nhaliday + video   276

Harnessing Evolution - with Bret Weinstein | Virtual Futures Salon - YouTube
- ways to get out of Malthusian conditions: expansion to new frontiers, new technology, redistribution/theft
- some discussion of existential risk
- wants to change humanity's "purpose" to one that would be safe in the long run; important thing is it has to be ESS (maybe he wants a singleton?)
- not too impressed by transhumanism (wouldn't identify with a brain emulation)
video  interview  thiel  expert-experience  evolution  deep-materialism  new-religion  sapiens  cultural-dynamics  anthropology  evopsych  sociality  ecology  flexibility  biodet  behavioral-gen  self-interest  interests  moloch  arms  competition  coordination  cooperate-defect  frontier  expansionism  technology  efficiency  thinking  redistribution  open-closed  zero-positive-sum  peace-violence  war  dominant-minority  hypocrisy  dignity  sanctity-degradation  futurism  environment  climate-change  time-preference  long-short-run  population  scale  earth  hidden-motives  game-theory  GT-101  free-riding  innovation  leviathan  malthus  network-structure  risk  existence  civil-liberty  authoritarianism  tribalism  us-them  identity-politics  externalities  unintended-consequences  internet  social  media  pessimism  universalism-particularism  energy-resources  biophysical-econ  politics  coalitions  incentives  attention  epistemic  biases  blowhards  teaching  education  emotion  impetus  comedy  expression-survival  economics  farmers-and-foragers  ca 
april 2018 by nhaliday
Information Processing: US Needs a National AI Strategy: A Sputnik Moment?
FT podcasts on US-China competition and AI: http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2018/05/ft-podcasts-on-us-china-competition-and.html

A new recommended career path for effective altruists: China specialist: https://80000hours.org/articles/china-careers/
Our rough guess is that it would be useful for there to be at least ten people in the community with good knowledge in this area within the next few years.

By “good knowledge” we mean they’ve spent at least 3 years studying these topics and/or living in China.

We chose ten because that would be enough for several people to cover each of the major areas listed (e.g. 4 within AI, 2 within biorisk, 2 within foreign relations, 1 in another area).

AI Policy and Governance Internship: https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/ai-policy-governance-internship/

Deciphering China’s AI Dream
The context, components, capabilities, and consequences of
China’s strategy to lead the world in AI

Europe’s AI delusion: https://www.politico.eu/article/opinion-europes-ai-delusion/
Brussels is failing to grasp threats and opportunities of artificial intelligence.

When the computer program AlphaGo beat the Chinese professional Go player Ke Jie in a three-part match, it didn’t take long for Beijing to realize the implications.

If algorithms can already surpass the abilities of a master Go player, it can’t be long before they will be similarly supreme in the activity to which the classic board game has always been compared: war.

As I’ve written before, the great conflict of our time is about who can control the next wave of technological development: the widespread application of artificial intelligence in the economic and military spheres.


If China’s ambitions sound plausible, that’s because the country’s achievements in deep learning are so impressive already. After Microsoft announced that its speech recognition software surpassed human-level language recognition in October 2016, Andrew Ng, then head of research at Baidu, tweeted: “We had surpassed human-level Chinese recognition in 2015; happy to see Microsoft also get there for English less than a year later.”


One obvious advantage China enjoys is access to almost unlimited pools of data. The machine-learning technologies boosting the current wave of AI expansion are as good as the amount of data they can use. That could be the number of people driving cars, photos labeled on the internet or voice samples for translation apps. With 700 or 800 million Chinese internet users and fewer data protection rules, China is as rich in data as the Gulf States are in oil.

How can Europe and the United States compete? They will have to be commensurately better in developing algorithms and computer power. Sadly, Europe is falling behind in these areas as well.


Chinese commentators have embraced the idea of a coming singularity: the moment when AI surpasses human ability. At that point a number of interesting things happen. First, future AI development will be conducted by AI itself, creating exponential feedback loops. Second, humans will become useless for waging war. At that point, the human mind will be unable to keep pace with robotized warfare. With advanced image recognition, data analytics, prediction systems, military brain science and unmanned systems, devastating wars might be waged and won in a matter of minutes.


The argument in the new strategy is fully defensive. It first considers how AI raises new threats and then goes on to discuss the opportunities. The EU and Chinese strategies follow opposite logics. Already on its second page, the text frets about the legal and ethical problems raised by AI and discusses the “legitimate concerns” the technology generates.

The EU’s strategy is organized around three concerns: the need to boost Europe’s AI capacity, ethical issues and social challenges. Unfortunately, even the first dimension quickly turns out to be about “European values” and the need to place “the human” at the center of AI — forgetting that the first word in AI is not “human” but “artificial.”

US military: "LOL, China thinks it's going to be a major player in AI, but we've got all the top AI researchers. You guys will help us develop weapons, right?"

US AI researchers: "No."

US military: "But... maybe just a computer vision app."

US AI researchers: "NO."

AI-risk was a mistake.
hsu  scitariat  commentary  video  presentation  comparison  usa  china  asia  sinosphere  frontier  technology  science  ai  speedometer  innovation  google  barons  deepgoog  stories  white-paper  strategy  migration  iran  human-capital  corporation  creative  alien-character  military  human-ml  nationalism-globalism  security  investing  government  games  deterrence  defense  nuclear  arms  competition  risk  ai-control  musk  optimism  multi  news  org:mag  europe  EU  80000-hours  effective-altruism  proposal  article  realness  offense-defense  war  biotech  altruism  language  foreign-lang  philosophy  the-great-west-whale  enhancement  foreign-policy  geopolitics  anglo  jobs  career  planning  hmm  travel  charity  tech  intel  media  teaching  tutoring  russia  india  miri-cfar  pdf  automation  class  labor  polisci  society  trust  n-factor  corruption  leviathan  ethics  authoritarianism  individualism-collectivism  revolution  economics  inequality  civic  law  regulation  data  scale  pro-rata  capital  zero-positive-sum  cooperate-defect  distribution  time-series  tre 
february 2018 by nhaliday
Reid Hofmann and Peter Thiel and technology and politics - Marginal REVOLUTION
econotariat  marginal-rev  links  video  interview  thiel  barons  randy-ayndy  cryptocurrency  ai  communism  individualism-collectivism  civil-liberty  sv  tech  automation  speedometer  stagnation  technology  politics  current-events  trends  democracy  usa  malthus  zero-positive-sum  china  asia  stanford  news  org:local  polarization  economics  cycles  growth-econ  zeitgeist  housing  urban-rural  california  the-west  decentralized  privacy  anonymity  inequality  multi  winner-take-all  realpolitik  machiavelli  error  order-disorder  leviathan  dirty-hands  the-world-is-just-atoms  heavy-industry  embodied  engineering  reflection  trump  2016-election  pessimism  definite-planning  optimism  left-wing  right-wing  steel-man  managerial-state  orwellian  vampire-squid  contrarianism  age-generation  econ-productivity  compensation  time-series  feudal  gnosis-logos 
february 2018 by nhaliday
Gladiator Quotes - YouTube
LUCILLA: They care about the greatness of Rome.
COMMODUS: Greatness of Rome? But what is that?
LUCILLA: It's an idea, greatness. Greatness is a vision.
COMMODUS: Exactly. A vision. I will give the people a vision and they will love me for it. They will soon forget the tedious sermonizing of a few dry old men. I will give them the greatest vision of their lives.

GRACCHUS: I think he knows what Rome is. Rome is the mob. He will conjure magic for them and they will be distracted. He will take away their freedom, and still they will roar. The beating heart of Rome is not the marble floor of the Senate, it is the sand of the Colosseum. He will give them death, and they will love him for it.
video  film  history  iron-age  mediterranean  the-classics  conquest-empire  civilization  rot  democracy  antidemos  egalitarianism-hierarchy  sulla  tribalism  illusion  cynicism-idealism  quotes  entertainment  vulgar  leadership  civil-liberty  benevolence 
january 2018 by nhaliday
Information Processing: Remarks on the Decline of American Empire
1. US foreign policy over the last decades has been disastrous -- trillions of dollars and thousands of lives expended on Middle Eastern wars, culminating in utter defeat. This defeat is still not acknowledged among most of the media or what passes for intelligentsia in academia and policy circles, but defeat it is. Iran now exerts significant control over Iraq and a swath of land running from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean. None of the goals of our costly intervention have been achieved. We are exhausted morally, financially, and militarily, and still have not fully extricated ourselves from a useless morass. George W. Bush should go down in history as the worst US President of the modern era.

2. We are fortunate that the fracking revolution may lead to US independence from Middle Eastern energy. But policy elites have to fully recognize this possibility and pivot our strategy to reflect the decreased importance of the region. The fracking revolution is a consequence of basic research from decades ago (including investment from the Department of Energy) and the work of private sector innovators and risk-takers.

3. US budget deficits are a ticking time bomb, which cripple investment in basic infrastructure and also in research that creates strategically important new technologies like AI. US research spending has been roughly flat in inflation adjusted dollars over the last 20 years, declining as a fraction of GDP.

4. Divisive identity politics and demographic trends in the US will continue to undermine political cohesion and overall effectiveness of our institutions. ("Civilizational decline," as one leading theoretical physicist observed to me recently, remarking on our current inability to take on big science projects.)

5. The Chinese have almost entirely closed the technology gap with the West, and dominate important areas of manufacturing. It seems very likely that their economy will eventually become significantly larger than the US economy. This is the world that strategists have to prepare for. Wars involving religious fanatics in unimportant regions of the world should not distract us from a possible future conflict with a peer competitor that threatens to match or exceed our economic, technological, and even military capability.

However, I'm not sure that OBOR (One Belt One Road) and a focus on the "world island" of Eurasia will be a winning strategy for China. Mackinder's dream of a unified or even fully economically integrated world island will have to overcome the limitations (in human capital, institutions, culture, etc.) of the under-developed middle...

The belt-and-road express: China faces resistance to a cherished theme of its foreign policy: http://www.economist.com/news/china/21721678-silk-routes-are-not-always-appealing-they-sound-china-faces-resistance-cherished-theme

The staggering scale of China's Belt and Road initiative: https://www.axios.com/staggering-scale-china-infrastructure-142f3b1d-82b5-47b8-8ca9-57beb306f7df.html
hsu  scitariat  commentary  video  interview  usa  great-powers  thucydides  rot  MENA  war  iran  iraq-syria  energy-resources  biophysical-econ  the-world-is-just-atoms  geopolitics  foreign-policy  china  asia  expansionism  trade  science  infrastructure  nationalism-globalism  conquest-empire  gibbon  cohesion  identity-politics  demographics  realpolitik  heavy-industry  innovation  duty  honor  integrity  virtu  values  cycles  oscillation  time  age-generation  self-interest  agri-mindset  interests  civilization  multi  news  org:lite  data  analysis  summary  scale  transportation  money  monetary-fiscal  strategy  debt  investing  maps  geography  org:rec  org:anglo  org:biz  trends  current-events  sinosphere  world  europe  definite-planning 
november 2017 by nhaliday
New Theory Cracks Open the Black Box of Deep Learning | Quanta Magazine
A new idea called the “information bottleneck” is helping to explain the puzzling success of today’s artificial-intelligence algorithms — and might also explain how human brains learn.

sounds like he's just talking about autoencoders?
news  org:mag  org:sci  popsci  announcement  research  deep-learning  machine-learning  acm  information-theory  bits  neuro  model-class  big-surf  frontier  nibble  hmm  signal-noise  deepgoog  expert  ideas  wild-ideas  summary  talks  video  israel  roots  physics  interdisciplinary  ai  intelligence  shannon  giants  arrows  preimage  lifts-projections  composition-decomposition  characterization  markov  gradient-descent  papers  liner-notes  experiment  hi-order-bits  generalization  expert-experience  explanans  org:inst  speedometer 
september 2017 by nhaliday
Resonance in a Pendulum - YouTube
The vibration of any given washer is able to transmit its energy only to another washer with exactly the same frequency. Since the length of a pendulum determines its frequency of vibration, each pendulum can only set another pendulum vibrating if it has the same length.
nibble  video  social  physics  mechanics  waves  oscillation  synchrony  flux-stasis  increase-decrease  concrete  ground-up  dirty-hands  phys-energy  frequency  spreading 
september 2017 by nhaliday
PRRI: America’s Changing Religious Identity
America, that is, the United States of America, has long been a huge exception for the secularization model. Basically as a society develops and modernizes it becomes more secular. At least that’s the model.


Today everyone is talking about the Pew survey which shows the marginalization of the Anglo-Protestant America which I grew up in. This marginalization is due to secularization broadly, and non-Hispanic whites in particular. You don’t need Pew to tell you this.


Note: Robert Putnam’s American Grace is probably the best book which highlights the complex cultural forces which ushered in the second wave of secularization. The short answer is that the culture wars diminished Christianity in the eyes of liberals.

Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Political Backlash and Generational Succession, 1987-2012: https://www.sociologicalscience.com/articles-vol1-24-423/
the causal direction in the rise of the “Nones” likely runs from political identity as a liberal or conservative to religious identity

The Persistent and Exceptional Intensity of American Religion: A Response to Recent Research: https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/xd37b
But we show that rather than religion fading into irrelevance as the secularization thesis would suggest, intense religion—strong affiliation, very frequent practice, literalism, and evangelicalism—is persistent and, in fact, only moderate religion is on the decline in the United States.

As in the U.K., so now too in America: the left establishment is moving towards an open view that orthodox Christians are unfit for office.

i've had the thought that it's a plausible future where traditional notions of theism become implicitly non-white


Some writers and Christian observers deny the flight of young people altogether, but the growing statistics should alarm us enough as Church leaders to do something about the dilemma. My hope in this post is to simply consolidate some of the research (many of the summaries are directly quoted) so you can decide for yourself. I’m going to organize the recent findings in a way that illuminates the problem:

'Christianity as default is gone': the rise of a non-Christian Europe: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/21/christianity-non-christian-europe-young-people-survey-religion
In the UK, only 7% of young adults identify as Anglican, fewer than the 10% who categorise themselves as Catholic. Young Muslims, at 6%, are on the brink of overtaking those who consider themselves part of the country’s established church.

Other scholars have disputed the global decline of Christianity, and instead hypothesized of an evolution of Christianity which allows it to not only survive, but actively expand its influence in contemporary societies.

Philip Jenkins hypothesized a "Christian Revolution" in the Southern nations, such as Africa, Asia and Latin America, where instead of facing decline, Christianity is actively expanding. The relevance of Christian teachings in the global South will allow the Christian population in these areas to continually increase, and together with the shrinking of the Western Christian population, will form a "new Christendom" in which the majority of the world's Christian population can be found in the South.[9]
news  org:ngo  data  analysis  database  white-paper  usa  religion  christianity  theos  politics  polisci  coalitions  trends  zeitgeist  demographics  race  latin-america  within-group  northeast  the-south  the-west  asia  migration  gender  sex  sexuality  distribution  visualization  age-generation  diversity  maps  judaism  time-series  protestant-catholic  other-xtian  gender-diff  education  compensation  india  islam  multi  org:rec  pro-rata  gnxp  scitariat  huntington  prediction  track-record  error  big-peeps  statesmen  general-survey  poll  putnam-like  study  sociology  roots  impetus  history  mostly-modern  books  recommendations  summary  stylized-facts  values  twitter  social  discussion  journos-pundits  backup  tradition  gnon  unaffiliated  right-wing  identity-politics  eric-kaufmann  preprint  uniqueness  comparison  similarity  org:lite  video  links  list  survey  internet  life-history  fertility  social-capital  wiki  reference  org:anglo  world  developing-world  europe  EU  britain  rot 
september 2017 by nhaliday
Medicine as a pseudoscience | West Hunter
The idea that venesection was a good thing, or at least not so bad, on the grounds that one in a few hundred people have hemochromatosis (in Northern Europe) reminds me of the people who don’t wear a seatbelt, since it would keep them from being thrown out of their convertible into a waiting haystack, complete with nubile farmer’s daughter. Daughters. It could happen. But it’s not the way to bet.

Back in the good old days, Charles II, age 53, had a fit one Sunday evening, while fondling two of his mistresses.

Monday they bled him (cupping and scarifying) of eight ounces of blood. Followed by an antimony emetic, vitriol in peony water, purgative pills, and a clyster. Followed by another clyster after two hours. Then syrup of blackthorn, more antimony, and rock salt. Next, more laxatives, white hellebore root up the nostrils. Powdered cowslip flowers. More purgatives. Then Spanish Fly. They shaved his head and stuck blistering plasters all over it, plastered the soles of his feet with tar and pigeon-dung, then said good-night.


Friday. The king was worse. He tells them not to let poor Nelly starve. They try the Oriental Bezoar Stone, and more bleeding. Dies at noon.

Most people didn’t suffer this kind of problem with doctors, since they never saw one. Charles had six. Now Bach and Handel saw the same eye surgeon, John Taylor – who blinded both of them. Not everyone can put that on his resume!

You may wonder how medicine continued to exist, if it had a negative effect, on the whole. There’s always the placebo effect – at least there would be, if it existed. Any real placebo effect is very small: I’d guess exactly zero. But there is regression to the mean. You see the doctor when you’re feeling worse than average – and afterwards, if he doesn’t kill you outright, you’re likely to feel better. Which would have happened whether you’d seen him or not, but they didn’t often do RCTs back in the day – I think James Lind was the first (1747).

Back in the late 19th century, Christian Scientists did better than others when sick, because they didn’t believe in medicine. For reasons I think mistaken, because Mary Baker Eddy rejected the reality of the entire material world, but hey, it worked. Parenthetically, what triggered all that New Age nonsense in 19th century New England? Hash?

This did not change until fairly recently. Sometime in the early 20th medicine, clinical medicine, what doctors do, hit break-even. Now we can’t do without it. I wonder if there are, or will be, other examples of such a pile of crap turning (mostly) into a real science.

good tweet: https://twitter.com/bowmanthebard/status/897146294191390720
The brilliant GP I've had for 35+ years has retired. How can I find another one who meets my requirements?

1 is overweight
2 drinks more than officially recommended amounts
3 has an amused, tolerant atitude to human failings
4 is well aware that we're all going to die anyway, & there are better or worse ways to die
5 has a healthy skeptical attitude to mainstream medical science
6 is wholly dismissive of "a|ternative” medicine
7 believes in evolution
8 thinks most diseases get better without intervention, & knows the dangers of false positives
9 understands the base rate fallacy

EconPapers: Was Civil War Surgery Effective?: http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/htrhcecon/444.htm
contra Greg Cochran:
To shed light on the subject, I analyze a data set created by Dr. Edmund Andrews, a Civil war surgeon with the 1st Illinois Light Artillery. Dr. Andrews’s data can be rendered into an observational data set on surgical intervention and recovery, with controls for wound location and severity. The data also admits instruments for the surgical decision. My analysis suggests that Civil War surgery was effective, and increased the probability of survival of the typical wounded soldier, with average treatment effect of 0.25-0.28.

Medical Prehistory: https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2016/03/14/medical-prehistory/
What ancient medical treatments worked?

In some very, very limited conditions, bleeding?
Bad for you 99% of the time.

Colchicine – used to treat gout – discovered by the Ancient Greeks.

Dracunculiasis (Guinea worm)
Wrap the emerging end of the worm around a stick and slowly pull it out.
(3,500 years later, this remains the standard treatment.)

Some of the progress is from formal medicine, most is from civil engineering, better nutrition ( ag science and physical chemistry), less crowded housing.

Nurses vs doctors: https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2014/10/01/nurses-vs-doctors/
Medicine, the things that doctors do, was an ineffective pseudoscience until fairly recently. Until 1800 or so, they were wrong about almost everything. Bleeding, cupping, purging, the four humors – useless. In the 1800s, some began to realize that they were wrong, and became medical nihilists that improved outcomes by doing less. Some patients themselves came to this realization, as when Civil War casualties hid from the surgeons and had better outcomes. Sometime in the early 20th century, MDs reached break-even, and became an increasingly positive influence on human health. As Lewis Thomas said, medicine is the youngest science.

Nursing, on the other hand, has always been useful. Just making sure that a patient is warm and nourished when too sick to take care of himself has helped many survive. In fact, some of the truly crushing epidemics have been greatly exacerbated when there were too few healthy people to take care of the sick.

Nursing must be old, but it can’t have existed forever. Whenever it came into existence, it must have changed the selective forces acting on the human immune system. Before nursing, being sufficiently incapacitated would have been uniformly fatal – afterwards, immune responses that involved a period of incapacitation (with eventual recovery) could have been selectively favored.

when MDs broke even: https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2014/10/01/nurses-vs-doctors/#comment-58981
I’d guess the 1930s. Lewis Thomas thought that he was living through big changes. They had a working serum therapy for lobar pneumonia ( antibody-based). They had many new vaccines ( diphtheria in 1923, whopping cough in 1926, BCG and tetanus in 1927, yellow fever in 1935, typhus in 1937.) Vitamins had been mostly worked out. Insulin was discovered in 1929. Blood transfusions. The sulfa drugs, first broad-spectrum antibiotics, showed up in 1935.

DALYs per doctor: https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2018/01/22/dalys-per-doctor/
The disability-adjusted life year (DALY) is a measure of overall disease burden – the number of years lost. I’m wondering just much harm premodern medicine did, per doctor. How many healthy years of life did a typical doctor destroy (net) in past times?


It looks as if the average doctor (in Western medicine) killed a bunch of people over his career ( when contrasted with doing nothing). In the Charles Manson class.

Eventually the market saw through this illusion. Only took a couple of thousand years.

That a very large part of healthcare spending is done for non-health reasons. He has a chapter on this in his new book, also check out his paper “Showing That You Care: The Evolution of Health Altruism” http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/showcare.pdf
I ran into too much stupidity to finish the article. Hanson’s a loon. For example when he talks about the paradox of blacks being more sentenced on drug offenses than whites although they use drugs at similar rate. No paradox: guys go to the big house for dealing, not for using. Where does he live – Mars?

I had the same reaction when Hanson parroted some dipshit anthropologist arguing that the stupid things people do while drunk are due to social expectations, not really the alcohol.

I don’t think that being totally unable to understand everybody around you necessarily leads to deep insights.

What I’ve wondered is if there was anything that doctors did that actually was helpful and if perhaps that little bit of success helped them fool people into thinking the rest of it helped.
Setting bones. extracting arrows: spoon of Diocles. Colchicine for gout. Extracting the Guinea worm. Sometimes they got away with removing the stone. There must be others.
Quinine is relatively recent: post-1500. Obstetrical forceps also. Caesarean deliveries were almost always fatal to the mother until fairly recently.

Opium has been around for a long while : it works.

If pre-modern medicine was indeed worse than useless – how do you explain no one noticing that patients who get expensive treatments are worse off than those who didn’t?
were worse off. People are kinda dumb – you’ve noticed?
My impression is that while people may be “kinda dumb”, ancient customs typically aren’t.
Even if we assume that all people who lived prior to the 19th century were too dumb to make the rational observation, wouldn’t you expect this ancient practice to be subject to selective pressure?
Your impression is wrong. Do you think that there some slick reason for Carthaginians incinerating their first-born?

Theodoric of York, bloodletting: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yvff3TViXmY

details on blood-letting and hemochromatosis: https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2018/01/22/dalys-per-doctor/#comment-100746

Starting Over: https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2018/01/23/starting-over/
Looking back on it, human health would have … [more]
west-hunter  scitariat  discussion  ideas  medicine  meta:medicine  science  realness  cost-benefit  the-trenches  info-dynamics  europe  the-great-west-whale  history  iron-age  the-classics  mediterranean  medieval  early-modern  mostly-modern  🌞  harvard  aphorism  rant  healthcare  regression-to-mean  illusion  public-health  multi  usa  northeast  pre-ww2  checklists  twitter  social  albion  ability-competence  study  cliometrics  war  trivia  evidence-based  data  intervention  effect-size  revolution  speculation  sapiens  drugs  antiquity  lived-experience  list  survey  questions  housing  population  density  nutrition  wiki  embodied  immune  evolution  poast  chart  markets  civil-liberty  randy-ayndy  market-failure  impact  scale  pro-rata  estimate  street-fighting  fermi  marginal  truth  recruiting  alt-inst  academia  social-science  space  physics  interdisciplinary  ratty  lesswrong  autism  👽  subculture  hanson  people  track-record  crime  criminal-justice  criminology  race  ethanol  error  video  lol  comedy  tradition  institutions  iq  intelligence  MENA  impetus  legacy 
august 2017 by nhaliday
The Function of Reason | Edge.org

How Social Is Reason?: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2017/08/how-social-is-reason.html

Reading The Enigma of Reason. Pretty good so far. Not incredibly surprising to me so far. To be clear, their argument is somewhat orthogonal to the whole ‘rationality’ debate you may be familiar with from Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s work (e.g., see Heuristics and Biases).

One of the major problems in analysis is that rationality, reflection and ratiocination, are slow and error prone. To get a sense of that, just read ancient Greek science. Eratosthenes may have calculated to within 1% of the true circumference of the world, but Aristotle’s speculations on the nature of reproduction were rather off.

You may be as clever as Eratosthenes, but most people are not. But you probably accept that the world is round and 24,901 miles around. If you are not American you probably are vague on miles anyway. But you know what the social consensus is, and you accept it because it seems reasonable.

One of the points in cultural evolution work is that a lot of the time rather than relying on your own intuition and or reason, it is far more effective and cognitively cheaper to follow social norms of your ingroup. I only bring this up because unfortunately many pathologies of our political and intellectual world today are not really pathologies. That is, they’re not bugs, but features.

Finished The Enigma of Reason. The basic thesis that reasoning is a way to convince people after you’ve already come to a conclusion, that is, rationalization, was already one I shared. That makes sense since one of the coauthors, Dan Sperber, has been influential in the “naturalistic” school of anthropology. If you’ve read books like In Gods We Trust The Enigma of Reason goes fast. But it is important to note that the cognitive anthropology perspective is useful in things besides religion. I’m thinking in particular of politics.

My point here is that many of our beliefs are arrived at in an intuitive manner, and we find reasons to justify those beliefs. One of the core insights you’ll get from The Enigma of Reason is that rationalization isn’t that big of a misfire or abuse of our capacities. It’s probably just a natural outcome for what and how we use reason in our natural ecology.

Mercier and Sperber contrast their “interactionist” model of what reason is for with an “intellectualist: model. The intellecutalist model is rather straightforward. It is one where individual reasoning capacities exist so that one may make correct inferences about the world around us, often using methods that mimic those in abstract elucidated systems such as formal logic or Bayesian reasoning. When reasoning doesn’t work right, it’s because people aren’t using it for it’s right reasons. It can be entirely solitary because the tools don’t rely on social input or opinion.

The interactionist model holds that reasoning exists because it is a method of persuasion within social contexts. It is important here to note that the authors do not believe that reasoning is simply a tool for winning debates. That is, increasing your status in a social game. Rather, their overall thesis seems to be in alignment with the idea that cognition of reasoning properly understood is a social process. In this vein they offer evidence of how juries may be superior to judges, and the general examples you find in the “wisdom of the crowds” literature. Overall the authors make a strong case for the importance of diversity of good-faith viewpoints, because they believe that the truth on the whole tends to win out in dialogic formats (that is, if there is a truth; they are rather unclear and muddy about normative disagreements and how those can be resolved).

The major issues tend to crop up when reasoning is used outside of its proper context. One of the literature examples, which you are surely familiar with, in The Enigma of Reason is a psychological experiment where there are two conditions, and the researchers vary the conditions and note wide differences in behavior. In particular, the experiment where psychologists put subjects into a room where someone out of view is screaming for help. When they are alone, they quite often go to see what is wrong immediately. In contrast, when there is a confederate of the psychologists in the room who ignores the screaming, people also tend to ignore the screaming.

The researchers know the cause of the change in behavior. It’s the introduction of the confederate and that person’s behavior. But the subjects when interviewed give a wide range of plausible and possible answers. In other words, they are rationalizing their behavior when called to justify it in some way. This is entirely unexpected, we all know that people are very good at coming up with answers to explain their behavior (often in the best light possible). But that doesn’t mean they truly understanding their internal reasons, which seem to be more about intuition.

But much of The Enigma of Reason also recounts how bad people are at coming up with coherent and well thought out rationalizations. That is, their “reasons” tend to be ad hoc and weak. We’re not very good at formal logic or even simple syllogistic reasoning. The explanation for this seems to be two-fold.


At this point we need to address the elephant in the room: some humans seem extremely good at reasoning in a classical sense. I’m talking about individuals such as Blaise Pascal, Carl Friedrich Gauss, and John von Neumann. Early on in The Enigma of Reason the authors point out the power of reason by alluding to Eratosthenes’s calculation of the circumference of the earth, which was only off by one percent. Myself, I would have mentioned Archimedes, who I suspect was a genius on the same level as the ones mentioned above.

Mercier and Sperber state near the end of the book that math in particular is special and a powerful way to reason. We all know this. In math the axioms are clear, and agreed upon. And one can inspect the chain of propositions in a very transparent manner. Mathematics has guard-rails for any human who attempts to engage in reasoning. By reducing the ability of humans to enter into unforced errors math is the ideal avenue for solitary individual reasoning. But it is exceptional.

Second, though it is not discussed in The Enigma of Reason there does seem to be variation in general and domain specific intelligence within the human population. People who flourish in mathematics usually have high general intelligences, but they also often exhibit a tendency to be able to engage in high levels of visual-spatial conceptualization.

One the whole the more intelligent you are the better you are able to reason. But that does not mean that those with high intelligence are immune from the traps of motivated reasoning or faulty logic. Mercier and Sperber give many examples. There are two. Linus Pauling was indisputably brilliant, but by the end of his life he was consistently pushing Vitamin C quackery (in part through a very selective interpretation of the scientific literature).* They also point out that much of Isaac Newton’s prodigious intellectual output turns out to have been focused on alchemy and esoteric exegesis which is totally impenetrable. Newton undoubtedly had a first class mind, but if the domain it was applied to was garbage, then the output was also garbage.


Overall, the take-homes are:

Reasoning exists to persuade in a group context through dialogue, not individual ratiocination.
Reasoning can give rise to storytelling when prompted, even if the reasons have no relationship to the underlying causality.
Motivated reasoning emerges because we are not skeptical of the reasons we proffer, but highly skeptical of reasons which refute our own.
The “wisdom of the crowds” is not just a curious phenomenon, but one of the primary reasons that humans have become more socially complex and our brains have larger.
Ultimately, if you want to argue someone out of their beliefs…well, good luck with that. But you should read The Enigma of Reason to understand the best strategies (many of them are common sense, and I’ve come to them independently simply through 15 years of having to engage with people of diverse viewpoints).

* R. A. Fisher, who was one of the pioneers of both evolutionary genetics and statistics, famously did not believe there was a connection between smoking and cancer. He himself smoked a pipe regularly.

** From what we know about Blaise Pascal and Isaac Newton, their personalities were such that they’d probably be killed or expelled from a hunter-gatherer band.
books  summary  psychology  social-psych  cog-psych  anthropology  rationality  biases  epistemic  thinking  neurons  realness  truth  info-dynamics  language  speaking  persuasion  dark-arts  impro  roots  ideas  speculation  hypocrisy  intelligence  eden  philosophy  multi  review  critique  ratty  hanson  org:edge  video  interview  communication  insight  impetus  hidden-motives  X-not-about-Y  signaling  🤖  metameta  metabuch  dennett  meta:rhetoric  gnxp  scitariat  open-things  giants  fisher  old-anglo  history  iron-age  mediterranean  the-classics  reason  religion  theos  noble-lie  intuition  instinct  farmers-and-foragers  egalitarianism-hierarchy  early-modern  britain  europe  gallic  hari-seldon  theory-of-mind  parallax  darwinian  evolution  telos-atelos  intricacy  evopsych  chart  traces 
august 2017 by nhaliday
Trump crafting plan to slash legal immigration - POLITICO
news  org:mag  politics  policy  government  trump  nascent-state  migration  current-events  canada  anglo  nationalism-globalism  multi  right-wing  org:lite  media  track-record  video  announcement  lol  journos-pundits  borjas  econotariat  rhetoric  human-capital  gnon  isteveish  albion  org:rec  douthatish  paleocon  gnxp  scitariat  commentary  wonkish  usa  chart  law  culture-war  🎩  sulla 
july 2017 by nhaliday
China ponders public morality after video of gruesome death - ABC News
Even as China presents itself outwardly as a prosperous rising power, around kitchen tables and in private WeChat groups, Chinese citizens routinely grumble about a nation that's gone bankrupt when it comes to two qualities: "suzhi," or "personal character," and "dixian," literally "bottom line" — or a basic, inviolable sense of right and wrong.

The only term that can really be used for China is No good deed goes unpunished. From someone who's of Chinese ethnic but not a Chinese national who has lived in the mainlands for the last 10 years.

The stories about extortionists are real, and they happen all over China. I'm genuinely terrified to help say an elderly who slipped on the pavement, or got nicked by a passing moped because I have no idea whether the victim will point at me and claim I caused the incident and demand payment from me. Police are useless and more often than not will ask the wrongly accused to make a small payment to the "victim" and be on their way, a little money to save time arguing with the extortionist. This has happened so much people are now taking videos of them helping anyone, in case their good deed goes sour.

A news story from about 2 weeks back, a man knew a friend was a bit unhappy/feeling down and invited said friend to his home to talk about this, to cheer her up. When he had his back towards the friend while getting some fruits, she jumped out the balcony and died. The family sued the man for 300k, and the court upheld their lawsuit but toned it down to 80k, saying the man is 20% responsible for her death, claiming he knows the friend was unhappy and should have kept a closer eye on her. Trying to help a friend, and that's what you get for not being to help, imagine why people don't want to help anymore.

backup  news  org:lite  video  death  nihil  china  asia  sinosphere  orient  n-factor  morality  ethics  multi  reddit  social  commentary  trust  corruption  org:rec  org:anglo  lol  current-events  business  business-models  crime  integrity  honor 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Vox and Teachers – spottedtoad
I think the best way to understand Vox is as “what is the Democratic Party telling itself these days?” The Center for American Progress (where Yglesias used to work) was explicitly designed to do this, but it wasn’t set up to be an effective media organization. Ezra Klein became the most powerful journalist in Washington at the ripe old age of 26 by relentlessly boosting and explaining the Affordable Care Act when no one else would, for which he was given unprecedented access to the upper levels of the Obama Administration, including POTUS himself. So when Vox pushes feminism hard in 2013 and 2014, and police killings hard in 2014 and 2015, and the pervasive toll of racism hard always, it is in part because the Democratic Party sees engaging female voters and African Americans as critical, and setting the terms of public debate as more critical still. This isn’t to say that Nancy Pelosi is calling Yglesias and Klein up every morning to tell them what to eat for breakfast; it is instead that organizations like Vox, the NYTimes, and a few other prestige organizations set the agenda that the rest of the party coheres around.

I'm not surprised that Vox's traffic was way down from 2016 to 2017, but it's more interesting that Vox's traffic was basically constant from its founding until Obama left office. (https://www.quantcast.com/measure/vox.com#trafficCard … )

Suggests way in which media consumption is itself a form of clientelism.

As Razib suggests, the fundamental story of the 21st century is quite possibly going to be a sort of neofeudalism, in which each of us identifies with different centers of power and personalized allegiance, perhaps even more than "identity" per se

Lol, 2/3 year-on-year collapse in total readership sure gets the ol noggin joggin
ratty  unaffiliated  commentary  org:data  org:lite  media  propaganda  westminster  culture-war  aphorism  news  video  mobility  class  education  multi  twitter  social  discussion  backup  gnxp  scitariat  feudal  power  usa  government  obama  data  visualization  time-series  trends  counter-revolution  left-wing  coalitions  cynicism-idealism 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Dimensions - Geert Hofstede



Individualism and Collectivism in Israeli Society: Comparing Religious and Secular High-School Students: https://sci-hub.tw/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1016945121604
A common collective basis of mutual value consensus was found in the two groups; however, as predicted, there were differences between secular and religious students on the three kinds of items, since the religious scored higher than the secular students on items emphasizing collectivist orientation. The differences, however, do not fit the common theoretical framework of collectivism-individualism, but rather tend to reflect the distinction between in-group and universal collectivism.

Individualism and Collectivism in Two Conflicted Societies: Comparing Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Arab High School Students: https://sci-hub.tw/http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0044118X01033001001
Both groups were found to be more collectivistic than individualistic oriented. However, as predicted, the Palestinians scored higher than the Israeli students on items emphasizing in-group collectivist orientation (my nationality, my country, etc.). The differences between the two groups tended to reflect some subdistinctions such as different elements of individualism and collectivism. Moreover, they reflected the historical context and contemporary influences, such as the stage where each society is at in the nation-making process.

Religion as culture: religious individualism and collectivism among american catholics, jews, and protestants.: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17576356
We propose the theory that religious cultures vary in individualistic and collectivistic aspects of religiousness and spirituality. Study 1 showed that religion for Jews is about community and biological descent but about personal beliefs for Protestants. Intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity were intercorrelated and endorsed differently by Jews, Catholics, and Protestants in a pattern that supports the theory that intrinsic religiosity relates to personal religion, whereas extrinsic religiosity stresses community and ritual (Studies 2 and 3). Important life experiences were likely to be social for Jews but focused on God for Protestants, with Catholics in between (Study 4). We conclude with three perspectives in understanding the complex relationships between religion and culture.

Inglehart–Welzel cultural map of the world: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inglehart%E2%80%93Welzel_cultural_map_of_the_world
Live cultural map over time 1981 to 2015: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ABWYOcru7js

prof  psychology  social-psych  values  culture  cultural-dynamics  anthropology  individualism-collectivism  expression-survival  long-short-run  time-preference  uncertainty  outcome-risk  gender  egalitarianism-hierarchy  things  phalanges  group-level  world  tools  comparison  data  database  n-factor  occident  social-norms  project  microfoundations  multi  maps  visualization  org:junk  psych-architecture  personality  hari-seldon  discipline  self-control  geography  shift  developing-world  europe  the-great-west-whale  anglosphere  optimate  china  asia  japan  sinosphere  orient  MENA  reddit  social  discussion  backup  EU  inequality  envy  britain  anglo  nordic  ranking  top-n  list  eastern-europe  germanic  gallic  mediterranean  cog-psych  sociology  guilt-shame  duty  tribalism  us-them  cooperate-defect  competition  gender-diff  metrics  politics  wiki  concept  society  civilization  infographic  ideology  systematic-ad-hoc  let-me-see  general-survey  chart  video  history  metabuch  dynamic  trends  plots  time-series  reference  water  mea 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Original pronunciation of "Ceasar"? : AskHistorians
So was Cicero (Sissero) pronounced Kikkero? Does the hard "k" only apply to the first letter making it Kissero?

KEE-ker-o would be the Latin pronunciation as far as we can tell, yes.

..wow, so that would make 'veni vidi vici' sound like "weeney, weedie, wiki"?

more like "wenny, widdy, wiki"

Wait, does this mean that the "Biggus Dickus" scene from Monty Python's Life of Brian was (in addition to being a funny scene) poking fun at what people might actually have sounded like when they were speaking proper Latin?

q-n-a  reddit  social  discussion  history  iron-age  mediterranean  foreign-lang  the-classics  multi  video  film  lol  comedy 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Yale Law Journal - Amazon's Antitrust Paradox
This Note argues that the current framework in antitrust—specifically its pegging competition to “consumer welfare,” defined as short-term price effects—is unequipped to capture the architecture of market power in the modern economy. We cannot cognize the potential harms to competition posed by Amazon’s dominance if we measure competition primarily through price and output. Specifically, current doctrine underappreciates the risk of predatory pricing and how integration across distinct business lines may prove anticompetitive. These concerns are heightened in the context of online platforms for two reasons. First, the economics of platform markets create incentives for a company to pursue growth over profits, a strategy that investors have rewarded. Under these conditions, predatory pricing becomes highly rational—even as existing doctrine treats it as irrational and therefore implausible. Second, because online platforms serve as critical intermediaries, integrating across business lines positions these platforms to control the essential infrastructure on which their rivals depend. This dual role also enables a platform to exploit information collected on companies using its services to undermine them as competitors.

Amazon Must Be Stopped: https://newrepublic.com/article/119769/amazons-monopoly-must-be-broken-radical-plan-tech-giant

Amazon Will Go To Denver: https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/09/10/amazon-will-go-to-denver/
Real things cities are offering to get Amazon HQ2
*Chicago: Let Amazon keep employees' income tax
*SoCal: Give away $100M in land
*Boston: City employees working just for Amazon
*Fresno: Let Amazon decide how to spend tax dollars

Washington, D.C., might have a leg up, having already hosted Amazon Chief Executive Jeff Bezos for visits when he considered acquiring the Washington Post, which he now owns. Mr. Bezos also purchased the former Textile Museum in Washington’s Kalorama neighborhood for $23 million in 2016 and is currently turning it into a private residence.

28-year-old makes millions buying from Walmart, selling on Amazon: https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/companies/28-year-old-makes-millions-buying-from-walmart-selling-on-amazon/ar-AAupB8i

Thread: Why Amazon’s HQ2 is going to Fairfax County


walmart is the only entity that has even a slim chance at preventing jeff bezos from intermediating every commodity exchange in the world, u must respect

"I tried to save you, but you didn't listen. Now you'll have to face Him alone..."

What Amazon does to wages: https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21735020-worlds-largest-retailer-underpaying-its-employees-what-amazon-does-wages
Is the world’s largest retailer underpaying its employees?

Flat or falling industry wages are common in the cities and towns where Amazon opens distribution centres, according to an analysis by The Economist. Government figures show that after Amazon opens a storage depot, local wages for warehouse workers fall by an average of 3%. In places where Amazon operates, such workers earn about 10% less than similar workers employed elsewhere.

What Amazon Does to Poor Cities: https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/02/amazon-warehouses-poor-cities/552020/
The debate over Amazon’s HQ2 obscures the company’s rapid expansion of warehouses in low-income areas.

The Facts Behind Trump’s Tweets on Amazon, Taxes and the Postal Service: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/29/us/politics/trump-amazon-post-office-fact-check.html

If Workers Slack Off, the Wristband Will Know. (And Amazon Has a Patent for It.): https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/technology/amazon-wristband-tracking-privacy.html

auto-management -> automation dystopia: http://marshallbrain.com/manna.htm

Amazon’s vision for the future: delivery drone beehives in every city: https://www.theverge.com/2017/6/23/15860668/amazon-drone-delivery-patent-city-centers
article  essay  study  law  business  industrial-org  market-power  rent-seeking  amazon  sv  tech  markets  capitalism  winner-take-all  multi  news  org:mag  org:biz  gnxp  scitariat  commentary  current-events  org:lite  right-wing  corporation  trends  zeitgeist  rhetoric  barons  management  org:rec  usa  the-west  video  profile  arbitrage  entrepreneurialism  microbiz  feudal  prediction  prediction-markets  power  org:local  twitter  social  discussion  speculation  backup  the-south  virginia-DC  planning  career  org:bv  econotariat  marginal-rev  inequality  gnon  🐸  memes(ew)  data  econ-metrics  marginal  malaise  supply-demand  labor  coming-apart  compensation  intervention  branches  org:anglo  automation  techtariat  ai  scifi-fantasy  pessimism  optimism  orwellian  vampire-squid  left-wing  trump  media  propaganda  taxes  government  capital 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Kinship Systems, Cooperation and the Evolution of Culture
In the data, societies with loose ancestral kinship ties cooperate and trust broadly, which is apparently sustained through a belief in moralizing gods, universally applicable moral principles, feelings of guilt, and large-scale institutions. Societies with a historically tightly knit kinship structure, on the other hand, exhibit strong in-group favoritism: they cheat on and are distrusting of out-group members, but readily support in-group members in need. This cooperation scheme is enforced by moral values of in-group loyalty, conformity to tight social norms, emotions of shame, and strong local institutions.

Henrich, Joseph, The Secret of Our Success: How Culture is Driving Human Evolution,
Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter, Princeton University Press, 2015.
—, W.E.I.R.D People: How Westerners became Individualistic, Self-Obsessed, Guilt-Ridden,
Analytic, Patient, Principled and Prosperous, Princeton University Press, n.d.
—, Jean Ensminger, Richard McElreath, Abigail Barr, Clark Barrett, Alexander Bolyanatz, Juan Camilo Cardenas, Michael Gurven, Edwins Gwako, Natalie Hen- rich et al., “Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment,” Science, 2010, 327 (5972), 1480–1484.


—, —, Will M. Gervais, Aiyana K. Willard, Rita A. McNamara, Edward Slingerland, and Joseph Henrich, “The Cultural Evolution of Prosocial Religions,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2016, 39, e1.


Purzycki, Benjamin Grant, Coren Apicella, Quentin D. Atkinson, Emma Cohen, Rita Anne McNamara, Aiyana K. Willard, Dimitris Xygalatas, Ara Norenzayan, and Joseph Henrich, “Moralistic Gods, Supernatural Punishment and the Expansion of Human Sociality,” Nature, 2016.

Table 1 summarizes
Figure 1 has map of kinship tightness
Figure 2 has cheating and in-group vs. out-group
Table 2 has regression
Figure 3 has univeralism and shame-guilt
Figure 4 has individualism-collectivism/conformity
Table 4 has radius of trust, Table 5 same for within-country variation (ethnic)
Tables 7 and 8 do universalism

Haidt moral foundations:
In line with the research hypothesis discussed in Section 3, the analysis employs two dependent variables, i.e., (i) the measure of in-group loyalty, and (ii) an index of the importance of communal values relative to the more universal (individualizing) ones. That is, the hypothesis is explicitly not about some societies being more or less moral than others, but merely about heterogeneity in the relative importance that people attach to structurally different types of values. To construct the index, I compute the first principal component of fairness / reciprocity, harm / care, in-group / loyalty, and respect /authority. The resulting score endogenously has the appealing property that – in line with the research hypothesis – it loads positively on the first two values and negatively on the latter two, with roughly equal weights, see Appendix F for details.²⁴I compute country-level scores by averaging responses by country of residence of respondents. Importantly, in Enke (2017) I document that – in a nationally representative sample of Americans – this same index of moral communalism is strongly correlated with individuals’ propensity to favor their local community over society as a whole in issues ranging from taxation and redistribution to donations and volunteering. Thus, there is evidence that the index of communal moral values captures economically meaningful behavioral heterogeneity.

The coevolution of kinship systems, cooperation, and culture: http://voxeu.org/article/kinship-cooperation-and-culture
- Benjamin Enke

pretty short

good linguistics reference cited in this paper:
On the biological and cultural evolution of shame: Using internet search tools to weight values in many cultures: https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1100v2
Here we explore the relative importance between shame and guilt by using Google Translate [>_>...] to produce translation for the words "shame", "guilt", "pain", "embarrassment" and "fear" to the 64 languages covered. We also explore the meanings of these concepts among the Yanomami, a horticulturist hunter-gatherer tribe in the Orinoquia. Results show that societies previously described as “guilt societies” have more words for guilt than for shame, but *the large majority*, including the societies previously described as “shame societies”, *have more words for shame than for guilt*. Results are consistent with evolutionary models of shame which predict a wide scatter in the relative importance between guilt and shame, suggesting that cultural evolution of shame has continued the work of biological evolution, and that neither provides a strong adaptive advantage to either shame or guilt [? did they not just say that most languages favor shame?].


The roots of the word "shame" are thought to derive from an older word meaning "to cover". The emotion of shame has clear physiological consequences. Its facial and corporal expression is a human universal, as was recognized already by Darwin (5). Looking away, reddening of the face, sinking the head, obstructing direct view, hiding the face and downing the eyelids, are the unequivocal expressions signaling shame. Shame might be an emotion specific to humans, as no clear description of it is known for animals.
Classical Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle, explicitly mention shame as a key element in building society.

Guilt is the emotion of being responsible for the commission of an offense, however, it seems to be distinct from shame. Guilt says “what I did was not good”, whereas shame says “I am no good"(2). For Benedict (1), shame is a violation of cultural or social values, while guilt feelings arise from violations of one's internal values.


Unobservable emotions such as guilt may be of value to the receiver but constitutes in economy “private information”. Thus, in economic and biological terms, adaptive pressures acting upon the evolution of shame differ from those acting on that of guilt.

Shame has evolutionary advantages to both individual and society, but the lack ofshame also has evolutionary advantages as it allows cheating and thus benefiting from public goods without paying the costs of its build up.


Dodds (7) coined the distinction between guilt and shame cultures and postulated that in Greek cultural history, shame as a social value was displaced, at least in part, by guilt in guiding moral behavior.
"[...]True guilt cultures rely on an internalized conviction of sin as the enforcer of good behavior, not, as shame cultures do, on external sanctions. Guilt cultures emphasize punishment and forgiveness as ways of restoring the moral order; shame cultures stress self-denial and humility as ways of restoring the social order”.


For example, Wikipedia is less error prone than Encyclopedia Britannica (12, 17); and Google Translate is as accurate as more traditional methods (35).

Table 1, Figure 1


This regression is close to a proportional line of two words for shame for each word for guilt.


For example, in the case of Chinese, no overlap between the five concepts is reported using Google Translate in Figure 1. Yet, linguistic-conceptual studies of guilt and shame revealed an important overlap between several of these concepts in Chinese (29).


Our results using Google Translate show no overlap between Guilt and Shame in any of the languages studied.
[lol:] Examples of the context when they feel “kili” are: a tiger appears in the forest; you kill somebody from another community; your daughter is going to die; everybody looks at your underwear; you are caught stealing; you soil your pants while among others; a doctor gives you an injection; you hit your wife and others find out; you are unfaithful to your husband and others find out; you are going to be hit with a machete.


Linguistic families do not aggregate according to the relationship of the number of synonyms for shame and guilt (Figure 3).


The ratios are 0.89 and 2.5 respectively, meaning a historical transition from guilt-culture in Latin to shame-culture in Italian, suggesting a historical development that is inverse to that suggested byDodds for ancient to classical Greek. [I hope their Latin corpus doesn't include stuff from Catholics...]

Joe Henrich presentation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f-unD4ZzWB4

relevant video:
Johnny Cash - God's Gonna Cut You Down: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eJlN9jdQFSc

this says Dems more guilt-driven but Peter Frost says opposite here (and matches my perception of the contemporary breakdown both including minorities and focusing only on whites): https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:9b75881f6861

this is an amazing paper:
The Origins of WEIRD Psychology: https://psyarxiv.com/d6qhu/
Recent research not only confirms the existence of substantial psychological variation around the globe but also highlights the peculiarity of populations that are Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD). We propose that much of this variation arose as people psychologically adapted to differing kin-based institutions—the set of social norms governing descent, marriage, residence and related domains. We further propose that part of the variation in these institutions arose historically from the Catholic Church’s marriage and family policies, which contributed to the dissolution of Europe’s traditional kin-based institutions, leading eventually to the predominance of nuclear families and impersonal institutions. By combining data on 20 psychological outcomes with historical measures of both kinship and Church exposure, we find support for these ideas in a comprehensive array of analyses across countries, among European regions and between individuals with … [more]
study  economics  broad-econ  pseudoE  roots  anthropology  sociology  culture  cultural-dynamics  society  civilization  religion  theos  kinship  individualism-collectivism  universalism-particularism  europe  the-great-west-whale  orient  integrity  morality  ethics  trust  institutions  things  pdf  piracy  social-norms  cooperate-defect  patho-altruism  race  world  developing-world  pop-diff  n-factor  ethnography  ethnocentrism  🎩  🌞  s:*  us-them  occident  political-econ  altruism  self-interest  books  todo  multi  old-anglo  big-peeps  poetry  aristos  homo-hetero  north-weingast-like  maps  data  modernity  tumblr  social  ratty  gender  history  iron-age  mediterranean  the-classics  christianity  speculation  law  public-goodish  tribalism  urban  china  asia  sinosphere  decision-making  polanyi-marx  microfoundations  open-closed  alien-character  axelrod  eden  growth-econ  social-capital  values  phalanges  usa  within-group  group-level  regional-scatter-plots  comparison  psychology  social-psych  behavioral-eco 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Information Processing: Everything Under the Heavens and China's Conceptualization of Power
These guys are not very quantitative, so let me clarify a part of their discussion that was left rather ambiguous. It is true that demographic trends are working against China, which has a rapidly aging population. French and Schell talk about a 10-15 year window during which China has to grow rich before it grows old (a well-traveled meme). From the standpoint of geopolitics this is probably not the correct or relevant analysis. China's population is ~4x that of the US. If, say, demographic trends limit this to only an effective 3x or 3.5x advantage in working age individuals, China still only has to reach ~1/3 of US per capita income in order to have a larger overall economy. It seems unlikely that there is any hard cutoff preventing China from reaching, say, 1/2 the US per capita GDP in a few decades. (Obviously a lot of this growth is still "catch-up" growth.) At that point its economy would be the largest in the world by far, and its scientific-technological workforce and infrastructure would be far larger than that of any other country.

- interesting point: China went from servile toward Japan to callous as soon as it surpassed Japan economically (I would bet this will apply to the US)
- conventional Chinese narrative for WW2: China won the Pacific Theater not the US
- serious Chinese superiority complex overall
- "patriotic education", the fucking opposite of our god-awful ideology
- in Chinese history: each dynasty judges the last, unimpeachable
- ceding control of South China Sea would damage relations with neighboring countries (not enforcing their legitimate claims) and damage international norms (rule of law, etc.)
- next 10-15 years dangerous (Thucydides); of course Hsu criticizes
- suggestions: cultivate local alliances, prevent arms races, welcome Chinese international initiatives
I'm highly skeptical of all but the alliances
- ethnic melting in Chinese history, population structure (not actually as much as he thinks AFAIK), "age of nationalism", Tibet, etc.

Gideon Rachman writes for the FT, so it's not surprising that his instincts seem a bit stronger when it comes to economics. He makes a number of incisive observations during this interview.


At 16min, he mentions that
I was in Beijing about I guess a month before the vote [US election], in fact when the first debates were going on, and the Chinese, I thought that official Chinese [i.e. Government Officials] in our meeting and the sort of semi-official academics were clearly pulling for Trump.


I wonder if the standard of comparison shouldn't be with the West as a whole, not just the United States?

It depends on what happens to the EU, whether western powers other than the US want to play the role of global hegemon, etc.

The situation today is that the US is focused on preserving its primacy, wants to deny Russia and China any local sphere of influence, etc., whereas Europe has little appetite for any of it. They can barely allocate enough resources for their own defense.

Europe and the US have their own demographic problems to deal with in the coming decades. An aging population may turn out to be less challenging than the consequences of mass immigration (note population trends in Africa, so close to Europe).

If China behaved as an aggressive hegemon like the US or former USSR, it would probably elicit a collective back reaction from the West. But I think its first step is simply to consolidate influence over Asia.


interesting somewhat contrarian take on China's girth here: https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/08/03/manufacturing-chinese-history-cheaply/

China Does Not Want Your Rules Based Order: http://scholars-stage.blogspot.com/2016/06/china-does-not-want-your-rules-based.html
There is much that is good in this narrative. McCain proclaims that "no nation has done as much to contribute to what China calls its “peaceful rise” as the United States of America." He is right to do so. No nation has done more to enable China's rise than America has. No country's citizens have done more for the general prosperity of the Chinese people than the Americans have. This is true in ways that are not widely known or immediately obvious. For example, the role American financiers and investment banks played in creating the architecture of modern Chinese financial markets and corporate structures is little realized, despite the size and importance of their interventions. Behind every great titan of Chinese industry--China Mobile, the world's largest mobile phone operator, China State Construction Engineering, whose IPO was valued at $7.3 billion, PetroChina, the most profitable company in Asia (well, before last year), to name a few of hundreds--lies an American investment banker. I do not exaggerate when I say Goldman Sachs created modern China. [2] China has much to thank America for.


In simpler terms, the Chinese equate “rising within a rules based order” with “halting China’s rise to power.” To live by Washington’s rules is to live under its power, and the Chinese have been telling themselves for three decades now that—after two centuries of hardship—they will not live by the dictates of outsiders ever again.

The Chinese will never choose our rules based order. That does not necessarily mean they want to dethrone America and throw down all that she has built. The Chinese do not have global ambitions. What they want is a seat at the table—and they want this seat to be recognized, not earned. That’s the gist of it. Beijing is not willing to accept an order it did not have a hand in creating. Thus all that G-2 talk we heard a few years back. The Chinese would love to found a new order balancing their honor and their interests with the Americans. It is a flattering idea. What they do not want is for the Americans to give them a list of hoops to jump through to gain entry into some pre-determined good-boys club. They feel like their power, wealth, and heritage should be more than enough to qualify for automatic entrance to any club.

hsu  scitariat  commentary  video  presentation  critique  china  asia  sinosphere  orient  foreign-policy  realpolitik  geopolitics  zeitgeist  demographics  scale  contrarianism  the-bones  economics  econ-metrics  wealth  population  2016-election  trump  interview  roots  history  nationalism-globalism  stereotypes  usa  civilization  japan  developing-world  world  ethnography  lived-experience  instinct  mostly-modern  world-war  cynicism-idealism  narrative  journos-pundits  ideology  communism  truth  government  leviathan  cohesion  oceans  great-powers  social-norms  law  war  cooperate-defect  moloch  demographic-transition  descriptive  values  patho-altruism  kumbaya-kult  race  ethnocentrism  pop-structure  antidemos  poast  conquest-empire  assimilation  migration  migrant-crisis  africa  europe  thucydides  expansionism  multi  news  org:rec  education  propaganda  org:mag  gnxp  unaffiliated  broad-econ  wonkish  justice  universalism-particularism  authoritarianism  twitter  social  discussion  backup  benevolence 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Evergreen State and the Battle for Modernity | Quillette
It is this dichotomy between postmodern and modern that is the most important takeaway from this entire affair. In many ways, the old left/right dichotomy no longer applies. Instead we are faced with a three-part distinction between postmodern/modern/traditional. Let’s take a look at each of these in turn, and discuss why they are particularly important today. Starting with the most right-leaning, the traditionalists. These folks do not like the direction in which modernity is headed, and so are looking to go back to an earlier time when they believe society was better. They may disagree with same-sex marriage, label sexual promiscuity as “deviance,” and feel threatened by racial and demographic changes in Western society. These folks include typical status-quo conservatives, Evangelical Christians as well as more nefarious types such as white nationalists and the “alt right”. Even though there is much furor in the media about the threat that these groups represent, I would argue that they have largely been pushed to the fringes in terms of their social influence, not withstanding the election of Trump who was actually opposed by many traditionalists such as the Never Trumpers.

Indeed, it is between the modernists and postmodernists where the future of society is being fought. Modernists are those who believe in human progress within a classical Western tradition. They believe that the world can continuously be improved through science, technology, and rationality. Unlike traditionalists, they seek progress rather than reversal, but what they share in common is an interest in preserving the basic structures of Western society. Most modernists could be classified as centrists (either left or right-leaning), classical liberals and libertarians.

Postmodernists, on the other hand, eschew any notion of objectivity, perceiving knowledge as a construct of power differentials rather than anything that could possibly be mutually agreed upon. Informed by such thinkers as Foucault and Derrida, science therefore becomes an instrument of Western oppression; indeed, all discourse is a power struggle between oppressors and oppressed. In this scheme, there is no Western civilization to preserve—as the more powerful force in the world, it automatically takes on the role of oppressor and therefore any form of equity must consequently then involve the overthrow of Western “hegemony.” These folks form the current Far Left, including those who would be described as communists, socialists, anarchists, Antifa, as well as social justice warriors (SJWs). These are all very different groups, but they all share a postmodernist ethos.


First, They Came for the Biologists: https://www.wsj.com/articles/first-they-came-for-the-biologists-1506984033
news  org:mag  org:popup  letters  rhetoric  things  ideology  politics  polisci  coalitions  tradition  civilization  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  truth  westminster  culture-war  current-events  trends  multi  video  documentary  org:lite  twitter  social  commentary  gnon  unaffiliated  right-wing  higher-ed  info-dynamics  individualism-collectivism  being-right  is-ought  absolute-relative  identity-politics  org:rec  science 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Leaving Social Media Taught Me How Broken The News Cycle Is | FiveThirtyEight
Informing Ourselves to Death: https://secondnaturejournal.com/informing-ourselves-to-death/
Neil Postman appears on The Open Mind on December 8, 1990 to discuss the problem of information glut with host Richard Heffner.
news  org:data  attention  serene  tribalism  internet  media  social  polarization  prioritizing  culture-war  multi  journos-pundits  big-peeps  org:mag  right-wing  interview  video  ascetic 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Tyler Cowen on Brexit, Steven Pinker, and Joseph McCarthy | askblog
Also, in my other post today, I mention an event on plutocracy co-sponsored by the Hudson Institute and The American Interest. Tyler Cowen makes remarks that have little or nothing to do with the article that he wrote for the event. Two of his more provocative opinions:

1. Steven Pinker may be wrong. Rather than mass violence following a benign trend, it could be cyclical. When there is a long peace, people become complacent, they allow bad leaders to take power and to run amok, and you get mass violence again. (Cowen argues that there are more countries now run by bad people than was the case a couple of decades ago)

2. Joseph McCarthy was not wrong. There were Soviet agents in influential positions. Regardless of what you think of that, the relevant point is that today Chinese and Russian plutocrats may have their tentacles in the U.S. and may be subtly causing the U.S. to be less of a liberal capitalist nation and more of a cronyist plutocracy.

hmm, the USPS stuff here: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:fc443b256b1a
econotariat  cracker-econ  commentary  marginal-rev  video  presentation  summary  straussian  contrarianism  rhetoric  pinker  peace-violence  cycles  oscillation  flexibility  leadership  government  history  mostly-modern  cold-war  china  asia  russia  communism  inequality  winner-take-all  authoritarianism  antidemos  corruption  anomie  domestication  gilens-page  n-factor  individualism-collectivism  egalitarianism-hierarchy  madisonian  democracy  rot  zeitgeist  the-bones  counter-revolution  flux-stasis  kumbaya-kult  virginia-DC  class-warfare  rent-seeking  vampire-squid  trump  current-events  news  org:rec  amazon  market-power  media  propaganda  taxes  corporation  capital 
june 2017 by nhaliday
How important was colonial trade for the rise of Europe? | Economic Growth in History
The latter view became the orthodoxy among economists and economic historians after Patrick O’Brien’s 1982 paper, which in one of many of Patrick’s celebrated phrases, claims that “”the periphery vs peripheral” for Europe. He concludes the paper by writing:

“[G]rowth, stagnation, and decay everywhere in Western Europe can be explained mainly by reference to endogenous forces. … for the economic growth of the core, the periphery was peripheral.”

This is the view that remarkable scholars such as N. Crafts, Deirdre McCloskey, or Joel Mokyr repeat today (though Crafts would argue cotton imports would have mattered in a late stage, and my reading of Mokyr is that he has softened his earlier view from the 1980s a little, specifically in the book The Enlightened Economy.) Even recently, Brad deLong has classifyied O’Brien’s 1982 position as “air tight”.

Among economists and economic historians more on the economics side, I would say that O’Brien’s paper was only one of two strong hits against the “Worlds-System” and related schools of thoughts of the 1970s, the other hit being Solow’s earlier conclusion that TFP growth (usually interpreted as technology, though there’s more to it than that) has accounted for economic growth a great deal more than capital accumulation, which is what Hobsbawm and Wallerstein, in their neo-Marxist framework, emphasize.

A friend tonight, on the third world and the first world, and our relationships to the past: "They don't forget, and we don't remember."
imo the European Intifada is being fueled by anti-Europeanism & widely taught ideas like this one discussed - Europe stole its riches

The British Empire was cruel, rapacious and racist. But contrary to what Shashi Tharoor writes in An Era Of Darkness, the fault for India’s miseries lies upon itself.

Indeed, the anti-Tharoor argument is arguably closer to the truth, because the British tended to use the landlord system in places where landlords were already in place, and at times when the British were relatively weak and couldn’t afford to upset tradition. Only after they became confident in their power did the British start to bypass the landlord class and tax the cultivators directly. King’s College London historian Jon Wilson (2016) writes in India Conquered, “Wherever it was implemented, raiyatwar began as a form of military rule.” Thus the system that Tharoor implicitly promotes, and which is associated with higher agricultural productivity today, arose from the very same colonialism that he blames for so many of India’s current woes. History does not always tell the parables that we wish to hear.


India’s share of the world economy was large in the eighteenth century for one simple reason: when the entire world was poor, India had a large share of the world’s population. India’s share fell because with the coming of the Industrial Revolution, Europe and North America saw increases of income per capita to levels never before seen in all of human history. This unprecedented growth cannot be explained by Britain’s depredations against India. Britain was not importing steam engines from India.

The big story of the Great Divergence is not that India got poorer, but that other countries got much richer. Even at the peak of Mughal wealth in 1600, the best estimates of economic historians suggest that GDP per capita was 61% higher in Great Britain. By 1750–before the battle of Plassey and the British takeover–GDP per capita in Great Britain was more than twice what it was in India (Broadberry, Custodis, and Gupta 2015). The Great Divergence has long roots.

Tharoor seems blinded by the glittering jewels of the Maharajas and the Mughals. He writes with evident satisfaction that when in 1615 the first British ambassador presented himself to the court of Emperor Jehangir in Agra, “the Englishman was a supplicant at the feet of the world’s mightiest and most opulent monarch.” True; but the Emperor’s opulence was produced on the backs of millions of poor subjects. Writing at the same time and place, the Dutch merchant Francisco Pelsaert (1626) contrasted the “great superfluity and absolute power” of the rich with “the utter subjection and poverty of the common people–poverty so great and miserable that the life of the people can be depicted…only as the home of stark want and the dwelling-place of bitter woe.” Indian rulers were rich because the empire was large and inequality was extreme.

In pre-colonial India the rulers, both Mughal and Maratha, extracted _anywhere from one-third to one half of all gross agricultural output_ and most of what was extracted was spent on opulence and the armed forces, not on improving agricultural productivity (Raychaudhuri 1982).


The British were awful rulers but the history of India is a long story of awful rulers (just as it is for most countries). Indeed, by Maddison’s (2007) calculations _the British extracted less from the Indian economy than did the Mughal Dynasty_. The Mughals built their palaces in India while the British built most of their palaces in Britain, but that was little comfort to the Indian peasant who paid for both. The Kohinoor diamond that graces the cover of Inglorious Empire is a telling symbol. Yes, it was stolen by the British (who stole it from the Sikhs who stole it from the Afghanis who stole it from the Mughals who stole it from one of the kings of South India). But how many Indians would have been better off if this bauble had stayed in India? Perhaps one reason why more Indians didn’t take up arms against the British was that for most of them, British rule was a case of meet the new boss, same as the old boss.

more for effect on colonies: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:4b0128372fe9

INDIA AND THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: AN ANGLO-INDIAN COMPARISON OF GDP PER CAPITA, 1600-1871: http://eh.net/eha/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Guptaetal.pdf
This paper provides estimates of Indian GDP constructed from the output side for the pre-1871 period, and combines them with population estimates to track changes in living standards. Indian per capita GDP declined steadily during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before stabilising during the nineteenth century. As British living standards increased from the mid-seventeenth century, India fell increasingly behind. Whereas in 1600, Indian per capita GDP was over 60 per cent of the British level, by 1871 it had fallen to less than 15 per cent. As well as placing the origins of the Great Divergence firmly in the early modern period, the estimates suggest a relatively prosperous India at the height of the Mughal Empire, with living standards well above bare bones subsistence.

but some of the Asian wage data (especialy India) have laughably small samples (see Broadberry & Gupta)

How profitable was colonialism for various European powers?: https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/p1q1q/how_profitable_was_colonialism_for_various/

How did Britain benefit from colonising India? What did colonial powers gain except for a sense of power?: https://www.quora.com/How-did-Britain-benefit-from-colonising-India-What-did-colonial-powers-gain-except-for-a-sense-of-power
The EIC period was mostly profitable, though it had recurring problems with its finances. The initial voyages from Surat in 1600s were hugely successful and brought profits as high as 200%. However, the competition from the Dutch East India Company started to drive down prices, at least for spices. Investing in EIC wasn’t always a sure shot way to gains - British investors who contributed to the second East India joint stock of 1.6 million pounds between 1617 and 1632 ended up losing money.


An alternate view is that the revenues of EIC were very small compared to the GDP of Britain, and hardly made an impact to the overall economy. For instance, the EIC Revenue in 1800 was 7.8m pounds while the British GDP in the same period was 343m pounds, and hence EIC revenue was only 2% of the overall GDP. (I got these figures from an individual blog and haven’t verified them).


The British Crown period - The territory of British India Provinces had expanded greatly and therefore the tax revenues had grown in proportion. The efficient taxation system paid its own administrative expenses as well as the cost of the large British Indian Army. British salaries were lucrative - the Viceroy received £25,000 a year, and Governors £10,000 for instance besides the lavish amenities in the form of subsidized housing, utilities, rest houses, etc.


Indian eminent intellectual, Dadabhai Naoroji wrote how the British systematically ensured the draining of Indian economy of its wealth and his theory is famously known as ‘Drain of Wealth’ theory. In his book 'Poverty' he estimated a 200–300 million pounds loss of revenue to Britain that is not returned.

At the same time, a fair bit of money did go back into India itself to support further colonial infrastructure. Note the explosion of infrastructure (Railway lines, 100+ Cantonment towns, 60+ Hill stations, Courthouses, Universities, Colleges, Irrigation Canals, Imperial capital of New Delhi) from 1857 onward till 1930s. Of course, these infrastructure projects were not due to any altruistic motive of the British. They were intended to make their India empire more secure, comfortable, efficient, and to display their grandeur. Huge sums of money were spent in the 3 Delhi Durbars conducted in this period.

So how profitable was the British Crown period? Probably not much. Instead bureaucracy, prestige, grandeur, comfort reigned supreme for the 70,000 odd British people in India.


There was a realization in Britain that colonies were not particularly economically beneficial to the home economy. … [more]
econotariat  broad-econ  article  history  early-modern  age-of-discovery  europe  the-great-west-whale  divergence  conquest-empire  economics  growth-econ  roots  trade  endo-exo  patho-altruism  expansionism  multi  twitter  social  discussion  gnon  unaffiliated  right-wing  🎩  attaq  albion  journos-pundits  mokyr-allen-mccloskey  cjones-like  big-picture  chart  news  org:mag  org:foreign  marginal-rev  wealth-of-nations  britain  india  asia  cost-benefit  leviathan  antidemos  religion  islam  class  pop-structure  nationalism-globalism  authoritarianism  property-rights  agriculture  econ-metrics  data  scale  government  industrial-revolution  pdf  regularizer  pseudoE  measurement  volo-avolo  time-series  anthropology  macro  sapiens  books  review  summary  counterfactual  stylized-facts  critique  heavy-industry  pre-ww2  study  technology  energy-resources  labor  capitalism  debate  org:data  org:lite  commentary  usa  piketty  variance-components  automation  west-hunter  scitariat  visualization  northeast  the-south  aphorism  h2o  fluid 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Why China Cannot Rise Peacefully - YouTube
- unexpected accent/tone lol
- principles: states as unit of action/global anarchy, uncertainty (fog-of-war), states as rational, selfish actors
- consequences: need to become as powerful as possible, regional hegemon, prevent peer competitors (no other regional hegemon in world, eg, China)
- future: China as giant Hong Kong
- future coalition: India, Japan, Russia, Vietnam, Singapore, South Korea, and the USA
- does he actually think Brazil coulda gotten as powerful as the US? lol.
- his summary of American grand strategy (lol):
1. Europe (great powers)
2. NE Asia (great powers)
3. Persian Gulf (oil)
- "Europe will become distant 3rd, Europe is a museum, lotta old people." lol
- "not gonna help us with Asia, got their own problems, bankrupting themselves"
- counterarguments: "not gonna grow, China's a Confucian culture (don't pay attention to those), economic interdependence." doesn't buy the last either.
- best counterarguments: nuclear deterrence, economic interdependence, "age of nationalism"
- mass-murder usually strategic (eg, maintaining power) not ideological

debate: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kd-1LymXXX0

interview: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yXSkY4QKDlA
- Clinton's a realist
- plenty of economic independence prior to world wars
- nukes makes WW3 unlikely, but do not rule out limited war (eg, over East/South China Sea)
- Confucian pacifism argument is ahistorical
rhetoric  video  presentation  foreign-policy  realpolitik  usa  china  asia  sinosphere  expansionism  war  great-powers  defense  statesmen  world  prediction  contrarianism  org:edu  org:davos  trends  martial  politics  polisci  nihil  nationalism-globalism  tetlock  kumbaya-kult  meta:war  intel  strategy  history  mostly-modern  russia  communism  cold-war  signal-noise  meta:prediction  🎩  civilization  rationality  realness  thinking  systematic-ad-hoc  uncertainty  outcome-risk  nyc  geopolitics  speaking  order-disorder  GT-101  chart  canada  latin-america  early-modern  world-war  japan  power  india  coalitions  zero-positive-sum  winner-take-all  germanic  europe  mediterranean  zeitgeist  the-bones  developing-world  korea  obama  MENA  pre-2013  energy-resources  economics  top-n  big-picture  trade  stylized-facts  debate  water  business  confucian  nuclear  deterrence  iraq-syria  africa  iran  oceans  climate-change  leviathan  death  cynicism-idealism  multi  interview  clinton  peace-violence  legibility  orient  flux-stasis  conquest-empire  c 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Beyond Sushiology: Does Diversity Work? | Brookings Institution
If your friends and colleagues are like mine, they tend to orient their domestic travel plans around cherished ethnic restaurants. So do I. But many carry their enthusiasm a step further, seeing the extraordinary variety and quality of ethnic cuisine now available in the United States as evidence of the unalloyed benefits flowing from our racial and ethnic diversity. I call this syndrome “sushiology.”

the song: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bI7UCJN-mu8
org:ngo  wonkish  rhetoric  contrarianism  diversity  putnam-like  cost-benefit  food  aphorism  migration  asia  collaboration  innovation  labor  class  vampire-squid  crime  criminal-justice  criminology  race  latin-america  religion  christianity  culture  realness  westminster  info-dynamics  identity-politics  lol  multi  video  music  rock 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Bagehot: Established political parties are crumbling. Why not the Tories? | The Economist
Theresa May redefines Conservatism as Tories move on from Thatcher: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/18/theresa-may-redefines-conservatism-tories-move-thatcher/
Theresa May criticized the term ‘citizen of the world.’ But half the world identifies that way: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/05/theresa-may-criticized-the-term-citizen-of-the-world-but-half-the-world-identifies-that-way/

welp: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom_general_election,_2017
UK 2017 General Election vote examined: income, poverty and Brexit: https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/uk-2017-general-election-vote-examined
- The Conservatives appealed to many lower income voters’ support for Brexit and immigration control. Labour instead appealed to these voters’ economic concerns over living standards, redistribution, inequality and austerity.
- Many voters who are struggling to get by and marginalized may agree with the vote for Brexit and calls to curb immigration, but were more likely to vote for Labour because of their desire for economic redistribution and to endorse Labour’s anti-austerity platform.
- Labour’s pitch to low income voters, and those in poverty, was a key driver of its performance at the 2017 election, but no political party made a major and clear breakthrough with these groups.

lol, this guy: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jacob-rees-mogg-conservative-mp-north-east-somerset-capital-management-investment-firm-belgravia-a7902951.html

The polite extremist: Jacob Rees-Mogg’s seemingly unstoppable rise: https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2018/02/polite-extremist-jacob-rees-mogg-s-seemingly-unstoppable-rise
A Brexit ultra and profound reactionary, the eccentric MP is a strong contender to be the next prime minister. How dangerous is he?
news  org:rec  org:anglo  org:biz  britain  politics  trends  government  anglo  coalitions  elections  EU  europe  migration  brexit  right-wing  tactics  current-events  anglosphere  multi  wiki  org:mag  profile  ideology  policy  summary  data  poll  values  usa  germanic  nationalism-globalism  vampire-squid  kumbaya-kult  us-them  video  memes(ew)  gnon  🐸  class  class-warfare  analysis  white-paper  org:ngo  phalanges  people  statesmen  populism 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Secular decline in testosterone levels - Rogue Health and Fitness
A Population-Level Decline in Serum Testosterone Levels in American Men: http://sci-hub.tw/10.1210/jc.2006-1375
Secular trends in sex hormones and fractures in men and women: http://www.eje-online.org/content/166/5/887.full.pdf
Small n and older sample, but interesting that while testosterone decreases have been large for men they’ve been even larger (in % terms) for women; wonder if this contributes to declining pregnancy and sexual frequency, rising depression.

Strangelove: https://youtu.be/N1KvgtEnABY?t=67

People offering human-centric explanations like cell phones: Note also that the sperm quality of dogs has decreased 30% since 1988.

mendelian rand.:
1 SD genetically instrumented increase in BMI was associated with a 0.25 SD decrease in serum testosterone

Ibuprofen linked to male infertility: study: https://nypost.com/2018/01/08/ibuprofen-linked-to-male-infertility-study/

Tucker Carlson: "Men Seem To Be Becoming Less Male": https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2018/03/08/tucker_carlson_men_seem_to_be_becoming_less_male.html
Carlson interviewed Dr. Jordan Peterson who blamed the "insidious" movement being driven by the "radical left" that teaches there a problem of "toxic masculinity." He said ideological policies focus on "de-emphasizing masculinity may be part of the problem."


Those are the numbers. They paint a very clear picture: American men are failing, in body, mind and spirit. This is a crisis. Yet our leaders pretend it’s not happening. They tell us the opposite is true: Women are victims, men are oppressors. To question that assumption is to risk punishment. Even as women far outpace men in higher education, virtually every college campus supports a women’s studies department, whose core goal is to attack male power. Our politicians and business leaders internalize and amplify that message. Men are privileged. Women are oppressed. Hire and promote and reward accordingly.

But it also hints at an almost opposite take: average testosterone levels have been falling for decades, so at this point these businessmen would be the only “normal” (by 1950s standards) men out there, and everyone else would be unprecedently risk-averse and boring.
org:health  fitsci  health  endocrine  trends  public-health  science-anxiety  gender  commentary  multi  study  pdf  data  piracy  white-paper  gnon  news  org:mag  right-wing  fertility  dysgenics  drugs  psychiatry  stress  politics  government  hypochondria  idk  embodied  FDA  externalities  epidemiology  video  film  classic  org:lite  org:anglo  genetics  endo-exo  mendel-randomization  obesity  fitness  scitariat  🌞  medicine  correlation  intervention  causation  GWAS  environmental-effects  hn  org:sci  popsci  model-organism  embodied-cognition  hmm  org:davos  communism  memes(ew)  fluid  endogenous-exogenous  roots  explanans  org:local  summary  modernity  rot  org:nat  chart  the-bones  albion  canada  journos-pundits  philosophy  iq  coming-apart  malaise  gender-diff  attention  disease  opioids  death  interview  current-events  tv  higher-ed  labor  management  compensation  grad-school  law  twitter  social  backup  ratty  unaffiliated  yvain  ssc 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Educational Romanticism & Economic Development | pseudoerasmus


Did Nations that Boosted Education Grow Faster?: http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2012/10/did_nations_tha.html
On average, no relationship. The trendline points down slightly, but for the time being let's just call it a draw. It's a well-known fact that countries that started the 1960's with high education levels grew faster (example), but this graph is about something different. This graph shows that countries that increased their education levels did not grow faster.

Where has all the education gone?: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=




The Case Against Education: What's Taking So Long, Bryan Caplan: http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2015/03/the_case_agains_9.html

The World Might Be Better Off Without College for Everyone: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/01/whats-college-good-for/546590/
Students don't seem to be getting much out of higher education.
- Bryan Caplan

College: Capital or Signal?: http://www.economicmanblog.com/2017/02/25/college-capital-or-signal/
After his review of the literature, Caplan concludes that roughly 80% of the earnings effect from college comes from signalling, with only 20% the result of skill building. Put this together with his earlier observations about the private returns to college education, along with its exploding cost, and Caplan thinks that the social returns are negative. The policy implications of this will come as very bitter medicine for friends of Bernie Sanders.

Doubting the Null Hypothesis: http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/doubting-the-null-hypothesis/

Is higher education/college in the US more about skill-building or about signaling?: https://www.quora.com/Is-higher-education-college-in-the-US-more-about-skill-building-or-about-signaling
ballpark: 50% signaling, 30% selection, 20% addition to human capital
more signaling in art history, more human capital in engineering, more selection in philosophy

Econ Duel! Is Education Signaling or Skill Building?: http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2016/03/econ-duel-is-education-signaling-or-skill-building.html
Marginal Revolution University has a brand new feature, Econ Duel! Our first Econ Duel features Tyler and me debating the question, Is education more about signaling or skill building?

Against Tulip Subsidies: https://slatestarcodex.com/2015/06/06/against-tulip-subsidies/




Most American public school kids are low-income; about half are non-white; most are fairly low skilled academically. For most American kids, the majority of the waking hours they spend not engaged with electronic media are at school; the majority of their in-person relationships are at school; the most important relationships they have with an adult who is not their parent is with their teacher. For their parents, the most important in-person source of community is also their kids’ school. Young people need adult mirrors, models, mentors, and in an earlier era these might have been provided by extended families, but in our own era this all falls upon schools.

Caplan gestures towards work and earlier labor force participation as alternatives to school for many if not all kids. And I empathize: the years that I would point to as making me who I am were ones where I was working, not studying. But they were years spent working in schools, as a teacher or assistant. If schools did not exist, is there an alternative that we genuinely believe would arise to draw young people into the life of their community?


It is not an accident that the state that spends the least on education is Utah, where the LDS church can take up some of the slack for schools, while next door Wyoming spends almost the most of any state at $16,000 per student. Education is now the one surviving binding principle of the society as a whole, the one black box everyone will agree to, and so while you can press for less subsidization of education by government, and for privatization of costs, as Caplan does, there’s really nothing people can substitute for it. This is partially about signaling, sure, but it’s also because outside of schools and a few religious enclaves our society is but a darkling plain beset by winds.

This doesn’t mean that we should leave Caplan’s critique on the shelf. Much of education is focused on an insane, zero-sum race for finite rewards. Much of schooling does push kids, parents, schools, and school systems towards a solution ad absurdum, where anything less than 100 percent of kids headed to a doctorate and the big coding job in the sky is a sign of failure of everyone concerned.

But let’s approach this with an eye towards the limits of the possible and the reality of diminishing returns.

The real reason the left would support Moander: the usual reason. because he’s an enemy.

I have a problem in thinking about education, since my preferences and personal educational experience are atypical, so I can’t just gut it out. On the other hand, knowing that puts me ahead of a lot of people that seem convinced that all real people, including all Arab cabdrivers, think and feel just as they do.

One important fact, relevant to this review. I don’t like Caplan. I think he doesn’t understand – can’t understand – human nature, and although that sometimes confers a different and interesting perspective, it’s not a royal road to truth. Nor would I want to share a foxhole with him: I don’t trust him. So if I say that I agree with some parts of this book, you should believe me.


Caplan doesn’t talk about possible ways of improving knowledge acquisition and retention. Maybe he thinks that’s impossible, and he may be right, at least within a conventional universe of possibilities. That’s a bit outside of his thesis, anyhow. Me it interests.

He dismisses objections from educational psychologists who claim that studying a subject improves you in subtle ways even after you forget all of it. I too find that hard to believe. On the other hand, it looks to me as if poorly-digested fragments of information picked up in college have some effect on public policy later in life: it is no coincidence that most prominent people in public life (at a given moment) share a lot of the same ideas. People are vaguely remembering the same crap from the same sources, or related sources. It’s correlated crap, which has a much stronger effect than random crap.

These widespread new ideas are usually wrong. They come from somewhere – in part, from higher education. Along this line, Caplan thinks that college has only a weak ideological effect on students. I don’t believe he is correct. In part, this is because most people use a shifting standard: what’s liberal or conservative gets redefined over time. At any given time a population is roughly half left and half right – but the content of those labels changes a lot. There’s a shift.

I put it this way, a while ago: “When you think about it, falsehoods, stupid crap, make the best group identifiers, because anyone might agree with you when you’re obviously right. Signing up to clear nonsense is a better test of group loyalty. A true friend is with you when you’re wrong. Ideally, not just wrong, but barking mad, rolling around in your own vomit wrong.”
You just explained the Credo quia absurdum doctrine. I always wondered if it was nonsense. It is not.
Someone on twitter caught it first – got all the way to “sliding down the razor blade of life”. Which I explained is now called “transitioning”

What Catholics believe: https://theweek.com/articles/781925/what-catholics-believe
We believe all of these things, fantastical as they may sound, and we believe them for what we consider good reasons, well attested by history, consistent with the most exacting standards of logic. We will profess them in this place of wrath and tears until the extraordinary event referenced above, for which men and women have hoped and prayed for nearly 2,000 years, comes to pass.

According to Caplan, employers are looking for conformity, conscientiousness, and intelligence. They use completion of high school, or completion of college as a sign of conformity and conscientiousness. College certainly looks as if it’s mostly signaling, and it’s hugely expensive signaling, in terms of college costs and foregone earnings.

But inserting conformity into the merit function is tricky: things become important signals… because they’re important signals. Otherwise useful actions are contraindicated because they’re “not done”. For example, test scores convey useful information. They could help show that an applicant is smart even though he attended a mediocre school – the same role they play in college admissions. But employers seldom request test scores, and although applicants may provide them, few do. Caplan says ” The word on the street… [more]
econotariat  pseudoE  broad-econ  economics  econometrics  growth-econ  education  human-capital  labor  correlation  null-result  world  developing-world  commentary  spearhead  garett-jones  twitter  social  pic  discussion  econ-metrics  rindermann-thompson  causation  endo-exo  biodet  data  chart  knowledge  article  wealth-of-nations  latin-america  study  path-dependence  divergence  🎩  curvature  microfoundations  multi  convexity-curvature  nonlinearity  hanushek  volo-avolo  endogenous-exogenous  backup  pdf  people  policy  monetary-fiscal  wonkish  cracker-econ  news  org:mag  local-global  higher-ed  impetus  signaling  rhetoric  contrarianism  domestication  propaganda  ratty  hanson  books  review  recommendations  distribution  externalities  cost-benefit  summary  natural-experiment  critique  rent-seeking  mobility  supply-demand  intervention  shift  social-choice  government  incentives  interests  q-n-a  street-fighting  objektbuch  X-not-about-Y  marginal-rev  c:***  qra  info-econ  info-dynamics  org:econlib  yvain  ssc  politics  medicine  stories 
april 2017 by nhaliday
Drivers of Cousin Marriage among British Pakistanis
Given this expectation, British Pakistani cousin marriage presents a puzzle. Evidence from small-scale studies conducted in the 1980s and the 1990s showed cousin marriage to be _more common among young British Pakistani adults than among their parents_. A West Yorkshire study found an increase from 33 to 55% in the proportion of first-cousin marriages by comparing the marriages of 100 young mothers in the postnatal wards of two maternity hospitals with their reports of their mothers’ marriages [9]. An Oxford study found an increase from 37 to 59% in first-cousin marriages, by comparing 70 marriages of adult children and grandchildren with data on the marriages of their pioneer-generation parents [10].

These data also suggested _an increase over ‘base rates’ for cousin marriage reported from Pakistan_. These are difficult to establish because of regional, urban-rural, educational and socio-economic variation. Overall estimates are that cousin marriage occurs at a rate of 38–49% in Pakistan, other marriages occurring with more distantly related or unrelated people [11, 12]. This rate is broadly similar to that reported for the Middle East and there has been no significant change over two decades [11]. A large household and obstetric inpatient survey of seven cities in the Punjab province found that 46.8% of marriages were consanguineous, to relatives such as second cousins or closer [12]. Higher frequencies of consanguineous marriage are associated with rural areas, lower levels of education and younger age at marriage, and lower frequencies are associated with urban areas and education, indicating a class dimension to the practice [11, 13].

Fifty years since Pakistani migration to Britain began, there is no firm evidence of any significant decline in the rate of cousin marriage among the children and grandchildren of pioneer-generation migrants. In fact, _recent evidence from Bradford indicates that the rate of cousin marriage has been sustained in the current childbearing generation_. Mothers of Pakistani origin accounted for 45% of the 11,396 mothers recruited to the Born in Bradford birth cohort study tracking the health of babies delivered in the Bradford Royal Infirmary between 2007 and 2011. In this study, 37% of the 5,127 babies of Pakistani origin had first-cousin parents, and 59% of these babies had parents who are consanguineous [14]. The consanguinity rate is similar to that reported in Birmingham 20 years ago [15]. It also represents an approximately 10% increase over the reported consanguinity of the babies’ maternal and paternal grandparents [16]. By contrast, a recent study from Norway demonstrates that, after an initial slight increase, the rate of first-cousin marriage among Pakistanis declined dramatically from 48.3 to 18.8% over a decade, and there was a 25% increase in marriage to unrelated partners [17]. Why, then, should the practice of marrying relatives be as common, in Bradford at least, as it was a generation ago?

>60% among Pakistani Brits (samples from 1980s)

they made a documentary, fucking lol: https://twitter.com/bbcasiannetwork/status/883340874603802624

should be noted that some of the organizers of killings of freethinkers in bangaldesh are return migrants from britain #multiculturalismFTW
study  sociology  demographics  britain  islam  MENA  migration  kinship  data  culture  sex  tribalism  age-generation  multi  pdf  org:anglo  video  documentary  news  religion  org:mag  assimilation  twitter  social  commentary  gnxp  scitariat  lurid  attaq 
april 2017 by nhaliday
Bloggingheads.tv: Gregory Cochran (The 10,000 Year Explosion) and Razib Khan (Unz Foundation, Gene Expression)
one interesting tidbit: doesn't think Homo sapiens smart enough for agriculture during previous interglacial period
Although we’re still in an ice age, we are currently in an interglacial period. That’s a good thing, since glacial periods are truly unpleasant – dry, cold, low biological productivity, high variability. Low CO2 concentrations made plants more susceptible to drought. Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd have suggested that the development of agriculture was impossible in glacial periods, due to these factors.

There was an earlier interglacial period that began about 130,000 years ago and ended about 114,000 years ago. It was a bit warmer than the current interglacial (the Holocene).

The most interesting events in the Eemian are those that didn’t happen. In the Holocene, humans developed agriculture, which led to all kinds of interesting trouble. They did it more than once, possibly as many as seven times independently. Back in the Eeemian, nichevo. Neanderthals moved father north as the glaciers melted, AMH moved up into the Middle East, but nobody did much of anything new. Populations likely increased, as habitable area expanded and biological productivity went up, but without any obvious consequences. Anatomically modern humans weren’t yet up to displacing archaic groups like the Neanderthals.

So, it is fair to say that everybody back then, including AMH, lacked capabilities that some later humans had. We could, if we wished, call these new abilities ‘behavioral modernity’.

The Bushmen are the most divergent of all human populations, and probably split off earliest. They are farther from the Bantu (in genetic distance) than the French or Chinese are.

According to some models, this split (between the Bushmen and other populations of sub-Saharan Africa) occurred more than 100,000 years ago. Recent direct measurements of mutations show much lower rates than previously thought, which tends to place such splits even farther back in time.

The question is whether they split off before the development of practical behavioral modernity.

They are anatomically modern: they have chins, etc. Behaviorally modern? There have been only a few attempts to measure their intelligence: what has been done indicates that they have very low IQs. They definitely talk, tell stories, sing songs: does that imply that they could, given the right environment, have developed the Antikythera mechanism or a clipper ship?

This means that language is older than some had thought, a good deal older. It also means that people with language are quite capable of going a quarter of a million years without generating much technological advance – without developing the ability to push aside archaic humans, for example. Of course, people with Williams syndrome have language, and you can’t send them into the kitchen and rely on them to bring back a fork. Is the sophistication of Bushman language – this means the concepts they can and do convey, not the complexity of the grammar – comparable with that of other populations? I don’t know. As far as I can see, one of the major goals of modern anthropology is to make sure that nobody knows. Or that they know things that aren’t so.


Some have suggested that the key to technological development is higher population: that produces more intellects past a high threshold, sure. I don’t think that’s the main factor. Eskimos have a pretty advanced technology, but there were never very many of them. On the other hand, they have the highest IQ of any existing hunter-gatherer population: that’s got to help. Populations must have gone up the Eemian, the previous interglacial period, but nothing much got invented back then. It would seem that agriculture would have been possible in the Eemian, but as far as we know it didn’t happen. Except for Valusia of course. With AMH going back at least 300,000 years, we have to start thinking about even earlier interglacial peiods, like Mindel-Riss (424-374 k years ago)


We now know ( from ancient DNA) that Bushmen split off from the rest of humanity (or we from them) at least a quarter of a million years ago. Generally, when you see a complex trait in sister groups, you can conclude that it existed in the common ancestor. Since both Bushmen and (everybody else) have complex language, one can conclude that complex language existed at least a quarter million years ago, in our common ancestor. You should also suspect that unique features of Bushmen language, namely those clicks, are not necessarily superficial: there has been time enough for real, baked-in, biologically rooted language differences to evolve. It also shows that having complex language isn’t enough, in itself, to generate anything very interesting. Cf Williams syndrome. Certainly technological change was very slow back then. Interglacial periods came and went without AMH displacing archaics in Eurasia or developing agriculture.

Next, the ability to generate rapid cultural change, invent lots of stuff, improvise effective bullshit didn’t exist in the common ancestor of extant humanity, since change was very slow back then.

Therefore it is not necessarily the case that every group has it today, or has it to the same extent. Psychic unity of mankind is unlikely. It’s also denied by every measurement ever made, but I guess invoking data, or your lying eyes, would be cheating.

“it has been observed by several researchers that the Khoisan palate ends to lack a prominent alveolar ridge.”

John Shea is a professor of anthropology at Stony Brook, specializing in ancient archaeology. He’s been making the argument that ‘behavioral modernity’ is a flawed concept, which it is. Naturally, he wants to replace it with something even worse. Not only are all existing human populations intellectually equal, as most anthropologists affirm – all are ‘behaviorally modern’ – all past populations of anatomically modern humans were too! The idea that our ancestors circa 150,000 B.C. might not be quite as sharp as people today is just like the now-discredited concept of race. And you know, he’s right. They’re both perfectly natural consequences of neodarwinism.

Behavioral modernity is a silly concept. As he says, it’s a typological concept: hominids are either behaviorally modern or they’re not. Now why would this make sense? Surely people vary in smarts, for example: it’s silly to say that they are either smart or not smart. We can usefully make much finer distinctions. We could think in terms of distributions – we might say that you score in the top quarter of intelligence for your population. We could analyze smarts in terms of thresholds: what is the most complex task that a given individual can perform? What fraction of the population can perform tasks of that complexity or greater? Etc. That would be a more reasonable way of looking at smarts, and this is of course what psychometrics does.

It’s also a group property. If even a few members of a population do something that anthropologists consider a sign of behavioral modernity – like making beads – everyone in that population must be behaviorally modern. By the the same argument, if anyone can reach the top shelf, we are all tall.

The notion of behavioral modernity has two roots. The first is that if you go back far enough, it’s obvious that our distant ancestors were pretty dim. Look at Oldowan tools – they’re not much more than broken rocks. And they stayed that way for a million years – change was inhumanly slow back then. That’s evidence. The second is not. Anthropologists want to say that all living populations are intellectually equal – which is not what the psychometric evidence shows. Or what population differences in brain size suggest. So they conjured up a quality – behavioral modernity – that all living people possess, but that homo erectus did not, rather than talk about quantitative differences.
west-hunter  video  interview  sapiens  agriculture  history  antiquity  technology  disease  parasites-microbiome  europe  medieval  early-modern  age-of-discovery  gavisti  gnxp  scitariat  multi  behavioral-gen  archaeology  conquest-empire  eden  intelligence  iq  evolution  archaics  africa  farmers-and-foragers  🌞  speculation  ideas  usa  discussion  roots  population  density  critique  language  cultural-dynamics  anthropology  innovation  aDNA  climate-change  speed  oscillation  aphorism  westminster  wiki  reference  environment  atmosphere  temperature  deep-materialism  pop-diff  speaking  embodied  attaq  psychometrics  biodet  domestication  gene-flow 
april 2017 by nhaliday
« earlier      
per page:    204080120160

bundles : meta

related tags

-_-  2016-election  80000-hours  :)  :/  aaronson  ability-competence  absolute-relative  academia  accelerationism  accretion  accuracy  acemoglu  acm  acmtariat  aDNA  adversarial  advertising  advice  aesthetics  africa  age-generation  age-of-discovery  aggregator  aging  agri-mindset  agriculture  ai  ai-control  akrasia  albion  alesina  algebra  algorithmic-econ  algorithms  alien-character  alignment  allodium  alt-inst  altruism  amazon  analogy  analysis  analytical-holistic  anglo  anglosphere  announcement  anomie  anonymity  anthropic  anthropology  antidemos  antiquity  aphorism  apollonian-dionysian  apple  applications  approximation  arbitrage  archaeology  archaics  architecture  aristos  arms  arrows  art  article  ascetic  asia  assimilation  atmosphere  atoms  attaq  attention  audio  authoritarianism  autism  automation  aversion  axelrod  axioms  backup  baez  bandits  bangbang  barons  bayesian  beauty  behavioral-econ  behavioral-gen  being-becoming  being-right  ben-recht  benevolence  berkeley  best-practices  better-explained  bias-variance  biases  big-list  big-peeps  big-picture  big-surf  bio  biodet  biohacking  biomechanics  biophysical-econ  biotech  bitcoin  bits  blockchain  blog  blowhards  books  borjas  bounded-cognition  branches  bret-victor  brexit  britain  broad-econ  buddhism  business  business-models  c(pp)  c:**  c:***  caching  calculation  calculator  california  caltech  canada  cancer  candidate-gene  capital  capitalism  career  cartoons  causation  censorship  characterization  charity  chart  cheatsheet  checklists  chemistry  chicago  china  christianity  christopher-lasch  civic  civil-liberty  civilization  cjones-like  clarity  class  class-warfare  classic  classification  clever-rats  climate-change  clinton  cliometrics  cloud  clown-world  coalitions  coarse-fine  cocktail  cog-psych  cohesion  cold-war  collaboration  comedy  coming-apart  commentary  communication  communism  community  comparison  compensation  competition  compilers  complex-systems  complexity  composition-decomposition  compressed-sensing  computer-vision  concentration-of-measure  concept  conceptual-vocab  concrete  concurrency  conference  confluence  confucian  conquest-empire  consumerism  context  contracts  contradiction  contrarianism  convexity-curvature  cool  cooperate-defect  coordination  core-rats  corporation  correlation  corruption  cost-benefit  counter-revolution  counterfactual  courage  course  cracker-econ  creative  crime  criminal-justice  criminology  CRISPR  critique  crooked  crosstab  crypto-anarchy  cryptocurrency  cs  cultural-dynamics  culture  culture-war  curiosity  current-events  curvature  cybernetics  cycles  cynicism-idealism  dance  dark-arts  darwinian  data  data-science  data-structures  database  dataset  dataviz  death  debate  debt  decentralized  decision-making  deep-learning  deep-materialism  deepgoog  defense  definite-planning  democracy  demographic-transition  demographics  dennett  density  dental  descriptive  design  desktop  detail-architecture  deterrence  developing-world  developmental  devtools  differential  dignity  dimensionality  direct-indirect  direction  dirty-hands  discipline  discovery  discrimination  discussion  disease  distributed  distribution  divergence  diversity  diy  documentary  documentation  domestication  dominant-minority  douthatish  draft  drama  driving  dropbox  drugs  duty  dynamic  dynamical  dysgenics  early-modern  earth  eastern-europe  ecology  econ-metrics  econ-productivity  econometrics  economics  econotariat  ed-yong  eden  eden-heaven  editors  education  EEA  effect-size  effective-altruism  efficiency  egalitarianism-hierarchy  EGT  eh  elections  electromag  elite  embodied  embodied-cognition  embodied-pack  emergent  emotion  empirical  ems  endo-exo  endocrine  endogenous-exogenous  energy-resources  engineering  enhancement  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  entanglement  entertainment  entrepreneurialism  environment  environmental-effects  envy  epidemiology  epistemic  equilibrium  eric-kaufmann  erik-demaine  error  essay  essence-existence  estimate  ethanol  ethical-algorithms  ethics  ethnocentrism  ethnography  EU  europe  events  evidence-based  evolution  evopsych  examples  existence  exit-voice  exocortex  expansionism  experiment  expert  expert-experience  explanans  explanation  exploratory  exposition  expression-survival  externalities  extrema  facebook  fall-2016  faq  farmers-and-foragers  FDA  fermi  fertility  feudal  feynman  fiction  field-study  fighting  film  finance  fire  fisher  fitness  fitsci  flexibility  fluid  flux-stasis  flynn  food  foreign-lang  foreign-policy  formal-values  forms-instances  free-riding  french  frequency  frisson  frontier  functional  fungibility-liquidity  futurism  gallic  galor-like  game-theory  games  garett-jones  gavisti  gedanken  gelman  gender  gender-diff  gene-flow  general-survey  generalization  genetic-correlation  genetic-load  genetics  genomics  geoengineering  geography  geometry  geopolitics  germanic  giants  gibbon  gif  gilens-page  gnon  gnosis-logos  gnxp  good-evil  google  gotchas  government  grad-school  gradient-descent  graphics  gravity  gray-econ  great-powers  gregory-clark  ground-up  group-level  group-selection  growth  growth-econ  GT-101  gtd  guide  guilt-shame  GWAS  gwern  GxE  h2o  habit  hacker  haidt  hanson  hanushek  hard-tech  hardness  hardware  hari-seldon  harvard  hci  health  healthcare  heavy-industry  henrich  herzog  hetero-advantage  heterodox  hi-order-bits  hidden-motives  hierarchy  high-dimension  high-variance  higher-ed  history  hive-mind  hmm  hn  homepage  homo-hetero  honor  horror  houellebecq  housing  howto  hsu  huge-data-the-biggest  human-bean  human-capital  human-ml  humanity  humility  huntington  hypochondria  hypocrisy  hypothesis-testing  ideas  identity  identity-politics  ideology  idk  IEEE  iidness  illusion  immune  impact  impetus  impro  incentives  increase-decrease  india  individualism-collectivism  industrial-org  industrial-revolution  inequality  info-dynamics  info-econ  info-foraging  infographic  information-theory  infrastructure  inhibition  init  innovation  input-output  insight  instinct  institutions  integration-extension  integrity  intel  intelligence  interdisciplinary  interests  internet  intervention  interview  intricacy  intuition  invariance  investigative-journo  investing  ioannidis  iq  iran  iraq-syria  iron-age  is-ought  islam  isotropy  israel  isteveish  iteration-recursion  iterative-methods  japan  jargon  javascript  jazz  jelani-nelson  jobs  journos-pundits  judaism  justice  kernels  kinship  kissinger  knowledge  korea  krugman  kumbaya-kult  labor  land  language  large-factor  latin-america  law  leadership  leaks  learning  learning-theory  lecture-notes  lectures  lee-kuan-yew  left-wing  legacy  legibility  lens  lesswrong  let-me-see  letters  levers  leviathan  life-history  lifts-projections  linear-algebra  linearity  liner-notes  links  list  literature  lived-experience  lmao  local-global  lol  long-short-run  long-term  longevity  longform  love-hate  lower-bounds  lurid  machiavelli  machine-learning  macro  madisonian  magnitude  maker  malaise  malthus  management  managerial-state  maps  marginal  marginal-rev  market-failure  market-power  markets  markov  martial  matching  math  math.CO  math.DS  math.GR  math.MG  mathtariat  matrix-factorization  maxim-gun  meaningness  measure  measurement  mechanics  mechanism-design  media  medicine  medieval  mediterranean  memes(ew)  memory-management  MENA  mena4  mendel-randomization  meta-analysis  meta:medicine  meta:prediction  meta:rhetoric  meta:science  meta:war  metabolic  metabuch  metameta  methodology  metrics  michael-jordan  michael-nielsen  micro  microbiz  microfoundations  migrant-crisis  migration  mihai  military  minimalism  minimum-viable  miri-cfar  mit  mobile  mobility  model-class  model-organism  models  modernity  mokyr-allen-mccloskey  moloch  moments  monetary-fiscal  money  mood-affiliation  morality  mostly-modern  motivation  mrtz  multi  murray  music  music-theory  musk  mutation  mystic  n-factor  narrative  nascent-state  nationalism-globalism  natural-experiment  nature  neocons  network-structure  networking  neuro  neurons  new-religion  news  nibble  nietzschean  nihil  nitty-gritty  nl-and-so-can-you  nlp  no-go  noble-lie  noblesse-oblige  nonlinearity  nordic  norms  north-weingast-like  northeast  nostalgia  novelty  nuclear  null-result  number  numerics  nutrition  nyc  obama  obesity  objective-measure  objektbuch  occident  oceans  off-convex  offense-defense  old-anglo  online-learning  open-closed  open-things  operational  opioids  optimate  optimism  optimization  order-disorder  ORFE  org:anglo  org:biz  org:bleg  org:bv  org:data  org:davos  org:econlib  org:edge  org:edu  org:euro  org:foreign  org:health  org:inst  org:junk  org:lite  org:local  org:mag  org:med  org:nat  org:ngo  org:popup  org:rec  org:sci  organization  organizing  orient  orwellian  os  oscillation  other-xtian  outcome-risk  outdoors  overflow  p:*  p:**  p:***  p:null  p:someday  p:whenever  paleocon  papers  paradox  parallax  parasites-microbiome  parenting  parody  parsimony  paternal-age  path-dependence  patho-altruism  paying-rent  pdf  peace-violence  people  performance  personality  persuasion  perturbation  pessimism  peter-singer  phalanges  pharma  philosophy  phys-energy  physics  pic  piketty  pinker  piracy  planning  play  plots  pls  plt  poast  podcast  poetry  polanyi-marx  polarization  policy  polis  polisci  political-econ  politics  poll  polynomials  pop-diff  pop-structure  popsci  population  population-genetics  populism  postmortem  postrat  power  practice  pragmatic  pre-2013  pre-ww2  prediction  prediction-markets  preference-falsification  preimage  prepping  preprint  presentation  primitivism  princeton  prioritizing  privacy  pro-rata  probability  problem-solving  procrastination  productivity  prof  profile  programming  project  propaganda  property-rights  proposal  protestant-catholic  protocol  prudence  pseudoE  psych-architecture  psychiatry  psychology  psychometrics  public-goodish  public-health  putnam-like  python  q-n-a  qra  QTL  quantitative-qualitative  quantum  quantum-info  questions  quixotic  quotes  race  random  randy-ayndy  ranking  rant  rationality  ratty  reading  realness  realpolitik  reason  recent-selection  recommendations  recording  recruiting  red-queen  reddit  redistribution  reduction  reference  reflection  regional-scatter-plots  regression  regression-to-mean  regularizer  regulation  reinforcement  religion  rent-seeking  replication  repo  reputation  research  research-program  responsibility  retention  review  revolution  rhetoric  right-wing  rigidity  rigor  rindermann-thompson  risk  ritual  robotics  robust  rock  roots  rot  rounding  ruby  russia  rust  s-factor  s:*  s:**  s:***  sanctity-degradation  sapiens  satire  scale  scaling-up  scholar  scholar-pack  science  science-anxiety  scifi-fantasy  scitariat  SDP  search  sebastien-bubeck  security  selection  self-control  self-interest  selfish-gene  seminar  sentiment  sequential  serene  sex  sexuality  shakespeare  shannon  shift  sib-study  SIGGRAPH  signal-noise  signaling  similarity  simler  simulation  singularity  sinosphere  skeleton  skunkworks  sky  sleuthin  slides  slippery-slope  smart-contracts  social  social-capital  social-choice  social-norms  social-psych  social-science  social-structure  sociality  society  sociology  socs-and-mops  software  solid-study  space  space-complexity  sparsity  spatial  speaking  spearhead  speculation  speed  speedometer  sports  spreading  spring-2016  ssc  stagnation  stanford  startups  stat-power  statesmen  stats  status  steel-man  stereotypes  stochastic-processes  stock-flow  stories  strategy  straussian  stream  street-fighting  stress  structure  study  studying  stylized-facts  subculture  sublinear  submodular  success  sulla  sum-of-squares  summary  supply-demand  survey  survival  sv  swimming  symmetry  synchrony  synthesis  systematic-ad-hoc  systems  szabo  tactics  talks  tapes  taxes  tcs  tcstariat  teaching  tech  technocracy  technology  techtariat  telos-atelos  temperance  temperature  terminal  terrorism  tetlock  the-basilisk  the-bones  the-classics  the-devil  the-great-west-whale  the-monster  the-self  the-south  the-trenches  the-watchers  the-west  the-world-is-just-atoms  theory-of-mind  theos  thermo  thick-thin  thiel  things  thinking  threat-modeling  thucydides  thurston  tightness  tim-roughgarden  time  time-preference  time-series  time-use  tip-of-tongue  todo  toolkit  tools  top-n  topics  toxoplasmosis  toys  traces  track-record  trade  tradeoffs  tradition  transportation  travel  trends  tribalism  tricks  trivia  troll  trump  trust  truth  tumblr  tutorial  tutoring  tv  twitter  ui  unaffiliated  uncertainty  unintended-consequences  uniqueness  unit  universalism-particularism  unsupervised  urban  urban-rural  us-them  usa  utopia-dystopia  ux  vaclav-smil  vague  valiant  values  vampire-squid  variance-components  venture  video  virginia-DC  virtu  visual-understanding  visualization  visuo  vitality  volo-avolo  vulgar  war  water  waves  wealth  wealth-of-nations  web  webapp  weightlifting  weird  welfare-state  west-hunter  westminster  white-paper  wigderson  wiki  wild-ideas  winner-take-all  wire-guided  wisdom  within-group  within-without  woah  wonkish  wordlessness  workflow  workshop  world  world-war  worrydream  wtf  wut  X-not-about-Y  x-sports  xenobio  yak-shaving  yarvin  yc  yoga  yvain  zeitgeist  zero-positive-sum  🌞  🎓  🎩  🐸  👳  👽  🔬  🖥  🤖  🦀  🦉 

Copy this bookmark: