nhaliday + objective-measure   17

We find that supporters of the major parties (Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats) have substantively different personality traits. Moreover, we show that those not identifying with any party, who are close to holding the majority, are similar to those identifying with the Conservatives. We show that these results are robust to controlling for cognitive skills and parental party preferences, and to estimation on a subsample of siblings. The relationship between personality traits and party identification is stable across birth cohorts.

Table 2: Big Five Personality Traits: Predictions.
Figure 3: Relationship between personality traits and stable party identification

Conservative core supporters are antagonistic towards others (low Agreeableness), they are closed to new experiences (low Openness), they are energetic and enthusiastic (high Extraversion), they are goal-orientated (high Conscientiousness), and they are even-tempered (low Neuroticism).

In contrast, the core supporters of the Labour Party have a pro-social and communal attitude (high Agreeableness), they are open to new experiences and ideas (high Openness), but they are more anxious, tense and discontented (high Neuroticism) and less prone to goal-directed behavior (low Conscientiousness). The core supporters of the Liberal Democrats have similar traits to the typical Labour supporters with two exceptions. First, they do not show any particular tendency towards pro-social and communal attitudes (insignificant Agreeableness). Second, they are more reserved and introverted than the more extraverted supporters of either the Conservatives or Labour (low Extraversion).

Psychological and Personality Profiles of Political Extremists: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.00119.pdf
We revisit the debate over the appeal of extremism in the U.S. context by comparing publicly available Twitter messages written by over 355,000 political extremist followers with messages written by non-extremist U.S. users. Analysis of text-based psychological indicators supports the moral foundation theory which identifies emotion as a critical factor in determining political orientation of individuals. Extremist followers also differ from others in four of the Big Five personality traits.

Fig. 2. Comparing psychological profiles of the followers of moderate and extremist single-issue groups, compared to random users.

Overall, the differences in psychological profile between followers of extremist and moderate groups is much larger for left-wing extremists (environmentalists) than right-wing (anti-abortion and anti-immigrant).

Fig. 3. Big Five Personality Profiles.

Results show that extremist followers (whether left or right) are less agreeable, less neurotic, and more open than nonextremists.

Ideology as Motivated Cultural Cognition: How Culture Translates Personality into Policy Preferences: https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2017/Ideology%20as%20Motivated%20Cultural%20Cognition.pdf
This paper summarises the results of a quantitative analysis testing the theory that culture acts as an intermediary in the relationship between individual perceptual tendencies and political orientation. Political psychologists have long observed that more “left-wing” individuals tend to be more comfortable than “right-wing” individuals with ambiguity, disorder, and uncertainty, to equivocate more readily between conflicting viewpoints, and to be more willing to change their opinions. These traits are often summarised under the blanket term of “open-mindedness”. A recent increase in cross-cultural studies, however, has indicated that these relationships are far less robust, and even reversed, in social contexts outside of North America and Western Europe. The sociological concept of culture may provide an answer to this inconsistency: emergent idea-networks, irreducible to individuals, which nonetheless condition psychological motivations, so that perceptual factors resulting in left-wing preferences in one culture may result in opposing preferences in another. The key is that open-mindedness leads individuals to attack the dominant ideas which they encounter: if prevailing orthodoxies happen to be left-wing, then open minded individuals may become right-wing in protest. Using conditional process analysis of the British Election Study, I find evidence for three specific mechanisms whereby culture interferes with perceptual influences on politics. Conformity to the locally dominant culture mediates these influences, in the sense that open-minded people in Britain are only more left-wing because they are less culturally conformal. This relationship is itself moderated both by cultural group membership and by Philip Converse’s notion of “constraint”, individual-level connectivity between ideas, such that the strength of perceptual influence differs significantly between cultural groups and between levels of constraint to the idea of the political spectrum. Overall, I find compelling evidence for the importance of culture in shaping perceptions of policy choices.
pdf  study  polisci  sociology  politics  ideology  personality  psych-architecture  correlation  britain  coalitions  phalanges  data  things  multi  preprint  psychology  social-psych  cog-psych  culture-war  gnon  🐸  subculture  objective-measure  demographics  org:mat  creative  culture  society  cultural-dynamics  anthropology  hari-seldon  discipline  extra-introversion  stress  individualism-collectivism  expression-survival  values  poll  chart  curiosity 
november 2017 by nhaliday
The Determinants of Trust
Both individual experiences and community characteristics influence how much people trust each other. Using data drawn from US localities we find that the strongest factors that reduce trust are: i) a recent history of traumatic experiences, even though the passage of time reduces this effect fairly rapidly; ii) belonging to a group that historically felt discriminated against, such as minorities (black in particular) and, to a lesser extent, women; iii) being economically unsuccessful in terms of income and education; iv) living in a racially mixed community and/or in one with a high degree of income disparity. Religious beliefs and ethnic origins do not significantly affect trust. The latter result may be an indication that the American melting pot at least up to a point works, in terms of homogenizing attitudes of different cultures, even though racial cleavages leading to low trust are still quite high.

Understanding Trust: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13387
In this paper we resolve this puzzle by recognizing that trust has two components: a belief-based one and a preference based one. While the sender's behavior reflects both, we show that WVS-like measures capture mostly the belief-based component, while questions on past trusting behavior are better at capturing the preference component of trust.

MEASURING TRUST: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/laibson/files/measuring_trust.pdf
We combine two experiments and a survey to measure trust and trustworthiness— two key components of social capital. Standard attitudinal survey questions about trust predict trustworthy behavior in our experiments much better than they predict trusting behavior. Trusting behavior in the experiments is predicted by past trusting behavior outside of the experiments. When individuals are closer socially, both trust and trustworthiness rise. Trustworthiness declines when partners are of different races or nationalities. High status individuals are able to elicit more trustworthiness in others.

What is Social Capital? The Determinants of Trust and Trustworthiness: http://www.nber.org/papers/w7216
Using a sample of Harvard undergraduates, we analyze trust and social capital in two experiments. Trusting behavior and trustworthiness rise with social connection; differences in race and nationality reduce the level of trustworthiness. Certain individuals appear to be persistently more trusting, but these people do not say they are more trusting in surveys. Survey questions about trust predict trustworthiness not trust. Only children are less trustworthy. People behave in a more trustworthy manner towards higher status individuals, and therefore status increases earnings in the experiment. As such, high status persons can be said to have more social capital.

Trust and Cheating: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18509
We find that: i) both parties to a trust exchange have implicit notions of what constitutes cheating even in a context without promises or messages; ii) these notions are not unique - the vast majority of senders would feel cheated by a negative return on their trust/investment, whereas a sizable minority defines cheating according to an equal split rule; iii) these implicit notions affect the behavior of both sides to the exchange in terms of whether to trust or cheat and to what extent. Finally, we show that individual's notions of what constitutes cheating can be traced back to two classes of values instilled by parents: cooperative and competitive. The first class of values tends to soften the notion while the other tightens it.

Nationalism and Ethnic-Based Trust: Evidence from an African Border Region: https://u.osu.edu/robinson.1012/files/2015/12/Robinson_NationalismTrust-1q3q9u1.pdf
These results offer microlevel evidence that a strong and salient national identity can diminish ethnic barriers to trust in diverse societies.

One Team, One Nation: Football, Ethnic Identity, and Conflict in Africa: http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/SI2017/DEV/Durante_Depetris-Chauvin.pdf
Do collective experiences that prime sentiments of national unity reduce interethnic tensions and conflict? We examine this question by looking at the impact of national football teams’ victories in sub-Saharan Africa. Combining individual survey data with information on over 70 official matches played between 2000 and 2015, we find that individuals interviewed in the days after a victory of their country’s national team are less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity and more likely to trust people of other ethnicities than those interviewed just before. The effect is sizable and robust and is not explained by generic euphoria or optimism. Crucially, national victories do not only affect attitudes but also reduce violence. Indeed, using plausibly exogenous variation from close qualifications to the Africa Cup of Nations, we find that countries that (barely) qualified experience significantly less conflict in the following six months than countries that (barely) did not. Our findings indicate that, even where ethnic tensions have deep historical roots, patriotic shocks can reduce inter-ethnic tensions and have a tangible impact on conflict.

Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?: http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/HHPW.pdf
We identify three families of mechanisms that link diversity to public goods provision—–what we term “preferences,” “technology,” and “strategy selection” mechanisms—–and run a series of experimental games that permit us to compare the explanatory power of distinct mechanisms within each of these three families. Results from games conducted with a random sample of 300 subjects from a slum neighborhood of Kampala, Uganda, suggest that successful public goods provision in homogenous ethnic communities can be attributed to a strategy selection mechanism: in similar settings, co-ethnics play cooperative equilibria, whereas non-co-ethnics do not. In addition, we find evidence for a technology mechanism: co-ethnics are more closely linked on social networks and thus plausibly better able to support cooperation through the threat of social sanction. We find no evidence for prominent preference mechanisms that emphasize the commonality of tastes within ethnic groups or a greater degree of altruism toward co-ethnics, and only weak evidence for technology mechanisms that focus on the impact of shared ethnicity on the productivity of teams.

does it generalize to first world?

Higher Intelligence Groups Have Higher Cooperation Rates in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp8499.html
The initial cooperation rates are similar, it increases in the groups with higher intelligence to reach almost full cooperation, while declining in the groups with lower intelligence. The difference is produced by the cumulation of small but persistent differences in the response to past cooperation of the partner. In higher intelligence subjects, cooperation after the initial stages is immediate and becomes the default mode, defection instead requires more time. For lower intelligence groups this difference is absent. Cooperation of higher intelligence subjects is payoff sensitive, thus not automatic: in a treatment with lower continuation probability there is no difference between different intelligence groups

Why societies cooperate: https://voxeu.org/article/why-societies-cooperate
Three attributes are often suggested to generate cooperative behaviour – a good heart, good norms, and intelligence. This column reports the results of a laboratory experiment in which groups of players benefited from learning to cooperate. It finds overwhelming support for the idea that intelligence is the primary condition for a socially cohesive, cooperative society. Warm feelings towards others and good norms have only a small and transitory effect.

individual payoff, etc.:

Trust, Values and False Consensus: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18460
Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more (less) trustworthy individuals form more optimistic (pessimistic) trust beliefs - and that this tendency continues to color trust beliefs after several rounds of game-play. Moreover, we show that one's own type/trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing. In a second closely-related experiment, we show the economic impact of mis-calibrated trust beliefs stemming from false consensus. Miscalibrated beliefs lower participants' experimental trust game earnings by about 20 percent on average.

The Right Amount of Trust: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15344
We investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance. We find that individual income is hump-shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs. Our interpretation is that highly trusting individuals tend to assume too much social risk and to be cheated more often, ultimately performing less well than those with a belief close to the mean trustworthiness of the population. On the other hand, individuals with overly pessimistic beliefs avoid being cheated, but give up profitable opportunities, therefore underperforming. The cost of either too much or too little trust is comparable to the income lost by forgoing college.


This framework allows us to show that income-maximizing trust typically exceeds the trust level of the average person as well as to estimate the distribution of income lost to trust mistakes. We find that although a majority of individuals has well calibrated beliefs, a non-trivial proportion of the population (10%) has trust beliefs sufficiently poorly calibrated to lower income by more than 13%.

Do Trust and … [more]
study  economics  alesina  growth-econ  broad-econ  trust  cohesion  social-capital  religion  demographics  race  diversity  putnam-like  compensation  class  education  roots  phalanges  general-survey  multi  usa  GT-101  conceptual-vocab  concept  behavioral-econ  intricacy  composition-decomposition  values  descriptive  correlation  harvard  field-study  migration  poll  status  🎩  🌞  chart  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  psychology  social-psych  sociology  cooperate-defect  justice  egalitarianism-hierarchy  inequality  envy  n-factor  axelrod  pdf  microfoundations  nationalism-globalism  africa  intervention  counter-revolution  tribalism  culture  society  ethnocentrism  coordination  world  developing-world  innovation  econ-productivity  government  stylized-facts  madisonian  wealth-of-nations  identity-politics  public-goodish  s:*  legacy  things  optimization  curvature  s-factor  success  homo-hetero  higher-ed  models  empirical  contracts  human-capital  natural-experiment  endo-exo  data  scale  trade  markets  time  supply-demand  summary 
august 2017 by nhaliday
Revealing the Economic Consequences of Group Cohesion
A comprehensive program of new experiments reveals the considerable economic impact of cohesion: higher cohesion groups are significantly more likely to achieve Pareto-superior outcomes in classic weak-link coordination games. We show that effects of cohesion are economically large, robust, and portable. We identify social preferences as a primary mechanism explaining the effects of cohesion.


Our workhorse to study group outcomes is a weak-link coordination game chosen because it captures economically interesting problems endemic to organizations and teams (e.g., Camerer and Weber (2013)). In our version of the weak-link game, inspired by Brandts and Cooper (2006), group members simultaneously choose an effort level. Payoffs to each group member then depend on their own effort and the lowest effort chosen by anyone (the “weakest link”) in the group. The game has multiple strict Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria in material payoffs. This feature makes it particularly interesting for our purposes because it combines two dimensions of group success: features of coordination (choosing the same effort level as other group members) and cooperation (groups achieving Pareto-superior Nash equilibria). We expected our weak-link game to be a “harsh” environment in the sense that most groups who play this game under anonymity and in the absence of pre-existing social relationships will collapse to the Pareto-worst equilibrium and never escape from it (Brandts and Cooper (2006), and own replication).

As we show in Section V, group cohesion is a key determinant of behavior in our experiments: low cohesion groups usually descend rapidly to minimum effort; high cohesion groups fare much better and high cohesion appears necessary (though not sufficient) for achieving Pareto-superior outcomes. Surprisingly, our measure of group cohesion is the only variable that successfully predicts cooperation success; none of more than twenty control variables (demographics and group characteristics) explain minimum effort. Further experiments show that our results are robust to the timing of oneness measurement (before or after play of the weak-link game). By benchmarking our results against the effect of monetary incentives, we also show (Section VI) that the effortenhancing effects of group cohesion are sizeable: large financial incentives are needed to achieve the levels of minimum effort expected for high cohesion groups.

In Section VII we turn to an explanation of our results. A rational choice perspective suggests three natural channels through which group cohesion could operate: it might affect some combination of group members’ social preferences, their beliefs or the form of their strategic reasoning. Considering social preferences, it is plausible to assume that members of highly cohesive groups care about one another and so place weight on each other’s earnings.1 In our weak-link game, if players do draw utility from each other’s earnings, this is tantamount to (some) sharing of earnings, which reduces strategic risk and fosters coordination on Pareto-superior equilibria.2 In relation to beliefs, highly cohesive groups may be more confident in simulating other group members’ thought processes and likely actions, perhaps because of a history of interactions in different (related) situations, which allows for implicit learning (e.g., Holyoak and Spellman (1993), Rick and Weber (2010)). Finally, group cohesion might influence the nature of strategic reasoning in more substantive ways. For instance, according to one model of strategic thinking, “team reasoning” (e.g., Sugden (2003), Bacharach (2006)), people think in terms of what would be best for the team (e.g., picking the Pareto-best equilibrium) and are inclined to do their part in implementing the group-optimal outcome. An interesting possibility is that team reasoning may be more likely the more cohesive the team is. These three channels might operate jointly and potentially reinforce each other in high cohesion groups. By contrast, low cohesion groups may have low levels of social preferences, little implicit learning to draw on from shared situations, and no team perception to facilitate team reasoning.

We probe these possibilities in two steps. We first show that subjects who report high oneness with their fellow group members are indeed more likely to expose themselves to the strategic risk of choosing high initial effort in our weak-link games; they are also less “harsh” in their responses when others’ effort levels are below their own. In highly cohesive groups, these tendencies apply across group members promoting coordination on equilibria above the Pareto-worst.

Our second step is to identify the social preferences channel as a promising route for explaining observed effects of group cohesion. We demonstrate this via additional experiments in which unrelated and anonymous group members play weak-link games but with all earnings shared equally. We interpret this manipulation as inducing a limiting form of social preferences (where all put equal weight on everyone’s material payoffs). The results show patterns of effort (opening levels and dynamics) very comparable to the top third most cohesive groups from our main experiment. Thus, social preferences provide a parsimonious candidate explanation of how group cohesion promotes Pareto-superior equilibria.

Smart groups of smart people: Evidence for IQ as the origin of collective intelligence in the performance of human groups: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160289616303282
Group-IQ almost exclusively reflects individual cognition. (80% variance explained)
pdf  study  org:ngo  economics  growth-econ  behavioral-gen  psychology  social-psych  cohesion  putnam-like  coordination  trust  social-capital  values  tribalism  descriptive  collaboration  pareto  efficiency  anthropology  altruism  🎩  white-paper  info-econ  microfoundations  industrial-org  n-factor  broad-econ  cooperate-defect  axelrod  organizing  roots  interests  hive-mind  multi  iq  gender  contrarianism  critique  management  diversity  individualism-collectivism  objective-measure  biophysical-econ  wealth-of-nations  variance-components  null-result  attaq  intelligence  psychometrics  decision-making  GT-101  public-goodish 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Kinship Systems, Cooperation and the Evolution of Culture
In the data, societies with loose ancestral kinship ties cooperate and trust broadly, which is apparently sustained through a belief in moralizing gods, universally applicable moral principles, feelings of guilt, and large-scale institutions. Societies with a historically tightly knit kinship structure, on the other hand, exhibit strong in-group favoritism: they cheat on and are distrusting of out-group members, but readily support in-group members in need. This cooperation scheme is enforced by moral values of in-group loyalty, conformity to tight social norms, emotions of shame, and strong local institutions.

Henrich, Joseph, The Secret of Our Success: How Culture is Driving Human Evolution,
Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter, Princeton University Press, 2015.
—, W.E.I.R.D People: How Westerners became Individualistic, Self-Obsessed, Guilt-Ridden,
Analytic, Patient, Principled and Prosperous, Princeton University Press, n.d.
—, Jean Ensminger, Richard McElreath, Abigail Barr, Clark Barrett, Alexander Bolyanatz, Juan Camilo Cardenas, Michael Gurven, Edwins Gwako, Natalie Hen- rich et al., “Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment,” Science, 2010, 327 (5972), 1480–1484.


—, —, Will M. Gervais, Aiyana K. Willard, Rita A. McNamara, Edward Slingerland, and Joseph Henrich, “The Cultural Evolution of Prosocial Religions,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2016, 39, e1.


Purzycki, Benjamin Grant, Coren Apicella, Quentin D. Atkinson, Emma Cohen, Rita Anne McNamara, Aiyana K. Willard, Dimitris Xygalatas, Ara Norenzayan, and Joseph Henrich, “Moralistic Gods, Supernatural Punishment and the Expansion of Human Sociality,” Nature, 2016.

Table 1 summarizes
Figure 1 has map of kinship tightness
Figure 2 has cheating and in-group vs. out-group
Table 2 has regression
Figure 3 has univeralism and shame-guilt
Figure 4 has individualism-collectivism/conformity
Table 4 has radius of trust, Table 5 same for within-country variation (ethnic)
Tables 7 and 8 do universalism

Haidt moral foundations:
In line with the research hypothesis discussed in Section 3, the analysis employs two dependent variables, i.e., (i) the measure of in-group loyalty, and (ii) an index of the importance of communal values relative to the more universal (individualizing) ones. That is, the hypothesis is explicitly not about some societies being more or less moral than others, but merely about heterogeneity in the relative importance that people attach to structurally different types of values. To construct the index, I compute the first principal component of fairness / reciprocity, harm / care, in-group / loyalty, and respect /authority. The resulting score endogenously has the appealing property that – in line with the research hypothesis – it loads positively on the first two values and negatively on the latter two, with roughly equal weights, see Appendix F for details.²⁴I compute country-level scores by averaging responses by country of residence of respondents. Importantly, in Enke (2017) I document that – in a nationally representative sample of Americans – this same index of moral communalism is strongly correlated with individuals’ propensity to favor their local community over society as a whole in issues ranging from taxation and redistribution to donations and volunteering. Thus, there is evidence that the index of communal moral values captures economically meaningful behavioral heterogeneity.

The coevolution of kinship systems, cooperation, and culture: http://voxeu.org/article/kinship-cooperation-and-culture
- Benjamin Enke

pretty short

good linguistics reference cited in this paper:
On the biological and cultural evolution of shame: Using internet search tools to weight values in many cultures: https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1100v2
Here we explore the relative importance between shame and guilt by using Google Translate [>_>...] to produce translation for the words "shame", "guilt", "pain", "embarrassment" and "fear" to the 64 languages covered. We also explore the meanings of these concepts among the Yanomami, a horticulturist hunter-gatherer tribe in the Orinoquia. Results show that societies previously described as “guilt societies” have more words for guilt than for shame, but *the large majority*, including the societies previously described as “shame societies”, *have more words for shame than for guilt*. Results are consistent with evolutionary models of shame which predict a wide scatter in the relative importance between guilt and shame, suggesting that cultural evolution of shame has continued the work of biological evolution, and that neither provides a strong adaptive advantage to either shame or guilt [? did they not just say that most languages favor shame?].


The roots of the word "shame" are thought to derive from an older word meaning "to cover". The emotion of shame has clear physiological consequences. Its facial and corporal expression is a human universal, as was recognized already by Darwin (5). Looking away, reddening of the face, sinking the head, obstructing direct view, hiding the face and downing the eyelids, are the unequivocal expressions signaling shame. Shame might be an emotion specific to humans, as no clear description of it is known for animals.
Classical Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle, explicitly mention shame as a key element in building society.

Guilt is the emotion of being responsible for the commission of an offense, however, it seems to be distinct from shame. Guilt says “what I did was not good”, whereas shame says “I am no good"(2). For Benedict (1), shame is a violation of cultural or social values, while guilt feelings arise from violations of one's internal values.


Unobservable emotions such as guilt may be of value to the receiver but constitutes in economy “private information”. Thus, in economic and biological terms, adaptive pressures acting upon the evolution of shame differ from those acting on that of guilt.

Shame has evolutionary advantages to both individual and society, but the lack ofshame also has evolutionary advantages as it allows cheating and thus benefiting from public goods without paying the costs of its build up.


Dodds (7) coined the distinction between guilt and shame cultures and postulated that in Greek cultural history, shame as a social value was displaced, at least in part, by guilt in guiding moral behavior.
"[...]True guilt cultures rely on an internalized conviction of sin as the enforcer of good behavior, not, as shame cultures do, on external sanctions. Guilt cultures emphasize punishment and forgiveness as ways of restoring the moral order; shame cultures stress self-denial and humility as ways of restoring the social order”.


For example, Wikipedia is less error prone than Encyclopedia Britannica (12, 17); and Google Translate is as accurate as more traditional methods (35).

Table 1, Figure 1


This regression is close to a proportional line of two words for shame for each word for guilt.


For example, in the case of Chinese, no overlap between the five concepts is reported using Google Translate in Figure 1. Yet, linguistic-conceptual studies of guilt and shame revealed an important overlap between several of these concepts in Chinese (29).


Our results using Google Translate show no overlap between Guilt and Shame in any of the languages studied.
[lol:] Examples of the context when they feel “kili” are: a tiger appears in the forest; you kill somebody from another community; your daughter is going to die; everybody looks at your underwear; you are caught stealing; you soil your pants while among others; a doctor gives you an injection; you hit your wife and others find out; you are unfaithful to your husband and others find out; you are going to be hit with a machete.


Linguistic families do not aggregate according to the relationship of the number of synonyms for shame and guilt (Figure 3).


The ratios are 0.89 and 2.5 respectively, meaning a historical transition from guilt-culture in Latin to shame-culture in Italian, suggesting a historical development that is inverse to that suggested byDodds for ancient to classical Greek. [I hope their Latin corpus doesn't include stuff from Catholics...]

Joe Henrich presentation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f-unD4ZzWB4

relevant video:
Johnny Cash - God's Gonna Cut You Down: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eJlN9jdQFSc

this says Dems more guilt-driven but Peter Frost says opposite here (and matches my perception of the contemporary breakdown both including minorities and focusing only on whites): https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:9b75881f6861

this is an amazing paper:
The Origins of WEIRD Psychology: https://psyarxiv.com/d6qhu/
Recent research not only confirms the existence of substantial psychological variation around the globe but also highlights the peculiarity of populations that are Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD). We propose that much of this variation arose as people psychologically adapted to differing kin-based institutions—the set of social norms governing descent, marriage, residence and related domains. We further propose that part of the variation in these institutions arose historically from the Catholic Church’s marriage and family policies, which contributed to the dissolution of Europe’s traditional kin-based institutions, leading eventually to the predominance of nuclear families and impersonal institutions. By combining data on 20 psychological outcomes with historical measures of both kinship and Church exposure, we find support for these ideas in a comprehensive array of analyses across countries, among European regions and between individuals with … [more]
study  economics  broad-econ  pseudoE  roots  anthropology  sociology  culture  cultural-dynamics  society  civilization  religion  theos  kinship  individualism-collectivism  universalism-particularism  europe  the-great-west-whale  orient  integrity  morality  ethics  trust  institutions  things  pdf  piracy  social-norms  cooperate-defect  patho-altruism  race  world  developing-world  pop-diff  n-factor  ethnography  ethnocentrism  🎩  🌞  s:*  us-them  occident  political-econ  altruism  self-interest  books  todo  multi  old-anglo  big-peeps  poetry  aristos  homo-hetero  north-weingast-like  maps  data  modernity  tumblr  social  ratty  gender  history  iron-age  mediterranean  the-classics  christianity  speculation  law  public-goodish  tribalism  urban  china  asia  sinosphere  decision-making  polanyi-marx  microfoundations  open-closed  alien-character  axelrod  eden  growth-econ  social-capital  values  phalanges  usa  within-group  group-level  regional-scatter-plots  comparison  psychology  social-psych  behavioral-eco 
june 2017 by nhaliday
The high heritability of educational achievement reflects many genetically influenced traits, not just intelligence
We focus on the results of a United Kingdom-wide examination, the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE), which is administered at the end of compulsory education at age 16. GCSE scores were obtained for 13,306 twins at age 16, whom we also assessed contemporaneously on 83 scales that were condensed to nine broad psychological domains, including intelligence, self-efficacy, personality, well-being, and behavior problems. The mean of GCSE core subjects (English, mathematics, science) is more heritable (62%) than the nine predictor domains (35–58%). Each of the domains correlates significantly with GCSE results, and these correlations are largely mediated genetically. The main finding is that, although intelligence accounts for more of the heritability of GCSE than any other single domain, the other domains collectively account for about as much GCSE heritability as intelligence. Together with intelligence, these domains account for 75% of the heritability of GCSE. We conclude that the high heritability of educational achievement reflects many genetically influenced traits, not just intelligence.
pdf  study  biodet  psychology  cog-psych  psychometrics  education  iq  personality  discipline  stress  variance-components  self-report  objective-measure  britain  twin-study  psych-architecture  genetics  behavioral-gen 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Heritability of ultimatum game responder behavior
Employing standard structural equation modeling techniques, we estimate that >40% of the variation in subjects' rejection behavior is explained by additive genetic effects. Our estimates also suggest a very modest role for common environment as a source of phenotypic variation.
study  biodet  org:nat  psychology  social-psych  behavioral-econ  variance-components  decision-theory  twin-study  europe  nordic  trust  GT-101  objective-measure  zero-positive-sum  justice  behavioral-gen  cooperate-defect  microfoundations 
february 2017 by nhaliday
Computer-based personality judgments are more accurate than those made by humans
- data: likes on facebook
- outperforms peer ratings (validated by self-other agreement) and self ratings (validated by correlation w/ objective life outcomes)
oxbridge  study  facebook  internet  personality  psychometrics  methodology  quiz  multi  psychology  cog-psych  metrics  org:nat  observer-report  objective-measure  self-report  measurement 
january 2017 by nhaliday
Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?
relevant thread (discussion of Matt Bruenig's passive income thing): https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/815644778641571842
other study: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/089533005775196732

Our main finding is that risk aversion and impatience both vary systematically with cognitive ability. Individuals with higher cognitive ability are significantly more willing to take risks in the lottery experiments and are significantly more patient over the yearlong time horizon studied in the intertemporal choice experiment. The correlation between cognitive ability and risk aversion is present for both young and old, and for males and females, although the relationship is somewhat weaker for females and younger individuals.
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january 2017 by nhaliday
Bestiary of Behavioral Economics/Trust Game - Wikibooks, open books for an open world
In the trust game, like the ultimatum game and the dictator game, there are two participants that are anonymously paired. Both of these individuals are given some quantity of money. The first individual, or player, is told that he must send some amount of his money to an anonymous second player, though the amount sent may be zero. The first player is also informed that whatever he sends will be tripled by the experimenter. So, when the first player chooses a value, the experimenter will take it, triple it, and give that money to the second player. The second player is then told to make a similar choice – give some amount of the now-tripled money back to the first player, even if that amount is zero.

Even with perfect information about the mechanics of the game, the first player option to send nothing (and thus the second player option to send nothing back) is the Nash equilibrium for the game.

In the original Berg et al. experiment, thirty out of thirty-two game trials resulted in a violation of the results predicted by standard economic theory. In these thirty cases, first players sent money that averaged slightly over fifty percent of their original endowment.

Heritability of cooperative behavior in the trust game: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2268795/
- trust defined by the standard A->B->A trust game
- smallish h^2, small but nonzero shared environment, primarily non-shared environment (~70%)

The results of our mixed-effects Bayesian ACE analysis suggest that variation in how subjects play the trust game is partially accounted for by genetic differences (Tables 2 and ​and33 and Fig. 2). In the ACE model of trust, the heritability estimate is 20% (C.I. 3–38%) in the Swedish experiment and 10% (C.I. 4–21%) in the U.S. experiment. The ACE model of trust also demonstrates that environmental variation plays a role. In particular, unshared environmental variation is a much more significant source of phenotypic variation than genetic variation (e2 = 68% vs. c2 = 12% in Sweden and e2 = 82% vs. c2 = 8% in the U.S.; P < 0.0001 in both samples). In the ACE model of trustworthiness, heritability (h2) generates 18% (C.I. 8–30%) of the variance in the Swedish experiment and 17% (C.I. 5–32%) in the U.S. experiment. Once again, environmental differences play a role (e2 = 66% vs. c2 = 17% in Sweden and e2 = 71% vs. c2 = 12% in the U.S.; P < 0.0001 in both samples).

Trust and Gender: An Examination of Behavior and Beliefs in the Investment Game: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222329553_Trust_and_Gender_An_Examination_of_Behavior_and_Beliefs_in_the_Investment_Game
How does gender influence trust, the likelihood of being trusted and the level of trustworthiness? We compare choices by men and women in the Investment Game and use questionnaire data to try to understand the motivations for the behavioral differences. We find that men trust more than women, and women are more trustworthy than men. The relationship between expected return and trusting behavior is stronger among men than women, suggesting that men view the interaction more strategically than women. Women felt more obligated both to trust and reciprocate, but the impact of obligation on behavior varies.

Genetic Influences Are Virtually Absent for Trust: http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0093880
trust defined by poll

Over the past decades, numerous twin studies have revealed moderate to high heritability estimates for individual differences in a wide range of human traits, including cognitive ability, psychiatric disorders, and personality traits. Even factors that are generally believed to be environmental in nature have been shown to be under genetic control, albeit modest. Is such heritability also present in _social traits that are conceptualized as causes and consequences of social interactions_ or in other ways strongly shaped by behavior of other people? Here we examine a population-based sample of 1,012 twins and relatives. We show that the genetic influence on generalized trust in other people (trust-in-others: h2 = 5%, ns), and beliefs regarding other people’s trust in the self (trust-in-self: h2 = 13%, ns), is virtually absent. As test-retest reliability for both scales were found to be moderate or high (r = .76 and r = .53, respectively) in an independent sample, we conclude that all variance in trust is likely to be accounted for by non-shared environmental influences.

Dutch sample

Generalized Trust: Four Lessons From Genetics and Culture: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0963721414552473
We share four basic lessons on trust: (a) Generalized trust is more a matter of culture than genetics; (b) trust is deeply rooted in social interaction experiences (that go beyond childhood), networks, and media; (c) people have too little trust in other people in general; and (d) it is adaptive to regulate a “healthy dose” of generalized trust.

Trust is heritable, whereas distrust is not: http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2017/06/13/1617132114
Notably, although both trust and distrust are strongly influenced by the individual’s unique environment, interestingly, trust shows significant genetic influences, whereas distrust does not. Rather, distrust appears to be primarily socialized, including influences within the family.

[ed.: All this is consistent with my intuition that moral behavior is more subject to cultural/"free will"-type influences.]
models  economics  behavioral-econ  decision-theory  wiki  reference  classic  minimum-viable  game-theory  decision-making  trust  GT-101  putnam-like  justice  social-capital  cooperate-defect  microfoundations  multi  study  psychology  social-psych  regularizer  environmental-effects  coordination  variance-components  europe  nordic  usa  🌞  🎩  anglo  biodet  objective-measure  sociology  behavioral-gen  poll  self-report  null-result  comparison  org:nat  chart  iteration-recursion  homo-hetero  intricacy 
december 2016 by nhaliday
CSRankings: Computer Science Rankings (beta)
some missing venues: ITCS, QCRYPT, QIP, COLT (last has some big impact on the margins)
data  higher-ed  grad-school  phd  cs  tcs  list  schools  🎓  top-n  database  conference  ranking  publishing  fall-2016  network-structure  academia  objective-measure  let-me-see  nibble  reference 
july 2016 by nhaliday
What is up with carbon dioxide and cognition? An offer - Less Wrong Discussion
study: http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/1104789/
n=22, p-values < .001 generally, no multiple comparisons or anything, right?
chart: http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/ehp.1104789.g002.png
- note it's CO2 not oxygen that's relevant
- some interesting debate in comments about whether you would find similar effects for similar levels of variation in oxygen, implications for high-altitude living, etc.
- CO2 levels can range quite to quite high levels indoors (~1500, and even ~7000 in some of Gwern's experiments); this seems to be enough to impact cognition to a significant degree
- outdoor air quality often better than indoor even in urban areas (see other studies)

the solution: houseplants, http://lesswrong.com/lw/nk0/what_is_up_with_carbon_dioxide_and_cognition_an/d956

except that environmental instability tends to be harder on more 'complex' adaptations and co2 ppm directly correlates with decreased effectiveness of cognition-enhancing traits vis chronic low-grade acidosis
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may 2016 by nhaliday

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