nhaliday + populism   86

The Political Typology: Beyond Red vs. Blue | Pew Research Center
The new typology has eight groups: Three are strongly ideological, highly politically engaged and overwhelmingly partisan – two on the right and one on the left. Steadfast Conservatives are staunch critics of government and the social safety net and are very socially conservative. Business Conservatives share Steadfast Conservatives’ preference for limited government, but differ in their support for Wall Street and business, as well as immigration reform. And Business Conservatives are far more moderate on social issues than are Steadfast Conservatives.

At the other end of the spectrum, Solid Liberals express liberal attitudes across almost every realm – government, the economy and business and foreign policy, as well as on race, homosexuality and abortion – and are reliable and loyal Democratic voters.

Taken together, these three groups form the electoral base of the Democratic and Republican Parties, and their influence on American politics is strong. While Solid Liberals, Steadfast Conservatives and Business Conservatives collectively make up only 36% of the American public, they represent 43% of registered voters and fully 57% of the more politically engaged segment of the American public: those who regularly vote and routinely follow government and public affairs.

The other typology groups are less partisan, less predictable and have little in common with each other or the groups at either end of the political spectrum. The one thing they do share is that they are less engaged politically than the groups on the right or left.

Young Outsiders lean Republican but do not have a strong allegiance to the Republican Party; in fact they tend to dislike both political parties. On many issues, from their support for environmental regulation to their liberal views on social issues, they diverge from traditional GOP orthodoxy. Yet in their support for limited government, Young Outsiders are firmly in the Republicans’ camp.

Hard-Pressed Skeptics have been battered by the struggling economy, and their difficult financial circumstances have left them resentful of both government and business. Despite their criticism of government performance, they back more generous government support for the poor and needy. Most Hard-Pressed Skeptics say they voted for Obama in 2012, though fewer than half approve of his job performance today.

The Next Generation Left are young, relatively affluent and very liberal on social issues like same-sex marriage and abortion. But they have reservations about the cost of social programs. And while most of the Next Generation Left support affirmative action, they decisively reject the idea that racial discrimination is the main reason why many blacks are unable to get ahead.

The Faith and Family Left lean Democratic, based on their confidence in government and support for federal programs to address the nation’s problems. But this very religious, racially and ethnically diverse group is uncomfortable with the pace of societal change, including the acceptance of homosexuality and non-traditional family structures.

And finally, an eighth group, the Bystanders, representing 10% of the public, are on the sidelines of the political process. They are not registered to vote and pay very little attention to politics.

...

The Faith and Family Left is by far the most racially and ethnically diverse group in the typology: In fact, just 41% are white non-Hispanic; 30% are black, 19% are Hispanic and 8% are other or mixed race. The Faith and Family Left also is less affluent and less educated than the other Democratically-oriented groups, and is older as well.

They also have strong religious convictions, which distinguishes them from Solid Liberals and the Next Generation Left. Fully 91% say “it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values.” No more than about one-in-ten in the other Democratically-oriented groups agree. And the Faith and Family Left have much more conservative positions on social issues. Just 37% favor same-sex marriage, less than half the share of the other two groups on the left.

The Faith and Family Left support activist government and a strong social safety net, though by less overwhelming margins than Solid Liberals. And while the Faith and Family Left support affirmative action programs, just 31% believe that “racial discrimination is the main reason many black people can’t get ahead these days.” Among the much less racially diverse Solid Liberals, 80% think racial discrimination is the main barrier to black progress.

...

First, Steadfast Conservatives take very conservative views on key social issues like homosexuality and immigration, while Business Conservatives are less conservative – if not actually progressive – on these issues. Nearly three-quarters of Steadfast Conservatives (74%) believe that homosexuality should be discouraged by society. Among Business Conservatives, just 31% think homosexuality should be discouraged; 58% believe it should be accepted.

Business Conservatives have generally positive attitudes toward immigrants and 72% favor a “path to citizenship” for those in the U.S. illegally, if they meet certain conditions. Steadfast Conservatives are more critical of immigrants; 50% support a path to citizenship, the lowest share of any typology group.

Second, just as Steadfast Conservatives are opposed to big government, they also are skeptical of big business. They believe that large corporations have too much power, and nearly half (48%) say the economic system unfairly favors powerful interests. By contrast, as their name suggests, Business Conservatives are far more positive about the free market, and overwhelmingly regard business – and Wall Street – positively.

group profiles (including demographics): http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/26/appendix-1-typology-group-profiles/

2017 redux:
Political Typology Reveals Deep Fissures on the Right and Left: http://www.people-press.org/2017/10/24/political-typology-reveals-deep-fissures-on-the-right-and-left/
Nearly a year after Donald Trump was elected president, the Republican coalition is deeply divided on such major issues as immigration, America’s role in the world and the fundamental fairness of the U.S. economic system.

The Democratic coalition is largely united in staunch opposition to President Trump. Yet, while Trump’s election has triggered a wave of political activism within the party’s sizable liberal bloc, the liberals’ sky-high political energy is not nearly as evident among other segments in the Democratic base. And Democrats also are internally divided over U.S. global involvement, as well as some religious and social issues.

...

Divisions on the right

The political typology finds two distinctly different groups on the right – Core Conservatives and Country First Conservatives, who both overwhelmingly approve of Trump, but disagree on much else – including immigration and whether it benefits the U.S. to be active internationally.

Core Conservatives, who are in many ways the most traditional group of Republicans, have an outsized influence on the GOP coalition; while they make up just 13% of the public – and about a third (31%) of all Republicans and Republican-leaning independents – they constitute a much larger share (43%) of politically engaged Republicans.

This financially comfortable, male-dominated group overwhelmingly supports smaller government, lower corporate tax rates and believes in the fairness of the nation’s economic system. And a large majority of Core Conservatives (68%) express a positive view of U.S. involvement in the global economy “because it provides the U.S. with new markets and opportunities for growth.”

Country First Conservatives, a much smaller segment of the GOP base, are older and less educated than other Republican-leaning typology groups. Unlike Core Conservatives, Country First Conservatives are unhappy with the nation’s course, highly critical of immigrants and deeply wary of U.S. global involvement.

Nearly two-thirds of Country First Conservatives (64%) – the highest share of any typology group, right or left – say that “if America is too open to people from all over the world, we risk losing our identity as a nation.”

A third Republican group, Market Skeptic Republicans, sharply diverges from the GOP’s traditional support for business and lower taxes. Only about a third of Market Skeptic Republicans (34%) say banks and other financial institutions have a positive effect on the way things are going in the country, lowest among Republican-leaning typology groups.

Alone among the groups in the GOP coalition, a majority of Market Skeptic Republicans support raising tax rates on corporations and large businesses. An overwhelming share (94%) say the economic system unfairly favors powerful interests, which places the view of Market Skeptic Republicans on this issue much closer to Solid Liberals (99% mostly unfair) than Core Conservatives (21%).

In contrast to Market Skeptic Republicans, New Era Enterprisers are fundamentally optimistic about the state of the nation and its future. They are more likely than any other typology group to say the next generation of Americans will have it better than people today. Younger and somewhat less overwhelmingly white than the other GOP-leaning groups, New Era Enterprisers are strongly pro-business and generally think that immigrants strengthen, rather than burden, the country.

Divisions on the left

...

While there have long been racial, ethnic and income differences within the Democratic coalition, these gaps are especially striking today. Reflecting the changing demographic composition of the Democratic base, for the first time there are two majority-minority Democratic-leaning typology groups, along with two more affluent, mostly white groups.

Solid Liberals are the largest group in the Democratic coalition, and they make up close to half (48%) of politically engaged Democrats and Democratic-leaning … [more]
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october 2017 by nhaliday
German Election: The AfD Profits from Non-Voters and Merkel Defectors | ZEIT ONLINE
The conservatives and center-left suffered huge losses while the right-wing populist AfD became Saxony's most powerful party. We analyzed the data so you don’t have to.

The anti-Muslim AfD just scored big in Germany’s election. What does this mean for German Muslims?: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/25/the-anti-muslim-afd-just-scored-big-in-germanys-election-what-does-this-mean-for-german-muslims/

The Germans Turn Right: http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-germans-turn-right/article/2009880
- Christopher Caldwell

The German Election—A Conservative Analysis: http://quillette.com/2017/09/28/german-election-conservative-analysis/
As traditional European conservatives were pushed Left-ward by media and academic communities on immigration and social and religious rights, the vacuum was filled by the rise of blut-und-boden far right parties all across Europe. In a Sophoclean twist of fate, the European political center and center-Left is now dying, thanks to the very person that liberals like to portray as the “new leader” of the free world.

later:
The End of German Stability: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_good_fight/2017/11/germany_s_coalition_talks_collapse_threatening_stability.html
The collapse of coalition talks bodes badly for Angela Merkel, and for democratic governments everywhere.

Austrian legislative election, 2017: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austrian_legislative_election,_2017
Austria heads for right-leaning coalition: http://www.politico.eu/article/austria-heads-for-right-leaning-coalition-early-projections/
https://twitter.com/almodozo/status/919662426966118403
https://archive.is/4vkG6
Finally an election where the far right actually did best (barely) among youngest voters: FPÖ got 30% of the <30 vote. SPÖ voters old #nrw17

European Populism Is Here to Stay: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/opinion/european-populism-is-here-to-stay.html

Czech Republic:
http://www.nydailynews.com/newswires/news/world/populist-billionaire-party-wins-big-czech-republic-article-1.3578312
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-czech-election-farright/far-right-scores-surprise-success-in-czech-election-idUSKBN1CQ0T3

Dealing with the Dignity Deficit: https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/04/05/dealing-dignity-deficit/
Are the grievances tearing our societies apart at this hyper-polarized moment insurmountable? A week with some AfD voters and politicians gave me a measure of hope.

More importantly, a generous welfare state appears at best to be an inadequate solution to the problems and pathologies of checker-boarded economic dislocation. The pesky question of dignity remains: Despite what boosters of a universal basic income try to tell us, our modern sense of purpose and identity remains closely tied to what we “do” for a living. Making disempowered people more comfortable does not necessarily make them less frustrated.

...

But since when are openness, cosmopolitanism, and diversity intrinsic to a complete definition of liberalism? They make no significant appearance in any of the foundational texts of liberal political thought. They are merely the product of the demands that globalization and urbanization places upon us “anywheres”, which we in turn try to wedge into the liberal canon in order to erase any discomfort we may feel about change pulling the ideological rug out from under our feet. Historical accounts of earlier periods of urbanization are rightly dispassionate in describing people flocking to cities out of economic want. And they correctly identify the emergence of the middle class and its attendant values as the product of complex factors interacting in these new circumstances. We instead now disfigure analysis into a form or moral self-congratulation.
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september 2017 by nhaliday
Seven charts that show how the developed world is losing its edge
Savings China’s gross savings (at market exchange rates) are nearly as large as those of the US and EU combined. China saves almost half of its national income. This extraordinarily high share is likely to fall but that decline is set to be gradual, since Chinese households are likely to remain frugal and the share of profits in national income is likely to remain high.

80% of the US had no real increase in income 2005 to 2012-2014

Time to worry about the American consumer?: https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/08/03/2192172/time-to-worry-about-the-american-consumer/
Two basic ways to spend more money: you can earn more and save the same, or you can earn the same and save less. Newly revised data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis show that American consumers have spent the past two years embracing option 2. The average American now saves about 35 per cent less than in 2015:

...

Not since the beginning of 2008 have Americans saved so little — and that’s before accounting for inflation. It could be a sign of trouble ahead.

https://twitter.com/menangahela/status/956993883556208641
https://archive.is/HKov7
this seems not good

China's Financial Debt: Everything You Know Is Wrong: http://www.unz.com/article/chinas-financial-debt-everything-you-know-is-wrong/
As China Piles on Debt, Consumers Seek a Piece of the Action: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/business/china-debt-consumers.html
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july 2017 by nhaliday
Does Management Matter? Evidence from India
We have shown that management matters, with improvements in management practices improving plant-level outcomes. One response from economists might then be to argue that poor management can at most be a short-run problem, since in the long run better managed firms should take over the market. Yet many of our firms have been in business for 20 years and more.

One reason why better run firms do not dominate the market is constraints on growth derived from limited managerial span of control. In every firm in our sample only members of the owning family have positions with major decision-making power over finance, purchasing, operations or employment. Non-family members are given only lower-level managerial positions with authority only over basic day-to-day activities. The principal reason is that family members do not trust non-family members. For example, they are concerned if they let their plant managers procure yarn they may do so at inflated rates from friends and receive kick-backs.

A key reason for this inability to decentralize is the poor rule of law in India. Even if directors found managers stealing, their ability to successfully prosecute them and recover the assets is minimal because of the inefficiency of Indian civil courts. A compounding reason for the inability to decentralize in Indian firms is bad management practices, as this means the owners cannot keep good track of materials and finance, so may not even able to identify mismanagement or theft within their firms.30

As a result of this inability to delegate, firms can expand beyond the size that can be managed by a single director only if other family members are available to share directorial duties. Thus, an important predictor of firm size was the number of male family members of the owners. In particular, the number of brothers and sons of the leading director has a correlation of 0.689 with the total employment of the firm, compared to a correlation between employment and the average management score of 0.223. In fact the best managed firm in our sample had only one (large) production plant, in large part because the owner had no brothers or sons to help run a larger organization. This matches the ideas of the Lucas (1978) span of control model, that there are diminishing returns to how much additional productivity better management technology can generate from a single manager. In the Lucas model, the limits to firm growth restrict the ability of highly productive firms to drive lower productivity ones from the market. In our Indian firms, this span of control restriction is definitely binding, so unproductive firms are able to survive because more productive firms cannot expand.

https://twitter.com/pseudoerasmus/status/885915088951095296

http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2017/03/india-much-entrepreneurial-society-united-states-thats-problem.html
However, when we reverse the employment statistic–only ~15% of Indians work for a firm compared to approximately 90% of US workers we see the problem. Entrepreneurship in India isn’t a choice, it’s a requirement. Indian entrepreneurship is a consequence of India’s failed economy. As a I wrote in my Cato paper with Goldschlag, less developed countries in general, not just India, have more entrepreneurs.

...

The modal size of an Indian firm is 1 employee and the mean is just over 2. The mean number of employees in a US firm is closer to 20 but even though that is ten times the Indian number it obscures the real difference. The US has many small firms but what makes it different is that it also has large firms that employ lots of people. In fact, over half of all US workers are employed by the tiny minority (0.3%) of firms with over 500 employees.

blames colonialism, idk, might have contributed

Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20150029
Students in India who cheat on a simple laboratory task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs. This paper shows that cheating on this task predicts corrupt behavior by civil servants, implying that it is a meaningful predictor of future corruption. Students who demonstrate pro-social preferences are less likely to prefer government jobs, while outcomes on an explicit game and attitudinal measures to measure corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. _A screening process that chooses high-ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption._ The findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption.

Where Does the Good Shepherd Go? Civic Virtue and Sorting into Public Sector Employment: http://repec.business.uzh.ch/RePEc/iso/leadinghouse/0134_lhwpaper.pdf
Our study extends the understanding of the motivational basis of public sector employment by considering civic virtue in addition to altruism and risk aversion and by investigating selection and socialization. Using a largely representative, longitudinal data set of employees in Germany including 63,101 observations of 13,673 different individuals, we find that civic virtue relates positively to public sector employment beyond altruism and risk aversion. We find evidence on selection and no evidence on socialization as an explanation for this result.

http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21716019-penchant-criminality-electoral-asset-india-worlds-biggest
Sadly, this is not a book about some small, shady corner of Indian politics: 34% of the members of parliament (MPs) in the Lok Sabha (lower house) have criminal charges filed against them; and the figure is rising (see chart). Some of the raps are peccadillos, such as rioting or unlawful assembly—par for the course in India’s raucous local politics. But over a fifth of MPs are in the dock for serious crimes, often facing reams of charges for anything from theft to intimidation and worse. (Because the Indian judicial system has a backlog of 31m cases, even serious crimes can take a decade or more to try, so few politicians have been convicted.) One can walk just about the whole way from Mumbai to Kolkata without stepping foot outside a constituency whose MP isn’t facing a charge.

...

What is more surprising is that the supply of willing criminals-cum-politicians was met with eager demand from voters. Over the past three general elections, a candidate with a rap sheet of serious charges has had an 18% chance of winning his or her race, compared with 6% for a “clean” rival. Mr Vaishnav dispels the conventional wisdom that crooks win because they can get voters to focus on caste or some other sectarian allegiance, thus overlooking their criminality. If anything, the more serious the charge, the bigger the electoral boost, as politicians well know.

As so often happens in India, poverty plays a part. India is almost unique in having adopted universal suffrage while it was still very poor. The upshot has been that underdeveloped institutions fail to deliver what citizens vote for. Getting the state to perform its most basic functions—building a school, disbursing a subsidy, repaving a road—is a job that can require banging a few heads together. Sometimes literally. Who better to represent needy constituents in these tricky situations than someone who “knows how to get things done”? If the system doesn’t work for you, a thuggish MP can be a powerful ally.

http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36446652
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july 2017 by nhaliday
Edward Feser: Conservatism, populism, and snobbery
https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/888972865063747587
https://archive.is/nuwnX
feser is good on this: chief task of conservative intellectuals is to defend epistemic credentials of mere prejudice

The Right vindicates common sense distinctions: https://bonald.wordpress.com/2017/02/10/the-right-vindicates-common-sense-distinctions/
In some ways, we’re already there. One of the core intellectual tasks of the Right has been, and will continue to be, the analysis and rehabilitation of categories found useful by pre-modern humanity but rejected by moderns in their fits of ideologically-driven oversimplification.
Consider these three:
1. Friend vs. Enemy. Carl Schmitt famously put this distinction at the core of his political theory in explicit defiance of the liberal humanitarianism of his day that wanted to reduce all questions to abstract morality and economic efficiency. The friend vs. enemy distinction, Schmitt insisted, is independent of these. To identify a threatening nation as the enemy does not necessarily make any statement about its moral, aesthetic, or economic qualities. Schmitt observed that the liberal nations (for him, the victors of WWI) in fact do mobilize against threats and competitors; forbidding themselves the vocabulary of “friend” and “enemy” means they recast their hostilities in terms of moral absolutes. The nation they attack cannot be called their own enemy, so it must be demonized as the enemy of all humanity. This will be a reoccurring conservative argument. Eliminating a needed category doesn’t eliminate hostility between peoples; it only forces them to be incorrectly conceptualized along moral lines, which actually diminishes our ability to empathize with our opponent.
2. Native vs. Foreigner. Much of what Schmitt said about the distinction between friend and enemy applies to the more basic categorization of people as belonging to “us” or as being alien. I argued recently in the Orthosphere, concerning the topic of Muslim immigration, that we can actually be more sympathetic to Muslims among us if we acknowledge that our concern is not that their ways are objectionable in some absolute (moral/philosophical) sense, but that they are alien to the culture we wish to preserve as dominant in our nation. Reflections about the “universal person” are also quite relevant to this.
3. Masculine vs. feminine. Conservatives have found little to recommend the liberals’ distinction between biological “sex” and socially constructed “gender”. However, pre-modern peoples had intriguing intuitions of masculinity and femininity as essences or principles that can be considered beyond the strict context of sexual reproduction. Largely defined by relation to each other (so that, for example, a woman relates in a feminine way to other people more than to wild animals or inanimate objects), even things other than sexually reproducing animals can participate in these principles to some extent. For example, the sun is masculine while Luna is feminine, at least in how they present themselves to us. Masculinity and femininity seem to represent poles in the structure of relationality itself, and so even the more mythical attributions of these essences were not necessarily intended metaphorically.

The liberal critique of these categories, and others not accommodated by their ideology, comes down to the following
1. Imperialism of the moral. The category in question is recognized as nonmoral, and the critic asserts that it is morally superior to use only moral categories. (“Wouldn’t it be better to judge someone based on whether he’s a good person than on where he was born?”) Alternatively, the critic presumes that other categories actually are reducible to moral categories, and other categories are condemned for being inaccurate in their presumed implicit moral evaluations. (“He’s a good person. How can you call him an ‘alien’ as if he were some kind of monster?!”)
2. Appeal to boundary cases. Sometimes the boundaries of the criticized category are fuzzy. Perhaps a particular person is like “us” in some ways but unlike “us” in others. From this, conclude that the category is arbitrary and meaningless.
3. Emotivism. Claim that the criticized category is actually a sub-rational emotional response. It must be because it has no place in liberal ideology, which the liberal presumes to be coextensive with reason itself. And in fact, when certain ways of thinking are made socially unacceptable, they will likely only pop out in emergencies and moments of distress. It would be no different with moral categories–if the concepts “evil” and “unfair” were socially disfavored, people would only resort to them when intolerably provoked and undoubtedly emotional.
4. Imputation of sinister social motives. The critic points out that the categorization promotes some established social structure; therefore, it must be an illusion.

Why the Republican Party Is Falling Apart: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-the-republican-party-falling-apart-22491?page=show
Moore and a great many of his voters subscribe to a simplistic and exaggerated view of the world and the conflicts it contains. Moore has voiced the belief that Christian communities in Illinois or Indiana, or somewhere “up north,” are under Sharia law. That’s absurd. But why does he believe it, and why do voters trust him despite such beliefs? Because on the other side is another falsehood, more sophisticated but patently false: the notion that unlimited Islamic immigration to Europe, for example, is utterly harmless, or the notion that Iran is an implacable fundamentalist threat while good Sunni extremists in Saudi Arabia are our true and faithful friends. Each of the apocalyptic beliefs held by a Roy Moore or his supporters contains a fragment of truth—or at least amounts to a rejection of some falsehood that has become an article of faith among America’s elite. The liberal view of the world to which Democrats and elite Republicans alike subscribe is false, but the resources for showing its falsehood in a nuanced way are lacking. Even the more intellectual sort of right-winger who makes it through the cultural indoctrination of his college and peer class tends to be mutilated by the experience. He—most often a he—comes out of it embittered and reactionary or else addicted to opium dreams of neo-medievalism or platonic republics. Since there are few nonliberal institutions of political thought, the right that recognizes the falsehood of liberalism and rejects it tends to be a force of feeling rather than reflection. Moore, of course, has a legal education, and he assuredly reads the Bible. He’s not unintelligent, but he cannot lean upon a well-balanced and subtle right because such a thing hardly exists in our environment. Yet there is a need for a right nonetheless, and so a Roy Moore or a Donald Trump fills the gap. There is only one thing the Republican establishment can do if it doesn’t like that: reform itself from stem to stern.

Who Are ‘The People’ Anyway?: http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/who-are-the-people-anyway/
Beware of those who claim to speak for today's populist audience.
- Paul Gottfried

Gottfried's got a real chip on his shoulder about the Straussians
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july 2017 by nhaliday
Corrupting cooperation and how anti-corruption strategies may backfire | Nature Human Behaviour
https://images.nature.com/original/nature-assets/nathumbehav/2017/s41562-017-0138/extref/s41562-017-0138-s1.pdf
Exposure to Norms: https://images.nature.com/original/nature-assets/nathumbehav/2017/s41562-017-0138/extref/s41562-017-0138-s1.pdf#page=114
Here we test how exposure to corruption norms affect behavior in our game. We do so by using our exposure score (a mean of the corruption perceptions of the countries the participant has lived in) and the heritage corruption score (a mean of the corruption perceptions of the countries the participant has an ethnic heritage). Since there is no incentive to offer bribes or contribute, except when compelled to do so by punishment, we predict that exposure to norms should primarily affect Leader decisions. Nonetheless, internalized norms may also affect the behavior of players in contributing and bribing.

...

The correlation between the direct exposure and heritage measures of corruption is r = 0.67, p < .001.

...

Then we see that direct exposure to corruption norms results in increased corrupt behavior—i.e. in our Canadian sample, those who have lived in corrupt countries from which they do not derive their heritage behave in more corrupt ways.

hard to interpret

https://twitter.com/Evolving_Moloch/status/884477414100697092
http://psych.ubc.ca/when-less-is-best/

I don't think the solution is to just do nothing. Should look to history for ideas; process of "getting to Denmark" took centuries in NW Euro. Try to replicate and don't expect fast results.

Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10510
I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the results through a theoretical lens that considers the implications of trust networks. A bond of trust may permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a bribe, which reduces corruption. Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents of areas with many other long-term residents, and by individuals in regions with many residents their own age. I confirm that the prevalence of bribery is lower under these circumstances, using the International Crime Victim Surveys. I also find that older people, who have had time to develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show that victims of (other) crimes bribe all types of public officials more than non-victims, and argue that both their victimization and bribery stem from a distrustful environment.

Kinship, Fractionalization and Corruption: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2847222
The theory of kin selection provides a straightforward justification for norms of nepotism and favoritism among relatives; more subtly, it also implies that the returns to such norms may be influenced by mating practices. Specifically, in societies with high levels of sub-ethnic fractionalization, where endogamous (and consanguineous) mating within kin-group, clan and tribe increases the local relatedness of individuals, the relative returns to norms of nepotism and favoritism are high. In societies with exogamous marriage practices, the relative returns to norms of impartial cooperation with non-relatives and strangers are increased. Using cross-country and within-country regression analyses and a cross-country lab experiment, we provide evidence for this account.

Ethnic favouritism: Not just an African phenomenon: http://voxeu.org/article/ethnic-favouritism-not-just-african-phenomenon
Ethnic favouritism is a global phenomenon
We find robust evidence for ethnic favouritism – ethnographic regions that are the current political leader’s ethnic homeland enjoy 7%-10% more intense night-time light, corresponding to 2%-3% higher regional GDP. Furthermore, we show that ethnic favouritism extends to ethnic groups that are linguistically close to the political leader.

Most significantly, these effects are as strong outside of Africa as they are within, challenging the preconception that ethnic favouritism is mainly or even entirely a sub-Saharan African phenomenon. For example, Bolivian presidents tended to favour areas populated by European descendants and Criollos, largely at the expense of the indigenous population. After the election of Evo Morales, a member of the indigenous Ayamara ethnic group, luminosity in indigenous areas grew substantially. Notably, critics suggest Morales gave special attention to the interests and values of the Ayamara at the expense of other indigenous peoples (e.g. Albro 2010, Postero 2010).

Democratisation is not a panacea
Our results further suggest that, while democratic institutions have a weak tendency to reduce ethnic favouritism, their effect is limited. In particular, a change from autocratic regimes to weak democracies does not seem to reduce ethnic favouritism (and may even increase it).

This result could in part be explained by political leaders’ motivations for engaging in ethnic favouritism. We find that the practice intensifies around election years in which the political leader's office is contested, suggesting that leaders may target policies towards their ethnic homelands to improve their re-election prospects, and not solely out of co-ethnic altruism. To the extent that political leaders engage in ethnic favouritism for electoral purposes, democratisation is not likely to be effective in curbing the practice.

Facebook’s war on free will: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/19/facebooks-war-on-free-will
Though Facebook will occasionally talk about the transparency of governments and corporations, what it really wants to advance is the transparency of individuals – or what it has called, at various moments, “radical transparency” or “ultimate transparency”. The theory holds that the sunshine of sharing our intimate details will disinfect the moral mess of our lives. With the looming threat that our embarrassing information will be broadcast, we’ll behave better. And perhaps the ubiquity of incriminating photos and damning revelations will prod us to become more tolerant of one another’s sins. “The days of you having a different image for your work friends or co-workers and for the other people you know are probably coming to an end pretty quickly,” Zuckerberg has said. “Having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack of integrity.”

The point is that Facebook has a strong, paternalistic view on what’s best for you, and it’s trying to transport you there. “To get people to this point where there’s more openness – that’s a big challenge. But I think we’ll do it,” Zuckerberg has said. He has reason to believe that he will achieve that goal. With its size, Facebook has amassed outsized powers. “In a lot of ways Facebook is more like a government than a traditional company,” Zuckerberg has said. “We have this large community of people, and more than other technology companies we’re really setting policies.”

Facebook and the Destruction of Private Life: http://www.socialmatter.net/2014/12/30/facebook-and-the-destruction-of-private-life/
- HENRY DAMPIER

The key value of privacy, which tends to be lost amid all the technological babble about the concept, is that it makes social cooperation more feasible among people who disagree, share different tastes, or fundamental points of view.

...

This is especially an issue with democracy. The reason why the United States has anonymous voting laws is because without them, people are persecuted for their party affiliations by people with rival party loyalties. This being forgotten, the age of Facebook and similar technologies has opened up ordinary people to this sort of ordinary political persecution. Moderating influences like that of the respect for privacy put a brake on some of the more rapacious, violent aspects of party politics.

...

The impulse for this comes less from the availability of the technology, and more because of the preexisting social trends. When there is a family life, there is communication and closeness within the family.

With more people living without a family life, they go to the public square to get their needs for social validation met. This doesn’t work so well, because strangers have no skin in the life of the atomized individual that only exists as an image on their screens.
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july 2017 by nhaliday
the mass defunding of higher education that’s yet to come – the ANOVA
Meanwhile, in my very large network of professional academics, almost no one recognizes any threat at all. Many, I can say with great confidence, would reply to the poll above with glee. They would tell you that they don’t want the support of Republicans. There’s little attempt to grapple with the simple, pragmatic realities of political power and how it threatens vulnerable institutions whose funding is in doubt. That’s because there is no professional or social incentive in the academy to think strategically or to understand that there is a world beyond campus. Instead, all of the incentives point towards constantly affirming one’s position in the moral aristocracy that the academy has imagined itself as. The less one spends on concerns about how the university and its subsidiary departments function in our broader society, the greater one’s performed fealty to the presumed righteousness of the communal values. I cannot imagine a professional culture less equipped to deal with a crisis than that of academics in the humanities and social sciences and the current threats of today. The Iron Law of Institutions defines the modern university, and what moves someone up the professional ranks within a given field is precisely the type of studied indifference to any concerns that originate outside of the campus walls.

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/449418/right-wing-populism-next-target-american-higher-education
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/07/10/wages-campus-revolts/
http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/polarized-attitudes-about-college/

https://twitter.com/jttiehen/status/911475904731275265
https://archive.is/zN0Dh
TBH, if people like Ben Shapiro need $600k security details, universities are on borrowed time. There will be a push to defund
https://twitter.com/jttiehen/status/911618263909404672
https://archive.is/lDXly
https://twitter.com/jttiehen/status/911625626251026432
https://archive.is/GNUDM
https://twitter.com/RoundSqrCupola/status/911631431348183040
https://archive.is/KYyGy

https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/74up3r/culture_war_roundup_for_the_week_following/do4mntc/
https://archive.is/LrvLo
It's interesting that this bill was passed at Wisconsin.
I'm not sure how familiar you guys are with what's been going on there, but the University system in Wisconsin has been the site of some serious, really playing-for-keeps, both-sides-engaged-and-firing-on-all-cylinders culture war the last 8 years. Anyone interested in Freddie de Boer's claims about the significant threat Universities face from plummeting support from conservatives should probably be familiar with Wisconsin, as it's been a real beachhead.

Republicans Stuff Education Bill With Conservative Social Agenda: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/us/first-amendment-education-bill.html
Religious colleges would be able to bar openly same-sex relationships without fear of repercussions.
Religious student groups could block people who do not share their faith from becoming members.
Controversial speakers would have more leverage when they want to appear at colleges.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/opinion/whos-really-placing-limits-on-free-speech.html

https://twitter.com/ortoiseortoise/status/879785012270436352
https://archive.is/6CYck
lost in "left v. right free speech" debate is that right="don't agree with BLM"; left: "white men deserve to die" @jttiehen @iamcuriousblue
the left needs free speech protections not just bc it "has less power", contra FDB and others, but because it says far more egregious shit
fact is, it's a "microaggression" to say america's a land of opportunity, scholarly&woke to say white males are fragile idiots, deserve pain

On Tommy Curry: https://necpluribusimpar.net/on-tommy-curry/
A few days ago, Rod Dreher wrote a piece in The American Conservative about a 4 year old interview of Tommy Curry, a professor of philosophy at Texas A&M University. (I would like to add that, although I’m going to criticize Dreher’s article, I think The American Conservative is actually a pretty good publication. In particular, on foreign policy, it’s one of the few publications in the US where sanity has not totally disappeared.) In that article, among other things, Dreher quotes Curry as saying that “in order to be equal, in order to be liberated, some white people might have to die”.

...

With the context, it’s clear that, in the statement quoted by Dreher, Curry wasn’t necessarily expressing his own view, but lamenting what he takes to be the erasure of the fact that, throughout American history, many black leaders have taken seriously the possibility of resorting to violence in order to protect themselves. (I actually think he is right about that, but that’s a pretty common phenomenon. Once a political/cultural figure becomes coopted by the establishment, he is turned into a consensual figure, even though he used to be quite controversial. This happened to Martin Luther King and Gandhi, but also to Charles De Gaulle and Winston Churchill, so despite what Curry seems to think I doubt it has much to do with race.)

...

Although he deserves censure for misrepresenting Curry’s interview, there is one thing Dreher says which strikes me as correct. Indeed, even if you don’t misrepresent what Curry said, it’s clear that any white person saying even half of it would immediately become the object of universal vilification and be cast out of polite society. Indeed, it’s striking how bigoted and, let’s say it, racist and/or sexist language has become on the left, which is apparently okay as long as no minority is targeted.

Texas College Op-Ed Calls For Ethnic Cleansing: http://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/texas-college-op-ed-calls-for-ethnic-cleansing/

Opposing Liberal Academia Doesn't Make One 'Anti-Intellectual': http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/444031/opposing-liberal-academia-doesnt-make-one-anti-intellectual
David French on David Gelernter
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july 2017 by nhaliday
Our civilization’s Ottoman years – Gene Expression
How does any of this apply to today? Perhaps this time it’s different, but it seems implausible to me that our multicultural future is going to involve equality between the different peoples. Rather, there will be accommodation and understandings. Much of the population will be subject to immiseration of subsistence but not flourishing. They may have some universal basic income, but they will be lack the dignity of work. Identity, religious and otherwise, will become necessary opiums of the people. The people will have their tribunes, who represent their interests, and give them the illusion or semi-reality of a modicum agency.

The tribunes, who will represent classical ethno-cultural blocs recognizable to us today, will deal with a supra-national global patriciate. Like the Ottoman elite it will not necessarily be ethnically homogeneous. There will be aspects of meritocracy to it, but it will be narrow, delimited, and see itself self-consciously above and beyond local identities and concerns. The patriciate itself may be divided. But their common dynamic will be that they will be supra-national, mobile, and economically liberated as opposed to dependent.

Of course democracy will continue. Augustus claimed he revived the Roman Republic. The tiny city-state of Constantinople in the 15th century claimed it was the Roman Empire. And so on. Outward forms and niceties may be maintained, but death of the nation-state at the hands of identity politics and late stage capitalism will usher in the era of oligarchic multinationalism.

I could be wrong. I hope I am.

AMERICA’S DEMOGRAPHIC DELIBERALIZATION: https://jacobitemag.com/2017/11/03/americas-demographic-deliberalization/
But in the wake of the Civil Rights movement a new multiracial and multicultural vision of America took hold. This counter-narrative rapidly became orthodoxy; it held that the nation belongs to people of all races and cultures, not just whites. That it always belonged to other peoples, even if they had not enjoyed recognition by the white majority.

...

America as a multicultural polity is not an aspiration, but a simple description of fact. We are today a coalition of different factions bound together legally, but rapidly dissipating any cultural unity.

History is rife with stable multicultural societies: the ancient Roman Empire, the territories of the Ottomans, the Mughal Empire. These diverse states maintained harmony through a hierarchy. Understandings and accommodations among elites of the various peoples smoothed tensions and allowed for the operation of government despite animosity simmering beneath the surface. Populist mass movements are functionally impossible within a diverse medley of cultures, because politics in these societies develop into byzantine games of balance, or coalitions of coercion. No social consensus takes hold, preventing any unanimity of purpose.

In these culturally diverse systems there emerge tribunes of the peoples. The plural is key here, for the various people brought together under an empire represent the interest of sub-nations within the greater whole. In the Ottoman Empire Christian sects were led by their clerics, whether Greek Orthodox, Jacobite or the Coptic pope. In the Roman Empire federates were administered under their own law and led by their own warlords. The British Raj at its peak was a coalition of peoples and monarchs, with the queen or king at the apogee of the system.

...

Donald Trump as President of the United States is not a world-historical aberration. His ethno-nationalist vision of the Republican party is to be expected as a reflection of the white American population which is now becoming as racially conscious as minorities have been of late. Facing their own demographic marginalization they are reasserting their own uniqueness. In Europe the rise of ethno-nationalist right-wing parties is a phenomenon that can be attributed to economic distress. But recessions come and go. Rather, demographic and cultural changes are producing men and women who channel the reactionary impulses of a populace who see the world they knew fading away. The National Front, Freedom Party, and Alternative for Germany, are symptoms of a broader phenomenon which won’t be a passing phase.

But the reality is that demagogues cannot turn back time. They can only delay the inevitable. Sans mass ethnic cleansing, accommodations between peoples must occur. And when these accommodations come they will operate as understandings between elites of disparate peoples, and the political units which emerge to foster stability will resemble the ramshackle oligarchies and monarchies. When the people are too many dissonant voices, conductors must come on stage and enforce harmony and suppress individuality. In an age of diversity there will come the oligarchy.

https://twitter.com/razibkhan/status/950859025327017984
https://archive.is/L5i5R
we are all some oligarch's bitch at some point. find your oligarch, know your oligarch, and nurture your relationship with them. it matters
--
Return of the Roman patron-client relationship...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patronage_in_ancient_Rome

https://twitter.com/thespandrell/status/954400568159752192
https://archive.is/94yRl
https://archive.is/zHTgH
So is baizouism the official religion of the permanent government in the states at this point?

How do we get the reaction? The Napoleon or the Deng who puts a stop to the madness?
--
of course it is.
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july 2017 by nhaliday
Young Men Are Playing Video Games Instead of Getting Jobs. That's OK. (For Now.) - Reason.com
https://www.dropbox.com/s/al533ecu82w29y1/BusinessCycleFallout.pdf
https://twitter.com/MarkKoyama/status/881893997706399744
This is like a reversal of the industrious revolution studied in my JEBO paper: new consumption technologies are money cheap but time pricey
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23552
https://www.1843magazine.com/features/escape-to-another-world
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13723996
http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2016/07/what-are-young-men-doing.html
https://www.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2016/08/americas-lost-boys

http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/work-becomes-optional/
participation has changed along an understudied margin of labor supply. I find that “in-and-outs”—men who temporarily leave the labor force—represent a growing fraction of prime age men across multiple data sources and are responsible for roughly one third of the decline in the participation rate since 1977. In-and-outs take short, infrequent breaks out of the labor force in between jobs, but they are otherwise continuously attached to the labor force. Leading explanations for the growing share of permanent labor force dropouts, such as disability, do not apply to in-and-outs. Instead, reduced-form evidence and a structural model of household labor supply both indicate that the rise of in-and-outs reflects a shift in labor supply, largely due to the increasing earnings of men’s partners and the growth of men living with their parents.

Pointer from Tyler Cowen. My thoughts:

1. When we think of labor force participation declining, we think of, say, John Smith, deciding to never work again. What this paper is saying is that the statistics reflect something different. One month Smith takes a break, then next month he gets a job and Tom Jones takes a break.

2. I think we have always had a large number of workers who are not fully employed year round. That is, there have always been a lot of workers who take breaks between jobs. This is common in construction work, for example.

3. I don’t know if this matters for the phenomenon at hand, but we used to have inventory recessions. In those cases, workers would be out of a job for a while, but they would still be in the labor force, because they were waiting to be recalled by the firm that had laid them off.

4. It seems to me that this is an important paper. Re-read the last sentence in the quoted excerpt.

Job outlook growing worse for young American men: https://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/contributors/2018/01/02/job-outlook-growing-worse-young-american-men-opinion/996922001/
As one might imagine, the absence of a job, quality education, or spouse has not bred otherwise productive citizens. Multiple studies have found that young men have replaced what would otherwise be working hours with leisure time at a near 1-1 ratio. Erik Hurst, an economist at the University of Chicago, found that young men spent a startling 75 percent of this leisure time playing video games, with many spending more than 30 hours a week gaming and over 5 million Americans spending more than 45 hours per week.

Higher suicide rates, violent crime, and drug addiction among young men have followed. Suicide rates in the United States are at a 30-year high, with men more than three and a half times more likely to take their own lives than women. Around the United States, violent crimes, homicide in particular, has increased in two-thirds of American cities, with overwhelming young male perpetrators driving the increase. A 2015 Brookings Institute study estimated that nearly half of working-age American men who are out of the labor force are using painkillers, daily.

These problems have been “invisible” for too long.

As video games get better, young men work less and play more: http://review.chicagobooth.edu/economics/2017/article/video-games-get-better-young-men-work-less-and-play-more

Why Are Prime-Age Men Vanishing from the Labor Force?: https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/econrev/econrevarchive/2018/1q18tuzemen.pdf

Prime-Age Men May Never Return to U.S. Workforce, Fed Paper Says: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-23/prime-age-men-may-never-return-to-u-s-workforce-fed-paper-says
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june 2017 by nhaliday
Paranoid Paleoconservatives | Quillette
longform history of alt-right
The dark history of Donald Trump's rightwing revolt: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/aug/16/secret-history-trumpism-donald-trump
pretty good actually. did not know the "Journal of American Greatness" was a thing and read by beltway types.

also good introduction to James Burnham and Samuel Francis.
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june 2017 by nhaliday
Levels or changes?: Ethnic context, immigration and the UK Independence party vote
It argues that high levels of established ethnic minorities reduce opposition to immigration and support for UKIP among White Britons. Conversely, more rapid ethnic changes increase opposition to immigration and support for UKIP. Longitudinal data demonstrates that these effects are not produced by self-selection.
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may 2017 by nhaliday
How Samuel Huntington Predicted Our Political Moment - The American Interest
The views of the general public on issues of national identity differ significantly from those of many elites. The public, overall, is concerned with physical security but also with societal security, which involves the sustainability–within acceptable conditions for evolution–of existing patterns of language, culture, association, religion and national identity. For many elites, these concerns are secondary to participating in the global economy, supporting international trade and migration, strengthening international institutions, promoting American values abroad, and encouraging minority identities and cultures at home. The central distinction between the public and elites is not isolationism versus internationalism, but nationalism versus cosmopolitanism.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/book-party/wp/2017/07/18/samuel-huntington-a-prophet-for-the-trump-era/
The book looks back to the Revolutionary War, the Jacksonian age, the Progressive era and the 1960s as moments of high creedal passions, and Huntington’s descriptions capture America today. In such moments, he writes, discontent is widespread, and authority and expertise are questioned; traditional values of liberty, individualism, equality and popular control of government dominate public debates; politics is characterized by high polarization and constant protest; hostility toward power, wealth and inequality grows intense; social movements focused on causes such as women’s rights and criminal justice flourish; and new forms of media emerge devoted to advocacy and adversarial journalism.

Huntington even predicts the timing of America’s next fight: “If the periodicity of the past prevails,” he writes, “a major sustained creedal passion period will occur in the second and third decades of the twenty-first century.”

We’re right on schedule.

...

Over the subsequent two decades, Huntington lost hope. In his final book, “Who Are We?,” which he emphasizes reflect his views not just as a scholar but also as a patriot, Huntington revises his definitions of America and Americans. Whereas once the creed was paramount, here it is merely a byproduct of the Anglo-Protestant culture — with its English language, Christian faith, work ethic and values of individualism and dissent — that he now says forms the true core of American identity.

...

The Huntington of 1981, apparently, was just wrong. When listing academics who had — inaccurately, he now insists — defined Americans by their political beliefs, Huntington quotes an unnamed scholar who once eloquently described Americans as inseparable from the self-evident truths of the Declaration. Unless you recognize the passage from “American Politics” or bother to check the endnotes, you have no idea he is quoting himself. It’s as close to a wink as you’ll find in Huntington’s angriest book.

...

Little wonder that, long before Trump cultivated the alt-right and Hillary Clinton denounced the “deplorables” in our midst, Huntington foresaw a backlash against multiculturalism from white Americans. “One very plausible reaction would be the emergence of exclusivist sociopolitical movements,” he writes, “composed largely but not only of white males, primarily working-class and middle-class, protesting and attempting to stop or reverse these changes and what they believe, accurately or not, to be the diminution of their social and economic status, their loss of jobs to immigrants and foreign countries, the perversion of their culture, the displacement of their language, and the erosion or even evaporation of the historical identity of their country. Such movements would be both racially and culturally inspired and could be anti-Hispanic, anti-black, and anti-immigration.” The more extreme elements in such movements, Huntington notes, fear “the replacement of the white culture that made America great by black or brown cultures that are . . . in their view, intellectually and morally inferior.”

...

This is a conflict he had long anticipated. In his 1996 book proclaiming a clash of civilizations, he writes that the West will continue its slow decline relative Asia and the Islamic world. While economic dynamism drives Asia’s rise, population growth in Muslim nations “provides recruits for fundamentalism, terrorism, insurgency, and migration.” Much as Trump mocks politicians who refuse to decry “radical Islamic terrorism,” Huntington criticizes American leaders such as Bill Clinton who argued that the West had no quarrel with Islam, only with violent extremists. “Fourteen hundred years of history demonstrate otherwise,” he remarks.

Huntington’s clash has been caricatured as a single-minded call to arms against Muslims, and certainly the argument is neither so narrow nor so simple. He is probably more concerned with China and fears a “major war” if Washington challenges Beijing’s rise as Asia’s hegemon. Yet the threat Huntington sees from the Muslim world goes far beyond terrorism or religious extremism. He worries of a broader Islamic resurgence, with political Islam as only one part of “the much more extensive revival of Islamic ideas, practices, and rhetoric and the rededication to Islam by Muslim populations.” Huntington cites scholars warning of the spread of Islamic legal concepts in the West, decries the “inhospitable nature of Islamic culture” for democracy and suggests that Islam will prevail in the numbers game against Christianity. In the long run, “Mohammed wins out,” he states. “Christianity spreads primarily by conversion, Islam by conversion and reproduction.”

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/918662411669917697
https://archive.is/Z2FlF
I am rereading Huntington. The only options he foresees are:
* cultural decay
* political breakup
* white re-assertion
* Christian revival
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may 2017 by nhaliday
The eternal Axial Age – Gene Expression
Into situation stepped Sulla. Sulla is not a contingent man. Sulla is a type. A reaction, usually a vain and futile attempt to hold the past together, and push it into the future, by brutal means. Sulla arises when social elites lose faith in the present, and attempt to recreate institutions from an idealized past.

Sulla is efficient. Cruel, but certain in his rightness. Sulla is not a clown. He is not narcissistic, for Sulla does have ideals, even if you hold that those ideals are cruel or callous. Sulla is a piece of furniture, found in many places at many times. The United States of America has not seen Sulla yet. I believe it will.
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may 2017 by nhaliday
Buchanan: How Long Can We Sustain This? | The Daily Caller
“Wheel And Fight”—Pat Buchanan’s Nixon Book Provides Road Map For Trump: http://www.vdare.com/articles/wheel-and-fight-pat-buchanans-nixon-book-provides-road-map-for-trump
After The Anti-Trump Coup, What Then?: http://www.vdare.com/articles/pat-buchanan-after-the-anti-trump-coup-what-then
https://twitter.com/avermeule/status/895711695192174602
Best real example of (1) an enduring polity composed of (2) large blocs (3) fundamentally at odds over ideological and cultural premises?
United In Tragedy—But For How Long?: http://www.theamericanconservative.com/buchanan/united-in-tragedy-but-for-how-long/

Unlike Nixon, Trump Will Not Go Quietly: http://www.theamericanconservative.com/buchanan/unlike-nixon-trump-will-not-go-quietly/

Mueller obtains "tens of thousands” of Trump transition emails: https://www.axios.com/scoop-mueller-obtains-tens-of-thousands-of-trump-transition-emails-1513456551-428f0b7a-b50e-4d9e-8bc4-9869f93c2845.html
https://act.moveon.org/event/mueller-firing-rapid-response-events/search/

https://twitter.com/netouyo_/status/942187038958333952
https://archive.is/4oKKB
I suspect there is gonna be a big finale for Trump-Mueller before the end of the year, shit goin down

https://twitter.com/netouyo_/status/942201841869312005
https://archive.is/GQKmD
who needs laws/due process when daddy Mueller is gonna save us from the evil Russians?
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may 2017 by nhaliday
Sending Jobs Overseas
*The Great Convergence*: http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2016/11/the-great-convergence.html

Richard Baldwin on the New Globalization: https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2018/04/the-new-globalization.html
To really understand how this changed the nature of globalization, consider a sports analogy. Suppose we have two football teams, one that needs a quarterback but has too many linebackers, and one that needs a linebacker but has too many quarterbacks. If they sit down and trade players, both teams win. It’s arbitrage in players. Each team gets rid of players they need less of and gets players they need more of. That’s the old globalization: exchange of goods.

Now let’s take a different kind of exchange, where the coach of the better team goes to the field of the worse team and starts training those players in the off-season. This is very good for the coach because he gets to sell his knowledge in two places. You can be sure that the quality of the league will rise, all the games will get more competitive, and the team that’s being trained up will enjoy the whole thing. But it’s not at all certain that the players of the better team will benefit from this exchange because the source of their advantage is now being traded.

In this analogy, the better team is, of course, the G7, and not surprisingly this has led to some resentment of globalization in those countries. The new globalization breaks the monopoly that G7 labor had on G7 know-how…

good reviews here:
The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization: https://www.amazon.com/Great-Convergence-Information-Technology-Globalization/dp/067466048X
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may 2017 by nhaliday
Bagehot: Established political parties are crumbling. Why not the Tories? | The Economist
Theresa May redefines Conservatism as Tories move on from Thatcher: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/18/theresa-may-redefines-conservatism-tories-move-thatcher/
Theresa May criticized the term ‘citizen of the world.’ But half the world identifies that way: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/05/theresa-may-criticized-the-term-citizen-of-the-world-but-half-the-world-identifies-that-way/

welp: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom_general_election,_2017
UK 2017 General Election vote examined: income, poverty and Brexit: https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/uk-2017-general-election-vote-examined
- The Conservatives appealed to many lower income voters’ support for Brexit and immigration control. Labour instead appealed to these voters’ economic concerns over living standards, redistribution, inequality and austerity.
- Many voters who are struggling to get by and marginalized may agree with the vote for Brexit and calls to curb immigration, but were more likely to vote for Labour because of their desire for economic redistribution and to endorse Labour’s anti-austerity platform.
- Labour’s pitch to low income voters, and those in poverty, was a key driver of its performance at the 2017 election, but no political party made a major and clear breakthrough with these groups.

lol, this guy: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jacob-rees-mogg-conservative-mp-north-east-somerset-capital-management-investment-firm-belgravia-a7902951.html
https://streamable.com/yuhyx

The polite extremist: Jacob Rees-Mogg’s seemingly unstoppable rise: https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2018/02/polite-extremist-jacob-rees-mogg-s-seemingly-unstoppable-rise
A Brexit ultra and profound reactionary, the eccentric MP is a strong contender to be the next prime minister. How dangerous is he?
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may 2017 by nhaliday
Le Pen and Macron Clash in Vicious Presidential Debate in France - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/world/europe/france-debate-marine-le-pen-emmanuel-macron.html
http://www.europe1.fr/politique/dans-lemission-politique-de-france-2-macron-rebondit-sur-la-fusillade-des-champs-elysees-3306584
"This threat will be part of the daily life of the next few years," he said, paying tribute to the victim. "The first mission of the President of the Republic is to protect."

https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/04/19/a-youth-revolt-in-france-boosts-the-far-right/
If Le Pen wins, European leaders fear the disintegration of the E.U. after decades spent trying to bind the continent more closely together. And although she’s down in hypothetical second-round contests, Le Pen enjoys a commanding lead among France’s youngest voters in the 11-candidate first round, polls show. One survey has her winning nearly 40 percent of the vote among those 18 to 24, nearly double the total of her nearest competitor, Emmanuel Macron.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/le-pen-support-young-voters-170415161404170.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/europe/marine-le-pen-national-front-party.html

http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21715979-fran-ois-fillon-admits-no-wrongdoing-putting-his-wife-payroll-his-campaign
François Fillon admits no wrongdoing in putting his wife on the payroll, but his campaign is faltering
http://www.dw.com/en/fillon-election-favorite-despite-plotting-thatcherite-course/a-37131311
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/20/nicolas-sarkozy-risks-falling-foul-of-left-wing-tactical-vote-as/

Daily chart: The centre can indeed hold in France’s presidential election: http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/04/daily-chart-5
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/04/france-s-presidential-election
20% per prediction markets: http://predictwise.com/politics/french-politics

later:
Laurent Wauquiez s'insurge contre «les élites»: http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2017/10/25/01002-20171025ARTFIG00363-laurent-wauquiez-s-insurge-contre-les-elites.php
https://twitter.com/epkaufm/status/929011773155442689
New French centre-right contender Laurent Wauquiez follows Kurz model, says elite suppressing debate over mass immigration, Islam, national identity. France for the French
https://twitter.com/whyvert/status/929094212338966528
https://archive.is/xHwZ5
Likely next leader of French Les Republicains @laurentwauquiez positions himself as populist nationalist: denounces the taboo on discussing the nation, massive immigration, identity, values, Islamism
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may 2017 by nhaliday
Places and Preferences: A Longitudinal Analysis of Self-Selection and Contextual Effects | British Journal of Political Science | Cambridge Core
preferences -> place, not place -> preferences (mostly)
Cosmopolitan immigration attitudes in Europe's large cities: Adaptation or selection: https://www.dropbox.com/s/lb3yrsdlhpxprfs/RahsaanMaxwellAPSACosmopolitanImmigrationCities.pdf?dl=0
The myth of London exceptionalism: https://quarterly.demos.co.uk/article/issue-5/ukip-in-london/
London is not as invulnerable to the appeal of UKIP as commonly reported, finds new research from Eric Kaufmann.

Are White British Londoners more accepting of immigration than White British elsewhere? The British Election Study (BES)’s 2015 panel survey asks whether immigration enriches or undermines cultural life. 34.7 per cent of White British outside London say immigration strongly undermines cultural life. But so do 34.4 per cent of White British Londoners. Not much difference there. 44 per cent of White Brits outside London want to leave the EU, but so do 42.3 per cent of White British Londoners. Again, not much in it.

...

Finally, when we control for a fuller range of demographic and attitudinal characteristics, as in figure 4, London and the South East emerge as significantly more likely than the rest of England and Wales to have voted UKIP in 2014, according to the BES.

Cosmopolitan cities and their country cousins – UK in a changing Europe: http://ukandeu.ac.uk/london-voted-leave-or-why-local-differences-in-populist-right-voting-are-overstated/
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may 2017 by nhaliday
Identifying the Determinants of Attitudes towards Immigrants: A Structural Cross-Country Analysis
not much of a difference by gender (seems female->more supportive in northern countries, less supportive in southern countries), biggest thing is urbanity+educational attainment

https://twitter.com/whyvert/status/899850410935975940
https://archive.is/nUJp2
Vote share for WEuro populist parties higher in regions: rural, ⇈foreigners, ⇈unemployment, AND ⇈education except in cities (surprising)
the urban educated hate the nationalist parties but the nonurban educated are prone to support them. Not all educated are alike

The success of radical right-wing parties in Western European regions – new challenging findings: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14782804.2016.1198691

Can Television Reduce Xenophobia? The Case of East Germany: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2932276
To examine this question, we exploit the fact that individuals in some areas of East Germany – due to their geographic location – could not receive West German television until 1989. We conjecture that individuals who received West German television were exposed more frequently to foreigners and thus have developed less xenophobia than people who were not exposed to those programs. Our results show that regions that could receive West German television were less likely to vote for right-wing parties during the national elections from 1998 to 2013. Only recently, the same regions were also more likely to vote for left-wing parties. Moreover, while counties that hosted more foreigners in 1989 were also more likely to vote for right-wing parties in most elections, we find counties that recently hosted more foreign visitors showed less xenophobia, which is in line with intergroup contact theory.

With an Open Mind: Openness to Experience Moderates the Effect of Interethnic Encounters on Support for Immigration: https://academic.oup.com/esr/article-abstract/33/5/721/4102111/With-an-Open-Mind-Openness-to-Experience-Moderates

Refugees Unwelcome? Changes in the Public Acceptance of Immigrants and Refugees in Germany in the Course of Europe’s ‘Immigration Crisis’: https://academic.oup.com/esr/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/esr/jcx071/4557564/Refugees-Unwelcome-Changes-in-the-Public
Derived from discussions making up the German immigration discourse during this time, we expect reduced acceptance especially of those immigrants who were explicitly connected to the salient events, like Muslims and the offenders of NYE. Most strikingly, we find that refugees were generally highly accepted and even more so in the second wave, whereas the acceptance of immigrants from Arab or African countries further decreased. Moreover, _female respondents’ initial preference for male immigrants_ disappeared. Contrary to our expectations, we find no changes in the acceptance of Muslims.
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may 2017 by nhaliday
The Omerta Olympics! | Mickey Kaus
Even apolitical owners of big, mainstream media outlets typically don’t like to bring up the immigration debate. At the very least it’s “divisive.” More important, reporting on, say, support for a border wall could alienate new, growing blocs of ethnic consumers that businesses (especially newspapers) want to reach. But it’s not easy to write long, important thumbsuckers about Trump’s primary victory without even mentioning the issue that both launched his campaign into prominence and fueled its continued rise. Luckily, America’s premier journalists are up to the job.

The Zeroth Amendment: http://takimag.com/article/the_zeroth_amendment_steve_sailer
https://twitter.com/daveweigel/status/903343502146330625
As we discuss DACA, a reminder that this was the only Q about immigration asked across the three presidential debates.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/19/the-final-trump-clinton-debate-transcript-annotated/
WALLACE: All right. Let's move on to the subject of immigration. And there is almost no issue that separates the two of you more than the issue of immigration. Actually, there are a lot of issues that separate the two of you.

Mr. Trump, you want to build a wall. Secretary Clinton, you have offered no specific plan for how you want to secure our southern border. Mr. Trump, you are calling for major deportations. Secretary Clinton, you say that within your first 100 days as president you're going to offer a package that includes a pathway to citizenship. The question, really, is, why are you right and your opponent wrong?

Mr. Trump, you go first in this segment. You have two minutes.

Foreign Policy: "This Land Is Their Land:" Today's Immigrant Supremacist Ideology at Its Most Blatant: http://www.unz.com/isteve/foreign-policy-todays-immigrant-supremacist-ideology-at-its-most-blatant/
"""
… All hail Western civilization, which gave the world the genocide of the Native Americans, slavery, the Inquisition, the Holocaust, Hiroshima, and global warming. How hypocritical this whole debate about migration really is. The rich countries complain loudly about migration from the poor ones.

This is how the game was rigged: First they colonized us and stole our treasure and prevented us from building our industries. After plundering us for centuries, they left, having drawn up maps in ways that ensured permanent strife between our communities.

Then they brought us to their countries as “guest workers” — as if they knew what the word “guest” meant in our cultures — but discouraged us from bringing our families. Having built up their economies with our raw materials and our labor, they asked us to go back and were surprised when we did not.

… Now, again, they ask us not to come, desperate and starving though they have rendered us, because the richest among them need a scapegoat.

This is how the game is now rigged. In 2015, Shashi Tharoor, the former U.N. undersecretary-general for communications and public information, gave a compelling Oxford Union speech that made the case for (symbolic) reparations owed by Britain to India. “India’s share of the world economy when Britain arrived on its shores was 23 percent. By the time the British left, it was down to below 4 percent. Why?” he asked. “Simply because India had been governed for the benefit of Britain. Britain’s rise for 200 years was financed by its depredations in India.”
"""

James Watt stole the blueprints for the steam engine from a Brahmin in Uttar Pradesh.

"""
Tharoor’s speech reminded me of the time my grandfather was sitting in a park in suburban London. An elderly British man came up to him and wagged a finger at him. “Why are you here?” the man demanded. “Why are you in my country?” “We are the creditors,” responded my grandfather, who was born in India, spent his working years in Kenya, and was now retired in London. “You took all our wealth, our diamonds. Now we have come to collect.”
"""

Boy, right now I’m really feeling like it would be a good idea to let in more of the Mehta family. It sounds like they have my best interests at heart.

https://twitter.com/hpmacd/status/907649633664552963
I have to say, "we will continue resenting you even after we've assimilated because you and your culture are evil" is not a great pitch

“Who belongs?”: http://www.unz.com/isteve/who-belongs/
Hospitality to travelers is a big theme in the Bible and other West Asian religious traditions. But it’s limited in duration and it’s reciprocal.
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april 2017 by nhaliday
The Peculiar Populism of Donald Trump - The New York Times
Instead, he points out, the United States has gone in two seemingly opposite directions over the past 15 years, becoming “significantly more secular-rational, while losing ground on self-expressive values.”

Whites living in low density, exurban and rural areas are driving the shift back toward survival values, Wilkinson argues.

https://niskanencenter.org/blog/tale-two-moralities-part-one-regional-inequality-moral-polarization/

How Fear of Falling Explains the Love of Trump: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/opinion/how-fear-of-falling-explains-the-love-of-trump.html
In these conversations, she said,

it wouldn’t take long before another topic spontaneously came up, blacks, their problems, their call on government help. At the bottom of the imagined slide was the situation of blacks — teen single moms, kids out in the street at night, slacking off in school, drugs, drink. So, yes, the feeling was, “if we don’t turn this thing around, that could be us.”

Why Fathers Leave Their Children: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/opinion/why-fathers-leave-their-children.html
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april 2017 by nhaliday
Virtual revenge is sweet in Bangladesh | 1843
A bloodthirsty video game set during the war of independence – and sponsored by the government – is proving popular with young Bangladeshis
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march 2017 by nhaliday
U.S.-Born Economists Also Compete With Immigrants | Moody's Analytics Economy.com
Economists tend to be pretty optimistic about the positive effects of globalization, including being generally pro immigration and pro free trade. This sometimes leads to accusations of selfishness: Of course economists are pro trade and immigration; they don’t have to compete with foreign workers like low-skilled natives do. This always seemed a little strange to me since I work at a company with offices all over the world. A quick look at the data confirms my suspicion. Economists being sheltered from globalization couldn’t be farther from the truth.
econotariat  rhetoric  economics  labor  migration  competition  realness  paying-rent  nationalism-globalism  borjas  populism  hypocrisy  regularizer 
march 2017 by nhaliday
Mark Rutte’s ‘right kind of populism’ – POLITICO
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-03-17/little-to-celebrate-in-the-dutch-elections

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/30/world/europe/dutch-denk-party.html
“What is unique about Denk is that it’s a party of people with a migration background who completely control the party,” said Cas Mudde, a specialist in European political and radical parties who was born in the Netherlands.

...

Among the Denk party’s stated policy goals are banning from legislative forums a pejorative term often used for Dutch nonwhites, “allochtoon,” and to replace the term “integration” with “acceptance.”

It wants to establish a “racism register” to track the use of hate speech by elected officials and to bar those who promote racism from holding public office.

http://www.euronews.com/2017/03/13/turks-squeeze-oranges-in-anti-dutch-protest

Why the Dutch Turned Against Immigrants: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-23/why-the-dutch-turned-against-immigrants
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march 2017 by nhaliday
Political Polarization in the American Public | Pew Research Center
- next few decades are gonna be a slugfest
- also, looks like Ds shifted left, then Rs as well, Ds refused to meet in middle, then both shifted in opposite directions (Ds moreso)

Party Differences in Support for Government Spending, 1973-2014: https://sci-hub.tw/http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1532673X17719718

The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider: http://www.people-press.org/2017/10/05/the-partisan-divide-on-political-values-grows-even-wider/
Sharp shifts among Democrats on aid to needy, race, immigration

sharp uptick in 2010 maybe related to: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:5ddfca30723d

https://twitter.com/toad_spotted/status/915959944087826432
https://archive.is/zNZm2
The Great a-Woke-ening of the 2010s has been a powerful force for Democrats.

cf: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:8c26cb2a515b

Democrats' delusions of pragmatism: http://theweek.com/articles/729980/democrats-delusions-pragmatism
Democrats like to tell themselves a comforting story.

Democrats are pragmatists, if they do say so themselves, deeply rooted in the reality-based community, beholden to facts, toiling valiantly and soberly to make the country a better, fairer place. Republicans, meanwhile, are ideologues monomaniacally fixated on cutting government spending and taxes for the wealthy, regardless of the consequences, and moving inexorably further and further to the extreme right.

However, if a recent Pew poll is to be believed, this story is nothing but a self-justifying myth. Yes, many Republicans are ideological, and the party has indeed been moving to the right in recent years. But the truth is that Democrats have simultaneously been moving to the left — and doing so with greater unity and, on some issues, more rapidly than Republicans have been moving right.

...

What's new in Pew's poll are the changes in public opinion over time across a range of issues. Not only are Democrats and Republicans further apart than ever (or at least since tracking began, in 1994) on such issues as government regulation of business, benefits to the poor, the fairness of corporate profits, the role of racism in American society, immigration, and environmental regulations, but in most cases the growing gap is more a result of a shift in public opinion among Democrats than it is a product of changes among Republicans.

In some cases (on race and immigration) the biggest shift has come in the past few years, which points to a rebound effect in reaction to Donald Trump's campaign and his presidency. But on most of the issues, the gap has been widening for a much longer time, pointing to a broader trend toward the ideological left among Democrats.
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march 2017 by nhaliday
Realignment: Will America Forge A New Political Consensus [NEW] - YouTube
Thiel: "When lip-service preachers [of ideology] stop receiving subsidies for spreading gospel, we'll see how much they really believe in it."
https://twitter.com/hyperstitious/status/841159254107144192
https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=2881&v=wx0DL-gxGGc

Bill Kristol comes out looking like an ass (and picks Obama trumpeting pulling out of Iraq of all things was an example of "demagoguery"...)

also like the comment about "'populism' being democracy by people you don't like". dude was kinda soporific otherwise.
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march 2017 by nhaliday
No easy answers: why left-wing economics is not the answer to right-wing populism - Vox
hence why Cato loves mass migration
https://medium.com/@MattBruenig/liberals-and-diversity-85c169580d14
jfc, by the book: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ORWM0ukT-Xw
"If we broke up the big banks tomorrow would that end racism? Would that end sexism? Would that end discrimination against the LGBT community? Would that make people feel more welcoming to immigrants overnight?"
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/02/13/clinton-in-nevada-not-everything-is-about-an-economic-theory/

The End of Liberalism - Samuel Bowles: https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/06/19/the-end-liberalism/GLVtC7fExhFPwhOx31fXrN/story.html
The progressive's immigration dilemma: https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/international/the-progressives-immigration-dilemma
Poor people's lives are made enormously better off by moving from poor countries to rich countries. Thanks to remittances, migrants also may have a significant positive impact on their home countries. For any progressive who wants to improve human welfare, facilitating more immigration from poor to rich countries should be an overriding priority.

Not only does a big welfare state reduce the number of immigrants that are politically accepted, a heavily regulated labour market seems to be associated with immigrants having a worse impact on natives. Even policies that seem like they would be good for Britons might still do much more harm than good if they make Britons less willing to accept higher levels of immigration.

This is a serious dilemma for any progressive who wants all humans to live good lives, not just ones of the same race or nationality. It means that these political concerns alone may demand a low regulation, low redistribution state.

fucking traitors

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/882982045714194433
https://archive.is/o1gUM
Essential liberal values:
You: My countrymen get to speak, think, commerce, associate freely.
Vox: Here are some new countrymen. Enjoy!
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march 2017 by nhaliday
Can Populism Take Paris? - The New York Times
So while Le Pen probably faces longer odds at this point than Trump did last October, she has one advantage to add to whatever strange assistance providence might send her way: She might actually deserve to win it.
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march 2017 by nhaliday
The genetics of politics: discovery, challenges, and progress
Figure 1. Summary of relative genetic and environmental influences on political traits.

- heritability increases discontinuously on leaving home
- pretty big range of heritability for different particular traits (party identification is lowest w/ largest shared environment by far)
- overall ideology quite highly heritable
- social trust is surprisingly highly compared other measurements I've seen...
- ethnocentrism quite low (sample-dependent?)
- authoritarianism and traditionalism quite high
- voter turnout quite high

Genes, psychological traits and civic engagement: http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/370/1683/20150015
We show an underlying genetic contribution to an index of civic engagement (0.41), as well as for the individual acts of engagement of volunteering for community or public service activities (0.33), regularly contributing to charitable causes (0.28) and voting in elections (0.27). There are closer genetic relationships between donating and the other two activities; volunteering and voting are not genetically correlated. Further, we show that most of the correlation between civic engagement and both positive emotionality and verbal IQ can be attributed to genes that affect both traits.

Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=poliscifacpub
TABLE 1. Genetic and Environmental Influences on Political Attitudes: The 28 Individual Wilson–Patterson Items

The origins of party identification and its relationship to political orientations: http://sci-hub.tw/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0191886915002470

All models showed a good overall fit (see Table 3). The data indicate that party identification is substantially heritable, with about 50% of the variation in PID attributable to additive genetic effects. Moreover, the results indicate that the non-genetic influences on party identification stem primarily from unique environmental factors rather than shared ones such as growing up in the same family. This too is not consistent with the Michigan model.

Table 3 also indicates that genetic influences explained about 50% of the variance in liberalism–conservatism. This estimate is similar to previous behavior genetic findings on political attitudes (e.g., Alford et al., 2005; Bouchard, 2004; Hatemi et al., 2014; Kandler, Bleidorn, & Riemann, 2012). The remaining variance was again due primarily to nonshared environmental influences. The latter finding indicates that the Michigan hypothesis that partisan social influences affect political orientations may have some merit, although the substantial level of heritability for this variable suggests that genetic effects also play an important role.

...

As Table 4 reveals, the best fitting model indicates that 100% of the genetic variance in PID is held in common with liberalism–conservatism ([aC2]/[aC2 + aPID2] = 1.00). Similarly, 73% of the environmental variation in PID is shared with liberalism–conservatism ([eC2]/[eC2 + ePID2] = .73). All told, only 13% of the total variance in PID cannot be explained by variation in liberalism–conservatism (1 [aC2 + eC2] = .13), as illustrated in Fig. 3. Since only a small proportion of the variance in PID cannot be explained by liberalism– conservatism, the findings are consistent with the hypothesis that genetic and environmental factors influence liberalism–conservatism, which in turn affects party identification. However, as discussed below, other causal scenarios cannot be ruled out.

Table 4 and Fig. 3 also show that 55% of the total variance in liberalism–conservatism cannot be accounted for by variance in PID

Fig. 3. Venn diagram mapping the common and specific variance in party
identification and liberalism–conservatism.

intuition for how you can figure out overlap of variance: look at how corr(PID, liberal-conservative) differs between MZ and DZ twin pairs, etc., fit structural equational model

p_k,i,j = r_A a_k,i,j,p + r_C c_k,i,p + r_E e_k,i,j,p (k=MZ or DZ, i=1..n_k, j=1,2, p=PID or LC value)

c_k,i,j,p = r_{C,p} c'_k,i,p + r_{C,common} c'_k,i,common (ditto)
e_k,i,j,p = r_{E,p} e'_k,i,j,p + r_{E,common} e'_k,i,j,common (ditto)

MZ twins:
a_MZ,i,j,p = r_{A,p} a'_MZ,i,p + r_{A,common} a'_MZ,i,common (i=1..n_k, j=1,2 p=PID or LC value)

DZ twins:
a_DZ,i,j,p = r_{A,p} (1/2 a'_DZ,i,p + 1/2 a'_DZ,i,j,p) + r_{A,common} (1/2 a'_DZ,i,common + 1/2 a'_DZ,i,j,common) (i=1..n_k, j=1,2 p=PID or LC value)

Gaussian distribution for the underlying a', c' and e' variables, maximum likelihood, etc.

see page 9 here: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:70f8b5b559a9

basically:
1. calculate population means μ from data (so just numbers)
2. calculate covariance matrix Σ in terms of latent parameters r_A, r_C, etc. (so variable correlations)
3. assume observed values are Gaussian with those parameters μ, Σ
4. maximum likelihood to figure out the parameters r_A, r_C, etc.

A Genetic Basis of Economic Egalitarianism: http://sci-hub.tw/10.1007/s11211-017-0297-y
Our results show that the large portion of the variance in a four-item economic egalitarianism scale can be attributed to genetic factor. At the same time, shared environment, as a socializing factor, has no significant effect. The effect of environment seems to be fully reserved for unique personal experience. Our findings further problematize a long-standing view that social justice attitudes are dominantly determined by socialization.

published in the journal "Social Justice Research" by some Hungarians, lol

various political science findings, w/ a few behavioral genetic, focus on Trump, right-wing populism/authoritarianism, and polarization: http://www.nationalaffairs.com/blog/detail/findings-a-daily-roundup/a-bridge-too-far
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february 2017 by nhaliday
It Came Apart: What's Next for a Fractured Culture? - YouTube
Join AEI’s Charles Murray and the Weekly Standard’s Bill Kristol for a special event as we analyze the rise of Trump and ask what’s next for an American culture and political system that appear to be fractured beyond recognition.

some points by Murray:
- mostly pessimistic, can't think of a good solutions for many trends
- automation going to reward one subset of labor force (computers/IQ)
- going to hit white collar jobs too, eg, lots of law work is pretty routine
- advocates a UBI
- going to be worse for men then women: healthcare, service jobs, social capital, conscientiousness (I think he folded in agreeableness too)
- coming apart, decline in marriage, etc.
- predicts an increase in religiosity ("20th century was anomaly")
- decline in religiosity has been higher in working class then upper-middle [ed.: absolute level still higher, right?]

Kristol:
- if social capital's so bad just replace them? [ed.: inverse weathervanes...]
- ~90% of Trump voters voted for Romney
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february 2017 by nhaliday
Progressive Cities vs. Conservative States - The Atlantic
The dark side of cities: http://theweek.com/articles/689554/dark-side-cities
President Trump often paints Americans cities as either liberal elitist enclaves or crime-ridden hellholes. Meanwhile, cities' defenders praise their flourishing, dense, and diverse communities that thumb their nose at Trumpism.

But defenders of the city also go further: They argue that changing technology and the network effects of density all favor the creativity and innovation of diverse metropolises. In other words, cities are supposed to do better than other places, and everyone who doesn't live in one already should get moving. Cities dominate American society like never before because of what they did right, these promoters say.

But actually, cities succeeded because of what the country did wrong.

A small number of liberal urban clusters certainly do dominate America's economic output. Rates of productivity growth are higher in cities. And over the last few decades, rates of business and job creation during recoveries fell off a cliff in less-dense areas — but held stable in the most dense areas.

Yet the productivity growth rate and the GDP growth rate across the entire national economy slowed to near record lows as cities rose in prominence. Certainly, agglomeration effects and dense innovative cultural milieus have real economic value. But how much value compared to other forces is the question.

More to the point, rates of job and business creation in dense areas held stable as rural areas died. They didn't increase to compensate. Economic vibrancy and opportunity didn't move to the cities. They just drowned everywhere else, while cities became the economy's only remaining life rafts.
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february 2017 by nhaliday
What Steve Bannon Wants You to Read - POLITICO Magazine
https://www.buzzfeed.com/lesterfeder/this-is-how-steve-bannon-sees-the-entire-world
http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/2/7/14533876/mencius-moldbug-steve-bannon-neoreactionary-curtis-yarvin
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/millman/neo-reactionaries-in-the-west-wing/
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/europe/vatican-steve-bannon-pope-francis.html
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/02/behind-the-internets-dark-anti-democracy-movement/516243/
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/europe/bannon-vatican-julius-evola-fascism.html
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/stephen-bannons-words-and-actions-dont-add-up/2017/02/09/33010a94-ef19-11e6-9973-c5efb7ccfb0d_story.html
https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/books/where-did-steve-bannon-get-his-worldview-from-my-book/2017/02/24/16937f38-f84a-11e6-9845-576c69081518_story.html
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/bannons-dangerous-deconstruction/2017/02/26/0d1aab0e-fad2-11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/03/silicon-valley-tech-alt-right-racism-misogyny
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/during-his-political-rise-stephen-k-bannon-was-a-man-with-no-fixed-address/2017/03/11/89866f4c-0285-11e7-ad5b-d22680e18d10_story.html
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/trump-steve-bannon-destroy-eu-european-union-214889
Atlantic article writes about @BronzeAgePerv and quotes Land and @kantbot2000 lol

‘I’m fascinated by Mussolini’: https://usa.spectator.co.uk/2018/03/im-fascinated-by-mussolini-steve-bannon-on-fascism-populism-and-everything-in-between/
‘The bigger threat we have got than socialism is state-controlled capitalism, which is where we’re headed, where we have big government and a handful of big companies. That’s what you’re seeing in technology right now with these massive companies. It’s the biggest danger we have.

‘Listen, I think our problem is [not just] the cultural Marxist left, but state capitalism on finance. That’s what we’re fighting right now.

They absolutely control our borders. They debase your currency, they debase your citizenship, and they take your personhood digitally.

‘This is the new serfdom. We’re just a collection of serfs — serfs living at a higher standard of living, but vis-à-vis what the total economic pie is, you’re still a serf, and that’s exactly where the modern state wants to keep you.’

Bannon is adamant that populism and fascism ‘are not even related’. ‘That’s just a smear. Look at the Gracchi brothers in Rome, Tiberius and Gaius, the greatest populists we ever had. They were not fascists. People are naturally not fascist. Come on, dude, you’ve got to know your Roman history? The brothers Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus … they’re not fascists, they’re populists.’

That’s quite a highbrow allusion, I say: isn’t citing Roman history way above every-one’s heads? ‘Why? No, you see here’s the problem. You want to talk down. This is what’s happening to us. I want to raise the bar and get back to classical allusions because I come from a blue-collar family that reads Plutarch.’

He goes on: ‘Lincoln had the King James Bible, Plutarch’s Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans and the plays of Shakespeare, that’s all he had, that’s what he read non-stop. He didn’t go to 20 years of school, he didn’t have a PhD in English. In the height of our civilisation, in England and other places, working men had reading associations. Churchill could make classical allusions and the Labour vote knew exactly what he was talking about. We’re not going to dumb it down, OK? I’m not going to let you dumb it down.’
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february 2017 by nhaliday
Trumpism and the Davos Man | Online Only | n+1
The global elite now openly admires authoritarian capitalism.

...

China’s rapid growth has inspired a similar taste for unconventional ideas. For the Western establishment, modern China is both an exotic political success case that flouts the wisdom of liberalism and a tribute to the ability of the Bretton Woods system to lift entire nations and fold them into the international community. Since the success of the Beijing Olympics in 2008, Davos has been particularly fond of borrowing authoritarian capitalist ideas for the West’s political reform agenda.

A typical contemporary example is the Berggruen Institute. Founded by Nicolas Berggruen, a billionaire who made his fortune by investing seed money from his art collector father into distressed companies, and Nathan Gardels, editor-in-chief of the WorldPost, the Institute hosts mini-Davos gatherings year round, all over the world. While the think tank tackles many governance issues, Berggruen and Gardels are personally invested in designing the “perfect” political system for the world. Their 2012 book Intelligent Governance for the 21st Century argues that the ideal government for Globalization 2.0 is one that is a “hybrid, ‘mixed constitutional’ template of ‘intelligent governance’ that seeks to incorporate the proven best practices of [the US and Chinese political systems]—competent government guided by cool deliberation and talent married to the self-correcting qualities of democratic feedback and accountability.” Essentially, this government amounts to a combination of Chinese meritocracy through the civil service, the dual houses of British parliament, and an executive insulated from the pressures of direct democracy. Meanwhile, the people can participate through social media. (This was back when Weibo, China’s Twitter, held the promise of being able to effect change from the grassroots. The government cracked down on Weibo the following year.) Prominent members of the Davos caste, Berggruen and Gardels have arguably done the most (outside of China itself) to promote the soft power of the country’s autocratic system.
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january 2017 by nhaliday
The Deep Roots of Rebellion: Evidence from the Irish Revolution∗
This paper studies how cultural norms shaped by negative historical shocks can explain conflicts in the long-run. Exploiting a unique dataset constructed from historical archives, we test whether the Irish Famine (1845-1850), one of the most lethal starvation in history, changed political attitudes and contributed to the Irish Revolution (1913-1921). First, we investigate the determinants of joining the rebellion movement on the basis of the 1911 Irish Census and the official lists of rebels. We find that rebels are more likely to be male, young, catholic and literate. Second, we explore whether the famine played a role in the probability of joining rebellion activities. Controlling for the level of economic development and other potential concurring factors, we provide evidence of the role of the great Irish famine as an exceptional legacy of rebellion during the movement of independence.

Activated History - The Case of the Turkish Sieges of Vienna: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3023816
We study whether long-gone but activated history can shape social attitudes and behavior even after centuries. We exploit the case of the sieges of Vienna in 1529 and 1683, when Turkish troops pillaged individual municipalities across East Austria. In 2005, Austrian right-wing populists started to campaign against Turks and Muslims and explicitly referred to the Turkish sieges. We show that right-wing voting increased in once pillaged municipalities compared to non-pillaged municipalities after the campaigns were launched, but not before. The effects are substantial: Around one out of ten votes for the far-right in a once pillaged municipality is caused by salient history. We conclude that campaigns can act as tipping points and catalyze history in a nonlinear fashion.

is this plausible?
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january 2017 by nhaliday
Why Trumpism Will Outlast Donald Trump - POLITICO Magazine
As part of a broad study of white working class politics, I solicited white Americans’ support for Donald Trump, but also for a hypothetical third party dedicated to “stopping mass immigration, providing American jobs to American workers, preserving America’s Christian heritage, and stopping the threat of Islam”—essentially the platform of the UK’s right-wing British National Party, adapted to the United States. How many white Americans do you think would consider voting for this type of protectionist, xenophobic party?

65 percent.

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/robert-jones-white-christian-america/532587/
Two-thirds of those who voted for the president felt his election was the "last chance to stop America's decline." But his victory won't arrest the cultural and demographic trends they opposed.

Beyond Economics: Fears of Cultural Displacement Pushed the White Working Class to Trump: https://www.prri.org/research/white-working-class-attitudes-economy-trade-immigration-election-donald-trump/

Why Trump could murder someone and people would still support him: http://secularright.org/SR/wordpress/why-trump-could-murder-someone-and-people-would-still-support-him/
The general principle here is obvious. If the cost of acceptance and approval is a negation of who you are, then you will make whatever compromises and sacrifices necessary to continue to be who you are. The Greek Orthodox church arguably made this choice when most of them rejected union with Rome as the cost for Western aid against the Turks.

The relevance for modern American politics should be clear. But if it isn’t, I’ll make it clear: many pro-Trump Americans perceive that Trump may protect them and their values, and see that anti-Trump politicians and leaders will never do so. Obviously there are a range of attitudes of people who support Trump, from genuine fondness and loyalty, to resigned acceptance that he is there only choice in a binary world.

...

Many pro-Trump Americans perceive that the Left and the cultural elite hate them deeply in their bones. Wish they would disappear. Dislike their aesthetic preferences, think their religion is contemptible, and are simply waiting for their expiration date to come due so that history will march onward, and leave them an unpleasant memory.

...

When elite Americans argue that these voters are supporting a conman, they shrug. First, they don’t trust the elites to have their interests at heart in the first place, so why trust their sincerity? These are the same elites joyfully writing think-pieces about how these middle class white Americans are no longer necessary in electoral coalitions, nor do they set the terms in American culture. The alternative offered is dispossession and marginalization with a smile, and that is not an offer they are willing to take. Better someone incompetently on your side than someone effectively against you.

56 percent say Trump 'tearing the country apart: https://www.politico.com/story/2017/08/30/trump-tearing-country-apart-242188
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january 2017 by nhaliday
Ethnic fractionalization and growth | Dietrich Vollrath
Garett Jones did a podcast with The Economics Detective recently on the costs of ethnic diversity. It is particularly worth listening to given that racial identity has re-emerged as a salient element of politics. A quick summary - and the link above includes a nice write-up of relevant sources - would be that diversity within workplaces does not appear to improve outcomes (however those outcomes are measured).

At the same time, there is a parallel literature, touched on in the podcast, about ethnic diversity (or fractionalization, as it is termed in that literature) and economic growth. But one has to be careful drawing a bright line between the two literatures. It does not follow that the results for workplace diversity imply the results regarding economic growth. And this is because the growth results, to the extent that you believe they are robust, all operate through political systems.

So here let me walk through some of the core empirical relationships that have been found regarding ethnic fractionalization and economic growth, and then talk about why you need to take care with over-interpreting them. This is not a thorough literature review, and I realize there are other papers in the same vein. What I’m after is characterizing the essential results.

--

- objection about sensitivity of measure to definition of clusters seems dumb to me (point is to fix definitions than compare different polities. as long as direction and strength of correlation is fairly robust to changes in clustering, this is a stupid critique)
- also, could probably define a less arbitrary notion of fractionalization (w/o fixed clustering or # of clusters) if using points in a metric/vector/euclidean space (eg, genomes)
- eg, A Generalized Index of Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization: http://www-3.unipv.it/webdept/prin/workpv02.pdf
So like -E_{A, B ~ X} d(A, B). Or maybe -E_{A, B ~ X} f(d(A, B)) for f an increasing function (in particular, f(x) = x^2).

Note that E ||A - B|| = Θ(E ||E[A] - A||), and E ||A - B||^2 = 2Var A,
for A, B ~ X, so this is just quantifying deviation from mean for Euclidean spaces.

In the case that you have a bunch of difference clusters w/ centers equidistant (so n+1 in R^n), measures p_i, and internal variances σ_i^2, you get E ||A - B||^2 = -2∑_i p_i^2σ_i^2 - ∑_{i≠j} p_ip_j(1 + σ_i^2 + σ_j^2) = -2∑_i p_i^2σ_i^2 - ∑_{i≠j} p_ip_j(1 + σ_i^2 + σ_j^2) = -∑_i p_i^2(1 + 2σ_i^2) - ∑_i 2p_i(1-p_i)σ_i^2
(inter-center distance scaled to 1 wlog).
(in general, if you allow _approximate_ equidistance, you can pack in exp(O(n)) clusters via JL lemma)
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december 2016 by nhaliday
Refugee Migration and Electoral Outcomes
in Denmark, immigration into given municipalities -> anti-migrant votes there (some conditions apply)

Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3042936
We provide evidence from a natural experiment in the Aegean Sea, where Greek islands close to the Turkish coast experienced a sudden and massive increase in refugee arrivals while similar islands slightly farther away did not. Leveraging distance as an instrument for between-island variation in exposure to the refugee crisis allows us to obtain causal estimates of its impact. In our targeted survey of 2,070 islands residents, we find that immediate exposure to large-scale refugee arrivals induces sizable and lasting increases in natives’ hostility toward refugee, immigrant and Muslim minorities; support for restrictive asylum and immigration policies; and political engagement to effect such policies.

Does Immigration into Their Neighborhoods Incline Voters Toward the Extreme Right? The Case of the Freedom Party of Austria: http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/jkueconwp/2012_5f05.htm
- immigration did affect FPO vote share at neighborhood level
- heterogeneous wrt skills
- high-skilled -> lower (spillover benefits), mid-skilled -> higher (competition), low-skilled -> little effect
study  europe  economics  polisci  government  politics  migrant-crisis  nordic  pdf  behavioral-econ  diversity  migration  political-econ  wonkish  intervention  elections  sociology  us-them  multi  natural-experiment  endo-exo  mediterranean  MENA  islam  econometrics  germanic  human-capital  stylized-facts  chart  microfoundations  populism  nationalism-globalism  eastern-europe  endogenous-exogenous 
december 2016 by nhaliday
Post-war consensus - Wikipedia
The post-war consensus is a historian's model of political cooperation in post-war British political history, from the end of World War II in 1945 to the late 1970s and its repudiation by Conservative Margaret Thatcher. Majorities in both parties agreed upon it. The consensus tolerated or encouraged nationalization, strong labour unions, heavy regulation, high taxes, and a generous welfare state.
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december 2016 by nhaliday
How Stable Are Democracies? ‘Warning Signs Are Flashing Red’ - The New York Times
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november 2016 by nhaliday
Deciphering Trumponomics, Chapter One - Bloomberg View
If there is any common theme to my predictions, it stems from Trump’s history in franchising his name and putting relatively little capital into many of his business deals. I think his natural instinct will be to look for some quick symbolic victories to satisfy supporters, and then pursue mass popularity with a lot of government benefits, debt and free-lunch thinking. I don’t think the Trump presidency will be recognizable as traditionally conservative or right-wing.

Overall, my biggest worry is that a Trump administration will herald a new age of geopolitical instability in the Pacific, in the Baltics, and perhaps in other parts of the world. That would hurt the global economic order and turn the U.S. inward, damaging global liberty to the detriment of the American republic.
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november 2016 by nhaliday
Democracy's Destabilizer: TMI - Bloomberg View
Information used to be scarce. Now it’s overwhelming. In his book “The Revolt of the Public and the Crisis of Authority in the New Millennium,” Gurri considers the political implications of this change. He argues that the shift from information scarcity to abundance has destroyed the public’s established trust in institutional authorities, including media, science, religion, and government.
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november 2016 by nhaliday
Among the Post-Liberals - The New York Times
tbh idk why Douthat writes about this stuff in a paper of record (especially when he just namedrops and doesn't define terms)
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october 2016 by nhaliday
Information Processing: High V, Low M
http://www.unz.com/article/iq-or-the-mathverbal-split/
Commenter Gwen on the blog Infoproc hints at a possible neurological basis for this phenomenon, stating that “one bit of speculation I have: the neuroimaging studies seem to consistently point towards efficiency of global connectivity rather than efficiency or other traits of individual regions; you could interpret this as a general factor across a wide battery of tasks because they are all hindered to a greater or lesser degree by simply difficulties in coordination while performing the task; so perhaps what causes Spearman is global connectivity becoming around as efficient as possible and no longer a bottleneck for most tasks, and instead individual brain regions start dominating additional performance improvements. So up to a certain level of global communication efficiency, there is a general intelligence factor but then specific abilities like spatial vs verbal come apart and cease to have common bottlenecks and brain tilts manifest themselves much more clearly.” [10] This certainly seem plausible enough. Let’s hope that those far smarter than ourselves will slowly get to the bottom of these matters over the coming decades.

...

My main prediction here then is that based on HBD, I don’t expect China or East Asia to rival the Anglosphere in the life sciences and medicine or other verbally loaded scientific fields. Perhaps China can mirror Japan in developing pockets of strengths in various areas of the life sciences. Given its significantly larger population, this might indeed translate into non-trivial high-end output in the fields of biology and biomedicine. The core strengths of East Asian countries though, as science in the region matures, will lie primarily in quantitative areas such as physics or chemistry, and this is where I predict the region will shine in the coming years. China’s recent forays into quantum cryptography provide one such example. [40]

...

In fact, as anyone who’s been paying attention has noticed, modern day tech is essentially a California and East Asian affair, with the former focused on software and the latter more so on hardware. American companies dominate in the realm of internet infrastructure and platforms, while East Asia is predominant in consumer electronics hardware, although as noted, China does have its own versions of general purpose tech giants in companies like Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent. By contrast, Europe today has relatively few well known tech companies apart from some successful apps such as Spotify or Skype and entities such as Nokia or Ericsson. [24] It used to have more established technology companies back in the day, but the onslaught of competition from the US and East Asia put a huge dent in Europe’s technology industry.

...

Although many will point to institutional factors such as China or the United States enjoying large, unfragmented markets to explain the decline of European tech, I actually want to offer a more HBD oriented explanation not only for why Europe seems to lag in technology and engineering relative to America and East Asia, but also for why tech in the United States is skewed towards software, while tech in East Asia is skewed towards hardware. I believe that the various phenomenon described above can all be explained by one common underlying mechanism, namely the math/verbal split. Simply put, if you’re really good at math, you gravitate towards hardware. If your skills are more verbally inclined, you gravitate towards software. In general, your chances of working in engineering and technology are greatly bolstered by being spatially and quantitatively adept.

...

If my assertions here are correct, I predict that over the coming decades, we’ll increasingly see different groups of people specialize in areas where they’re most proficient at. This means that East Asians and East Asian societies will be characterized by a skew towards quantitative STEM fields such as physics, chemistry, and engineering and towards hardware and high-tech manufacturing, while Western societies will be characterized by a skew towards the biological sciences and medicine, social sciences, humanities, and software and services. [41] Likewise, India also appears to be a country whose strengths lie more in software and services as opposed to hardware and manufacturing. My fundamental thesis is that all of this is ultimately a reflection of underlying HBD, in particular the math/verbal split. I believe this is the crucial insight lacking in the analyses others offer.

http://www.unz.com/article/iq-or-the-mathverbal-split/#comment-2230751

Sailer In TakiMag: What Does the Deep History of China and India Tell Us About Their Futures?: http://takimag.com/article/a_pair_of_giants_steve_sailer/print#axzz5BHqRM5nD
In an age of postmodern postnationalism that worships diversity, China is old-fashioned. It’s homogeneous, nationalist, and modernist. China seems to have utilitarian 1950s values.

For example, Chinese higher education isn’t yet competitive on the world stage, but China appears to be doing a decent job of educating the masses in the basics. High Chinese scores on the international PISA test for 15-year-olds shouldn’t be taken at face value, but it’s likely that China is approaching first-world norms in providing equality of opportunity through adequate schooling.

Due to censorship and language barriers, Chinese individuals aren’t well represented in English-language cyberspace. Yet in real life, the Chinese build things, such as bridges that don’t fall down, and they make stuff, employing tens of millions of proletarians in their factories.

The Chinese seem, on average, to be good with their hands, which is something that often makes American intellectuals vaguely uncomfortable. But at least the Chinese proles are over there merely manufacturing things cheaply, so American thinkers don’t resent them as much as they do American tradesmen.

Much of the class hatred in America stems from the suspicions of the intelligentsia that plumbers and mechanics are using their voodoo cognitive ability of staring at 3-D physical objects and somehow understanding why they are broken to overcharge them for repairs. Thus it’s only fair, America’s white-collar managers assume, that they export factory jobs to lower-paid China so that they can afford to throw manufactured junk away when it breaks and buy new junk rather than have to subject themselves to the humiliation of admitting to educationally inferior American repairmen that they don’t understand what is wrong with their own gizmos.

...

This Chinese lack of diversity is out of style, and yet it seems to make it easier for the Chinese to get things done.

In contrast, India appears more congenial to current-year thinkers. India seems postmodern and postnationalist, although it might be more accurately called premodern and prenationalist.

...

Another feature that makes our commentariat comfortable with India is that Indians don’t seem to be all that mechanically facile, perhaps especially not the priestly Brahmin caste, with whom Western intellectuals primarily interact.

And the Indians tend to be more verbally agile than the Chinese and more adept at the kind of high-level abstract thinking required by modern computer science, law, and soft major academia. Thousands of years of Brahmin speculations didn’t do much for India’s prosperity, but somehow have prepared Indians to make fortunes in 21st-century America.

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160289616300757
- Study used two moderately large American community samples.
- Verbal and not nonverbal ability drives relationship between ability and ideology.
- Ideology and ability appear more related when ability assessed professionally.
- Self-administered or nonverbal ability measures will underestimate this relationship.

https://www.unz.com/gnxp/the-universal-law-of-interpersonal-dynamics/
Every once in a while I realize something with my conscious mind that I’ve understood implicitly for a long time. Such a thing happened to me yesterday, while reading a post on Stalin, by Amritas. It is this:

S = P + E

Social Status equals Political Capital plus Economic Capital

...

Here’s an example of its explanatory power: If we assume that a major human drive is to maximize S, we can predict that people with high P will attempt to minimize the value of E (since S-maximization is a zero-sum game). And so we see. Throughout history there has been an attempt to ennoble P while stigmatizing E. Conversely, throughout history, people with high E use it to acquire P. Thus, in today’s society we see that socially adept people, who have inborn P skills, tend to favor socialism or big government – where their skills are most valuable, while economically productive people are often frustrated by the fact that their concrete contribution to society is deplored.

Now, you might ask yourself why the reverse isn’t true, why people with high P don’t use it to acquire E, while people with high E don’t attempt to stigmatize P? Well, I think that is true. But, while the equation is mathematically symmetrical, the nature of P-talent and E-talent is not. P-talent can be used to acquire E from the E-adept, but the E-adept are no match for the P-adept in the attempt to stigmatize P. Furthermore, P is endogenous to the system, while E is exogenous. In other words, the P-adept have the ability to manipulate the system itself to make P-talent more valuable in acquiring E, while the E-adept have no ability to manipulate the external environment to make E-talent more valuable in acquiring P.

...

1. All institutions will tend to be dominated by the P-adept
2. All institutions that have no in-built exogenous criteria for measuring its members’ status will inevitably be dominated by the P-adept
3. Universities will inevitably be dominated by the P-adept
4. Within a university, humanities and social sciences will be more dominated by the P-adept than … [more]
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september 2016 by nhaliday
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