nhaliday + white-paper + wealth   3

Global Evidence on Economic Preferences
- Benjamin Enke et al

This paper studies the global variation in economic preferences. For this purpose, we present the Global Preference Survey (GPS), an experimentally validated survey dataset of time preference, risk preference, positive and negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust from 80,000 individuals in 76 countries. The data reveal substantial heterogeneity in preferences across countries, but even larger within-country heterogeneity. Across individuals, preferences vary with age, gender, and cognitive ability, yet these relationships appear partly country specific. At the country level, the data reveal correlations between preferences and bio-geographic and cultural variables such as agricultural suitability, language structure, and religion. Variation in preferences is also correlated with economic outcomes and behaviors. Within countries and subnational regions, preferences are linked to individual savings decisions, labor market choices, and prosocial behaviors. Across countries, preferences vary with aggregate outcomes ranging from per capita income, to entrepreneurial activities, to the frequency of armed conflicts.

...

This paper explores these questions by making use of the core features of the GPS: (i) coverage of 76 countries that represent approximately 90 percent of the world population; (ii) representative population samples within each country for a total of 80,000 respondents, (iii) measures designed to capture time preference, risk preference, altruism, positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, and trust, based on an ex ante experimental validation procedure (Falk et al., 2016) as well as pre-tests in culturally heterogeneous countries, (iv) standardized elicitation and translation techniques through the pre-existing infrastructure of a global polling institute, Gallup. Upon publication, the data will be made publicly available online. The data on individual preferences are complemented by a comprehensive set of covariates provided by the Gallup World Poll 2012.

...

The GPS preference measures are based on twelve survey items, which were selected in an initial survey validation study (see Falk et al., 2016, for details). The validation procedure involved conducting multiple incentivized choice experiments for each preference, and testing the relative abilities of a wide range of different question wordings and formats to predict behavior in these choice experiments. The particular items used to construct the GPS preference measures were selected based on optimal performance out of menus of alternative items (for details see Falk et al., 2016). Experiments provide a valuable benchmark for selecting survey items, because they can approximate the ideal choice situations, specified in economic theory, in which individuals make choices in controlled decision contexts. Experimental measures are very costly, however, to implement in a globally representative sample, whereas survey measures are much less costly.⁴ Selecting survey measures that can stand in for incentivized revealed preference measures leverages the strengths of both approaches.

The Preference Survey Module: A Validated Instrument for Measuring Risk, Time, and Social Preferences: http://ftp.iza.org/dp9674.pdf

Table 1: Survey items of the GPS

Figure 1: World maps of patience, risk taking, and positive reciprocity.
Figure 2: World maps of negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust.

Figure 3: Gender coefficients by country. For each country, we regress the respective preference on gender, age and its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting gender coefficients as well as their significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the coefficients.

Figure 4: Cognitive ability coefficients by country. For each country, we regress the respective preference on gender, age and its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting coefficients on subjective math skills as well as their significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the coefficients.

Figure 5: Age profiles by OECD membership.

Table 6: Pairwise correlations between preferences and geographic and cultural variables

Figure 10: Distribution of preferences at individual level.
Figure 11: Distribution of preferences at country level.

interesting digression:
D Discussion of Measurement Error and Within- versus Between-Country Variation
study  dataset  data  database  let-me-see  economics  growth-econ  broad-econ  microfoundations  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  culture  psychology  behavioral-econ  values  🎩  pdf  piracy  world  spearhead  general-survey  poll  group-level  within-group  variance-components  🌞  correlation  demographics  age-generation  gender  iq  cooperate-defect  time-preference  temperance  labor  wealth  wealth-of-nations  entrepreneurialism  outcome-risk  altruism  trust  patience  developing-world  maps  visualization  n-factor  things  phalanges  personality  regression  gender-diff  pop-diff  geography  usa  canada  anglo  europe  the-great-west-whale  nordic  anglosphere  MENA  africa  china  asia  sinosphere  latin-america  self-report  hive-mind  GT-101  realness  long-short-run  endo-exo  signal-noise  communism  japan  korea  methodology  measurement  org:ngo  white-paper  endogenous-exogenous  within-without  hari-seldon 
october 2017 by nhaliday
The lopsided age distribution of partisan politics, visualized - The Washington Post
controlling for demographics: http://www.pleeps.org/2016/06/23/the-mystery-of-millennial-politics/
https://twitter.com/epkaufm/status/903376370759196672
White millennials in US relatively similar to older whites in both partisanship & conservatism, shows Deborah Schildkraut at #APSA2017
https://twitter.com/wccubbison/status/903699883332427777
https://archive.is/WHpvc
Incredibly important paper from #APSA2017 by @debbiejsr & Satia Marotta on racial views of white millennials
cf: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:8bdede501f24
https://twitter.com/SeanMcElwee/status/905104283036774400
People mistakenly believe that younger people have always been more liberal. In reality, the current age divide is larger than ever.

The future belongs to the Left: http://www.edwest.co.uk/spectator-blogs/the-future-belongs-to-the-left/
Labour is now the party of the middle class: http://www.edwest.co.uk/spectator-blogs/labour-is-now-the-party-of-the-middle-class/

The Zero-Sum Society: https://spottedtoad.wordpress.com/2017/06/12/the-zero-sum-society/
Record house prices are stopping couples having 160,000 children because they cannot afford bigger homes or are stuck in rental flats: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4699862/House-prices-stopping-couples-having-160-000-children.html
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56eddde762cd9413e151ac92/t/5968e14e86e6c08c90fda56c/1500045650060/Housing+and+fertility.pdf
Conservatism has no future unless it tackles housing: https://inews.co.uk/opinion/conservatism-no-future-unless-tackles-housing/
https://twitter.com/Birdyword/status/915676030110715904
https://archive.is/ezoDy
Wealth is unevenly distributed generally, but much less so in property than financial wealth - far bigger constituency for protecting it (Bristol Uni 2015)
This is why the 'house prices should fall' line is a dead end. Ex-pensions it's most of all the wealth majority of people have.

US at min wage: https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/06/rent-is-affordable-to-low-wage-workers-in-exactly-12-us-counties/529782/

How Britain voted at the 2017 general election: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2017/06/13/how-britain-voted-2017-general-election/
In electoral terms, age seems to be the new dividing line in British politics. The starkest way to show this is to note that, amongst first time voters (those aged 18 and 19), Labour was forty seven percentage points ahead. Amongst those aged over 70, the Conservatives had a lead of fifty percentage points.
https://twitter.com/Peston/status/902990464697208835
This has got to embarrass most sensible Tory MPs
(poll numbers for specific issues)
https://twitter.com/tomhfh/status/917376537867051009
https://archive.is/IHhSz
John Curtice giving us @DUConservatives a slightly painful talk 😬
...
John Curtice is explaining that Labour’s economic policies did almost nothing to galvanise the young. It was their social liberalism.
Older voters more likely to care about rent control or redistribution than young.
Tuition fees are a misdiagnosis.
It’s SOCIAL LIBERALISM.
“In many ways the cues and mood music are more important than the policy.”
“The prominence of social issues have never been as big a dimension as they played in 2017.
Neither had the disparity in age.”
news  org:rec  politics  polisci  wonkish  data  visualization  aging  trends  demographics  race  usa  latin-america  prediction  coalitions  age-generation  population  ideology  multi  albion  journos-pundits  org:data  analysis  confounding  religion  education  compensation  endo-exo  counter-revolution  time-series  twitter  social  commentary  sociology  eric-kaufmann  trump  scitariat  chart  org:anglo  poll  values  class  britain  elections  gender  policy  events  pic  2016-election  ratty  unaffiliated  economics  density  left-wing  housing  urban  zero-positive-sum  maps  money  cost-benefit  within-group  class-warfare  pdf  econotariat  org:ngo  white-paper  fertility  the-bones  org:lite  summary  org:mag  inequality  winner-take-all  🎩  hmm  marginal  expression-survival  zeitgeist  postmortem  phalanges  wealth  distribution  backup  discussion  impetus  roots  things  social-norms  realness  diversity  putnam-like  endogenous-exogenous  urban-rural  hari-seldon 
march 2017 by nhaliday
Democracy does not cause growth | Brookings Institution
64-page paper
Democracy & Growth: http://www.nber.org/papers/w4909
The favorable effects on growth include maintenance of the rule of law, free markets, small government consumption, and high human capital. Once these kinds of variables and the initial level of real per-capita GDP are held constant, the overall effect of democracy on growth is weakly negative. There is a suggestion of a nonlinear relationship in which democracy enhances growth at low levels of political freedom but depresses growth when a moderate level of freedom has already been attained.

The growth effect of democracy: Is it heterogenous and how can it be estimated∗: http://perseus.iies.su.se/~tpers/papers/cifar_paper_may16_07.pdf
In particular, we find an average negative effect on growth of leaving democracy on the order of −2 percentage points implying effects on income per capita as large as 45 percent over the 1960-2000 panel. Heterogenous characteristics of reforming and non-reforming countries appear to play an important role in driving these results.

Does democracy cause innovation? An empirical test of the popper hypothesis: http://www.sciencedirect.com.sci-hub.cc/science/article/pii/S0048733317300975
The results from the difference-in-differences method show that democracy itself has no direct positive effect on innovation measured with patent counts, patent citations and patent originality.

Benevolent Autocrats: https://williameasterly.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/benevolent-autocrats-easterly-draft.pdf
A large literature attributes this to the higher variance of growth rates under autocracy than under democracy. The literature offers alternative explanations for this stylized fact: (1) leaders don’t matter under democracy, but good and bad leaders under autocracy cause high and low growth, (2) leaders don’t matter under autocracy either, but good and bad autocratic systems cause greater extremes of high and low growth, or (3) democracy does better than autocracy at reducing variance from shocks from outside the political system. This paper details further the stylized facts to test these distinctions. Inconsistent with (1), the variance of growth within the terms of leaders swamps the variance across leaders, and more so under autocracy than under democracy. Country effects under autocracy are also overwhelmed by within-country variance, inconsistent with (2). Explanation (3) fits the stylized facts the best of the three alternatives.

Political Institutions, Size of Government and Redistribution: An empirical investigation: http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/pdf/WP/WP89.pdf
Results show that the stronger democratic institutions are, the lower is government size and the higher the redistributional capacity of the state. Political competition exercises the strongest and most robust effect on the two variables.

https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/899466295170801664
https://archive.is/sPFII
Fits the high-variance theory of autocracies:
More miracles, more disasters. And there's a lot of demand for miracles.

Measuring the ups and downs of governance: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/09/22/measuring-the-ups-and-downs-of-governance/
Figure 2: Voice and Accountability and Government Effectiveness, 2016
https://twitter.com/whyvert/status/917444456386666497
https://archive.is/EBQlD
Georgia, Japan, Rwanda, and Serbia ↑ Gov Effectiveness; Indonesia, Tunisia, Liberia, Serbia, and Nigeria ↑ Voice and Accountability.

The logic of hereditary rule: theory and evidence: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69615/
Hereditary leadership has been an important feature of the political landscape throughout history. This paper argues that hereditary leadership is like a relational contract which improves policy incentives. We assemble a unique dataset on leaders between 1874 and 2004 in which we classify them as hereditary leaders based on their family history. The core empirical finding is that economic growth is higher in polities with hereditary leaders but only if executive constraints are weak. Moreover, this holds across of a range of specifications. The finding is also mirrored in policy outcomes which affect growth. In addition, we find that hereditary leadership is more likely to come to an end when the growth performance under the incumbent leader is poor.

I noted this when the paper was a working paper, but non-hereditary polities with strong contraints have higher growth rates.
study  announcement  polisci  economics  macro  government  policy  contrarianism  hmm  econometrics  counterfactual  alt-inst  institutions  new-religion  thiel  political-econ  stylized-facts  🎩  group-level  longitudinal  c:**  2016  summary  realpolitik  wonkish  mostly-modern  democracy  org:ngo  ideology  definite-planning  social-choice  nascent-state  chart  madisonian  antidemos  cynicism-idealism  kumbaya-kult  whiggish-hegelian  multi  pdf  effect-size  authoritarianism  growth-econ  econ-metrics  wealth-of-nations  wealth  innovation  null-result  endo-exo  leviathan  civil-liberty  property-rights  capitalism  markets  human-capital  curvature  piracy  easterly  bias-variance  moments  outcome-risk  redistribution  welfare-state  white-paper  natural-experiment  correlation  history  cold-war  twitter  social  commentary  spearhead  econotariat  garett-jones  backup  gibbon  counter-revolution  data  visualization  plots  trends  marginal  scitariat  hive-mind  inequality  egalitarianism-hierarchy  world  developing-world  convexity-curvature  endogeno 
september 2016 by nhaliday

bundles : econmeta

related tags

2016-election  africa  age-generation  aging  albion  alt-inst  altruism  analysis  anglo  anglosphere  announcement  anthropology  antidemos  asia  authoritarianism  backup  behavioral-econ  bias-variance  britain  broad-econ  c:**  canada  capitalism  chart  china  civil-liberty  class  class-warfare  coalitions  cold-war  commentary  communism  compensation  confounding  contrarianism  control  convexity-curvature  cooperate-defect  correlation  cost-benefit  counter-revolution  counterfactual  cultural-dynamics  culture  curvature  cynicism-idealism  data  database  dataset  definite-planning  democracy  demographics  density  developing-world  discussion  distribution  diversity  easterly  econ-metrics  econometrics  economics  econotariat  education  effect-size  egalitarianism-hierarchy  elections  empirical  endo-exo  endogenous-exogenous  entrepreneurialism  eric-kaufmann  europe  events  evidence-based  expression-survival  fertility  garett-jones  gender  gender-diff  general-survey  geography  gibbon  gnon  government  group-level  growth-econ  GT-101  hari-seldon  history  hive-mind  hmm  housing  human-capital  ideology  impetus  inequality  innovation  institutions  intellectual-property  iq  japan  journos-pundits  korea  kumbaya-kult  labor  latin-america  left-wing  let-me-see  leviathan  long-short-run  longitudinal  macro  madisonian  maps  marginal  markets  measurement  MENA  methodology  microfoundations  moments  money  mostly-modern  multi  n-factor  nascent-state  natural-experiment  new-religion  news  nordic  null-result  org:anglo  org:data  org:lite  org:mag  org:ngo  org:rec  outcome-risk  patience  pdf  personality  phalanges  pic  piracy  plots  policy  polisci  political-econ  politics  poll  pop-diff  population  postmortem  prediction  property-rights  psychology  putnam-like  race  ratty  realness  realpolitik  redistribution  regression  religion  roots  scitariat  self-report  signal-noise  sinosphere  social  social-choice  social-norms  sociology  spearhead  study  stylized-facts  sulla  summary  temperance  the-bones  the-great-west-whale  thiel  things  time-preference  time-series  trends  trump  trust  twitter  unaffiliated  urban  urban-rural  usa  values  variance-components  visualization  wealth  wealth-of-nations  welfare-state  whiggish-hegelian  white-paper  winner-take-all  within-group  within-without  wonkish  world  zeitgeist  zero-positive-sum  🌞  🎩 

Copy this bookmark:



description:


tags: