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The Easiest Way to Memorize the Algorithms of Rubik's Cube: 7 Steps
Learn to solve the Rubik’s cube in no time by taking advantage of your visual memory. You’ve probably been playing with Rubik’s cube and wondering how to solve it. Eventually, you may have succeeded by following an online tutorial. While there are several methods to solve the 3x3 cube, these techniques usually consist of a number of algorithms that look something like this: T R Ti Ri Ti Fi T F.

Some people can memorize such sequences without difficulty. But what about the rest of us who are better at remembering peoples faces rather than their names? The good news is that the algorithms can be converted into easy to memorize graphics so that you don’t need to spend days learning the sequences by heart!
diy  puzzles  visuo  spatial  explanation  howto  math.GR  rec-math  wordlessness
july 2017 by nhaliday
In the first place | West Hunter
We hear a lot about innovative educational approaches, and since these silly people have been at this for a long time now, we hear just as often about the innovative approaches that some idiot started up a few years ago and are now crashing in flames.  We’re in steady-state.

I’m wondering if it isn’t time to try something archaic.  In particular, mnemonic techniques, such as the method of loci.  As far as I know, nobody has actually tried integrating the more sophisticated mnemonic techniques into a curriculum.  Sure, we all know useful acronyms, like the one for resistor color codes, but I’ve not heard of anyone teaching kids how to build a memory palace.

https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2013/12/28/in-the-first-place/#comment-20106
I have never used formal mnemonic techniques, but life has recently tested me on how well I remember material from my college days. Turns out that I can still do the sorts of math and physics problems that I could then, in subjects like classical mechanics, real analysis, combinatorics, complex variables, quantum mechanics, statistical mechanics, etc. I usually have to crack the book though. Some of that material I have used from time to time, or even fairly often (especially linear algebra), most not. I’m sure I’m slower than I was then, at least on the stuff I haven’t used.

https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2013/12/28/in-the-first-place/#comment-20109
Long-term memory capacity must be finite, but I know of no evidence that anyone has ever run out of it. As for the idea that you don’t really need a lot of facts in your head to come up with new ideas: pretty much the opposite of the truth, in a lot of fields.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Method_of_loci

Mental Imagery > Ancient Imagery Mnemonics: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-imagery/ancient-imagery-mnemonics.html
In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, very elaborate versions of the method evolved, using specially learned imaginary spaces (Memory Theaters or Palaces), and complex systems of predetermined symbolic images, often imbued with occult or spiritual significances. However, modern experimental research has shown that even a simple and easily learned form of the method of loci can be highly effective (Ross & Lawrence, 1968; Maguire et al., 2003), as are several other imagery based mnemonic techniques (see section 4.2 of the main entry).

The advantages of organizing knowledge in terms of country and place: http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2018/02/advantages-organizing-knowledge-terms-country-place.html

https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-best-books-on-Memory-Palace

fascinating aside:
US vs Nazi army, Vietnam, the draft: https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2013/12/28/in-the-first-place/#comment-20136
You think I know more about this than a retired major general and former head of the War College? I do, of course, but that fact itself should worry you.

He’s not all wrong, but a lot of what he says is wrong. For example, the Germany Army was a conscript army, so conscription itself can’t explain why the Krauts were about 25% more effective than the average American unit. Nor is it true that the draft in WWII was corrupt.

The US had a different mix of armed forces – more air forces and a much larger Navy than Germany. Those services have higher technical requirements and sucked up a lot of the smarter guys. That was just a product of the strategic situation.

The Germans had better officers, partly because of better training and doctrine, partly the fruit of a different attitude towards the army. The US, much of the time, thought of the Army as a career for losers, but Germans did not.

The Germans had an enormous amount of relevant combat experience, much more than anyone in the US. Spend a year or two on the Eastern Front and you learn.

And the Germans had better infantry weapons.

The US tooth-to-tail ratio was , I think, worse than that of the Germans: some of that was a natural consequence of being an expeditionary force, but some was just a mistake. You want supply sergeants to be literate, but it is probably true that we put too many of the smarter guys into non-combat positions. That changed some when we ran into manpower shortages in late 1944 and combed out the support positions.

This guy is back-projecting Vietnam problems into WWII – he’s mostly wrong.

more (more of a focus on US Marines than Army): https://www.quora.com/Were-US-Marines-tougher-than-elite-German-troops-in-WW2/answer/Joseph-Scott-13
west-hunter  scitariat  speculation  ideas  proposal  education  learning  retention  neurons  the-classics  nitty-gritty  visuo  spatial  psych-architecture  multi  poast  history  mostly-modern  world-war  war  military  strategy  usa  europe  germanic  cold-war  visual-understanding  cartoons  narrative  wordlessness  comparison  asia  developing-world  knowledge  metabuch  econotariat  marginal-rev  discussion  world  thinking  government  local-global  humility  wire-guided  policy  iron-age  mediterranean  wiki  reference  checklists  exocortex  early-modern  org:edu  philosophy  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  qra  q-n-a  books  recommendations  list  links  ability-competence  leadership  elite  higher-ed  math  physics  linear-algebra  cost-benefit  prioritizing  defense  martial  war-nerd  worrydream
may 2017 by nhaliday
Information Processing: Oppenheimer on Bohr (1964 UCLA)
I find it strange that psychometricians usually define "verbal ability" over a vocabulary set that excludes words from mathematics and other scientific areas. A person's verbal score is enhanced by knowing many (increasingly obscure) words for the same concept, as opposed to knowing words which describe new concepts beyond those which appear in ordinary language.
hsu  scitariat  thinking  metabuch  language  neurons  psychometrics  dimensionality  concept  list  critique  conceptual-vocab  quotes  giants  discussion  wordlessness  novelty  tricki
january 2017 by nhaliday
soft question - Thinking and Explaining - MathOverflow
- good question from Bill Thurston
- great answers by Terry Tao, fedja, Minhyong Kim, gowers, etc.

Terry Tao:
- symmetry as blurring/vibrating/wobbling, scale invariance
- anthropomorphization, adversarial perspective for estimates/inequalities/quantifiers, spending/economy

fedja walks through his though-process from another answer

Minhyong Kim: anthropology of mathematical philosophizing

Per Vognsen: normality as isotropy
comment: conjugate subgroup gHg^-1 ~ "H but somewhere else in G"

gowers: hidden things in basic mathematics/arithmetic
comment by Ryan Budney: x sin(x) via x -> (x, sin(x)), (x, y) -> xy
I kinda get what he's talking about but needed to use Mathematica to get the initial visualization down.
To remind myself later:
- xy can be easily visualized by juxtaposing the two parabolae x^2 and -x^2 diagonally
- x sin(x) can be visualized along that surface by moving your finger along the line (x, 0) but adding some oscillations in y direction according to sin(x)
q-n-a  soft-question  big-list  intuition  communication  teaching  math  thinking  writing  thurston  lens  overflow  synthesis  hi-order-bits  👳  insight  meta:math  clarity  nibble  giants  cartoons  gowers  mathtariat  better-explained  stories  the-trenches  problem-solving  homogeneity  symmetry  fedja  examples  philosophy  big-picture  vague  isotropy  reflection  spatial  ground-up  visual-understanding  polynomials  dimensionality  math.GR  worrydream  scholar  🎓  neurons  metabuch  yoga  retrofit  mental-math  metameta  wisdom  wordlessness  oscillation  operational  adversarial  quantifiers-sums  exposition  explanation  tricki  concrete  s:***  manifolds  invariance  dynamical  info-dynamics  cool  direction  elegance  heavyweights  analysis  guessing  grokkability-clarity  technical-writing
january 2017 by nhaliday
Overcoming Bias : Why Men Are Bad At “Feelings”
Mating in mammals has a basic asymmetry – females must invest more in each child than males. This can lead to an equilibrium where males focus on impressing and having sex with as many females as possible, while females do most of the child-rearing and choose impressive males.

Since human kids require extra child-rearing, human foragers developed pair-bonding, wherein for a few years a male gave substantial resource support to help raising a kid in trade for credible signs that the kid was his. Farmers strengthened such bonds into “marriage” — while both lived, the man gave resources sufficient to raise kids, and the woman only had sex with him. Such strong pair-bonds were held together not only by threats of social punishment, but also by strong feelings of attachment.

Such bonds can break, however. And because they are asymmetric, their betrayal is also asymmetric. Women betray bonds more by temporarily having fertile sex with other men, while men betray bonds more by directing resources more permanently to other women. So when farmer husbands and wives watch for signs of betrayal, they watch for different things. Husbands watch wives more for signs of a temporary inclination toward short-term mating with other men, while wives watch husbands more for signs of an inclination to shift toward a long-term resource-giving bond with other women. (Of course they both watch for both sorts of inclinations; the issue is emphasis.)

Emotionally, Men Are Far, Women Near: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2011/08/emotional-men-are-far-women-near.html
1. Each gender is more emotional about the topic area (short vs. long term mating) where its feelings are more complex, layered, and opaque.
2. Long term mating thoughts tend to be in far mode, while short term mating thoughts tend to be in near mode. (Love is far, sex is near.)

Given these assumptions we should expect emotional men to be more in far mode, and emotional women to be more in near mode. (At least if mating-related emotions are a big part of emotions overall.) And since far modes tend to have a more positive mood, we should expect men to have more positive emotions, and women more negative.

In fact, even though overall men and women are just as emotional, men report more positive and less negative emotions than women. Also, after listening to an emotional story, male hormones help one remember its far-mode-abstract gist, while female hormones help one remembrer its near-mode-concrete details. (Supporting study quotes below.)

I’ve been wondering for a while why we don’t see a general correlation between near vs. far and emotionality, and I guess this explains it – the correlation is there but it flips between genders. This also helps explain common patterns in when the genders see each other as overly or underly emotional. Women are more emotional about details (e.g., his smell, that song), while men are more emotional about generalities (e.g., patriotism, fairness). Now for those study quotes:

Love Is An Interpretation: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2013/10/love-is-an-interpretation.html
What does it mean to feel loved: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0265407517724600
Cultural consensus and individual differences in felt love

We examined different romantic and nonromantic scenarios that occur in daily life and asked people if they perceived those scenarios as loving signals and if they aligned with the cultural agreement... More specifically, we found that male participants show less knowledge of the consensus on felt love than female participants... Men are more likely to think about sexual commitment and the pleasure of intercourse when thinking about love, whereas women are more prone to thinking about love as emotional commitment and security... In terms of relationship status, we also found that people in relationships know more about the consensus on felt love than people who are single... Our results also demonstrated personality differences in people’s ability to know the consensus on felt love. Based on our findings, people who were higher in agreeableness and/ or higher in neuroticism showed more knowledge about the consensus on felt love... The finding that neuroticism is related to more knowledge of the consensus on felt love is surprising when considering the literature which typically links neuroticism to problematic relationship outcomes, such as divorce, low relationship satisfaction, marital instability, and shorter relationships... Results indicated that in this U.S. sample Black people showed less knowledge about the consensus on felt love than other racial and ethnic groups. This finding is expected because the majority of the U.S. sample recruited is of White racial/ethnic background and thus this majority (White) mostly influences the consensus on the indicators of love.

Lost For Words, On Purpose: https://www.overcomingbias.com/2014/07/lost-for-words-on-purpose.html
But consider the two cases of food and love/sex (which I’m lumping together here). It seems to me that while these topics are of comparable importance, we have a lot more ways to clearly express distinctions on foods than on love/sex. So when people want to express feelings on love/sex, they often retreat to awkward analogies and suggestive poetry.
hanson  thinking  gender  study  summary  near-far  gender-diff  emotion  ratty  sex  sexuality  signum  endocrine  correlation  phalanges  things  multi  psychology  social-psych  wordlessness  demographics  race  language  signaling  X-not-about-Y  dimensionality  degrees-of-freedom  consilience  homo-hetero  farmers-and-foragers  social-structure  number  duty  morality  symmetry  EEA  evopsych  hidden-motives  illusion  within-without  dennett  open-closed  hypocrisy  detail-architecture  time  apollonian-dionysian  long-short-run  cooperate-defect
october 2016 by nhaliday
Generalizing From One Example - Less Wrong
My old professor, David Berman, liked to talk about what he called the "typical mind fallacy", which he illustrated through the following example:

There was a debate, in the late 1800s, about whether "imagination" was simply a turn of phrase or a real phenomenon. That is, can people actually create images in their minds which they see vividly, or do they simply say "I saw it in my mind" as a metaphor for considering what it looked like?

Upon hearing this, my response was "How the stars was this actually a real debate? Of course we have mental imagery. Anyone who doesn't think we have mental imagery is either such a fanatical Behaviorist that she doubts the evidence of her own senses, or simply insane." Unfortunately, the professor was able to parade a long list of famous people who denied mental imagery, including some leading scientists of the era. And this was all before Behaviorism even existed.

The debate was resolved by Francis Galton, a fascinating man who among other achievements invented eugenics, the "wisdom of crowds", and standard deviation. Galton gave people some very detailed surveys, and found that some people did have mental imagery and others didn't. The ones who did had simply assumed everyone did, and the ones who didn't had simply assumed everyone didn't, to the point of coming up with absurd justifications for why they were lying or misunderstanding the question. There was a wide spectrum of imaging ability, from about five percent of people with perfect eidetic imagery to three percent of people completely unable to form mental images.

Dr. Berman dubbed this the Typical Mind Fallacy: the human tendency to believe that one's own mental structure can be generalized to apply to everyone else's.

--

my favorite comment:
Interesting illustration of mental imagery (from Dennett):

Picture a 3 by 3 grid. Then picture the words "gas", "oil", and "dry" spelled downwards in the columns left to right in that order. Looking at the picture in your mind, read the words across on the grid.

I can figure out what the words are of course, but it is very hard for me to read them off the grid. I should be able to if I could actually picture it. It was fascinating for me to think that this isn't true for everyone.
ratty  lesswrong  yvain  thinking  psychology  rationality  essay  dennett  cog-psych  operational  biases  pre-2013  gedanken  visuo  spatial  galton  neurons  giants  early-modern  big-peeps  quiz  stories  experiment  empirical  old-anglo  pre-ww2  wordlessness
october 2016 by nhaliday

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