nhaliday + microfoundations   319

Cultural variation in cultural evolution | Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences
Cultural evolutionary models have identified a range of conditions under which social learning (copying others) is predicted to be adaptive relative to asocial learning (learning on one's own), particularly in humans where socially learned information can accumulate over successive generations. However, cultural evolution and behavioural economics experiments have consistently shown apparently maladaptive under-utilization of social information in Western populations. Here we provide experimental evidence of cultural variation in people's use of social learning, potentially explaining this mismatch. People in mainland China showed significantly more social learning than British people in an artefact-design task designed to assess the adaptiveness of social information use. People in Hong Kong, and Chinese immigrants in the UK, resembled British people in their social information use, suggesting a recent shift in these groups from social to asocial learning due to exposure to Western culture. Finally, Chinese mainland participants responded less than other participants to increased environmental change within the task. Our results suggest that learning strategies in humans are culturally variable and not genetically fixed, necessitating the study of the ‘social learning of social learning strategies' whereby the dynamics of cultural evolution are responsive to social processes, such as migration, education and globalization.

...

Western education emphasizes individual discovery and creativity, whereas East Asian education emphasizes rote learning from authority [25]. The adoption of consumer products shows less social influence in Western than East Asian countries [26]. Westerners are described as more individualistic/independent, while East Asians are described as more collectivistic/interdependent [27], dimensions which intuitively map on to asocial and social learning, respectively.

Societal background influences social learning in cooperative decision making: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090513817303501
We demonstrate that Chinese participants base their cooperation decisions on information about their peers much more frequently than their British counterparts. Moreover, our results reveal remarkable societal differences in the type of peer information people consider. In contrast to the consensus view, Chinese participants tend to be substantially less majority-oriented than the British. While Chinese participants are inclined to adopt peer behavior that leads to higher payoffs, British participants tend to cooperate only if sufficiently many peers do so too. These results indicate that the basic processes underlying social transmission are not universal; rather, they vary with cultural conditions. As success-based learning is associated with selfish behavior and majority-based learning can help foster cooperation, our study suggests that in different societies social learning can play diverging roles in the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.
study  org:nat  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  sapiens  pop-diff  comparison  sociality  learning  duplication  individualism-collectivism  n-factor  europe  the-great-west-whale  china  asia  sinosphere  britain  anglosphere  strategy  environmental-effects  biodet  within-without  auto-learning  tribalism  things  broad-econ  psychology  cog-psych  social-psych  🎩  🌞  microfoundations  egalitarianism-hierarchy  innovation  creative  explanans  education  culture  curiosity  multi  occident  cooperate-defect  coordination  organizing  self-interest  altruism  patho-altruism  orient  ecology  axelrod 
may 2018 by nhaliday
What explains the formation and decay of clusters of creativity? - Marginal REVOLUTION
Creativity is often highly concentrated in time and space, and across different domains. What explains the formation and decay of clusters of creativity? In this paper we match data on thousands of notable individuals born in Europe between the XIth and the XIXth century with historical data on city institutions and population. After documenting several stylized facts, we show that the formation of creative clusters is not preceded by increases in city size. Instead, the emergence of city institutions protecting economic and political freedoms facilitates the attraction and production of creative talent.

IOW, the opposite of what Dick Florida said.
econotariat  marginal-rev  links  commentary  study  economics  growth-econ  broad-econ  cliometrics  innovation  stylized-facts  contrarianism  urban-rural  europe  the-great-west-whale  history  medieval  political-econ  institutions  microfoundations  roots  policy  nascent-state  creative  civil-liberty  randy-ayndy  polisci  regulation  capitalism  markets  mokyr-allen-mccloskey  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  reflection  track-record 
january 2018 by nhaliday
Team *Decorations Until Epiphany* on Twitter: "@RoundSqrCupola maybe just C https://t.co/SFPXb3qrAE"
https://archive.is/k0fsS
Remember ‘BRICs’? Now it’s just ICs.
--
maybe just C
Solow predicts that if 2 countries have the same TFP, then the poorer nation should grow faster. But poorer India grows more slowly than China.

Solow thinking leads one to suspect India has substantially lower TFP.

Recent growth is great news, but alas 5 years isn't the long run!

FWIW under Solow conditional convergence assumptions--historically robust--the fact that a country as poor as India grows only a few % faster than the world average is a sign they'll end up poorer than S Europe.

see his spreadsheet here: http://mason.gmu.edu/~gjonesb/SolowForecast.xlsx
spearhead  econotariat  garett-jones  unaffiliated  twitter  social  discussion  india  asia  china  economics  macro  growth-econ  econ-metrics  wealth  wealth-of-nations  convergence  world  developing-world  trends  time-series  cjones-like  prediction  multi  backup  the-bones  long-short-run  europe  mediterranean  comparison  simulation  econ-productivity  great-powers  thucydides  broad-econ  pop-diff  microfoundations  🎩  marginal  hive-mind  rindermann-thompson  hari-seldon  tools  calculator  estimate 
december 2017 by nhaliday
The Power of Abortion Policy - Marginal REVOLUTION
I provide new evidence on the relative “powers” of contraception and abortion policy in effecting the dramatic social transformations of the 1960s and 1970s. Trends in sexual behavior suggest that young women’s increased access to the birth control pill fueled the sexual revolution, but neither these trends nor difference-in-difference estimates support the view that this also led to substantial changes in family formation. Rather, the estimates robustly suggest that it was liberalized access to abortion that allowed large numbers of women to delay marriage and motherhood.
econotariat  marginal-rev  commentary  study  summary  economics  policy  intervention  sociology  gender  sex  fertility  demographics  demographic-transition  history  mostly-modern  cold-war  rot  roots  explanans  technology  microfoundations  nitty-gritty  sexuality  modernity  the-bones  general-survey  endogenous-exogenous  control  life-history  social-norms  medicine  abortion-contraception-embryo 
december 2017 by nhaliday
Land, history or modernization? Explaining ethnic fractionalization: Ethnic and Racial Studies: Vol 38, No 2
Ethnic fractionalization (EF) is frequently used as an explanatory tool in models of economic development, civil war and public goods provision. However, if EF is endogenous to political and economic change, its utility for further research diminishes. This turns out not to be the case. This paper provides the first comprehensive model of EF as a dependent variable.
study  polisci  sociology  political-econ  economics  broad-econ  diversity  putnam-like  race  concept  conceptual-vocab  definition  realness  eric-kaufmann  roots  database  dataset  robust  endogenous-exogenous  causation  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  tribalism  methodology  world  developing-world  🎩  things  metrics  intricacy  microfoundations 
december 2017 by nhaliday
ON THE ORIGIN OF STATES: STATIONARY BANDITS AND TAXATION IN EASTERN CONGO
As a foundation for this study, I organized the collection of village-level panel data on violent actors, managing teams of surveyors, village elders, and households in 380 war-torn areas of DRC. I introduce optimal taxation theory to the decision of violent actors to establish local monopolies of violence. The value of such decision hinges on their ability to tax the local population. A sharp rise in the global demand for coltan, a bulky commodity used in the electronics industry, leads violent actors to impose monopolies of violence and taxation in coltan sites, which persist even years after demand collapses. A similar rise in the demand for gold, easier to conceal and more difficult to tax, does not. However, the groups who nevertheless control gold sites are more likely to respond by undertaking investments in fiscal capacity, consistent with the difficulty to observe gold, and with well-documented trajectories of state formation in Europe (Ardant, 1975). The findings support the view that the expected revenue from taxation, determined in particular by tax base elasticity and costly investments in fiscal capacity, can explain the stages of state formation preceding the states as we recognize them today.
pdf  study  economics  growth-econ  broad-econ  political-econ  polisci  leviathan  north-weingast-like  unintended-consequences  institutions  microfoundations  econometrics  empirical  government  taxes  rent-seeking  supply-demand  incentives  property-rights  africa  developing-world  peace-violence  interests  longitudinal  natural-experiment  endogenous-exogenous  archaeology  trade  world  feudal  roots  ideas  cost-benefit  econ-productivity  traces 
november 2017 by nhaliday
King Kong and Cold Fusion: Counterfactual analysis and the History of Technology
How “contingent” is technological history? Relying on models from evolutionary epistemology, I argue for an analogy with Darwinian Biology and thus a much greater degree of contingency than is normally supposed. There are three levels of contingency in technological development. The crucial driving force behind technology is what I call S-knowledge, that is, an understanding of the exploitable regularities of nature (which includes “science” as a subset). The development of techniques depend on the existence of epistemic bases in S. The “inevitability” of technology thus depends crucially on whether we condition it on the existence of the appropriate S-knowledge. Secondly, even if this knowledge emerges, there is nothing automatic about it being transformed into a technique that is, a set of instructions that transforms knowledge into production. Third, even if the techniques are proposed, there is selection which reflects the preferences and biases of an economy and injects another level of indeterminacy and contingency into the technological history of nations.

https://twitter.com/whyvert/status/932451959079972865
https://archive.is/MBmyV
Moslem conquest of Europe, or a Mongol conquest, or a post-1492 epidemic, or a victory of the counter-reformation would have prevented the Industrial Revolution (Joel Mokyr)
pdf  study  essay  economics  growth-econ  broad-econ  microfoundations  history  medieval  early-modern  industrial-revolution  divergence  volo-avolo  random  mokyr-allen-mccloskey  wealth-of-nations  europe  the-great-west-whale  occident  path-dependence  roots  knowledge  technology  society  multi  twitter  social  commentary  backup  conquest-empire  war  islam  MENA  disease  parasites-microbiome  counterfactual  age-of-discovery  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  usa  scitariat  gnon  degrees-of-freedom 
november 2017 by nhaliday
Do High School Sports Build or Reveal Character?
We examine the extent to which participation in high school athletics has beneficial effects on future education, labor market, and health outcomes. Due to the absence of plausible instruments in observational data, we use recently developed methods that relate selection on observables with selection on unobservables to estimate bounds on the causal effect of athletics participation. We analyze these effects in the US separately for men and women using three different nationally representative longitudinal data sets that each link high school athletics participation with later-life outcomes. We do not find consistent evidence of individual benefits reported in many previous studies – once we have accounted for selection, high school athletes are no more likely to attend college, earn higher wages, or participate in the labor force. However, we do find that men (but not women) who participated in high school athletics are more likely to exercise regularly as adults. Nevertheless, athletes are no less likely to be obese.
pdf  study  broad-econ  economics  econometrics  microfoundations  human-capital  sports  intervention  null-result  wonkish  endo-exo  selection  confounding  labor  education  health  fitness  fitsci  org:ngo  white-paper  methodology  compensation  cost-benefit  input-output  endogenous-exogenous  branches 
november 2017 by nhaliday
Fortifications and Democracy in the Ancient Greek World by Josiah Ober, Barry Weingast :: SSRN
- Joshiah Ober, Barry Weingast

In the modern world, access-limiting fortification walls are not typically regarded as promoting democracy. But in Greek antiquity, increased investment in fortifications was correlated with the prevalence and stability of democracy. This paper sketches the background conditions of the Greek city-state ecology, analyzes a passage in Aristotle’s Politics, and assesses the choices of Hellenistic kings, Greek citizens, and urban elites, as modeled in a simple game. The paper explains how city walls promoted democracy and helps to explain several other puzzles: why Hellenistic kings taxed Greek cities at lower than expected rates; why elites in Greek cities supported democracy; and why elites were not more heavily taxed by democratic majorities. The relationship between walls, democracy, and taxes promoted continued economic growth into the late classical and Hellenistic period (4th-2nd centuries BCE), and ultimately contributed to the survival of Greek culture into the Roman era, and thus modernity. We conclude with a consideration of whether the walls-democracy relationship holds in modernity.

'Rulers Ruled by Women': An Economic Analysis of the Rise and Fall of Women's Rights in Ancient Sparta by Robert K. Fleck, F. Andrew Hanssen: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=788106
Throughout most of history, women as a class have possessed relatively few formal rights. The women of ancient Sparta were a striking exception. Although they could not vote, Spartan women reportedly owned 40 percent of Sparta's agricultural land and enjoyed other rights that were equally extraordinary. We offer a simple economic explanation for the Spartan anomaly. The defining moment for Sparta was its conquest of a neighboring land and people, which fundamentally changed the marginal products of Spartan men's and Spartan women's labor. To exploit the potential gains from a reallocation of labor - specifically, to provide the appropriate incentives and the proper human capital formation - men granted women property (and other) rights. Consistent with our explanation for the rise of women's rights, when Sparta lost the conquered land several centuries later, the rights for women disappeared. Two conclusions emerge that may help explain why women's rights have been so rare for most of history. First, in contrast to the rest of the world, the optimal (from the men's perspective) division of labor among Spartans involved women in work that was not easily monitored by men. Second, the rights held by Spartan women may have been part of an unstable equilibrium, which contained the seeds of its own destruction.
study  broad-econ  economics  polisci  political-econ  institutions  government  north-weingast-like  democracy  walls  correlation  polis  history  mediterranean  iron-age  the-classics  microfoundations  modernity  comparison  architecture  military  public-goodish  elite  civic  taxes  redistribution  canon  literature  big-peeps  conquest-empire  rent-seeking  defense  models  GT-101  incentives  urban  urban-rural  speculation  interdisciplinary  cliometrics  multi  civil-liberty  gender  gender-diff  equilibrium  cycles  branches  labor  interests  property-rights  unintended-consequences  explanation  explanans  analysis  econ-productivity  context  arrows  micro  natural-experiment 
november 2017 by nhaliday
Climate Risk, Cooperation, and the Co-Evolution of Culture and Institutions∗
We test this hypothesis for Europe combining high-resolution climate data for the period 1500-2000 with survey data at the sub-national level. We find that regions with higher inter-annual variability in precipitation and temperature display higher levels of trust. This effect is driven by variability in the growing season months, and by historical rather than recent variability. Regarding possible mechanisms, we show that regions with more variable climate were more closely connected to the Medieval trade network, indicating a higher propensity to engage in inter-community exchange. We also find that these regions were more likely to adopt participatory political institutions earlier on, and are characterized by a higher quality of local governments still today. Our results suggest that, by favoring the emergence of mutually-reinforcing norms and institutions, exposure to environmental risk had a long-lasting impact on human cooperation.
pdf  study  broad-econ  economics  cliometrics  path-dependence  growth-econ  political-econ  institutions  government  social-norms  culture  cultural-dynamics  correlation  history  early-modern  mostly-modern  values  poll  trust  n-factor  cooperate-defect  cohesion  democracy  environment  europe  the-great-west-whale  geography  trade  network-structure  general-survey  outcome-risk  uncertainty  branches  microfoundations  hari-seldon 
november 2017 by nhaliday
The political economy of fertility | SpringerLink
This paper studies the political economy of fertility. Specifically, I argue that fertility may be a strategic choice for ethnic groups engaged in redistributive conflict. I first present a simple conflict model where high fertility is optimal for each ethnic group if and only if the economy’s ethnic diversity is high, institutions are weak, or both. I then test the model in a cross-national dataset. Consistent with the theory, I find that economies where the product of ethnic diversity and a measure of institutional weakness is high have increased fertility rates. I conclude that fertility may depend on political factors.
study  sociology  speculation  stylized-facts  demographics  population  fertility  polisci  political-econ  institutions  nationalism-globalism  tribalism  us-them  self-interest  intervention  wonkish  pdf  piracy  microfoundations  phalanges  diversity  putnam-like  competition  israel  MENA  the-bones 
november 2017 by nhaliday
The weirdest people in the world?
Abstract: Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world’s top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers – often implicitly – assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these “standard subjects” are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species – frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior – hence, there are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions of human nature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges.
pdf  study  microfoundations  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  sociology  psychology  social-psych  cog-psych  iq  biodet  behavioral-gen  variance-components  psychometrics  psych-architecture  visuo  spatial  morality  individualism-collectivism  n-factor  justice  egalitarianism-hierarchy  cooperate-defect  outliers  homo-hetero  evopsych  generalization  henrich  europe  the-great-west-whale  occident  organizing  🌞  universalism-particularism  applicability-prereqs  hari-seldon  extrema  comparison  GT-101  ecology  EGT  reinforcement  anglo  language  gavisti  heavy-industry  marginal  absolute-relative  reason  stylized-facts  nature  systematic-ad-hoc  analytical-holistic  science  modernity  behavioral-econ  s:*  illusion  cool  hmm  coordination  self-interest  social-norms  population  density  humanity  sapiens  farmers-and-foragers  free-riding  anglosphere  cost-benefit  china  asia  sinosphere  MENA  world  developing-world  neurons  theory-of-mind  network-structure  nordic  orient  signum  biases  usa  optimism  hypocrisy  humility  within-without  volo-avolo  domes 
november 2017 by nhaliday
Global Evidence on Economic Preferences
- Benjamin Enke et al

This paper studies the global variation in economic preferences. For this purpose, we present the Global Preference Survey (GPS), an experimentally validated survey dataset of time preference, risk preference, positive and negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust from 80,000 individuals in 76 countries. The data reveal substantial heterogeneity in preferences across countries, but even larger within-country heterogeneity. Across individuals, preferences vary with age, gender, and cognitive ability, yet these relationships appear partly country specific. At the country level, the data reveal correlations between preferences and bio-geographic and cultural variables such as agricultural suitability, language structure, and religion. Variation in preferences is also correlated with economic outcomes and behaviors. Within countries and subnational regions, preferences are linked to individual savings decisions, labor market choices, and prosocial behaviors. Across countries, preferences vary with aggregate outcomes ranging from per capita income, to entrepreneurial activities, to the frequency of armed conflicts.

...

This paper explores these questions by making use of the core features of the GPS: (i) coverage of 76 countries that represent approximately 90 percent of the world population; (ii) representative population samples within each country for a total of 80,000 respondents, (iii) measures designed to capture time preference, risk preference, altruism, positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, and trust, based on an ex ante experimental validation procedure (Falk et al., 2016) as well as pre-tests in culturally heterogeneous countries, (iv) standardized elicitation and translation techniques through the pre-existing infrastructure of a global polling institute, Gallup. Upon publication, the data will be made publicly available online. The data on individual preferences are complemented by a comprehensive set of covariates provided by the Gallup World Poll 2012.

...

The GPS preference measures are based on twelve survey items, which were selected in an initial survey validation study (see Falk et al., 2016, for details). The validation procedure involved conducting multiple incentivized choice experiments for each preference, and testing the relative abilities of a wide range of different question wordings and formats to predict behavior in these choice experiments. The particular items used to construct the GPS preference measures were selected based on optimal performance out of menus of alternative items (for details see Falk et al., 2016). Experiments provide a valuable benchmark for selecting survey items, because they can approximate the ideal choice situations, specified in economic theory, in which individuals make choices in controlled decision contexts. Experimental measures are very costly, however, to implement in a globally representative sample, whereas survey measures are much less costly.⁴ Selecting survey measures that can stand in for incentivized revealed preference measures leverages the strengths of both approaches.

The Preference Survey Module: A Validated Instrument for Measuring Risk, Time, and Social Preferences: http://ftp.iza.org/dp9674.pdf

Table 1: Survey items of the GPS

Figure 1: World maps of patience, risk taking, and positive reciprocity.
Figure 2: World maps of negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust.

Figure 3: Gender coefficients by country. For each country, we regress the respective preference on gender, age and its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting gender coefficients as well as their significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the coefficients.

Figure 4: Cognitive ability coefficients by country. For each country, we regress the respective preference on gender, age and its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting coefficients on subjective math skills as well as their significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the coefficients.

Figure 5: Age profiles by OECD membership.

Table 6: Pairwise correlations between preferences and geographic and cultural variables

Figure 10: Distribution of preferences at individual level.
Figure 11: Distribution of preferences at country level.

interesting digression:
D Discussion of Measurement Error and Within- versus Between-Country Variation
study  dataset  data  database  let-me-see  economics  growth-econ  broad-econ  microfoundations  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  culture  psychology  behavioral-econ  values  🎩  pdf  piracy  world  spearhead  general-survey  poll  group-level  within-group  variance-components  🌞  correlation  demographics  age-generation  gender  iq  cooperate-defect  time-preference  temperance  labor  wealth  wealth-of-nations  entrepreneurialism  outcome-risk  altruism  trust  patience  developing-world  maps  visualization  n-factor  things  phalanges  personality  regression  gender-diff  pop-diff  geography  usa  canada  anglo  europe  the-great-west-whale  nordic  anglosphere  MENA  africa  china  asia  sinosphere  latin-america  self-report  hive-mind  GT-101  realness  long-short-run  endo-exo  signal-noise  communism  japan  korea  methodology  measurement  org:ngo  white-paper  endogenous-exogenous  within-without  hari-seldon 
october 2017 by nhaliday
An investigation of the unexpectedly high fertility of secular, native-born Jews in Israel: Population Studies: Vol 70, No 2
Secular, native-born Jews in Israel enjoy the socio-economic status of many affluent populations living in other democratic countries, but have above-replacement period and cohort fertility. This study revealed a constellation of interrelated factors which together characterize the socio-economic, cultural, and political environment of this fertility behaviour and set it apart from that of other advanced societies. The factors are: a combination of state and family support for childbearing; a dual emphasis on the social importance of women's employment and fertility; policies that support working mothers within a conservative welfare regime; a family system in which parents provide significant financial and caregiving aid to their adult children; relatively egalitarian gender-role attitudes and household behaviour; the continuing importance of familist ideology and of marriage as a social institution; the role of Jewish nationalism and collective behaviour in a religious society characterized by ethno-national conflict; and a discourse which defines women as the biological reproducers of the nation.

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/904137844834398209
https://archive.is/2RVjo
Fertility trends in Israel and Palestinian territories

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/923612344009351168
https://archive.is/FJ7Fn
https://archive.is/8vq6O
https://archive.is/qxpmX
my impression is the evidence actually favors propaganda effects over tax credits and shit. but I need to gather it all together at some pt
study  sociology  polisci  biophysical-econ  demographics  fertility  demographic-transition  intervention  wonkish  hmm  track-record  MENA  israel  judaism  🎩  gender  egalitarianism-hierarchy  tribalism  us-them  ethnocentrism  religion  labor  pdf  piracy  the-bones  microfoundations  life-history  dignity  nationalism-globalism  multi  twitter  social  commentary  gnon  unaffiliated  right-wing  backup  propaganda  status  fashun  hari-seldon 
october 2017 by nhaliday
Individualistic values, institutional trust, and interventionist attitudes | Journal of Institutional Economics | Cambridge Core
A popular explanation for economic development is that ‘individualistic values’ provide a mind-set that is favorable to the creation of growth-promoting institutions. The present paper investigates the relationship between individualistic values and personal attitudes toward government intervention. We consider two key components of an individualistic culture to be particularly relevant for attitude formation: self-direction (‘social’ individualism) and self-determination (‘economic’ individualism). Results indicate that both are negatively associated with interventionist attitudes. Effects of self-direction are much weaker though, than self-determination. Moreover, the effects of self-direction are mitigated through higher trust in the state and lower confidence in companies, while that is not the case for self-determination values. We conclude that especially economic individualism supports attitudes conducive to the formation of formal market-friendly institutions.
study  polisci  sociology  political-econ  microfoundations  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  culture  individualism-collectivism  n-factor  values  things  phalanges  pdf  piracy  correlation  capitalism  markets  egalitarianism-hierarchy  civil-liberty  anglosphere  optimate  trust  institutions  government  business  expression-survival  farmers-and-foragers  branches  frontier 
september 2017 by nhaliday
Love Thy Neighbor? Ethnoracial Diversity and Trust Reexamined: American Journal of Sociology: Vol 121, No 3
For whites, heterogeneity means more out-group neighbors; for nonwhites, heterogeneity means more in-group neighbors. Therefore, separate analyses were conducted by ethnoracial groups. Only for whites does living among out-group members—not in diverse communities per se—negatively predict trust.

doesn't really change the essential lesson
study  polisci  sociology  anthropology  trust  cohesion  diversity  putnam-like  🎩  microfoundations  tribalism  us-them  n-factor  anomie  social-capital  malaise  stylized-facts  the-bones  cooperate-defect  identity-politics  spearhead  wonkish  intricacy 
september 2017 by nhaliday
Autocratic Rule and Social Capital: Evidence from Imperial China by Melanie Meng Xue, Mark Koyama :: SSRN
This paper studies how autocratic rule affects social capital. Between 1660-1788, individuals in imperial China were persecuted if they were suspected of holding subversive attitudes towards the state. A difference-in-differences approach suggests that these persecutions led to a decline of 38% in social capital, as measured by the number of charitable organizations, in each subsequent decade. Investigating the long-run effect of autocratic rule, we show that persecutions are associated with lower levels of trust, political engagement, and the under provision of local public goods. These results indicate a possible vicious cycle in which autocratic rule becomes self-reinforcing through a permanent decline in social capital.
study  economics  broad-econ  econotariat  history  early-modern  growth-econ  authoritarianism  antidemos  china  asia  sinosphere  orient  n-factor  social-capital  individualism-collectivism  charity  cliometrics  trust  cohesion  political-econ  polisci  public-goodish  correlation  intervention  unintended-consequences  iteration-recursion  cycles  effect-size  path-dependence  🎩  leviathan  endogenous-exogenous  control  branches  pseudoE  slippery-slope  counter-revolution  nascent-state  microfoundations  explanans  the-great-west-whale  occident  madisonian  hari-seldon  law  egalitarianism-hierarchy  local-global  decentralized  the-watchers  noblesse-oblige  benevolence 
september 2017 by nhaliday
Does Communist Party Membership Pay? Estimating the Economic Returns to Party Membership in the Labor Market in China
This study estimates the economic returns to Chinese Communist Party membership using complementary approaches to address the endogeneity of party membership status: propensity score matching and instrumental variable. Although the magnitudes of these estimates vary across estimators, all the estimates show positive economic returns to party membership.
pdf  study  economics  broad-econ  labor  microfoundations  political-econ  polisci  sociology  compensation  correlation  endo-exo  econometrics  government  institutions  corruption  china  asia  sinosphere  communism  authoritarianism  antidemos  social-capital  human-capital  intervention  supply-demand  micro  endogenous-exogenous  leviathan 
september 2017 by nhaliday
Culture, Ethnicity, and Diversity - American Economic Association
We investigate the empirical relationship between ethnicity and culture, defined as a vector of traits reflecting norms, values, and attitudes. Using survey data for 76 countries, we find that ethnic identity is a significant predictor of cultural values, yet that within-group variation in culture trumps between-group variation. Thus, in contrast to a commonly held view, ethnic and cultural diversity are unrelated. Although only a small portion of a country’s overall cultural heterogeneity occurs between groups, we find that various political economy outcomes (such as civil conflict and public goods provision) worsen when there is greater overlap between ethnicity and culture. (JEL D74, H41, J15, O15, O17, Z13)

definition of chi-squared index, etc., under:
II. Measuring Heterogeneity

Table 5—Incidence of Civil Conflict and Diversity
Table 6—Public Goods Provision and Diversity

https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/924002043576115202
https://archive.is/oqMnC
https://archive.is/sBqqo
https://archive.is/1AcXn
χ2 diversity: raising the risk of civil war. Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, Wacziarg, in the American Economic Review (1/N)

What predicts higher χ2 diversity? The authors tell us that, too. Here are all of the variables that have a correlation > 0.4: (7/N)

one of them is UK legal origin...

online appendix (with maps, Figures B1-3): http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/downloads/2017_culture_appendix.pdf
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september 2017 by nhaliday
A cross-country empirical test of cognitive abilities and innovation nexus - Munich Personal RePEc Archive
In this study we analyze the relationship between national cognitive abilities and innovational output using data from 124 countries of the world. By employing cross-country IQ scores traditionally used by psychological literature to represent national intelligence, and Economic Complexity Index as a novel measure of innovation, our study shows that there is a positive connection between them. We use a variety of tests to check the robustness of the nexus. Overall, our findings indicate that more intelligent nations export more sophisticated and diverse products to the world market and thus are more innovative. Therefore, developing countries should consider investing in human capital and related institutions if they are to boost innovative capabilities and move up the technology ladder in producing and exporting sophisticated and varied lines of products. This should bring them greater economic diversity which could be a right lever in mitigating negative external shocks.
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september 2017 by nhaliday
Key forces behind the decline of fertility: lessons from childlessness in Rouen before the industrial revolution | Springer for Research & Development
To better understand the forces underlying fertility decisions, we look at the forerunners of fertility decline. In Rouen, France, completed fertility dropped between 1640 and 1792 from 7.4 to 4.2 children. We review possible explanations and keep only three: increases in materialism, in women’s empowerment, and in returns to education. The methodology is one of analytic narrative, bringing together descriptive evidence with a theoretical model. We accordingly propose a theory showing that we can discriminate between these explanations by looking at childlessness and its social gradient. An increase in materialism or, under certain conditions, in women’s empowerment, leads to an increase in childlessness, while an increase in the return to education leads to a decrease in childlessness. Looking at the Rouen data, childlessness was clearly on the rise, from 4% in 1640 to 10% at the end of the eighteenth century, which appears to discredit the explanation based on increasing returns to education, at least for this period.
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september 2017 by nhaliday
Stolen generations | West Hunter
Someone was quoted as saying that if you adopted an Australian Aborigine kid and raised him in England, he’d do just fine. This is a standard prediction, or maybe really an assumption, of most social scientists: people are the same everywhere. Let me put it more precisely: If you adopted a random draw of such kids just after birth, and then treated them in the same way that local native kids were treated, they’d end up with the same adult IQ, on average. And the same rate of alcoholism, and so forth. Same with any other racial group, the prediction says.

But is this actually true? The same people would say that one-day-old babies from different groups ought to act the same, and that’s certainly not true.

I would think that there was a lot of adoption of Australian Aborigines going on in Australia, back in the day. What were the results?

https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2014/03/15/stolen-generations/#comment-23715
I don’t see how you could spend a lot of time on this (aboriginal education) and not see the pattern in front of you. But people do, certainly in the US as well. Here’s a fun quote: “There is no logical reason to expect that the number of minority students in gifted programs would not be proportional to their representation in the general population. ” (p. 498) Frasier 1997
Of course this never happens, never has happened, but still it’s gotta happen.

This is secondhand, but an interesting story. There was once a graduate student in anthropology at UNM who was very interested in Australian Aboriginal education. I believe that’s what he wanted to do when he got out. He did a lot of digging into the subject, including mimeographed stuff that never got published, and much against his will came to the conclusion that Aboriginals really were different from Europeans, really did have significantly lower intelligence. It drove him nuts – he actually had to be hospitalized. Dropped out of the program.

https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2014/03/15/stolen-generations/#comment-23811
It’s easier than you think. Just threaten the members of the IRB – they generally have no honor.

The long-term effects of American Indian boarding schools: http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2017/09/long-term-effects-american-indian-boarding-schools.html
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387817300664
Combining recent reservation-level census data and school enrollment data from 1911 to 1932, I find that reservations that sent a larger share of students to off-reservation boarding schools have higher high school graduation rates, higher per capita income, lower poverty rates, a greater proportion of exclusively English speakers, and smaller family sizes. These results are supported when distance to the nearest off-reservation boarding school that subsequently closed is used as an instrument for the proportion of past boarding school students. I conclude with a discussion of the possible reasons for this link.

...

Last, the link drawn here between higher boarding school share and assimilation should not be misinterpreted as an endorsement of coercive assimilation.
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august 2017 by nhaliday
The Long-Run Weight of Communism or the Weight of LongRun History?
This study provides evidence that culture understood as values and beliefs moves very slowly. Despite massive institutional change, values and beliefs in transition countries have not changed much over the last 20 years. Evidence suggests that culture is affected by the long run historical past, in particular the participation in empires for over 100 years. Current institutional evolutions in transition countries might be more affected by their long run past than by the communist experience of the twentieth century
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august 2017 by nhaliday
Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million B.C. to 1990
The nonrivalry of technology, as modeled in the endogenous growth literature, implies that high population spurs technological change. This paper constructs and empirically tests a model of long-run world population growth combining this implication with the Malthusian assumption that technology limits population. The model predicts that over most of history, the growth rate of population will be proportional to its level. Empirical tests support this prediction and show that historically, among societies with no possibility for technological contact, those with larger initial populations have had faster technological change and population growth.

Table I gives the gist (population growth rate scales w/ tech innovation). Note how the Mongol invasions + reverberations stand out.

https://jasoncollins.org/2011/08/15/more-people-more-ideas-in-the-long-run/
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august 2017 by nhaliday
Credit Scores and Committed Relationships
We document substantial positive assortative matching with respect to credit scores, even when controlling for other socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. As a result, individual-level differences in access to credit are largely preserved at the household level. Moreover, we find that the couples’ average level of and the match quality in credit scores, measured at the time of relationship formation, are highly predictive of subsequent separations.
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august 2017 by nhaliday
The Conservation of Coercion - American Affairs Journal
The two faces of the Kapauku Papuans, and the way their anarchist-friendly political order rested on a deeply illiberal social order, neatly express how Technology and the End of Authority, by the Cato Institute scholar Jason Kuznicki, is both an interesting and a maddening book. Kuznicki states that he was inspired to write the book when he wondered why so many classical political philosophers, despite their disagreements over a vast number of topics, nevertheless all believed the nature and proper role of the state was the most important question concerning the proper organization of human affairs. Even libertarian and anarchist political theorists obsess about states, filling books with discussions of when and why we ought to reject them as illegitimate. The nature of their opposition implicitly concedes that the state, its value and purpose, is the central question for us to grapple with.

In contrast, Kuznicki invites us, if not to ignore the state, then at least to banish it from the forefront of our thinking. He asks us to consider states as just one tool among many that human societies have deployed to solve various sorts of problems. The state is neither God nor the Devil, but something pragmatic and unromantic—like a sewage system, or a town dump. Yes, we want it to function smoothly lest the place start to stink, but good taste demands that we not focus obsessively on its operation. Statecraft, like sanitation engineering, is a dirty job that somebody has to do, but unlike sanitation engineering it should also be a mildly embarrassing one. The notion that political means are a locus of the good, or that the state is imbued with the highest purposes of society, is as ridiculous as the notion that a city exists for its sewers rather than vice versa. So, Kuznicki suggests, we should treat anybody attempting to derive the correct or legitimate purposes of the state with the same skepticism with which we would view somebody waxing philosophical about a trash compactor. The real center of society, the topics worth debating and pondering, are all the other institutions—like markets, churches, sports teams, scientific schools, and families—whose existence the correct operation of the state supports.

...

The second implication of Kuznicki’s statecraft-as-engineering is that any determination about the proper role and behavior of government must remain unsettled not only by historical and cultural context, but also by the ambient level of technology. Kuznicki explores this at some length. He does not mean to make the common argument that the particular set of technologies deployed within a society can be more or less conducive to particular forms of government—as mass democracy might be encouraged by technologies of communication and travel, or as centralized autocracy might tend to arise in societies relying on large-scale irrigation for intensive agriculture. Rather, if the state is a tool for solving an array of otherwise intractable social problems, Kuznicki surmises, a newly discovered technological solution to such a problem could remove it from the state’s set of concerns—perhaps permanently.

...

What are the qualities of a society which make it more or less likely to be able to solve these dilemmas as they come up? Social scientists call societies that support commitment and enforcement mechanisms sufficient to overcome such dilemmas “high trust.” Some sources of social trust are mundane: for instance, it seems to make a big difference for a society to simply have a high enough median wealth that someone isn’t liable to be ruined if he or she takes a gamble on trusting a stranger and ends up getting cheated. Others are fuzzier: shared participation in churches, clubs, and social organizations can also significantly increase the degree of solidarity and trust in a community. Thinkers from Tocqueville to Robert Nisbet have pointed out the ways in which the ascendant state makes war upon and seeks to displace the “little platoons” of civil society. It is not well appreciated today that the reverse is also true: a “thick” culture rooted in shared norms and shared history can make the state less necessary by helping to raise the ambient level of social trust above whatever threshold makes it possible for citizens to organize and discipline themselves without state compulsion.

...

The story of the diamontaires ends with the whole system, private courts and all, falling apart following an influx of non-Hasidic actors into the New York diamond industry. But lack of trust and solidarity aren’t just problems if we want private courts. Yes, a very high degree of social trust can help to replace or displace state institutions, but any amount of trust tends to make governments more efficient and less corrupt. It isn’t a coincidence that many of the most successful governments on earth, whether efficient and well-run welfare states on the Scandinavian model or free-market havens boasting low taxes and few regulations, have been small, tight-knit, often culturally and linguistically homogeneous. Conversely, history’s most successful multiethnic polities have tended to be empires or confederations with a very high degree of provincial or local autonomy. Government is not a problem that scales gracefully: certainly not with number of citizens, but perhaps also not with number of constituent cultures. Those who love cosmopolitanism (among whom I count myself) talk a great deal about the incidental benefits it brings, and a great deal less about its drawbacks. I and other cosmopolitans love to exalt the dynamism that comes from diversity and the way it can help a society avoid falling into complacency. We are less willing to discuss the tiny invisible tax on everything and everybody that reduced social trust imposes, and the ways in which that will tend to make a nation more sclerotic.

In the absence of trust, every private commercial or social interaction becomes just a little bit more expensive, a little bit less efficient, and a little bit less likely to happen at all. Individuals are more cautious in their dealings with strangers, businesses are less likely to extend credit, everybody is a little more uncertain about the future, and people adjust their investment decisions accordingly. Individuals and businesses spend more money on bike locks, security systems, and real estate they perceive to be “safe,” rather than on the consumption or investment they would otherwise prefer. Critics of capitalism frequently observe that a liberal economic order depends upon, and sometimes cannibalizes, precapitalist sources of loyalty and affection. What if the same is true of political freedom more generally?

Some might object that even to consider such a thing is to give in to the forces of bigotry. But the whole point of taking a flinty-eyed engineer’s approach to state-building is that we don’t have to like the constraints we are working with, we just have to deal with them. The human preference for “people like us”—whether that means coreligionists or people who share our musical tastes, and whether we choose to frame it as bigotry or as game-theoretic rationality—is a stubborn, resilient reality. Perhaps in the future some advanced genetic engineering or psychological conditioning will change that. For now we need to recognize and deal with the fact that if we wish to have cosmopolitanism, we need to justify it on robust philosophical grounds, with full awareness of the costs as well as the benefits that it brings to bear on every member of society.
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august 2017 by nhaliday
The Determinants of Trust
Both individual experiences and community characteristics influence how much people trust each other. Using data drawn from US localities we find that the strongest factors that reduce trust are: i) a recent history of traumatic experiences, even though the passage of time reduces this effect fairly rapidly; ii) belonging to a group that historically felt discriminated against, such as minorities (black in particular) and, to a lesser extent, women; iii) being economically unsuccessful in terms of income and education; iv) living in a racially mixed community and/or in one with a high degree of income disparity. Religious beliefs and ethnic origins do not significantly affect trust. The latter result may be an indication that the American melting pot at least up to a point works, in terms of homogenizing attitudes of different cultures, even though racial cleavages leading to low trust are still quite high.

Understanding Trust: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13387
In this paper we resolve this puzzle by recognizing that trust has two components: a belief-based one and a preference based one. While the sender's behavior reflects both, we show that WVS-like measures capture mostly the belief-based component, while questions on past trusting behavior are better at capturing the preference component of trust.

MEASURING TRUST: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/laibson/files/measuring_trust.pdf
We combine two experiments and a survey to measure trust and trustworthiness— two key components of social capital. Standard attitudinal survey questions about trust predict trustworthy behavior in our experiments much better than they predict trusting behavior. Trusting behavior in the experiments is predicted by past trusting behavior outside of the experiments. When individuals are closer socially, both trust and trustworthiness rise. Trustworthiness declines when partners are of different races or nationalities. High status individuals are able to elicit more trustworthiness in others.

What is Social Capital? The Determinants of Trust and Trustworthiness: http://www.nber.org/papers/w7216
Using a sample of Harvard undergraduates, we analyze trust and social capital in two experiments. Trusting behavior and trustworthiness rise with social connection; differences in race and nationality reduce the level of trustworthiness. Certain individuals appear to be persistently more trusting, but these people do not say they are more trusting in surveys. Survey questions about trust predict trustworthiness not trust. Only children are less trustworthy. People behave in a more trustworthy manner towards higher status individuals, and therefore status increases earnings in the experiment. As such, high status persons can be said to have more social capital.

Trust and Cheating: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18509
We find that: i) both parties to a trust exchange have implicit notions of what constitutes cheating even in a context without promises or messages; ii) these notions are not unique - the vast majority of senders would feel cheated by a negative return on their trust/investment, whereas a sizable minority defines cheating according to an equal split rule; iii) these implicit notions affect the behavior of both sides to the exchange in terms of whether to trust or cheat and to what extent. Finally, we show that individual's notions of what constitutes cheating can be traced back to two classes of values instilled by parents: cooperative and competitive. The first class of values tends to soften the notion while the other tightens it.

Nationalism and Ethnic-Based Trust: Evidence from an African Border Region: https://u.osu.edu/robinson.1012/files/2015/12/Robinson_NationalismTrust-1q3q9u1.pdf
These results offer microlevel evidence that a strong and salient national identity can diminish ethnic barriers to trust in diverse societies.

One Team, One Nation: Football, Ethnic Identity, and Conflict in Africa: http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/SI2017/DEV/Durante_Depetris-Chauvin.pdf
Do collective experiences that prime sentiments of national unity reduce interethnic tensions and conflict? We examine this question by looking at the impact of national football teams’ victories in sub-Saharan Africa. Combining individual survey data with information on over 70 official matches played between 2000 and 2015, we find that individuals interviewed in the days after a victory of their country’s national team are less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity and more likely to trust people of other ethnicities than those interviewed just before. The effect is sizable and robust and is not explained by generic euphoria or optimism. Crucially, national victories do not only affect attitudes but also reduce violence. Indeed, using plausibly exogenous variation from close qualifications to the Africa Cup of Nations, we find that countries that (barely) qualified experience significantly less conflict in the following six months than countries that (barely) did not. Our findings indicate that, even where ethnic tensions have deep historical roots, patriotic shocks can reduce inter-ethnic tensions and have a tangible impact on conflict.

Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?: http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/HHPW.pdf
We identify three families of mechanisms that link diversity to public goods provision—–what we term “preferences,” “technology,” and “strategy selection” mechanisms—–and run a series of experimental games that permit us to compare the explanatory power of distinct mechanisms within each of these three families. Results from games conducted with a random sample of 300 subjects from a slum neighborhood of Kampala, Uganda, suggest that successful public goods provision in homogenous ethnic communities can be attributed to a strategy selection mechanism: in similar settings, co-ethnics play cooperative equilibria, whereas non-co-ethnics do not. In addition, we find evidence for a technology mechanism: co-ethnics are more closely linked on social networks and thus plausibly better able to support cooperation through the threat of social sanction. We find no evidence for prominent preference mechanisms that emphasize the commonality of tastes within ethnic groups or a greater degree of altruism toward co-ethnics, and only weak evidence for technology mechanisms that focus on the impact of shared ethnicity on the productivity of teams.

does it generalize to first world?

Higher Intelligence Groups Have Higher Cooperation Rates in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp8499.html
The initial cooperation rates are similar, it increases in the groups with higher intelligence to reach almost full cooperation, while declining in the groups with lower intelligence. The difference is produced by the cumulation of small but persistent differences in the response to past cooperation of the partner. In higher intelligence subjects, cooperation after the initial stages is immediate and becomes the default mode, defection instead requires more time. For lower intelligence groups this difference is absent. Cooperation of higher intelligence subjects is payoff sensitive, thus not automatic: in a treatment with lower continuation probability there is no difference between different intelligence groups

Why societies cooperate: https://voxeu.org/article/why-societies-cooperate
Three attributes are often suggested to generate cooperative behaviour – a good heart, good norms, and intelligence. This column reports the results of a laboratory experiment in which groups of players benefited from learning to cooperate. It finds overwhelming support for the idea that intelligence is the primary condition for a socially cohesive, cooperative society. Warm feelings towards others and good norms have only a small and transitory effect.

individual payoff, etc.:

Trust, Values and False Consensus: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18460
Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more (less) trustworthy individuals form more optimistic (pessimistic) trust beliefs - and that this tendency continues to color trust beliefs after several rounds of game-play. Moreover, we show that one's own type/trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing. In a second closely-related experiment, we show the economic impact of mis-calibrated trust beliefs stemming from false consensus. Miscalibrated beliefs lower participants' experimental trust game earnings by about 20 percent on average.

The Right Amount of Trust: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15344
We investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance. We find that individual income is hump-shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs. Our interpretation is that highly trusting individuals tend to assume too much social risk and to be cheated more often, ultimately performing less well than those with a belief close to the mean trustworthiness of the population. On the other hand, individuals with overly pessimistic beliefs avoid being cheated, but give up profitable opportunities, therefore underperforming. The cost of either too much or too little trust is comparable to the income lost by forgoing college.

...

This framework allows us to show that income-maximizing trust typically exceeds the trust level of the average person as well as to estimate the distribution of income lost to trust mistakes. We find that although a majority of individuals has well calibrated beliefs, a non-trivial proportion of the population (10%) has trust beliefs sufficiently poorly calibrated to lower income by more than 13%.

Do Trust and … [more]
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august 2017 by nhaliday
Clans, Guilds, and Markets: Apprenticeship Institutions and Growth in the Pre-Industrial Economy* | The Quarterly Journal of Economics | Oxford Academic
We argue that medieval European institutions such as guilds, and specific features such as journeymanship, can explain the rise of Europe relative to regions that relied on the transmission of knowledge within closed kinship systems (extended families or clans).
study  economics  growth-econ  broad-econ  history  medieval  europe  the-great-west-whale  occident  n-factor  kinship  coordination  institutions  wealth-of-nations  divergence  roots  technology  learning  spreading  network-structure  pdf  piracy  organizing  open-closed  microfoundations  feudal  explanans  orient  hari-seldon 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Inherited Trust and Growth - American Economic Association
This paper develops a new method to uncover the causal effect of trust on economic growth by focusing on the inherited component of trust and its time variation. We show that inherited trust of descendants of US immigrants is significantly influenced by the country of origin and the timing of arrival of their forebears. We thus use the inherited trust of descendants of US immigrants as a time-varying measure of inherited trust in their country of origin. This strategy allows to identify the sizeable causal impact of inherited trust on worldwide growth during the twentieth century by controlling for country fixed effects. (JEL N11, N12, N31, N32, O47, Z13)

key data:
Table 1, Figure 1, Figure 3, Figure 4

Trust Assimilation in the United States, Bryan Caplan: http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2017/05/trust_assimilat.html

How Durable are Social Norms? Immigrant Trust and Generosity in 132 Countries: http://www.nber.org/papers/w19855
We find that migrants tend to make social trust assessments that mainly reflect conditions in the country where they now live, but they also reveal a significant influence from their countries of origin. The latter effect is one-third as important as the effect of local conditions. We also find that the altruistic behavior of migrants, as measured by the frequency of their donations in their new countries, is strongly determined by social norms in their new countries, while also retaining some effect of the levels of generosity found in their birth countries. To show that the durability of social norms is not simply due to a failure to recognize new circumstances, we demonstrate that there are no footprint effects for immigrants’ confidence in political institutions. Taken together, these findings support the notion that social norms are deeply rooted in long-standing cultures, yet are nonetheless subject to adaptation when there are major changes in the surrounding circumstances and environment.

The autocratic roots of social distrust: http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596717300951
This paper identifies a new source of social distrust: an individual’s autocratic
origin.
 Individuals whose ancestors migrated from countries with higher autocracy
levels are less likely to trust others and to vote in presidential elections in the
U.S.
 The impact of autocratic culture on trust lasts for at least three generations
whereas the impact on voting disappears after one generation.
 The results are not driven by selection into migration or other factors such as the
GDP, education, or the strength of family ties in home countries in the U.S.
 Autocratic culture also has similar impacts on trust and voting across Europe.
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july 2017 by nhaliday
Does European development have Roman roots? Evidence from the German Limes
The results indicate that economic development—as mea-sured by luminosity—is indeed significantly and robustly larger in the formerly Roman part of Germany. The study identifies the persistence of the Roman road network until the present an important factor causing this developmental advantage of the formerly Roman part ofGermany both by fostering city growth and by allowing for a denser road network.

https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/888521595416793089
https://archive.is/ozKku
CC: @GarettJones this puts a new spin on deep history! Hard to explain...
I've got a theory, have a partial model but need some time to formalize it. I've called it the Radio Brain Hypothesis...
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july 2017 by nhaliday
The Rise and Fall of Cognitive Control - Behavioral Scientist
The results highlight the downsides of controlled processing. Within a population, controlled processing may—rather than ensuring undeterred progress—usher in short-sighted, irrational, and detrimental behavior, ultimately leading to population collapse. This is because the innovations produced by controlled processing benefit everyone, even those who do not act with control. Thus, by making non-controlled agents better off, these innovations erode the initial advantage of controlled behavior. This results in the demise of control and the rise of lack-of-control. In turn, this eventually leads to a return to poor decision making and the breakdown of the welfare-enhancing innovations, possibly accelerated and exacerbated by the presence of the enabling technologies themselves. Our models therefore help to explain societal cycles whereby periods of rationality and forethought are followed by plunges back into irrationality and short-sightedness.

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/51ed234ae4b0867e2385d879/t/595fac998419c208a6d99796/1499442499093/Cyclical-Population-Dynamics.pdf
Psychologists, neuroscientists, and economists often conceptualize decisions as arising from processes that lie along a continuum from automatic (i.e., “hardwired” or overlearned, but relatively inflexible) to controlled (less efficient and effortful, but more flexible). Control is central to human cognition, and plays a key role in our ability to modify the world to suit our needs. Given its advantages, reliance on controlled processing may seem predestined to increase within the population over time. Here, we examine whether this is so by introducing an evolutionary game theoretic model of agents that vary in their use of automatic versus controlled processes, and in which cognitive processing modifies the environment in which the agents interact. We find that, under a wide range of parameters and model assumptions, cycles emerge in which the prevalence of each type of processing in the population oscillates between 2 extremes. Rather than inexorably increasing, the emergence of control often creates conditions that lead to its own demise by allowing automaticity to also flourish, thereby undermining the progress made by the initial emergence of controlled processing. We speculate that this observation may have relevance for understanding similar cycles across human history, and may lend insight into some of the circumstances and challenges currently faced by our species.
econotariat  economics  political-econ  policy  decision-making  behavioral-econ  psychology  cog-psych  cycles  oscillation  unintended-consequences  anthropology  broad-econ  cultural-dynamics  tradeoffs  cost-benefit  rot  dysgenics  study  summary  multi  EGT  dynamical  volo-avolo  self-control  discipline  the-monster  pdf  error  rationality  info-dynamics  bounded-cognition  hive-mind  iq  intelligence  order-disorder  risk  microfoundations  science-anxiety  big-picture  hari-seldon  cybernetics 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Does Management Matter? Evidence from India
We have shown that management matters, with improvements in management practices improving plant-level outcomes. One response from economists might then be to argue that poor management can at most be a short-run problem, since in the long run better managed firms should take over the market. Yet many of our firms have been in business for 20 years and more.

One reason why better run firms do not dominate the market is constraints on growth derived from limited managerial span of control. In every firm in our sample only members of the owning family have positions with major decision-making power over finance, purchasing, operations or employment. Non-family members are given only lower-level managerial positions with authority only over basic day-to-day activities. The principal reason is that family members do not trust non-family members. For example, they are concerned if they let their plant managers procure yarn they may do so at inflated rates from friends and receive kick-backs.

A key reason for this inability to decentralize is the poor rule of law in India. Even if directors found managers stealing, their ability to successfully prosecute them and recover the assets is minimal because of the inefficiency of Indian civil courts. A compounding reason for the inability to decentralize in Indian firms is bad management practices, as this means the owners cannot keep good track of materials and finance, so may not even able to identify mismanagement or theft within their firms.30

As a result of this inability to delegate, firms can expand beyond the size that can be managed by a single director only if other family members are available to share directorial duties. Thus, an important predictor of firm size was the number of male family members of the owners. In particular, the number of brothers and sons of the leading director has a correlation of 0.689 with the total employment of the firm, compared to a correlation between employment and the average management score of 0.223. In fact the best managed firm in our sample had only one (large) production plant, in large part because the owner had no brothers or sons to help run a larger organization. This matches the ideas of the Lucas (1978) span of control model, that there are diminishing returns to how much additional productivity better management technology can generate from a single manager. In the Lucas model, the limits to firm growth restrict the ability of highly productive firms to drive lower productivity ones from the market. In our Indian firms, this span of control restriction is definitely binding, so unproductive firms are able to survive because more productive firms cannot expand.

https://twitter.com/pseudoerasmus/status/885915088951095296

http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2017/03/india-much-entrepreneurial-society-united-states-thats-problem.html
However, when we reverse the employment statistic–only ~15% of Indians work for a firm compared to approximately 90% of US workers we see the problem. Entrepreneurship in India isn’t a choice, it’s a requirement. Indian entrepreneurship is a consequence of India’s failed economy. As a I wrote in my Cato paper with Goldschlag, less developed countries in general, not just India, have more entrepreneurs.

...

The modal size of an Indian firm is 1 employee and the mean is just over 2. The mean number of employees in a US firm is closer to 20 but even though that is ten times the Indian number it obscures the real difference. The US has many small firms but what makes it different is that it also has large firms that employ lots of people. In fact, over half of all US workers are employed by the tiny minority (0.3%) of firms with over 500 employees.

blames colonialism, idk, might have contributed

Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20150029
Students in India who cheat on a simple laboratory task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs. This paper shows that cheating on this task predicts corrupt behavior by civil servants, implying that it is a meaningful predictor of future corruption. Students who demonstrate pro-social preferences are less likely to prefer government jobs, while outcomes on an explicit game and attitudinal measures to measure corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. _A screening process that chooses high-ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption._ The findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption.

Where Does the Good Shepherd Go? Civic Virtue and Sorting into Public Sector Employment: http://repec.business.uzh.ch/RePEc/iso/leadinghouse/0134_lhwpaper.pdf
Our study extends the understanding of the motivational basis of public sector employment by considering civic virtue in addition to altruism and risk aversion and by investigating selection and socialization. Using a largely representative, longitudinal data set of employees in Germany including 63,101 observations of 13,673 different individuals, we find that civic virtue relates positively to public sector employment beyond altruism and risk aversion. We find evidence on selection and no evidence on socialization as an explanation for this result.

http://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21716019-penchant-criminality-electoral-asset-india-worlds-biggest
Sadly, this is not a book about some small, shady corner of Indian politics: 34% of the members of parliament (MPs) in the Lok Sabha (lower house) have criminal charges filed against them; and the figure is rising (see chart). Some of the raps are peccadillos, such as rioting or unlawful assembly—par for the course in India’s raucous local politics. But over a fifth of MPs are in the dock for serious crimes, often facing reams of charges for anything from theft to intimidation and worse. (Because the Indian judicial system has a backlog of 31m cases, even serious crimes can take a decade or more to try, so few politicians have been convicted.) One can walk just about the whole way from Mumbai to Kolkata without stepping foot outside a constituency whose MP isn’t facing a charge.

...

What is more surprising is that the supply of willing criminals-cum-politicians was met with eager demand from voters. Over the past three general elections, a candidate with a rap sheet of serious charges has had an 18% chance of winning his or her race, compared with 6% for a “clean” rival. Mr Vaishnav dispels the conventional wisdom that crooks win because they can get voters to focus on caste or some other sectarian allegiance, thus overlooking their criminality. If anything, the more serious the charge, the bigger the electoral boost, as politicians well know.

As so often happens in India, poverty plays a part. India is almost unique in having adopted universal suffrage while it was still very poor. The upshot has been that underdeveloped institutions fail to deliver what citizens vote for. Getting the state to perform its most basic functions—building a school, disbursing a subsidy, repaving a road—is a job that can require banging a few heads together. Sometimes literally. Who better to represent needy constituents in these tricky situations than someone who “knows how to get things done”? If the system doesn’t work for you, a thuggish MP can be a powerful ally.

http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36446652
study  economics  broad-econ  growth-econ  econometrics  field-study  india  asia  pseudoE  management  industrial-org  cultural-dynamics  institutions  trust  intervention  coordination  cohesion  n-factor  kinship  orient  multi  twitter  social  commentary  econotariat  spearhead  wealth-of-nations  pop-diff  pdf  scale  gender  leviathan  econ-productivity  marginal-rev  world  developing-world  comparison  usa  business  network-structure  labor  social-structure  lived-experience  entrepreneurialism  hmm  microfoundations  culture  corruption  anomie  crooked  human-capital  technocracy  government  data  crime  criminology  north-weingast-like  news  org:rec  org:biz  org:anglo  politics  populism  incentives  transportation  society  GT-101  integrity  🎩  endo-exo  cooperate-defect  ethics  attaq  selection  europe  the-great-west-whale  germanic  correlation  altruism  outcome-risk  uncertainty  impetus  longitudinal  civic  public-goodish  organizing  endogenous-exogenous 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Corrupting cooperation and how anti-corruption strategies may backfire | Nature Human Behaviour
https://images.nature.com/original/nature-assets/nathumbehav/2017/s41562-017-0138/extref/s41562-017-0138-s1.pdf
Exposure to Norms: https://images.nature.com/original/nature-assets/nathumbehav/2017/s41562-017-0138/extref/s41562-017-0138-s1.pdf#page=114
Here we test how exposure to corruption norms affect behavior in our game. We do so by using our exposure score (a mean of the corruption perceptions of the countries the participant has lived in) and the heritage corruption score (a mean of the corruption perceptions of the countries the participant has an ethnic heritage). Since there is no incentive to offer bribes or contribute, except when compelled to do so by punishment, we predict that exposure to norms should primarily affect Leader decisions. Nonetheless, internalized norms may also affect the behavior of players in contributing and bribing.

...

The correlation between the direct exposure and heritage measures of corruption is r = 0.67, p < .001.

...

Then we see that direct exposure to corruption norms results in increased corrupt behavior—i.e. in our Canadian sample, those who have lived in corrupt countries from which they do not derive their heritage behave in more corrupt ways.

hard to interpret

https://twitter.com/Evolving_Moloch/status/884477414100697092
http://psych.ubc.ca/when-less-is-best/

I don't think the solution is to just do nothing. Should look to history for ideas; process of "getting to Denmark" took centuries in NW Euro. Try to replicate and don't expect fast results.

Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10510
I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the results through a theoretical lens that considers the implications of trust networks. A bond of trust may permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a bribe, which reduces corruption. Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents of areas with many other long-term residents, and by individuals in regions with many residents their own age. I confirm that the prevalence of bribery is lower under these circumstances, using the International Crime Victim Surveys. I also find that older people, who have had time to develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show that victims of (other) crimes bribe all types of public officials more than non-victims, and argue that both their victimization and bribery stem from a distrustful environment.

Kinship, Fractionalization and Corruption: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2847222
The theory of kin selection provides a straightforward justification for norms of nepotism and favoritism among relatives; more subtly, it also implies that the returns to such norms may be influenced by mating practices. Specifically, in societies with high levels of sub-ethnic fractionalization, where endogamous (and consanguineous) mating within kin-group, clan and tribe increases the local relatedness of individuals, the relative returns to norms of nepotism and favoritism are high. In societies with exogamous marriage practices, the relative returns to norms of impartial cooperation with non-relatives and strangers are increased. Using cross-country and within-country regression analyses and a cross-country lab experiment, we provide evidence for this account.

Ethnic favouritism: Not just an African phenomenon: http://voxeu.org/article/ethnic-favouritism-not-just-african-phenomenon
Ethnic favouritism is a global phenomenon
We find robust evidence for ethnic favouritism – ethnographic regions that are the current political leader’s ethnic homeland enjoy 7%-10% more intense night-time light, corresponding to 2%-3% higher regional GDP. Furthermore, we show that ethnic favouritism extends to ethnic groups that are linguistically close to the political leader.

Most significantly, these effects are as strong outside of Africa as they are within, challenging the preconception that ethnic favouritism is mainly or even entirely a sub-Saharan African phenomenon. For example, Bolivian presidents tended to favour areas populated by European descendants and Criollos, largely at the expense of the indigenous population. After the election of Evo Morales, a member of the indigenous Ayamara ethnic group, luminosity in indigenous areas grew substantially. Notably, critics suggest Morales gave special attention to the interests and values of the Ayamara at the expense of other indigenous peoples (e.g. Albro 2010, Postero 2010).

Democratisation is not a panacea
Our results further suggest that, while democratic institutions have a weak tendency to reduce ethnic favouritism, their effect is limited. In particular, a change from autocratic regimes to weak democracies does not seem to reduce ethnic favouritism (and may even increase it).

This result could in part be explained by political leaders’ motivations for engaging in ethnic favouritism. We find that the practice intensifies around election years in which the political leader's office is contested, suggesting that leaders may target policies towards their ethnic homelands to improve their re-election prospects, and not solely out of co-ethnic altruism. To the extent that political leaders engage in ethnic favouritism for electoral purposes, democratisation is not likely to be effective in curbing the practice.

Facebook’s war on free will: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/19/facebooks-war-on-free-will
Though Facebook will occasionally talk about the transparency of governments and corporations, what it really wants to advance is the transparency of individuals – or what it has called, at various moments, “radical transparency” or “ultimate transparency”. The theory holds that the sunshine of sharing our intimate details will disinfect the moral mess of our lives. With the looming threat that our embarrassing information will be broadcast, we’ll behave better. And perhaps the ubiquity of incriminating photos and damning revelations will prod us to become more tolerant of one another’s sins. “The days of you having a different image for your work friends or co-workers and for the other people you know are probably coming to an end pretty quickly,” Zuckerberg has said. “Having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack of integrity.”

The point is that Facebook has a strong, paternalistic view on what’s best for you, and it’s trying to transport you there. “To get people to this point where there’s more openness – that’s a big challenge. But I think we’ll do it,” Zuckerberg has said. He has reason to believe that he will achieve that goal. With its size, Facebook has amassed outsized powers. “In a lot of ways Facebook is more like a government than a traditional company,” Zuckerberg has said. “We have this large community of people, and more than other technology companies we’re really setting policies.”

Facebook and the Destruction of Private Life: http://www.socialmatter.net/2014/12/30/facebook-and-the-destruction-of-private-life/
- HENRY DAMPIER

The key value of privacy, which tends to be lost amid all the technological babble about the concept, is that it makes social cooperation more feasible among people who disagree, share different tastes, or fundamental points of view.

...

This is especially an issue with democracy. The reason why the United States has anonymous voting laws is because without them, people are persecuted for their party affiliations by people with rival party loyalties. This being forgotten, the age of Facebook and similar technologies has opened up ordinary people to this sort of ordinary political persecution. Moderating influences like that of the respect for privacy put a brake on some of the more rapacious, violent aspects of party politics.

...

The impulse for this comes less from the availability of the technology, and more because of the preexisting social trends. When there is a family life, there is communication and closeness within the family.

With more people living without a family life, they go to the public square to get their needs for social validation met. This doesn’t work so well, because strangers have no skin in the life of the atomized individual that only exists as an image on their screens.
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july 2017 by nhaliday
A Review of Avner Greif’s Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade
Avner Greif’s Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade (Cambridge University Press, 2006) is a major work in the ongoing project of many economists and economic historians to show that institutions are the fundamental driver of all economic history, and of all contemporary differences in economic performance. This review outlines the contribution of this book to the project and the general status of this long standing ambition.
pdf  spearhead  gregory-clark  essay  article  books  review  economics  growth-econ  broad-econ  institutions  history  early-modern  europe  the-great-west-whale  divergence  🎩  industrial-revolution  medieval  critique  roots  world  measurement  empirical  realness  cultural-dynamics  north-weingast-like  modernity  microfoundations  aphorism  track-record 
july 2017 by nhaliday
The Determinants of Media Bias in China
Based on content analysis, we construct a measure of media bias, which has high predicting power of a newspaper being a strictly controlled party organ and of a newspaperís advertising revenues. We Önd that more-biased newspapers 1) cover more news on political leaders in an o¢ cial way, while more heavily suppress reports that are detrimental to the ideology of the ruling party; and 2) cover more news that is related to the accountability of local government o¢ cials, such as corruption, disasters, and accidents, while reporting less on sports, entertainment, and crimes. These results indicate that the Chinese government not only uses the media to maintain regime stability and enhance top-down policy implementation, but also uses the media as a public signaling device to monitor government o¢ cials and mitigate the distortion of information from bottom up.
pdf  study  economics  econometrics  sociology  polisci  china  asia  sinosphere  media  propaganda  correlation  biases  government  authoritarianism  antidemos  leviathan  info-dynamics  truth  westminster  political-econ  signaling  corruption  🎩  broad-econ  microfoundations  field-study  crooked  anomie  dark-arts  alt-inst  institutions  the-watchers  hari-seldon 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Cultural economics - Wikipedia
Cultural economics is the branch of economics that studies the relation of culture to economic outcomes. Here, 'culture' is defined by shared beliefs and preferences of respective groups. Programmatic issues include whether and how much culture matters as to economic outcomes and what its relation is to institutions.[1]

Applications include the study of religion,[2] social norms.[3] social identity,[4] fertility,[5] beliefs in redistributive justice,[6] ideology,[7] hatred,[8] terrorism,[9] trust,[10] and the culture of economics.[11][12] A general analytical theme is how ideas and behaviors are spread among individuals through the formation of social capital,[13] social networks[14] and processes such as social learning, as in the theory of social evolution[15] and information cascades.[16] Methods include case studies and theoretical and empirical modeling of cultural transmission within and across social groups.[17] In 2013 Said E. Dawlabani added the value systems approach to the cultural emergence aspect of macroeconomics.[18]

interesting references
economics  micro  culture  cultural-dynamics  sociology  social-science  article  religion  theos  fertility  social-norms  redistribution  ideology  hate  terrorism  trust  social-capital  network-structure  wiki  reference  links  broad-econ  institutions  chart  microfoundations  prejudice  hari-seldon 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Economics of corruption - Wikipedia
In 1968, Nobel laureate economist Gunnar Myrdal found corruption 'almost a taboo (among economists) as research topic'. Indeed, it has mostly been a matter of political science and sociology. However, the scenario changed since the 1970s. Since Rose-Ackerman's article "The Economics of Corruption", published in the Journal of Public Economics in 1975,[1] more than 3,000 articles have been written with 'corruption' in the title, at least 500 of which directly focus on different aspects relating to corruption using an economic framework.[2] Some books have also been published on the subject.[3]

Organizations have emerged to deal with the economics of corruption.[4] Some universities offer courses under the title Economics of Corruption.[5] Nobel laureate economist Gary Becker and an American Judge Richard Posner have opened a blog for open public discussion discussing economics of corruption [6]
economics  micro  polisci  government  rent-seeking  corruption  article  history  mostly-modern  methodology  wiki  reference  social-science  microfoundations  ethics 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Dimensions - Geert Hofstede
http://geerthofstede.com/culture-geert-hofstede-gert-jan-hofstede/6d-model-of-national-culture/

https://www.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/4g88kt/eu28_countries_ranked_by_hofstedes_cultural/
https://archive.is/rXnII

https://hbdchick.wordpress.com/2013/09/07/national-individualism-collectivism-scores/

Individualism and Collectivism in Israeli Society: Comparing Religious and Secular High-School Students: https://sci-hub.tw/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1016945121604
A common collective basis of mutual value consensus was found in the two groups; however, as predicted, there were differences between secular and religious students on the three kinds of items, since the religious scored higher than the secular students on items emphasizing collectivist orientation. The differences, however, do not fit the common theoretical framework of collectivism-individualism, but rather tend to reflect the distinction between in-group and universal collectivism.

Individualism and Collectivism in Two Conflicted Societies: Comparing Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Arab High School Students: https://sci-hub.tw/http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0044118X01033001001
Both groups were found to be more collectivistic than individualistic oriented. However, as predicted, the Palestinians scored higher than the Israeli students on items emphasizing in-group collectivist orientation (my nationality, my country, etc.). The differences between the two groups tended to reflect some subdistinctions such as different elements of individualism and collectivism. Moreover, they reflected the historical context and contemporary influences, such as the stage where each society is at in the nation-making process.

Religion as culture: religious individualism and collectivism among american catholics, jews, and protestants.: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17576356
We propose the theory that religious cultures vary in individualistic and collectivistic aspects of religiousness and spirituality. Study 1 showed that religion for Jews is about community and biological descent but about personal beliefs for Protestants. Intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity were intercorrelated and endorsed differently by Jews, Catholics, and Protestants in a pattern that supports the theory that intrinsic religiosity relates to personal religion, whereas extrinsic religiosity stresses community and ritual (Studies 2 and 3). Important life experiences were likely to be social for Jews but focused on God for Protestants, with Catholics in between (Study 4). We conclude with three perspectives in understanding the complex relationships between religion and culture.

Inglehart–Welzel cultural map of the world: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inglehart%E2%80%93Welzel_cultural_map_of_the_world
Live cultural map over time 1981 to 2015: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ABWYOcru7js

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-materialism
prof  psychology  social-psych  values  culture  cultural-dynamics  anthropology  individualism-collectivism  expression-survival  long-short-run  time-preference  uncertainty  outcome-risk  gender  egalitarianism-hierarchy  things  phalanges  group-level  world  tools  comparison  data  database  n-factor  occident  social-norms  project  microfoundations  multi  maps  visualization  org:junk  psych-architecture  personality  hari-seldon  discipline  self-control  geography  shift  developing-world  europe  the-great-west-whale  anglosphere  optimate  china  asia  japan  sinosphere  orient  MENA  reddit  social  discussion  backup  EU  inequality  envy  britain  anglo  nordic  ranking  top-n  list  eastern-europe  germanic  gallic  mediterranean  cog-psych  sociology  guilt-shame  duty  tribalism  us-them  cooperate-defect  competition  gender-diff  metrics  politics  wiki  concept  society  civilization  infographic  ideology  systematic-ad-hoc  let-me-see  general-survey  chart  video  history  metabuch  dynamic  trends  plots  time-series  reference  water  mea 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Revealing the Economic Consequences of Group Cohesion
A comprehensive program of new experiments reveals the considerable economic impact of cohesion: higher cohesion groups are significantly more likely to achieve Pareto-superior outcomes in classic weak-link coordination games. We show that effects of cohesion are economically large, robust, and portable. We identify social preferences as a primary mechanism explaining the effects of cohesion.

...

Our workhorse to study group outcomes is a weak-link coordination game chosen because it captures economically interesting problems endemic to organizations and teams (e.g., Camerer and Weber (2013)). In our version of the weak-link game, inspired by Brandts and Cooper (2006), group members simultaneously choose an effort level. Payoffs to each group member then depend on their own effort and the lowest effort chosen by anyone (the “weakest link”) in the group. The game has multiple strict Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria in material payoffs. This feature makes it particularly interesting for our purposes because it combines two dimensions of group success: features of coordination (choosing the same effort level as other group members) and cooperation (groups achieving Pareto-superior Nash equilibria). We expected our weak-link game to be a “harsh” environment in the sense that most groups who play this game under anonymity and in the absence of pre-existing social relationships will collapse to the Pareto-worst equilibrium and never escape from it (Brandts and Cooper (2006), and own replication).

As we show in Section V, group cohesion is a key determinant of behavior in our experiments: low cohesion groups usually descend rapidly to minimum effort; high cohesion groups fare much better and high cohesion appears necessary (though not sufficient) for achieving Pareto-superior outcomes. Surprisingly, our measure of group cohesion is the only variable that successfully predicts cooperation success; none of more than twenty control variables (demographics and group characteristics) explain minimum effort. Further experiments show that our results are robust to the timing of oneness measurement (before or after play of the weak-link game). By benchmarking our results against the effect of monetary incentives, we also show (Section VI) that the effortenhancing effects of group cohesion are sizeable: large financial incentives are needed to achieve the levels of minimum effort expected for high cohesion groups.

In Section VII we turn to an explanation of our results. A rational choice perspective suggests three natural channels through which group cohesion could operate: it might affect some combination of group members’ social preferences, their beliefs or the form of their strategic reasoning. Considering social preferences, it is plausible to assume that members of highly cohesive groups care about one another and so place weight on each other’s earnings.1 In our weak-link game, if players do draw utility from each other’s earnings, this is tantamount to (some) sharing of earnings, which reduces strategic risk and fosters coordination on Pareto-superior equilibria.2 In relation to beliefs, highly cohesive groups may be more confident in simulating other group members’ thought processes and likely actions, perhaps because of a history of interactions in different (related) situations, which allows for implicit learning (e.g., Holyoak and Spellman (1993), Rick and Weber (2010)). Finally, group cohesion might influence the nature of strategic reasoning in more substantive ways. For instance, according to one model of strategic thinking, “team reasoning” (e.g., Sugden (2003), Bacharach (2006)), people think in terms of what would be best for the team (e.g., picking the Pareto-best equilibrium) and are inclined to do their part in implementing the group-optimal outcome. An interesting possibility is that team reasoning may be more likely the more cohesive the team is. These three channels might operate jointly and potentially reinforce each other in high cohesion groups. By contrast, low cohesion groups may have low levels of social preferences, little implicit learning to draw on from shared situations, and no team perception to facilitate team reasoning.

We probe these possibilities in two steps. We first show that subjects who report high oneness with their fellow group members are indeed more likely to expose themselves to the strategic risk of choosing high initial effort in our weak-link games; they are also less “harsh” in their responses when others’ effort levels are below their own. In highly cohesive groups, these tendencies apply across group members promoting coordination on equilibria above the Pareto-worst.

Our second step is to identify the social preferences channel as a promising route for explaining observed effects of group cohesion. We demonstrate this via additional experiments in which unrelated and anonymous group members play weak-link games but with all earnings shared equally. We interpret this manipulation as inducing a limiting form of social preferences (where all put equal weight on everyone’s material payoffs). The results show patterns of effort (opening levels and dynamics) very comparable to the top third most cohesive groups from our main experiment. Thus, social preferences provide a parsimonious candidate explanation of how group cohesion promotes Pareto-superior equilibria.

Smart groups of smart people: Evidence for IQ as the origin of collective intelligence in the performance of human groups: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160289616303282
Group-IQ almost exclusively reflects individual cognition. (80% variance explained)
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june 2017 by nhaliday
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