillance Photos of NYC Communists and Nazis Go Online
look, history removed from the consequence of the present...
archive  motive  surveillance  photography 
april 2014 by straup
Schneier on Security: Ephemeral Apps #816e2f78c9da059ce1eb409857b2f825
The problem is that these new “ephemeral” conversations aren’t really ephemeral the way a face-to-face unrecorded conversation would be. They’re not ephemeral like a conversation during a walk in a deserted woods used to be before the invention of cell phones and GPS receivers.

At best, the data is recorded, used, saved and then deliberately deleted. At worst, the ephemeral nature is faked. While the apps make the posts, texts or messages unavailable to users quickly, they probably don’t erase them off their systems immediately. They certainly don’t erase them from their backup tapes, if they end up there.
surveillance  ephemera  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=04  dt:day=02  url:c871a09c7e80ec718a99d66a6b02456b 
april 2014 by straup
Schneier on Security: Metadata = Surveillance #8948dc8d2d0b163ec0349b1bd3b025dc
This is new. Police could always tail a suspect, but now they can tail everyone - suspect or not. And once they’re able to do that, they can perform analyses that weren’t otherwise possible. The Washington Post reported two examples. One, you can look for pairs of phones that move toward each other, turn off for an hour or so, and then turn themselves back on while moving away from each other. In other words, you can look for secret meetings. Two, you can locate specific phones of interest and then look for other phones that move geographically in synch with those phones. In other words, you can look for someone physically tailing someone else. I’m sure there are dozens of other clever analyses you can perform with a database like this. We need more researchers thinking about the possibilities. I can assure you that the world’s intelligence agencies are conducting this research.
surveillance  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=03  dt:day=30  url:4a244ef87e9c41dcec86a9f3f65ec9f6 
march 2014 by straup
Druckversion - Former NSA Director: 'Shame On Us' - SPIEGEL ONLINE - News - International #0a2ab76d87b7f5c0382c3476ec409026
SPIEGEL: You’ve been monitored yourself on a train to New York while you spoke confidentially on the phone. A blogger overheard you and tweeted your conversations.

Hayden: My only objection was that he misrepresented what I said. If you’re going to intercept somebody else’s communications, get it right.
nsa  surveillance  motive  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=03  dt:day=26  url:7bbfa861734d06d5ab6783db9d37e899 
march 2014 by straup
Detecting A Surveillance State - Part 2 Radio Frequency Exfiltration - SpiderLabs Anterior #bd95db35b7dd1c3756bbd2102f5d6631
An alternative method to detect these types of devices is purely theoretical at this time. If you had a device that could pick up the RF signals from the devices, you would be able to pick up any transmissions from these bugs. You may have seen this in spy movies from the 70’s and 80’s. The only problem is, the frequencies are not known and based on the information leaked the devices may only power on when data is being extracted.

This would be where recent advents in open source may help us. With software defined radio (SDR) gaining popularity, amateur RF listening devices and programs are available for as little as $20 to scan under 2GHz or more beefy ones like the hackRF are available for a few hundred dollars and can listen on frequencies up to 6GHz. This is a huge drop in price to what similar devices would have cost just 10 years ago. Now, why is this a big deal with detecting bugs? These devices can be programmed to listen to a large part of the RF spectrum and detect anomalies based on the software written for them. A suspicious operator could validate if there are RF transmitters in a device by monitoring the spectrum while the device is off (to get a baseline for ambient RF background noise) and then monitoring it again after the suspect device is turned on and transmitting data via radio frequency. The detection device would pick up the signal and alert the user.
surveillance  radio  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=03  dt:day=19  url:b7e77de2766ce912d45b69359319b0ed 
march 2014 by straup #8ff8e441769a06e2b3c977b464388121
As I said before and will now say again, the controlling factor, the root cause, of risk is dependence, particularly dependence on the expectation of stable system state. Yet the more technologic the society becomes, the greater the dynamic range of possible failures. When you live in a cave, starvation, predators, disease, and lightning are about the full range of failures that end life as you know it and you are well familiar with each of them. When you live in a technologic society where everybody and everything is optimized in some way akin to just-in-time delivery, the dynamic range of failures is incomprehensibly larger and largely incomprehensible. The wider the dynamic range of failure, the more prevention is the watchword. Cadres of people charged with defending masses of other people must focus on prevention, and prevention is all about proving negatives. Therefore, and inescapably so, there is only one conclusion: as technologic society grows more interconnected, it becomes more interdependent within itself. As society becomes more interdependent within itself, the more it must rely on prediction based on data collected in broad ways, not in targeted ways. That is surveillance. That is intelligence practiced not by intelligence agencies but by anyone or anything with a sensor network.
surveillance  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=03  dt:day=14  url:5b69908c995a04b9ad1586076f4af8f8 
march 2014 by straup #9a85c360dd5dbe9ddc10ccacd0315344
When you read the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to so-called e-discovery, you can certainly conclude that total retention of observed data is a prudent legal strategy. What is less clear is whether you have a duty to observe given that you have the capacity to do so.
surveillance  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=03  dt:day=14  url:5b69908c995a04b9ad1586076f4af8f8 
march 2014 by straup
MetaPhone: The Sensitivity of Telephone Metadata « Web Policy #c2c09361f3a985853e6b0ae84fe86c07
At the outset of this study, we shared the same hypothesis as our computer science colleagues—we thought phone metadata could be very sensitive. We did not anticipate finding much evidence one way or the other, however, since the MetaPhone participant population is small and participants only provide a few months of phone activity on average.

We were wrong. We found that phone metadata is unambiguously sensitive, even in a small population and over a short time window. We were able to infer medical conditions, firearm ownership, and more, using solely phone metadata.
surveillance  mobile  metadata  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=03  dt:day=14  url:724ef72c7b261a3c3a641ebb7bd2cd6e 
march 2014 by straup
How to Keep the NSA From Spying Through Your Webcam | Threat Level |
"Muting the mic won’t work, since it’s possible for an intruder to unmute it. Your best defense is probably to insert a dummy plug into the microphone jack to prevent sound from being picked up by the internal mic. You can create a dummy plug by simply cutting off the unneeded portion of an old microphone plug. This won’t prevent someone from listening to your conversations when you need the mic, such as when using Skype, but it will at least thwart them from using the microphone on their own without you knowing."
surveillance  audio  hack 
march 2014 by straup
How the NSA Plans to Infect 'Millions' of Computers with Malware - The Intercept #c2cb7b6f8b265db224ea32b62479f6c6
In one secret post on an internal message board, an operative from the NSA’s Signals Intelligence Directorate describes using malware attacks against systems administrators who work at foreign phone and Internet service providers. By hacking an administrator’s computer, the agency can gain covert access to communications that are processed by his company. “Sys admins are a means to an end,” the NSA operative writes.

The internal post – titled “I hunt sys admins” – makes clear that terrorists aren’t the only targets of such NSA attacks. Compromising a systems administrator, the operative notes, makes it easier to get to other targets of interest, including any “government official that happens to be using the network some admin takes care of.”
nsa  security  surveillance  sysadmin  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=03  dt:day=13  url:33439e0f701b9a309c90f28950ea2409 
march 2014 by straup
How the NSA Plans to Infect 'Millions' of Computers with Malware - The Intercept #f87c3b431e16a9efd01feb0304f7ee74
“The thing that raises a red flag for me is the reference to ‘network choke points,’” he says. “That’s the last place that we should be allowing intelligence agencies to compromise the infrastructure – because that is by definition a mass surveillance technique.”
nsa  surveillance  network  motive  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=03  dt:day=13  url:33439e0f701b9a309c90f28950ea2409 
march 2014 by straup
How the NSA Plans to Infect 'Millions' of Computers with Malware - The Intercept #741603d3e444c694dbdc95fbe5006cbc
“Hacking routers has been good business for us and our 5-eyes partners for some time,” notes one NSA analyst in a top-secret document dated December 2012. “But it is becoming more apparent that other nation states are honing their skillz [sic] and joining the scene.”
nsa  surveillance  hardware  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=03  dt:day=13  url:33439e0f701b9a309c90f28950ea2409 
march 2014 by straup
Dianne Feinstein Calls Out the C.I.A. for Spying on the Senate #1337567358d700a2d8bf3925dac5363d
The Panetta review was the C.I.A’s note to itself on what might be found in all those millions of documents. Apparently, it is damning, too. The six-thousand-page report didn’t rely on it; the report didn’t have to, because it had the documents themselves. The Panetta review became important only after the C.I.A. saw the draft of the committee’s report and fought back. The agency offered a classified rebuttal (again, the report is still classified); publicly, without being specific, it said that the Senate had gotten a lot wrong, that its facts were off, its judgments mistaken. Then, in December, Senator Mark Udall, in an open hearing, said that this was a funny thing for the C.I.A. to say, given that its internal review (the Panetta review) sounded a whole lot like the Senate report.
cia  surveillance  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=03  dt:day=12  url:5b05d650b8e3d9b482de883fb0f499d6 
march 2014 by straup
Rule 34, meet Kafka - Charlie's Diary
It does, however, suggest to me that the savvy Al Qaida conspirators[yes, I know this is a contradiction in terms] of the next decade will hold their covert meetings in the nude, on Yahoo! video chat, while furiously masturbating.
march 2014 by straup
Are the N.S.A. and G.C.H.Q. Trading Webcam Pictures? #9b1f05b6e42cc1cf492306f316d05128
“Undesirable” is a funny word to use to describe intimate exchanges one intrusively collects. One doesn’t have to have sympathy for webcam porn to find the G.C.H.Q.’s complaints about it annoyingly whiny. There is a worry, in the documents, that the spies might be offended by what they see, as if a naked public has uncharitably created a hostile work environment for intelligence analysts. (“Users who may feel uncomfortable about such material are advised not to open them.”) Is it clothes that appear to be thrown off too quickly, because of the every-fifth-frame jumpiness, or in a graceless manner, that made the images “undesirable”? People don’t forfeit privacy because they have undesirable political views, and certainly not if they happen to tilt their webcams in angles that are less than helpful for surveillance agencies’ facial-recognition software. If our governments find our bodies so awkward, they can just stop looking.
surveillance  webcam  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=03  dt:day=03  url:13d3376d2f576ac392424ade8fae2763 
march 2014 by straup
NSA robots are 'collecting' your data, too, and they're getting away with it #37dbcb36dfbac2aab1b748faed4e5861
The primary difference between a computer and a dog is that the computer interacts with other people in the real world, and the dog does not. If someone could isolate the computer in the same way a dog is isolated, we wouldn’t have any reason to worry about algorithms crawling around in our data. But we can’t. Computer algorithms are intimately tied to people. And when we think of computer algorithms surveilling us or analyzing our personal data, we need to think about the people behind those algorithms. Whether or not anyone actually looks at our data, the very fact that they even could is what makes it surveillance.
dogs  surveillance  motive  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=02  dt:day=28  url:cfaca51eed79bc1c92dd7187d67f8f5e 
february 2014 by straup
NSA robots are 'collecting' your data, too, and they're getting away with it #8f8f7b948cb765a66b30fdd6c978f91e
To wit: when you’re watched by a dog, you know that what you’re doing will go no further than the dog. The dog can’t remember the details of what you’ve done. The dog can’t tell anyone else. When you’re watched by a computer, that’s not true. You might be told that the computer isn’t saving a copy of the video, but you have no assurance that that’s true. You might be told that the computer won’t alert a person if it perceives something of interest, but you can’t know if that’s true. You do know that the computer is making decisions based on what it receives, and you have no way of confirming that no human being will access that decision.

When a computer stores your data, there’s always a risk of exposure. There’s the risk of accidental exposure, when some hacker or criminal breaks in and steals the data. There’s the risk of purposeful exposure, when the organization that has your data uses it in some manner. And there’s the risk that another organization will demand access to the data. The FBI can serve a National Security Letter on Google, demanding details on your email and browsing habits. There isn’t a court order in the world that can get that information out of your dog.
dogs  surveillance  motive  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=02  dt:day=28  url:cfaca51eed79bc1c92dd7187d67f8f5e 
february 2014 by straup
Cloudwash – Creating the Technical Prototype | Robots and Clouds #22264ebb304b428100857af75635f8e1
To use a machine that used a main board with a connection for external communications (either for a separate controls/display board or for remote diagnostics). If we could work out the communication protocol being used, we could then control the machine through this protocol with a microcontroller.
berg  cloudwash  surveillance  motive  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=02  dt:day=27  url:b7273d88f9ada28703af83e710bbaed3 
february 2014 by straup
Schneier on Security: PICASSO: NSA Exploit of the Day
"(S//SI//REL) Modified GSM (target) handset that collects user data, location information and room audio. Command and data exfil is done from a laptop and regular phone via SMS (Short Messaging Service), without alerting the target."

picasso... I suppose there's a certain humour in that
nsa  surveillance  mobile  artisyourfriend 
february 2014 by straup
What tear gas taught me about Twitter and the NSA #88bde695186046cb08b19f080fcc0e9c
Journalists, politicians, and pretty much all prominent people believe that the government goes further, and taps their phones as well. (Cartoonists often draw the state as a giant ear.) In fact, many protesters speculated that the government had not only allowed the Internet to stay up, but encouraged it. Those repeater vans may have been vacuuming up the ID numbers of the protesters. Somewhere in the government’s digital archives, there is likely a list of every Turkish citizen who visited the park during the protests.
surveillance  turkey  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=02  dt:day=14  url:322aec43cd2210f88914a798eee0190f 
february 2014 by straup
CIA confirms agency obliged to follow federal surveillance law | World news |
Last Wednesday, in a brief exchange at the hearing, Senator Ron Wyden, an Oregon Democrat, asked CIA director John Brennan if the agency is subject to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, a three-decade-old law intended to protect computer systems, like those of financial and government networks, from unauthorized access.

Brennan demurred, citing the need to check on the legal complexities posed by Wyden’s question, and pledged to give the senator an answer within a week.

The answer, agency spokesman Dean Boyd told the Guardian, is: “Yes, the statute applies to CIA.”
cia  cffa  law  surveillance  motive 
february 2014 by straup
NSA: THE DECISION PROBLEM | #c71adae164658cc9c8d192fd9013fe9e
Data mining, on the scale now practiced by Google and the NSA, is the realization of what Alan Turing was getting at, in 1939, when he wondered "how far it is possible to eliminate intuition, and leave only ingenuity," in postulating what he termed an "Oracle Machine." He had already convinced himself of the possibility of what we now call artificial intelligence (in his more precise terms, mechanical intelligence) and was curious as to whether intuition could be similarly reduced to a mechanical procedure—although it might (indeed should) involve non-deterministic steps. He assumed, for sake of argument, that "we do not mind how much ingenuity is required, and therefore assume it to be available in unlimited supply."
turing  nsa  motive  surveillance  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=01  dt:day=31  url:61296affbbbcff298586a8cc2b2ac952 
january 2014 by straup
NSA: THE DECISION PROBLEM | #e3f1e27018fe099dbb28ce3c9595afdf
The United States has established a coordinated system that links suspect individuals (only foreigners, of course, but that definition becomes fuzzy at times) to dangerous ideas, and, if the links and suspicions are strong enough, our drone fleet, deployed ever more widely, is authorized to execute a strike. This is only a primitive first step toward something else. Why kill possibly dangerous individuals (and the inevitable innocent bystanders) when it will soon become technically irresistible to exterminate the dangerous ideas themselves?
motive  surveillance  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=01  dt:day=31  url:61296affbbbcff298586a8cc2b2ac952 
january 2014 by straup
Lawfare › Catalog of the Snowden Revelations
This page catalogs various revelations by Edward Snowden, regarding the United States’ surveillance activities.

Each disclosure is assigned to one of the following categories: tools and methods, overseas USG locations from which operations are undertaken, foreign officials and systems that NSA has targeted, encryption that NSA has broken, ISPs or platforms that NSA has penetrated or attempted to penetrate, and identities of cooperating companies and governments.
nsa  surveillance 
january 2014 by straup
New documents: NSA provided 2-3 daily “tips” to FBI for at least 3 years #d0a0045c1dfbd01adfd5f3f0ac5e4b8b
Thus, since the earliest days of the FISC-authorized collection of call-detail records by the NSA, the NSA has, on a daily basis, accessed the BR metadata for purposes of comparing thousands of non-RAS approved telephone identifiers on its alert list against the BR metadata in order to identify any matches. Such access was prohibited by the governing minimization procedures under each of the relevant Court orders, as the government concedes in its submission.

The government’s submission suggests that its non-compliance with the Court’s orders resulted from a belief by some personnel within the NSA that some of the Court’s restrictions on access to the BR metadata applied only to “archived data,” i.e., data residing within certain databases at the NSA. That interpretation of the Court’s Orders strains credulity. It is difficult to imagine why the Court would intend the applicability of the RAS requirements—a critical component of the procedures proposed by the government and adopted by the Court—to turn on whether or not the data being access has been “archived” by the NSA in a particular database at the time of the access. Indeed, to the extent that the NSA makes the decision about where to store incoming BR metadata and when the archiving occurs, such an illogical interpretation of this Court’s Orders renders compliance with the RAS requirement merely optional.
nsa  surveillance  archive  motive  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=01  dt:day=23  url:5127247e0595688832f4bd22fad53b42 
january 2014 by straup
You don’t want your privacy: Disney and the meat space data race #43991a7836888cd341c7654f8f0bfab4
We don’t want the NSA tracking us, because we get nothing in return. It tries to sell us on “terrorism prevention,” but most people don’t experience that benefit in a visceral way. But this is not to say Americans won’t give up privacy for anything.

On the contrary, Americans are very, very cheap dates. For just a modicum of convenience, entertainment and comfort, I’m happy to give you a list of everyone I call and everywhere I go. That’s more than I’m sure the NSA has on me. And despite your privacy concerns, most of you are exactly the same way.
privacy  surveillance  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=01  dt:day=21  url:60ecf7ed9b55efe3d8d1f31f959f0565 
january 2014 by straup
Lawrence Wright: Could Unlimited Phone Surveillance Have Prevented 9/11? #3ee2c705a605acc1c6ac3d959729923f
Judge Pauley cites the 9/11 Commission Report for his statement that telephone metadata “might have permitted the N.S.A. to notify the [F.B.I.] of the fact that al-Mihdhar was calling the Yemeni safe house from inside the United States.” What the report actually says is that the C.I.A. and the N.S.A. already knew that Al Qaeda was in America, based on the N.S.A.’s monitoring of the Hada phone. If they had told the F.B.I., the agents would have established a link to the embassy-bombings case, which “would have made them very interested in learning more about Mihdhar.” Instead, “the agents who found the source were being kept from obtaining the fruits of their work.”

The N.S.A. failed to understand the significance of the calls between the U.S. and Yemen. The C.I.A. had access to the intelligence, and knew that Al Qaeda was in the U.S. almost two years before 9/11. An investigation by the C.I.A.’s inspector general found that up to sixty people in the agency knew that Al Qaeda operatives were in America. The inspector general said that those who refused to coöperate with the F.B.I. should be held accountable. Instead, they were promoted.
motive  surveillance  911  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=01  dt:day=15  url:68904feffc7c90c68400b77a78a35807 
january 2014 by straup
Transcript: Jacob Appelbaum at 30c3: To Protect And Infect, The Militarization of the Internet - naked capitalism #c3cbd1141fcd199eb0e39657beae2ac9
So – and I don’t just mean that in that Yahoo is vulnerable, they are, but I mean people that use Yahoo tend to – maybe it’s a bad generalization, but, you know, they’re not the most security-conscious people on the planet, they don’t keep their computers up to date, I’m guessing, and that’s probably why they love Yahoo so much. They also love, which is some other, I don’t know what that says, it’s like a sociological study of compromise.
surveillance  yahoo  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=01  dt:day=09  url:0a314ff44aea5ae6335f79c365fb0f55 
january 2014 by straup
Transcript: Jacob Appelbaum at 30c3: To Protect And Infect, The Militarization of the Internet - naked capitalism #eef2f82399f5cd771c83e32244340329
So if you have a wifi card in your computer, the SOMBERKNAVE program, which is another classified document here, they basically repurpose your wifi gear. They say, you’re not using that wifi card? We’re going to scan for wifi nearby. We’re going to exfiltrate data by finding an open wifi network and we’re going to jump on it. So they’re actually using other people’s wireless networks in addition to having this stuff in your computer. And this is one of the ways they beat a so-called airgapped target computer.
surveillance  wireless  network  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=01  dt:day=09  url:0a314ff44aea5ae6335f79c365fb0f55 
january 2014 by straup
Transcript: Jacob Appelbaum at 30c3: To Protect And Infect, The Militarization of the Internet - naked capitalism #e62d2b71cc9fdf419db5a7fdef13bfd4
We also redacted the names of victims of NSA surveillance, because we think that there’s a balance. Unfortunately there is a serious problem which is that the U.S. government asserts that you don’t have standing to prove that you’ve been surveilled unless we release that kind of information, but we don’t want to release that kind of information in case it could be a legitimate target, and we – I’m really uncomfortable with that term, but let’s say that there is a legitimate target, the most legitimate target, and we didn’t want to make that decision. But we did also want to make sure that we didn’t harm someone, but we also wanted to show concrete examples. So if you look at the Spiegel stuff on line, we redacted the names even of those who were victimized by the NSA’s oppressive tactics, which I think actually goes further than is necessary, but I believe that it strikes the right balance to ensure continued publication and also to make sure that people are not harmed and that legitimate good things, however rare they may be, they are also not harmed. So if you’ve been targeted by the NSA and you would have found out today if we had taken a different decision, I’m really sorry, but this is the thing I think that keeps us alive, so this is the choice that I think is the right choice, and I think it’s also the safest choice for everyone.
nsa  surveillance  motive  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=01  dt:day=08  url:0a314ff44aea5ae6335f79c365fb0f55 
january 2014 by straup
How the NSA Threatens National Security #3cacd18f6f42b877d113f5582022251d
Ubiquitous surveillance should have died with the fall of Communism, but it got a new—and even more dangerous—life with the intelligence community’s post-9/11 “never again” terrorism mission. This quixotic goal of preventing something from happening forces us to try to know everything that does happen. This pushes the NSA to eavesdrop on online gaming worlds and on every cell phone in the world. But it’s a fool’s errand; there are simply too many ways to communicate.
surveillance  schneier  nsa  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=01  dt:day=07  url:8434dbec0cecd680237543d130575b2c 
january 2014 by straup
Welcome Jordan & Logstash - #42370cde2ede21a2dbe4d6828427b9ec
One of my favourite examples is that of a Fortune 100 company that stored all of their documents and their access logs recording views and modifications in Elasticsearch. They wanted to ask questions about how people were using the confidential documents. They used “more like this” queries to find places where people had copied and pasted information across documents, which was against policy, and then used the access logs to find who had accessed those documents. This was only possible by correlating the documents and access logs, putting them into the same context.
elasticsearch  surveillance  roboteyes  highlights  from:instapaper  dt:year=2014  dt:month=01  dt:day=05  url:7c0c68b1e16f4509cbfa0fbf64fa3e65 
january 2014 by straup
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