nhaliday + white-paper + things   6

Global Evidence on Economic Preferences
- Benjamin Enke et al

This paper studies the global variation in economic preferences. For this purpose, we present the Global Preference Survey (GPS), an experimentally validated survey dataset of time preference, risk preference, positive and negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust from 80,000 individuals in 76 countries. The data reveal substantial heterogeneity in preferences across countries, but even larger within-country heterogeneity. Across individuals, preferences vary with age, gender, and cognitive ability, yet these relationships appear partly country specific. At the country level, the data reveal correlations between preferences and bio-geographic and cultural variables such as agricultural suitability, language structure, and religion. Variation in preferences is also correlated with economic outcomes and behaviors. Within countries and subnational regions, preferences are linked to individual savings decisions, labor market choices, and prosocial behaviors. Across countries, preferences vary with aggregate outcomes ranging from per capita income, to entrepreneurial activities, to the frequency of armed conflicts.

...

This paper explores these questions by making use of the core features of the GPS: (i) coverage of 76 countries that represent approximately 90 percent of the world population; (ii) representative population samples within each country for a total of 80,000 respondents, (iii) measures designed to capture time preference, risk preference, altruism, positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, and trust, based on an ex ante experimental validation procedure (Falk et al., 2016) as well as pre-tests in culturally heterogeneous countries, (iv) standardized elicitation and translation techniques through the pre-existing infrastructure of a global polling institute, Gallup. Upon publication, the data will be made publicly available online. The data on individual preferences are complemented by a comprehensive set of covariates provided by the Gallup World Poll 2012.

...

The GPS preference measures are based on twelve survey items, which were selected in an initial survey validation study (see Falk et al., 2016, for details). The validation procedure involved conducting multiple incentivized choice experiments for each preference, and testing the relative abilities of a wide range of different question wordings and formats to predict behavior in these choice experiments. The particular items used to construct the GPS preference measures were selected based on optimal performance out of menus of alternative items (for details see Falk et al., 2016). Experiments provide a valuable benchmark for selecting survey items, because they can approximate the ideal choice situations, specified in economic theory, in which individuals make choices in controlled decision contexts. Experimental measures are very costly, however, to implement in a globally representative sample, whereas survey measures are much less costly.⁴ Selecting survey measures that can stand in for incentivized revealed preference measures leverages the strengths of both approaches.

The Preference Survey Module: A Validated Instrument for Measuring Risk, Time, and Social Preferences: http://ftp.iza.org/dp9674.pdf

Table 1: Survey items of the GPS

Figure 1: World maps of patience, risk taking, and positive reciprocity.
Figure 2: World maps of negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust.

Figure 3: Gender coefficients by country. For each country, we regress the respective preference on gender, age and its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting gender coefficients as well as their significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the coefficients.

Figure 4: Cognitive ability coefficients by country. For each country, we regress the respective preference on gender, age and its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting coefficients on subjective math skills as well as their significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the coefficients.

Figure 5: Age profiles by OECD membership.

Table 6: Pairwise correlations between preferences and geographic and cultural variables

Figure 10: Distribution of preferences at individual level.
Figure 11: Distribution of preferences at country level.

interesting digression:
D Discussion of Measurement Error and Within- versus Between-Country Variation
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october 2017 by nhaliday
The Political Typology: Beyond Red vs. Blue | Pew Research Center
The new typology has eight groups: Three are strongly ideological, highly politically engaged and overwhelmingly partisan – two on the right and one on the left. Steadfast Conservatives are staunch critics of government and the social safety net and are very socially conservative. Business Conservatives share Steadfast Conservatives’ preference for limited government, but differ in their support for Wall Street and business, as well as immigration reform. And Business Conservatives are far more moderate on social issues than are Steadfast Conservatives.

At the other end of the spectrum, Solid Liberals express liberal attitudes across almost every realm – government, the economy and business and foreign policy, as well as on race, homosexuality and abortion – and are reliable and loyal Democratic voters.

Taken together, these three groups form the electoral base of the Democratic and Republican Parties, and their influence on American politics is strong. While Solid Liberals, Steadfast Conservatives and Business Conservatives collectively make up only 36% of the American public, they represent 43% of registered voters and fully 57% of the more politically engaged segment of the American public: those who regularly vote and routinely follow government and public affairs.

The other typology groups are less partisan, less predictable and have little in common with each other or the groups at either end of the political spectrum. The one thing they do share is that they are less engaged politically than the groups on the right or left.

Young Outsiders lean Republican but do not have a strong allegiance to the Republican Party; in fact they tend to dislike both political parties. On many issues, from their support for environmental regulation to their liberal views on social issues, they diverge from traditional GOP orthodoxy. Yet in their support for limited government, Young Outsiders are firmly in the Republicans’ camp.

Hard-Pressed Skeptics have been battered by the struggling economy, and their difficult financial circumstances have left them resentful of both government and business. Despite their criticism of government performance, they back more generous government support for the poor and needy. Most Hard-Pressed Skeptics say they voted for Obama in 2012, though fewer than half approve of his job performance today.

The Next Generation Left are young, relatively affluent and very liberal on social issues like same-sex marriage and abortion. But they have reservations about the cost of social programs. And while most of the Next Generation Left support affirmative action, they decisively reject the idea that racial discrimination is the main reason why many blacks are unable to get ahead.

The Faith and Family Left lean Democratic, based on their confidence in government and support for federal programs to address the nation’s problems. But this very religious, racially and ethnically diverse group is uncomfortable with the pace of societal change, including the acceptance of homosexuality and non-traditional family structures.

And finally, an eighth group, the Bystanders, representing 10% of the public, are on the sidelines of the political process. They are not registered to vote and pay very little attention to politics.

...

The Faith and Family Left is by far the most racially and ethnically diverse group in the typology: In fact, just 41% are white non-Hispanic; 30% are black, 19% are Hispanic and 8% are other or mixed race. The Faith and Family Left also is less affluent and less educated than the other Democratically-oriented groups, and is older as well.

They also have strong religious convictions, which distinguishes them from Solid Liberals and the Next Generation Left. Fully 91% say “it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values.” No more than about one-in-ten in the other Democratically-oriented groups agree. And the Faith and Family Left have much more conservative positions on social issues. Just 37% favor same-sex marriage, less than half the share of the other two groups on the left.

The Faith and Family Left support activist government and a strong social safety net, though by less overwhelming margins than Solid Liberals. And while the Faith and Family Left support affirmative action programs, just 31% believe that “racial discrimination is the main reason many black people can’t get ahead these days.” Among the much less racially diverse Solid Liberals, 80% think racial discrimination is the main barrier to black progress.

...

First, Steadfast Conservatives take very conservative views on key social issues like homosexuality and immigration, while Business Conservatives are less conservative – if not actually progressive – on these issues. Nearly three-quarters of Steadfast Conservatives (74%) believe that homosexuality should be discouraged by society. Among Business Conservatives, just 31% think homosexuality should be discouraged; 58% believe it should be accepted.

Business Conservatives have generally positive attitudes toward immigrants and 72% favor a “path to citizenship” for those in the U.S. illegally, if they meet certain conditions. Steadfast Conservatives are more critical of immigrants; 50% support a path to citizenship, the lowest share of any typology group.

Second, just as Steadfast Conservatives are opposed to big government, they also are skeptical of big business. They believe that large corporations have too much power, and nearly half (48%) say the economic system unfairly favors powerful interests. By contrast, as their name suggests, Business Conservatives are far more positive about the free market, and overwhelmingly regard business – and Wall Street – positively.

group profiles (including demographics): http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/26/appendix-1-typology-group-profiles/

2017 redux:
Political Typology Reveals Deep Fissures on the Right and Left: http://www.people-press.org/2017/10/24/political-typology-reveals-deep-fissures-on-the-right-and-left/
Nearly a year after Donald Trump was elected president, the Republican coalition is deeply divided on such major issues as immigration, America’s role in the world and the fundamental fairness of the U.S. economic system.

The Democratic coalition is largely united in staunch opposition to President Trump. Yet, while Trump’s election has triggered a wave of political activism within the party’s sizable liberal bloc, the liberals’ sky-high political energy is not nearly as evident among other segments in the Democratic base. And Democrats also are internally divided over U.S. global involvement, as well as some religious and social issues.

...

Divisions on the right

The political typology finds two distinctly different groups on the right – Core Conservatives and Country First Conservatives, who both overwhelmingly approve of Trump, but disagree on much else – including immigration and whether it benefits the U.S. to be active internationally.

Core Conservatives, who are in many ways the most traditional group of Republicans, have an outsized influence on the GOP coalition; while they make up just 13% of the public – and about a third (31%) of all Republicans and Republican-leaning independents – they constitute a much larger share (43%) of politically engaged Republicans.

This financially comfortable, male-dominated group overwhelmingly supports smaller government, lower corporate tax rates and believes in the fairness of the nation’s economic system. And a large majority of Core Conservatives (68%) express a positive view of U.S. involvement in the global economy “because it provides the U.S. with new markets and opportunities for growth.”

Country First Conservatives, a much smaller segment of the GOP base, are older and less educated than other Republican-leaning typology groups. Unlike Core Conservatives, Country First Conservatives are unhappy with the nation’s course, highly critical of immigrants and deeply wary of U.S. global involvement.

Nearly two-thirds of Country First Conservatives (64%) – the highest share of any typology group, right or left – say that “if America is too open to people from all over the world, we risk losing our identity as a nation.”

A third Republican group, Market Skeptic Republicans, sharply diverges from the GOP’s traditional support for business and lower taxes. Only about a third of Market Skeptic Republicans (34%) say banks and other financial institutions have a positive effect on the way things are going in the country, lowest among Republican-leaning typology groups.

Alone among the groups in the GOP coalition, a majority of Market Skeptic Republicans support raising tax rates on corporations and large businesses. An overwhelming share (94%) say the economic system unfairly favors powerful interests, which places the view of Market Skeptic Republicans on this issue much closer to Solid Liberals (99% mostly unfair) than Core Conservatives (21%).

In contrast to Market Skeptic Republicans, New Era Enterprisers are fundamentally optimistic about the state of the nation and its future. They are more likely than any other typology group to say the next generation of Americans will have it better than people today. Younger and somewhat less overwhelmingly white than the other GOP-leaning groups, New Era Enterprisers are strongly pro-business and generally think that immigrants strengthen, rather than burden, the country.

Divisions on the left

...

While there have long been racial, ethnic and income differences within the Democratic coalition, these gaps are especially striking today. Reflecting the changing demographic composition of the Democratic base, for the first time there are two majority-minority Democratic-leaning typology groups, along with two more affluent, mostly white groups.

Solid Liberals are the largest group in the Democratic coalition, and they make up close to half (48%) of politically engaged Democrats and Democratic-leaning … [more]
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october 2017 by nhaliday
Political Conservatives’ Affinity for Obedience to Authority Is Loyal, Not BlindPersonality and Social Psychology Bulletin - Jeremy A. Frimer, Danielle Gaucher, Nicola K. Schaefer, 2014
Sharp Partisan Divisions in Views of National Institutions: http://www.people-press.org/2017/07/10/sharp-partisan-divisions-in-views-of-national-institutions/
Americans’ Attitudes About the News Media Deeply Divided Along Partisan Lines: http://www.journalism.org/2017/05/10/americans-attitudes-about-the-news-media-deeply-divided-along-partisan-lines/

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/925509885848059904
https://archive.is/Q2x1T
I'm going through this survey... it just keeps getting better famalam

from the Cato study here: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:75ca38a74b99

https://twitter.com/AngloRemnant/status/884984883512307712
https://archive.is/bEj6i
Near perfect symmetry between Rep/Dem positive opinion on Church/College, because, well..
Yes, it's amazing how well each of these hostile tribes recognize each other's religious institutions.
.. income & education are Inversely related to positive view of universities among right-leaning folks.
wew, means there's so much room to grow among the proles
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july 2017 by nhaliday
The lopsided age distribution of partisan politics, visualized - The Washington Post
controlling for demographics: http://www.pleeps.org/2016/06/23/the-mystery-of-millennial-politics/
https://twitter.com/epkaufm/status/903376370759196672
White millennials in US relatively similar to older whites in both partisanship & conservatism, shows Deborah Schildkraut at #APSA2017
https://twitter.com/wccubbison/status/903699883332427777
https://archive.is/WHpvc
Incredibly important paper from #APSA2017 by @debbiejsr & Satia Marotta on racial views of white millennials
cf: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:8bdede501f24
https://twitter.com/SeanMcElwee/status/905104283036774400
People mistakenly believe that younger people have always been more liberal. In reality, the current age divide is larger than ever.

The future belongs to the Left: http://www.edwest.co.uk/spectator-blogs/the-future-belongs-to-the-left/
Labour is now the party of the middle class: http://www.edwest.co.uk/spectator-blogs/labour-is-now-the-party-of-the-middle-class/

The Zero-Sum Society: https://spottedtoad.wordpress.com/2017/06/12/the-zero-sum-society/
Record house prices are stopping couples having 160,000 children because they cannot afford bigger homes or are stuck in rental flats: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4699862/House-prices-stopping-couples-having-160-000-children.html
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56eddde762cd9413e151ac92/t/5968e14e86e6c08c90fda56c/1500045650060/Housing+and+fertility.pdf
Conservatism has no future unless it tackles housing: https://inews.co.uk/opinion/conservatism-no-future-unless-tackles-housing/
https://twitter.com/Birdyword/status/915676030110715904
https://archive.is/ezoDy
Wealth is unevenly distributed generally, but much less so in property than financial wealth - far bigger constituency for protecting it (Bristol Uni 2015)
This is why the 'house prices should fall' line is a dead end. Ex-pensions it's most of all the wealth majority of people have.

US at min wage: https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/06/rent-is-affordable-to-low-wage-workers-in-exactly-12-us-counties/529782/

How Britain voted at the 2017 general election: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2017/06/13/how-britain-voted-2017-general-election/
In electoral terms, age seems to be the new dividing line in British politics. The starkest way to show this is to note that, amongst first time voters (those aged 18 and 19), Labour was forty seven percentage points ahead. Amongst those aged over 70, the Conservatives had a lead of fifty percentage points.
https://twitter.com/Peston/status/902990464697208835
This has got to embarrass most sensible Tory MPs
(poll numbers for specific issues)
https://twitter.com/tomhfh/status/917376537867051009
https://archive.is/IHhSz
John Curtice giving us @DUConservatives a slightly painful talk 😬
...
John Curtice is explaining that Labour’s economic policies did almost nothing to galvanise the young. It was their social liberalism.
Older voters more likely to care about rent control or redistribution than young.
Tuition fees are a misdiagnosis.
It’s SOCIAL LIBERALISM.
“In many ways the cues and mood music are more important than the policy.”
“The prominence of social issues have never been as big a dimension as they played in 2017.
Neither had the disparity in age.”
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march 2017 by nhaliday
Political Polarization in the American Public | Pew Research Center
- next few decades are gonna be a slugfest
- also, looks like Ds shifted left, then Rs as well, Ds refused to meet in middle, then both shifted in opposite directions (Ds moreso)

Party Differences in Support for Government Spending, 1973-2014: https://sci-hub.tw/http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1532673X17719718

The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider: http://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-values-grows-even-wider/
Sharp shifts among Democrats on aid to needy, race, immigration

sharp uptick in 2010 maybe related to: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:5ddfca30723d

https://twitter.com/toad_spotted/status/915959944087826432
https://archive.is/zNZm2
The Great a-Woke-ening of the 2010s has been a powerful force for Democrats.

cf: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:8c26cb2a515b

Democrats' delusions of pragmatism: http://theweek.com/articles/729980/democrats-delusions-pragmatism
Democrats like to tell themselves a comforting story.

Democrats are pragmatists, if they do say so themselves, deeply rooted in the reality-based community, beholden to facts, toiling valiantly and soberly to make the country a better, fairer place. Republicans, meanwhile, are ideologues monomaniacally fixated on cutting government spending and taxes for the wealthy, regardless of the consequences, and moving inexorably further and further to the extreme right.

However, if a recent Pew poll is to be believed, this story is nothing but a self-justifying myth. Yes, many Republicans are ideological, and the party has indeed been moving to the right in recent years. But the truth is that Democrats have simultaneously been moving to the left — and doing so with greater unity and, on some issues, more rapidly than Republicans have been moving right.

...

What's new in Pew's poll are the changes in public opinion over time across a range of issues. Not only are Democrats and Republicans further apart than ever (or at least since tracking began, in 1994) on such issues as government regulation of business, benefits to the poor, the fairness of corporate profits, the role of racism in American society, immigration, and environmental regulations, but in most cases the growing gap is more a result of a shift in public opinion among Democrats than it is a product of changes among Republicans.

In some cases (on race and immigration) the biggest shift has come in the past few years, which points to a rebound effect in reaction to Donald Trump's campaign and his presidency. But on most of the issues, the gap has been widening for a much longer time, pointing to a broader trend toward the ideological left among Democrats.
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march 2017 by nhaliday
Divorce and children’s long-term outcomes | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal
It has been widely demonstrated that parental divorce is associated with negative outcomes for affected children. However, the degree of causality in this relationship is not as clear. This column tackles this problem by using the level of gender integration in fathers’ workplaces as an instrument for divorce. The results suggest a causal link between divorce and worse economic outcomes that persists into early adulthood.
http://ftp.iza.org/dp9928.pdf

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3904543/
The literature on father absence is frequently criticized for its use of cross-sectional data and methods that fail to take account of possible omitted variable bias and reverse causality. We review studies that have responded to this critique by employing a variety of innovative research designs to identify the causal effect of father absence, including studies using lagged dependent variable models, growth curve models, individual fixed effects models, sibling fixed effects models, natural experiments, and propensity score matching models. Our assessment is that studies using more rigorous designs continue to find negative effects of father absence on offspring well-being, although the magnitude of these effects is smaller than what is found using traditional cross-sectional designs. The evidence is strongest and most consistent for outcomes such as high school graduation, children’s social-emotional adjustment, and adult mental health.

Genetics, the Rearing Environment, and the Intergenerational Transmission of Divorce: A Swedish National Adoption Study: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0956797617734864
There was stronger resemblance to lived-with mothers, providing indirect evidence of rearing-environment influences on the intergenerational transmission of divorce. The heritability of divorce assessed across generations was 0.13. We attempted to replicate our findings using within-generation data from adoptive and biological siblings (ns = 8,523–53,097). Adoptees resembled their biological, not adoptive, siblings in their history of divorce. Thus, there was consistent evidence that genetic factors contributed to the intergenerational transmission of divorce but weaker evidence for a rearing-environment effect of divorce. Within-generation data from siblings supported these conclusions.

The Long-Term Effects of Legalizing Divorce on Children: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/obes.12200/abstract
We find that women who grew up under legal divorce have lower earnings and income and worse health as adults compared with women who grew up under illegal divorce. These negative effects are not found for men.

Father Absence and Reproductive Strategy: An Evolutionary Perspective: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=anthropologyfacpub
interesting fact: father-absent childhood raises verbal and lowers math/spatial aptitude

Relation of Type and Onset of Father Absence to Cognitive Development: http://sci-hub.tw/http://www.jstor.org/stable/1127548
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august 2016 by nhaliday

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