nhaliday + micro   108

microeconomics - Partial vs. general equilibrium - Economics Stack Exchange
The main difference between partial and general equilibrium models is, that partial equilibrium models assume that what happens on the market one wants to analyze has no effect on other markets.
q-n-a  stackex  explanation  jargon  comparison  concept  models  economics  micro  macro  equilibrium  supply-demand  markets  methodology  competition 
november 2017 by nhaliday
Fortifications and Democracy in the Ancient Greek World by Josiah Ober, Barry Weingast :: SSRN
- Joshiah Ober, Barry Weingast

In the modern world, access-limiting fortification walls are not typically regarded as promoting democracy. But in Greek antiquity, increased investment in fortifications was correlated with the prevalence and stability of democracy. This paper sketches the background conditions of the Greek city-state ecology, analyzes a passage in Aristotle’s Politics, and assesses the choices of Hellenistic kings, Greek citizens, and urban elites, as modeled in a simple game. The paper explains how city walls promoted democracy and helps to explain several other puzzles: why Hellenistic kings taxed Greek cities at lower than expected rates; why elites in Greek cities supported democracy; and why elites were not more heavily taxed by democratic majorities. The relationship between walls, democracy, and taxes promoted continued economic growth into the late classical and Hellenistic period (4th-2nd centuries BCE), and ultimately contributed to the survival of Greek culture into the Roman era, and thus modernity. We conclude with a consideration of whether the walls-democracy relationship holds in modernity.

'Rulers Ruled by Women': An Economic Analysis of the Rise and Fall of Women's Rights in Ancient Sparta by Robert K. Fleck, F. Andrew Hanssen: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=788106
Throughout most of history, women as a class have possessed relatively few formal rights. The women of ancient Sparta were a striking exception. Although they could not vote, Spartan women reportedly owned 40 percent of Sparta's agricultural land and enjoyed other rights that were equally extraordinary. We offer a simple economic explanation for the Spartan anomaly. The defining moment for Sparta was its conquest of a neighboring land and people, which fundamentally changed the marginal products of Spartan men's and Spartan women's labor. To exploit the potential gains from a reallocation of labor - specifically, to provide the appropriate incentives and the proper human capital formation - men granted women property (and other) rights. Consistent with our explanation for the rise of women's rights, when Sparta lost the conquered land several centuries later, the rights for women disappeared. Two conclusions emerge that may help explain why women's rights have been so rare for most of history. First, in contrast to the rest of the world, the optimal (from the men's perspective) division of labor among Spartans involved women in work that was not easily monitored by men. Second, the rights held by Spartan women may have been part of an unstable equilibrium, which contained the seeds of its own destruction.
study  broad-econ  economics  polisci  political-econ  institutions  government  north-weingast-like  democracy  walls  correlation  polis  history  mediterranean  iron-age  the-classics  microfoundations  modernity  comparison  architecture  military  public-goodish  elite  civic  taxes  redistribution  canon  literature  big-peeps  conquest-empire  rent-seeking  defense  models  GT-101  incentives  urban  urban-rural  speculation  interdisciplinary  cliometrics  multi  civil-liberty  gender  gender-diff  equilibrium  cycles  branches  labor  interests  property-rights  unintended-consequences  explanation  explanans  analysis  econ-productivity  context  arrows  micro  natural-experiment 
november 2017 by nhaliday
The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession on JSTOR
Abstract. The paper extends and empirically tests Gordon Tullock’s public choice theory of the nature of autocracy. A simple model of the relationship between constitutional rules governing succession in autocratic regimes and the occurrence of coups against autocrats is sketched. The model is applied to a case study of coups against monarchs in Denmark in the period ca. 935–1849. A clear connection is found between the specific constitutional rules governing succession and the frequency of coups. Specifically, the introduction of automatic hereditary succession in an autocracy provides stability and limits the number of coups conducted by contenders.

Table 2. General constitutional rules of succession, Denmark ca. 935–1849

To see this the data may be divided into three categories of constitutional rules of succession: One of open succession (for the periods 935–1165 and 1326–40), one of appointed succession combined with election (for the periods 1165–1326 and 1340–1536), and one of more or less formalized hereditary succession (1536–1849). On the basis of this categorization the data have been summarized in Table 3.

validity of empirics is a little sketchy

https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/922103073257824257
https://archive.is/NXbdQ
The graphic novel it is based on is insightful, illustrates Tullock's game-theoretic, asymmetric information views on autocracy.

Conclusions from Gorton Tullock's book Autocracy, p. 211-215.: https://astro.temple.edu/~bstavis/courses/tulluck.htm
study  polisci  political-econ  economics  cracker-econ  big-peeps  GT-101  info-econ  authoritarianism  antidemos  government  micro  leviathan  elite  power  institutions  garett-jones  multi  econotariat  twitter  social  commentary  backup  art  film  comics  fiction  competition  europe  nordic  empirical  evidence-based  incentives  legacy  peace-violence  order-disorder  🎩  organizing  info-dynamics  history  medieval  law  axioms  stylized-facts  early-modern  data  longitudinal  flux-stasis  shift  revolution  correlation  org:junk  org:edu  summary  military  war  top-n  hi-order-bits  feudal  democracy  sulla 
october 2017 by nhaliday
Health Services as Credence Goods: A Field Experiment by Felix Gottschalk, Wanda Mimra, Christian Waibel :: SSRN
A test patient who does not need treatment is sent to 180 dentists to receive treatment recommendations. In the experiment, we vary two factors: First, the information that the patient signals to the dentist. Second, we vary the perceived socioeconomic status (SES) of the test patient. Furthermore, we collected data to construct several measures of short- and long-term demand and competition as well as dentist and practice characteristics. We find that the patient receives an overtreatment recommendation in _more than every fourth visit_. A low short-term demand, indicating excess capacities, leads to significantly more overtreatment recommendations. Physician density and their price level, however, do not have a significant effect on overtreatment. Furthermore, we observe significantly less overtreatment recommendations for the patient with higher SES compared to lower SES under standard information. More signalled information however does not significantly reduce overtreatment.

How much dentists are ethically concerned about overtreatment; a vignette-based survey in Switzerland: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4474445/
Are Dentists Overtreating Your Teeth?: https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/are-dentists-overtreating-your-teeth/
Have you had a rash of fillings after years of healthy teeth? The culprit may be “microcavities,” and not every dentist thinks they need to be treated, reports today’s Science Times.
How Dentists Rip Us Off: https://www.dentistat.com/ReaderDigestArticle.pdf

https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130356647
study  economics  micro  field-study  markets  trust  healthcare  dental  crooked  supply-demand  incentives  class  signaling  🎩  trivia  cocktail  europe  germanic  medicine  meta:medicine  integrity  ethics  free-riding  data  scale  inequality  news  org:rec  org:health  info-econ  pdf  org:mag  left-wing 
october 2017 by nhaliday
Tax Evasion and Inequality
This paper attempts to estimate the size and distribution of tax evasion in rich countries. We combine stratified random audits—the key source used to study tax evasion so far—with new micro-data leaked from two large offshore financial institutions, HSBC Switzerland (“Swiss leaks”) and Mossack Fonseca (“Panama Papers”). We match these data to population-wide wealth records in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. We find that tax evasion rises sharply with wealth, a phenomenon that random audits fail to capture. On average about 3% of personal taxes are evaded in Scandinavia, but this figure rises to about 30% in the top 0.01% of the wealth distribution, a group that includes households with more than $40 million in net wealth. A simple model of the supply of tax evasion services can explain why evasion rises steeply with wealth. Taking tax evasion into account increases the rise in inequality seen in tax data since the 1970s markedly, highlighting the need to move beyond tax data to capture income and wealth at the top, even in countries where tax compliance is generally high. We also find that after reducing tax evasion—by using tax amnesties—tax evaders do not legally avoid taxes more. This result suggests that fighting tax evasion can be an effective way to collect more tax revenue from the ultra-wealthy.

Figure 1

America’s unreported economy: measuring the size, growth and determinants of income tax evasion in the U.S.: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10611-011-9346-x
This study empirically investigates the extent of noncompliance with the tax code and examines the determinants of federal income tax evasion in the U.S. Employing a refined version of Feige’s (Staff Papers, International Monetary Fund 33(4):768–881, 1986, 1989) General Currency Ratio (GCR) model to estimate a time series of unreported income as our measure of tax evasion, we find that 18–23% of total reportable income may not properly be reported to the IRS. This gives rise to a 2009 “tax gap” in the range of $390–$540 billion. As regards the determinants of tax noncompliance, we find that federal income tax evasion is an increasing function of the average effective federal income tax rate, the unemployment rate, the nominal interest rate, and per capita real GDP, and a decreasing function of the IRS audit rate. Despite important refinements of the traditional currency ratio approach for estimating the aggregate size and growth of unreported economies, we conclude that the sensitivity of the results to different benchmarks, imperfect data sources and alternative specifying assumptions precludes obtaining results of sufficient accuracy and reliability to serve as effective policy guides.
pdf  study  economics  micro  evidence-based  data  europe  nordic  scale  class  compensation  money  monetary-fiscal  political-econ  redistribution  taxes  madisonian  inequality  history  mostly-modern  natural-experiment  empirical  🎩  cocktail  correlation  models  supply-demand  GT-101  crooked  elite  vampire-squid  nationalism-globalism  multi  pro-rata  usa  time-series  trends  world-war  cold-war  government  todo  planning  long-term  trivia  law  crime  criminology  estimate  speculation  measurement  labor  macro  econ-metrics  wealth  stock-flow  time  density  criminal-justice  frequency  dark-arts  traces  evidence 
october 2017 by nhaliday
Can Europe Run Greece? Lessons from U.S. Fiscal Receiverships in Latin America, 1904-31 by Noel Maurer, Leticia Arroyo Abad :: SSRN
In 2012 and again in 2015, the German government proposed sending German administrators to manage Greece’s tax and privatization authorities. The idea was that shared governance would reduce corruption and root out inefficient practices. (In 2017 the Boston Globe proposed a similar arrangement for Haiti.) We test a version of shared governance using eight U.S. interventions between 1904 and 1931, under which American officials took over management of Latin American fiscal institutions. We develop a stylized model in which better monitoring by incorruptible managers does not lead to higher government revenues. Using a new panel of data on fiscal revenues and the volume and terms of trade, we find that revenue fell under receiverships. Our results hold under instrumental variables estimation and with counterfactual specifications using synthetic controls.
study  economics  broad-econ  political-econ  growth-econ  polisci  government  monetary-fiscal  money  europe  the-great-west-whale  germanic  mediterranean  usa  latin-america  conquest-empire  corruption  integrity  n-factor  management  history  mostly-modern  pre-ww2  models  analogy  track-record  endo-exo  counterfactual  cliometrics  micro  endogenous-exogenous 
september 2017 by nhaliday
Does Communist Party Membership Pay? Estimating the Economic Returns to Party Membership in the Labor Market in China
This study estimates the economic returns to Chinese Communist Party membership using complementary approaches to address the endogeneity of party membership status: propensity score matching and instrumental variable. Although the magnitudes of these estimates vary across estimators, all the estimates show positive economic returns to party membership.
pdf  study  economics  broad-econ  labor  microfoundations  political-econ  polisci  sociology  compensation  correlation  endo-exo  econometrics  government  institutions  corruption  china  asia  sinosphere  communism  authoritarianism  antidemos  social-capital  human-capital  intervention  supply-demand  micro  endogenous-exogenous  leviathan 
september 2017 by nhaliday
Reckonings; A Rent Affair - The New York Times
Economists who have ventured into the alleged real world often quote Princeton's Alan Blinder, who has formulated what he calls ''Murphy's Law of economic policy'': ''Economists have the least influence on policy where they know the most and are most agreed; they have the most influence on policy where they know the least and disagree most vehemently.'' It's flip and cynical, but it's true.
news  org:rec  krugman  econotariat  aphorism  stylized-facts  social-choice  wonkish  economics  micro  supply-demand  macro  housing  markets  government 
august 2017 by nhaliday
A Model of Protests, Revolution, and Information
A population considering a revolt must participate in sufficient numbers to succeed. We study how their ability to coordinate is affected by their information. The effects of information are non-monotone: the population may coordinate on a revolt if there is very little information or if they know a lot about each other’s preferences for change, but having each agent know about the the willingness of a few others to revolt can actually make non-participation by all the unique equilibrium. We also show that holding mass protests before a revolution can be an essential step in mobilizing a population. Protests provide costly signals of how many agents are willing to participate, while easier forms of communication (e.g., via social media) may fail to signal willingness to actively participate. Thus, although social media can enhance coordination, it may still be necessary to hold a protest before a revolution in order to measure the size of the population willing to revolt. We also examine how having competing groups involved in a revolution can change its feasibility, as well as other extensions, such as what the minimal redistribution on the part of the government is in order to avoid a revolution, and the role of propaganda.
pdf  study  economics  models  info-econ  preference-falsification  info-dynamics  MENA  revolution  signaling  media  propaganda  coalitions  westminster  polisci  political-econ  redistribution  🎩  leviathan  GT-101  internet  authoritarianism  antidemos  micro  flux-stasis  organizing 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Cultural economics - Wikipedia
Cultural economics is the branch of economics that studies the relation of culture to economic outcomes. Here, 'culture' is defined by shared beliefs and preferences of respective groups. Programmatic issues include whether and how much culture matters as to economic outcomes and what its relation is to institutions.[1]

Applications include the study of religion,[2] social norms.[3] social identity,[4] fertility,[5] beliefs in redistributive justice,[6] ideology,[7] hatred,[8] terrorism,[9] trust,[10] and the culture of economics.[11][12] A general analytical theme is how ideas and behaviors are spread among individuals through the formation of social capital,[13] social networks[14] and processes such as social learning, as in the theory of social evolution[15] and information cascades.[16] Methods include case studies and theoretical and empirical modeling of cultural transmission within and across social groups.[17] In 2013 Said E. Dawlabani added the value systems approach to the cultural emergence aspect of macroeconomics.[18]

interesting references
economics  micro  culture  cultural-dynamics  sociology  social-science  article  religion  theos  fertility  social-norms  redistribution  ideology  hate  terrorism  trust  social-capital  network-structure  wiki  reference  links  broad-econ  institutions  chart  microfoundations  prejudice  hari-seldon 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Economics of corruption - Wikipedia
In 1968, Nobel laureate economist Gunnar Myrdal found corruption 'almost a taboo (among economists) as research topic'. Indeed, it has mostly been a matter of political science and sociology. However, the scenario changed since the 1970s. Since Rose-Ackerman's article "The Economics of Corruption", published in the Journal of Public Economics in 1975,[1] more than 3,000 articles have been written with 'corruption' in the title, at least 500 of which directly focus on different aspects relating to corruption using an economic framework.[2] Some books have also been published on the subject.[3]

Organizations have emerged to deal with the economics of corruption.[4] Some universities offer courses under the title Economics of Corruption.[5] Nobel laureate economist Gary Becker and an American Judge Richard Posner have opened a blog for open public discussion discussing economics of corruption [6]
economics  micro  polisci  government  rent-seeking  corruption  article  history  mostly-modern  methodology  wiki  reference  social-science  microfoundations  ethics 
june 2017 by nhaliday
The Limits of Public Choice Theory – Jacobite
Many people believe that politics is difficult because of incentives: voters vote for their self interest; bureaucrats deliberately don’t solve problems to enlarge their departments; and elected officials maximize votes for power and sell out to lobbyists. But this cynical view is mostly wrong—politics, insofar as it has problems, has problems not because people are selfish—it has problems because people have wrong ideas. In fact, people mostly act surprisingly altruistically, motivated by trying to do good for their country.

...

I got into politics and ideas as a libertarian. I was attracted by the idea of public choice as a universal theory of politics. It’s intuitively appealing, methodologically individualist, and it supported all of the things I already believed. And it’s definitely true to some extent—there is a huge amount of evidence that it affects things somewhat. But it’s terrible as a general theory of politics in the developed world. Our policies are bad because voters are ignorant and politicians believe in things too much, not because everyone is irredeemably cynical and atavistic.

interesting take, HBD?: https://twitter.com/pseudoerasmus/status/869882831572434946

recommended by Garett Jones:
https://web.archive.org/web/20110517015819/http://reviewsindepth.com/2010/03/yes-prime-minister-the-most-cunning-political-propaganda-ever-conceived/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Thick_of_It
org:popup  albion  wonkish  econotariat  rhetoric  essay  contrarianism  methodology  economics  micro  social-choice  elections  government  politics  polisci  incentives  altruism  social-norms  democracy  cynicism-idealism  optimism  antidemos  morality  near-far  ethics  map-territory  models  cooperate-defect  anthropology  coordination  multi  twitter  social  commentary  pseudoE  broad-econ  wealth-of-nations  rent-seeking  leviathan  pop-diff  gnon  political-econ  public-goodish  tv  review  garett-jones  backup  recommendations  microfoundations  wiki  britain  organizing  interests  applicability-prereqs  the-watchers  noblesse-oblige  n-factor  self-interest  cohesion  EGT  world  guilt-shame  alignment 
may 2017 by nhaliday
There Is No Such Thing as Decreasing Returns to Scale — Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal
Besides pedagogical inertia—enforced to some extent by textbook publishers—I am not quite sure what motivates the devotion in so many economics curricula to U-shaped average cost curves. Let me make one guess: there is a desire to explain why firms are the size they are rather than larger or smaller. To my mind, such an explanation should proceed in one of three ways, appropriate to three different situations.
econotariat  economics  micro  plots  scale  marginal  industrial-org  business  econ-productivity  efficiency  cost-benefit  explanation  critique  clarity  intricacy  curvature  convexity-curvature  nonlinearity  input-output 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Sending Jobs Overseas
*The Great Convergence*: http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2016/11/the-great-convergence.html

Richard Baldwin on the New Globalization: https://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2018/04/the-new-globalization.html
To really understand how this changed the nature of globalization, consider a sports analogy. Suppose we have two football teams, one that needs a quarterback but has too many linebackers, and one that needs a linebacker but has too many quarterbacks. If they sit down and trade players, both teams win. It’s arbitrage in players. Each team gets rid of players they need less of and gets players they need more of. That’s the old globalization: exchange of goods.

Now let’s take a different kind of exchange, where the coach of the better team goes to the field of the worse team and starts training those players in the off-season. This is very good for the coach because he gets to sell his knowledge in two places. You can be sure that the quality of the league will rise, all the games will get more competitive, and the team that’s being trained up will enjoy the whole thing. But it’s not at all certain that the players of the better team will benefit from this exchange because the source of their advantage is now being traded.

In this analogy, the better team is, of course, the G7, and not surprisingly this has led to some resentment of globalization in those countries. The new globalization breaks the monopoly that G7 labor had on G7 know-how…

good reviews here:
The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization: https://www.amazon.com/Great-Convergence-Information-Technology-Globalization/dp/067466048X
news  org:ngo  letters  essay  rhetoric  right-wing  nascent-state  politics  polisci  policy  economics  growth-econ  trade  world  nationalism-globalism  vampire-squid  developing-world  china  asia  ideology  democracy  populism  technocracy  usa  labor  compensation  contrarianism  capital  capitalism  britain  heavy-industry  unintended-consequences  hmm  idk  technology  internet  roots  chart  zeitgeist  europe  the-great-west-whale  books  summary  review  cost-benefit  automation  korea  india  latin-america  africa  egalitarianism-hierarchy  robust  human-capital  knowledge  density  regulation  micro  incentives  longform  government  rot  malaise  nl-and-so-can-you  sinosphere  expansionism  the-world-is-just-atoms  scale  paleocon  kumbaya-kult  madisonian  counter-revolution  modernity  convergence  class-warfare  multi  econotariat  marginal-rev  commentary  volo-avolo  heterodox  definite-planning  stagnation 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Kaldor–Hicks efficiency - Wikipedia
A Kaldor–Hicks improvement, named for Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks, also known as the Kaldor–Hicks criterion, is a way of judging economic re-allocations of resources among people that captures some of the intuitive appeal of Pareto efficiencies, but has less stringent criteria and is hence applicable to more circumstances. A re-allocation is a Kaldor–Hicks improvement if those that are made better off could hypothetically compensate those that are made worse off and lead to a Pareto-improving outcome. The compensation does not actually have to occur (there is no presumption in favor of status-quo) and thus, a Kaldor–Hicks improvement can in fact leave some people worse off.

A situation is said to be Kaldor–Hicks efficient if no potential Kaldor–Hicks improvement from that situation exists.
concept  atoms  economics  micro  GT-101  pareto  redistribution  policy  government  wiki  reference  jargon  methodology  efficiency  welfare-state  equilibrium 
april 2017 by nhaliday
How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment
We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision-making. We present a model in which career concerned committee members receive private information of different type-dependent accuracy, deliberate and vote. We study three levels of transparency under which career concerns are predicted to affect behavior differently, and test the model’s key predictions in a laboratory experiment. The model’s predictions are largely borne out – transparency negatively affects information aggregation at the deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different committee error rates than under secrecy. This occurs despite subjects revealing more information under transparency than theory predicts.
study  economics  micro  decision-making  decision-theory  collaboration  coordination  info-econ  info-dynamics  behavioral-econ  field-study  clarity  ethics  civic  integrity  error  unintended-consequences  🎩  org:ngo  madisonian  regularizer  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  white-paper  microfoundations  open-closed  composition-decomposition  organizing 
april 2017 by nhaliday
Deadweight loss - Wikipedia
example:
Deadweight loss created by a binding price ceiling. Producer surplus is necessarily decreased, while consumer surplus may or may not increase; however the decrease in producer surplus must be greater than the increase (if any) in consumer surplus.
economics  concept  efficiency  markets  micro  metabuch  regulation  taxes  wiki  reference  models  things  manifolds  plots  supply-demand  intersection  intersection-connectedness 
february 2017 by nhaliday
List of games in game theory - Wikipedia
https://twitter.com/BretWeinstein/status/961503023854833665
https://archive.is/qLsD4
The most important patterns:

1. Prisoner's Dilemma
2. Race to the Bottom
3. Free Rider Problem / Tragedy of the Commons / Collective Action
4. Zero Sum vs. Non-Zero Sum
5. Externalities / Principal Agent
6. Diminishing Returns
7. Evolutionarily Stable Strategy / Nash Equilibrium
concept  economics  micro  models  examples  list  game-theory  GT-101  wiki  reference  cooperate-defect  multi  twitter  social  discussion  backup  journos-pundits  coordination  competition  free-riding  zero-positive-sum  externalities  rent-seeking  marginal  convexity-curvature  nonlinearity  equilibrium  top-n  metabuch  conceptual-vocab  alignment  contracts 
february 2017 by nhaliday
Would Clinton have defeated Trump in an epistocracy? | We the Pleeple
Next on the chart are the various epistocratic scenarios. What if we give especially low-knowledge voters only half a vote, or only a third, or bar them completely? What if we use a graduated more-votes-for-more-knowledge system? What if we give especially high-knowledge voters an extra vote, or two, or take epistocracy literally and allow only these high-knowledge folks to vote?

Do any of these proposals improve Clinton’s popular vote margin over Trump? No. In fact, each one would have given Trump a popular vote lead, anywhere from 0.5 points (giving high-knowledge folks a single extra vote) to 4.3 points (letting only high-knowledge folks vote). In an epistocracy of the sort Brennan and others imagine, Trump’s victory over Clinton would have been even more securely won.

contrary update:
ACTUALLY, EPISTOCRACY MIGHT HAVE HELPED CLINTON DEFEAT TRUMP: http://www.pleeps.org/2017/04/11/actually-epistocracy-might-have-helped-clinton-defeat-trump/
But she probably would have been running against President Romney, and might have still lost.

Were Trump Voters Irrational?: http://quillette.com/2017/09/28/trump-voters-irrational/
In addition to being misplaced, leftists never seem to see how insulting this critique of Republican voters is. Their failure to see the insult illustrates precisely what they get wrong in evaluating the rationality of the Trump voters. Consider that these What’s the Matter with Kansas? critiques are written by highly educated left-wing pundits, professors, and advocates. Perhaps we should ask one of them whether their own vote is purely self-interested and for their own monetary benefit. They will say no, of course. And they will deny as well that their vote is irrational. Progressives will say that they often vote against their own monetary interests in order to do good for other people. Or they will say that their vote reflects their values and worldview—that they are concerned about the larger issues that are encompassed by that worldview (abortion legislation or climate change or gun restriction). Leftists seem unable to see that Republican voters—even lower income ones—may be just as attached to their own values and worldviews. The stance of the educated progressive making the What’s the Matter with Kansas? argument seems to be that: “no one else should vote against their monetary interests, but it’s not irrational for me to do so, because I am enlightened.”

...

Progressives tend to deny or obfuscate (just as conservatives obfuscate the research on global warming) the data indicating that single-parent households lead to more behavioral problems among children. Overwhelmingly progressive university schools of education deny the strong scientific consensus that phonics-based reading instruction facilitates most readers, especially those struggling the most. Many progressives find it hard to believe that there is no bias at all in the initial hiring of women for tenure-track university positions in STEM disciplines. Progressives tend to deny the consensus view that genetically modified organisms are safe to consume. Gender feminists routinely deny biological facts about sex differences. Largely Democratic cities and university towns are at the forefront of the anti-vaccine movement which denies a scientific consensus. In the same cities and towns, people find it hard to believe that there is a strong consensus among economists that rent control causes housing shortages and a diminution in the quality of housing. [Research citations for all the above are available from the author here.]

...

More formal studies have indicated that there are few differences in factual knowledge of the world between Republicans and Democrats. The Pew Research Center reported one of its News IQ surveys in 2015 (What the Public Knows, April 28, 2015) and found very few partisan differences. People in the sample answered 12 questions about current events (identifying the route of the Keystone XL pipeline; knowledge of how many Supreme Court justices are women; etc.) and the Republicans outperformed the Democrats on 7 of the 12 items. Democrats outperformed the Republicans on 5 of the items. On average, the Republicans in the sample answered 8.3 items correctly, the Democrats answered 7.9 items correctly, and the independents answered 8.0 items correctly.

...

Measures of so-called “knowledge” in such a domain are easily skewed in a partisan manner by selection effects. This is a version of the “party of science” problem discussed previously. Whether the Democrats or the Republicans are the “party of science” depends entirely on how the issue in question is selected. The 17-item measure used by Klein was relatively balanced (8 items biased against leftists and 9 items biased against conservatives). With all the caveats in place about the difficulty of item matching, the weak conclusion that can be drawn is that existing research provides no evidence for the view that conservatives are deficient in the domain of economic knowledge—a domain critical for rational voting behavior.
politics  polisci  2016-election  government  demographics  data  analysis  social-choice  democracy  trump  clinton  education  org:data  elections  egalitarianism-hierarchy  wonkish  antidemos  class  coalitions  postmortem  general-survey  knowledge  race  class-warfare  poll  values  distribution  multi  obama  news  org:mag  org:popup  biases  sampling-bias  survey  links  study  summary  rationality  epistemic  psychology  social-psych  expert  scitariat  identity-politics  science  social-science  westminster  truth  gender  gender-diff  labor  housing  economics  micro  markets  supply-demand  descriptive  sociology  expert-experience 
january 2017 by nhaliday
The Case for Protecting Infant Industries - Bloomberg View
pseudoerasmus commentary:
https://twitter.com/pseudoerasmus/status/812119586573316096
https://pseudoerasmus.com/2016/12/26/napoleon/
mentioned studies:
China and US today: http://www.ddorn.net/papers/Autor-Dorn-Hanson-ChinaShock.pdf
Turkey: http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/econ/Krueger,%2520An%2520Empirical%2520Test%2520of%2520the%2520Infant.pdf
Napoleonic France: http://www.rjuhasz.com/research/jm_blockade_juhasz.pdf

This dismissal was premature. Arguments from theory can break down in any number of ways. And examples like Turkey’s aren’t true random experiments -- for example, countries might try to use protectionism to shore up industries that were uncompetitive to begin with, and which had little hope of ever flourishing. Policy decisions don’t just drive economic conditions, they’re also driven by them. To really know whether infant-industry protection is effective, we’d need some kind of random event that affected the competitive environment.

Economist Reka Juhasz, of Princeton and Columbia, combed through the historical record to find such a random event. And she found one: the Napoleonic Wars. It seems doubtful that Napoleon’s conquest of Europe was an elaborate scheme to protect failing French manufacturing industries, so it’s probably safe to consider its effects as akin to an act of God.

During his wars with Britain, Napoleon tried (unsuccessfully) to bring his island nemesis to its knees by cutting it off from European markets. The move protected industries within the sprawling Napoleonic domains that competed heavily with Britain. The prime example was mechanized cotton spinning, a very high-tech industry for its time, and a locus of intense competition between early industrial nations like Britain and France. With detailed historical records, Juhasz was able to identify how much different regions saw their trade costs with Britain go up as the result of Napoleon’s embargo, and to see whether cotton spinners in those areas flourished.

They did. Juhasz found that in the short term, profits of protected cotton spinners rose, and their size and productivity increased more in the long run. Decades later, these regions were exporting more, relative to less-protected regions, showing that companies in the shielded areas were eventually able to compete in global markets -- just as the infant-industry argument would predict.
news  org:mag  org:bv  contrarianism  econotariat  rhetoric  policy  trade  business  pseudoE  study  summary  multi  links  micro  natural-experiment  history  europe  war  gallic  noahpinion  debate  stylized-facts  🎩  labor  org:biz  cliometrics  economics  regulation  proposal  wonkish  early-modern  current-events  heavy-industry  nationalism-globalism  broad-econ  article  political-econ 
december 2016 by nhaliday
What Drives Firm-Level Stock Returns?
I use a vector autoregressive model (VAR) to decompose an individual firm's stock return into two components: changes in cash-flow expectations (i.e., cash-flow news) and changes in discount rates (i.e., expected-return news). The VAR yields three main results. First, firm-level stock returns are mainly driven by cash-flow news. For a typical stock, the variance of cash-flow news is more than twice that of expected-return news. Second, shocks to expected returns and cash flows are positively correlated for a typical small stock. Third, expected-return-news series are highly correlated across firms, while cash-flow news can largely be diversified away in aggregate portfolios.
pdf  study  economics  classic  business  investing  causation  variance-components  micro  🎩  econometrics  wonkish  roots  securities  outcome-risk  ORFE 
december 2016 by nhaliday
Professors Make More Than a Thousand Dollars an Hour Peddling Mega-Mergers | Hacker News
https://www.wsj.com/articles/paying-professors-inside-googles-academic-influence-campaign-1499785286
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/07/12/tech-companies-arent-different/
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/us/politics/eric-schmidt-google-new-america.html
WASHINGTON — In the hours after European antitrust regulators levied a record $2.7 billion fine against Google in late June, an influential Washington think tank learned what can happen when a tech giant that shapes public policy debates with its enormous wealth is criticized.

The New America Foundation has received more than $21 million from Google; its parent company’s executive chairman, Eric Schmidt; and his family’s foundation since the think tank’s founding in 1999. That money helped to establish New America as an elite voice in policy debates on the American left.

But not long after one of New America’s scholars posted a statement on the think tank’s website praising the European Union’s penalty against Google, Mr. Schmidt, who had chaired New America until 2016, communicated his displeasure with the statement to the group’s president, Anne-Marie Slaughter, according to the scholar.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/30/zephyr-teachout-google-is-coming-after-critics-in-academia-and-journalism-its-time-to-stop-them/
http://nypost.com/2017/08/30/being-evil-the-firing-of-a-google-critic/
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/us/politics/anne-marie-slaughter-new-america-google.html
https://www.vox.com/conversations/2017/9/8/16266496/silicon-valley-google-apple-facebook-amazon-monopolies
commentary  hn  news  investigative-journo  academia  economics  ethics  business  longform  micro  policy  industrial-org  org:mag  crooked  anomie  multi  org:rec  market-power  google  law  political-econ  regulation  madisonian  property-rights  civil-liberty  censorship  drama  current-events  corruption  media  org:lite  exit-voice  sv  tech  org:data  interview  thiel  barons  facebook  2016-election  trump  org:local 
november 2016 by nhaliday
The best kind of discrimination – The sideways view
I think it would be nice if the world had more price discrimination; we would produce more goods, and those goods would be available to more people. As a society we could enable price discrimination by providing more high-quality signals to be used by price discriminators. The IRS is in a particularly attractive position to offer such signals since income is a particularly useful signal. But realistically I think that such a proposal would require coordination in order to get consumers’ consent to make the data available (and to ensure that only upper bounds were available); the total gains are probably not large enough to justify the amount of coordination and complexity that is required.

apparently about 1/3 of income goes to capital-holders, and 2/3 to workers (wonder what the source for that is, and how consistent it is across industries)
clever-rats  ratty  alt-inst  economics  proposal  policy  markets  arbitrage  hmm  efficiency  street-fighting  analysis  gray-econ  🤖  acmtariat  compensation  distribution  objektbuch  capital  labor  cost-benefit  capitalism  ideas  discrimination  supply-demand  micro 
november 2016 by nhaliday
Overcoming Bias : Two Kinds Of Status
prestige and dominance

More here. I was skeptical at first, but now am convinced: humans see two kinds of status, and approve of prestige-status much more than domination-status. I’ll have much more to say about this in the coming days, but it is far from clear to me that prestige-status is as much better than domination-status as people seem to think. Efforts to achieve prestige-status also have serious negative side-effects.

Two Ways to the Top: Evidence That Dominance and Prestige Are Distinct Yet Viable Avenues to Social Rank and Influence: https://henrich.fas.harvard.edu/files/henrich/files/cheng_et_al_2013.pdf
Dominance (the use of force and intimidation to induce fear) and Prestige (the sharing of expertise or know-how to gain respect)

...

According to the model, Dominance initially arose in evolutionary history as a result of agonistic contests for material resources and mates that were common among nonhuman species, but continues to exist in contemporary human societies, largely in the form of psychological intimidation, coercion, and wielded control over costs and benefits (e.g., access to resources, mates, and well-being). In both humans and nonhumans, Dominance hierarchies are thought to emerge to help maintain patterns of submission directed from subordinates to Dominants, thereby minimizing agonistic battles and incurred costs.

In contrast, Prestige is likely unique to humans, because it is thought to have emerged from selection pressures to preferentially attend to and acquire cultural knowledge from highly skilled or successful others, a capacity considered to be less developed in other animals (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Laland & Galef, 2009). In this view, social learning (i.e., copying others) evolved in humans as a low-cost fitness-maximizing, information-gathering mechanism (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Once it became adaptive to copy skilled others, a preference for social models with better than average information would have emerged. This would promote competition for access to the highest quality models, and deference toward these models in exchange for copying and learning opportunities. Consequently, selection likely favored Prestige differentiation, with individuals possessing high-quality information or skills elevated to the top of the hierarchy. Meanwhile, other individuals may reach the highest ranks of their group’s hierarchy by wielding threat of force, regardless of the quality of their knowledge or skills. Thus, Dominance and Prestige can be thought of as coexisting avenues to attaining rank and influence within social groups, despite being underpinned by distinct motivations and behavioral patterns, and resulting in distinct patterns of imitation and deference from subordinates.

Importantly, both Dominance and Prestige are best conceptualized as cognitive and behavioral strategies (i.e., suites of subjective feelings, cognitions, motivations, and behavioral patterns that together produce certain outcomes) deployed in certain situations, and can be used (with more or less success) by any individual within a group. They are not types of individuals, or even, necessarily, traits within individuals. Instead, we assume that all situated dyadic relationships contain differential degrees of both Dominance and Prestige, such that each person is simultaneously Dominant and Prestigious to some extent, to some other individual. Thus, it is possible that a high degree of Dominance and a high degree of Prestige may be found within the same individual, and may depend on who is doing the judging. For example, by controlling students’ access to rewards and punishments, school teachers may exert Dominance in their relationships with some students, but simultaneously enjoy Prestige with others, if they are respected and deferred to for their competence and wisdom. Indeed, previous studies have shown that based on both self- and peer ratings, Dominance and Prestige are largely independent (mean r = -.03; Cheng et al., 2010).

Status Hypocrisy: https://www.overcomingbias.com/2017/01/status-hypocrisy.html
Today we tend to say that our leaders have prestige, while their leaders have dominance. That is, their leaders hold power via personal connections and the threat and practice of violence, bribes, sex, gossip, and conformity pressures. Our leaders, instead, mainly just have whatever abilities follow from our deepest respect and admiration regarding their wisdom and efforts on serious topics that matter for us all. Their leaders more seek power, while ours more have leadership thrust upon them. Because of this us/them split, we tend to try to use persuasion on us, but force on them, when seeking to to change behaviors.

...

Clearly, while there is some fact of the matter about how much a person gains their status via licit or illicit means, there is also a lot of impression management going on. We like to give others the impression that we personally mainly want prestige in ourselves and our associates, and that we only grant others status via the prestige they have earned. But let me suggest that, compared to this ideal, we actually want more dominance in ourselves and our associates than we like to admit, and we submit more often to dominance.

Cads, Dads, Doms: https://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/07/cads-dads-doms.html
"The proper dichotomy is not “virile vs. wimpy” as has been supposed, but “exciting vs. drab,” with the former having the two distinct sub-groups “macho man vs. pretty boy.” Another way to see that this is the right dichotomy is to look around the world: wherever girls really dig macho men, they also dig the peacocky musician type too, finding safe guys a bit boring. And conversely, where devoted dads do the best, it’s more difficult for macho men or in-town-for-a-day rockstars to make out like bandits. …

Whatever it is about high-pathogen-load areas that selects for greater polygynous behavior … will result in an increase in both gorilla-like and peacock-like males, since they’re two viable ways to pursue a polygynous mating strategy."

This fits with there being two kinds of status: dominance and prestige. Macho men, such as CEOs and athletes, have dominance, while musicians and artists have prestige. But women seek both short and long term mates. Since both kinds of status suggest good genes, both attract women seeking short term mates. This happens more when women are younger and richer, and when there is more disease. Foragers pretend they don’t respect dominance as much as they do, so prestigious men get more overt attention, while dominant men get more covert attention.

Women seeking long term mates also consider a man’s ability to supply resources, and may settle for poorer genes to get more resources. Dominant men tend to have more resources than prestigious men, so such men are more likely to fill both roles, being long term mates for some women and short term mates for others. Men who can offer only prestige must accept worse long term mates, while men who can offer only resources must accept few short term mates. Those low in prestige, resources, or dominance must accept no mates. A man who had prestige, dominance, and resources would get the best short and long term mates – what men are these?

Stories are biased toward dramatic events, and so are biased toward events with risky men; it is harder to tell a good story about the attraction of a resource-rich man. So stories naturally encourage short term mating. Shouldn’t this make long-term mates wary of strong mate attraction to dramatic stories?

https://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/07/cads-dads-doms.html#comment-518319076
Woman want three things: someone to fight for them (the Warrior), someone to provide for them (the Tycoon) and someone to excite their emotions or entertain them (the Wizard).

In this context,

Dom=Warrior
Dad= Tycoon
Cad= Wizard

To repeat:

Dom (Cocky)+ Dad (Generous) + Cad (Exciting/Funny) = Laid

https://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/07/cads-dads-doms.html#comment-518318987
There is an old distinction between "proximate" and "ultimate" causes. Evolution is an ultimate cause, physiology (and psychology, here) is a proximate cause. The flower bends to follow the sun because it gathers more light that way, but the immediate mechanism of the bending involves hormones called auxins. I see a lot of speculation about, say, sexual cognitive dimorphism whose ultimate cause is evolutionary, but not so much speculation about the proximate cause - the "how" of the difference, rather than the "why". And here I think a visit to an older mode of explanation like Marsden's - one which is psychological rather than genetic - can sensitize us to the fact that the proximate causes of a behavioral tendency need not be a straightforward matter of being hardwired differently.

This leads to my second point, which is just that we should remember that human beings actually possess consciousness. This means not only that the proximate cause of a behavior may deeply involve subjectivity, self-awareness, and an existential situation. It also means that all of these propositions about what people do are susceptible to change once they have been spelled out and become part of the culture. It is rather like the stock market: once everyone knows (or believes) something, then that information provides no advantage, creating an incentive for novelty.

Finally, the consequences of new beliefs about the how and the why of human nature and human behavior. Right or wrong, theories already begin to have consequences once they are taken up and incorporated into subjectivity. We really need a new Foucault to take on this topic.

The Economics of Social Status: http://www.meltingasphalt.com/the-economics-of-social-status/
Prestige vs. dominance. Joseph Henrich (of WEIRD fame) distinguishes two types of status. Prestige is the kind of status we get from being an impressive human specimen (think Meryl Streep), and it's governed by our 'approach' instincts. Dominance, on the other hand, is … [more]
things  status  hanson  thinking  comparison  len:short  anthropology  farmers-and-foragers  phalanges  ratty  duty  power  humility  hypocrisy  hari-seldon  multi  sex  gender  signaling  🐝  tradeoffs  evopsych  insight  models  sexuality  gender-diff  chart  postrat  yvain  ssc  simler  critique  essay  debate  paying-rent  gedanken  empirical  operational  vague  info-dynamics  len:long  community  henrich  long-short-run  rhetoric  contrarianism  coordination  social-structure  hidden-motives  politics  2016-election  rationality  links  study  summary  list  hive-mind  speculation  coalitions  values  🤖  metabuch  envy  universalism-particularism  egalitarianism-hierarchy  s-factor  unintended-consequences  tribalism  group-selection  justice  inequality  competition  cultural-dynamics  peace-violence  ranking  machiavelli  authoritarianism  strategy  tactics  organizing  leadership  management  n-factor  duplication  thiel  volo-avolo  todo  technocracy  rent-seeking  incentives  econotariat  marginal-rev  civilization  rot  gibbon 
september 2016 by nhaliday
Overcoming Bias : We Need The Very Rich
Why look at years-to-payback instead of return on investment? A new NBER paper on private vs. public firms makes the answer clear. Unless project gains can be very clearly proven to analysts, or perhaps so small and numerous to allow averaging over them, public firms are basically incapable of taking a loss on earnings this quarter in order to make gains several years later, no matter how big those gains. CEOs are strongly tempted to instead please analysts by grabbing higher short-term quarterly earnings. So we need the very rich to make long-term investments.
hanson  study  economics  micro  investing  finance  econometrics  business  arbitrage  len:short  efficiency  🎩  market-failure  pre-2013  long-short-run  industrial-org  entrepreneurialism  wealth  chart  ratty 
september 2016 by nhaliday
« earlier      
per page:    204080120160

bundles : dismalityeconframe

related tags

2016-election  80000-hours  absolute-relative  abstraction  academia  accretion  acm  acmtariat  adversarial  africa  aggregator  agriculture  ai  albion  algebra  algorithmic-econ  algorithms  alignment  alt-inst  altruism  amazon  analogy  analysis  analytical-holistic  anomie  anthropology  antidemos  aphorism  applicability-prereqs  applications  arbitrage  archaeology  architecture  arrows  art  article  asia  atoms  authoritarianism  automation  autor  axelrod  axioms  backup  barons  bayesian  behavioral-econ  behavioral-gen  benevolence  biases  big-peeps  big-picture  biodet  bits  books  branches  britain  broad-econ  business  c:*  c:***  caltech  canon  capital  capitalism  career  cartoons  causation  censorship  characterization  chart  checklists  chemistry  chicago  china  civic  civil-liberty  civilization  cjones-like  clarity  class  class-warfare  classic  clever-rats  clinton  cliometrics  clown-world  coalitions  cocktail  cog-psych  cohesion  cold-war  collaboration  comics  commentary  communication  communism  community  comparison  compensation  competition  complement-substitute  complex-systems  complexity  composition-decomposition  computation  concept  conceptual-vocab  confluence  confounding  conquest-empire  context  contracts  contrarianism  convergence  convexity-curvature  cool  cooperate-defect  coordination  corporation  correlation  corruption  cost-benefit  cost-disease  counter-revolution  counterfactual  course  cracker-econ  creative  crime  criminal-justice  criminology  critique  crooked  crux  cultural-dynamics  culture  culture-war  current-events  curvature  cycles  cynicism-idealism  dark-arts  data  data-science  database  debate  debt  decision-making  decision-theory  defense  definite-planning  definition  degrees-of-freedom  democracy  demographics  density  dental  dependence-independence  descriptive  detail-architecture  developing-world  differential  direct-indirect  discrimination  discussion  disease  distribution  diversity  drama  dropbox  drugs  duplication  duty  dysgenics  early-modern  econ-metrics  econ-productivity  econometrics  economics  econotariat  eden  education  effect-size  effective-altruism  efficiency  egalitarianism-hierarchy  EGT  elections  electromag  elite  embodied  emotion  empirical  encyclopedic  endo-exo  endogenous-exogenous  ends-means  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  entertainment  entrepreneurialism  environment  envy  epistemic  equilibrium  error  essay  estimate  ethics  europe  evidence  evidence-based  evolution  evopsych  examples  existence  exit-voice  expansionism  expectancy  expert  expert-experience  explanans  explanation  exploratory  exposition  externalities  facebook  farmers-and-foragers  fashun  FDA  fermi  fertility  feudal  feynman  fiction  field-study  film  finance  flexibility  flux-stasis  formal-values  free-riding  frequency  fungibility-liquidity  gallic  game-theory  games  garett-jones  gedanken  gender  gender-diff  general-survey  genetics  genomics  geography  germanic  giants  gibbon  gilens-page  gnon  god-man-beast-victim  google  gotchas  government  grad-school  gray-econ  group-selection  growth  growth-econ  GT-101  guilt-shame  hanson  hari-seldon  hate  healthcare  heavy-industry  henrich  heterodox  hi-order-bits  hidden-motives  higher-ed  history  hive-mind  hmm  hn  homepage  homo-hetero  honor  housing  hsu  human-bean  human-capital  humility  hypocrisy  ideas  identity  identity-politics  ideology  idk  impro  incentives  india  industrial-org  inequality  info-dynamics  info-econ  info-foraging  information-theory  init  innovation  input-output  insight  institutions  insurance  integration-extension  integrity  interdisciplinary  interests  internet  interpretation  intersection  intersection-connectedness  intervention  interview  intricacy  intuition  investigative-journo  investing  iron-age  israel  iteration-recursion  jargon  journos-pundits  justice  knowledge  korea  krugman  kumbaya-kult  labor  language  larry-summers  latin-america  lattice  law  leadership  learning  lecture-notes  left-wing  legacy  len:long  len:short  lens  lesswrong  let-me-see  letters  leviathan  lifehack  limits  linear-algebra  linearity  liner-notes  links  list  literature  local-global  logic  lol  long-short-run  long-term  longform  longitudinal  love-hate  lower-bounds  machiavelli  machine-learning  macro  madisonian  magnitude  malaise  management  manifolds  map-territory  maps  marginal  marginal-rev  market-failure  market-power  marketing  markets  martial  matching  math  math.CA  math.GR  math.NT  math.RT  measure  measurement  mechanism-design  media  medicine  medieval  mediterranean  MENA  meta:medicine  meta:war  metabuch  metameta  methodology  metrics  micro  microbiz  microfoundations  migrant-crisis  migration  military  miri-cfar  mit  mobile  mobility  models  modernity  mokyr-allen-mccloskey  monetary-fiscal  money  money-for-time  morality  mostly-modern  multi  music-theory  mutation  n-factor  nascent-state  nationalism-globalism  natural-experiment  near-far  network-structure  neuro  news  nibble  nl-and-so-can-you  noahpinion  noblesse-oblige  nonlinearity  nordic  north-weingast-like  null-result  numerics  obama  objektbuch  old-anglo  open-closed  operational  optimism  optimization  order-disorder  ORFE  org:biz  org:bv  org:data  org:econlib  org:edu  org:fin  org:health  org:junk  org:lite  org:local  org:mag  org:med  org:nat  org:ngo  org:popup  org:rec  organizing  outcome-risk  p:someday  paleocon  papers  paradox  parallax  parasites-microbiome  parenting  pareto  patho-altruism  patience  paul-romer  paying-rent  pdf  peace-violence  people  personal-finance  phalanges  phd  philosophy  physics  piracy  planning  plots  poast  polanyi-marx  policy  polis  polisci  political-econ  politics  poll  pop-diff  population  populism  postmortem  postrat  power  power-law  pre-2013  pre-ww2  prediction  preference-falsification  prejudice  preprint  prioritizing  priors-posteriors  pro-rata  probability  problem-solving  prof  proofs  propaganda  property-rights  proposal  pseudoE  psychology  public-goodish  q-n-a  qra  quantitative-qualitative  quantum  quixotic  quotes  race  randy-ayndy  ranking  rationality  ratty  reading  realness  realpolitik  recommendations  recruiting  reddit  redistribution  reduction  reference  reflection  regularizer  regulation  relativity  religion  rent-seeking  research-program  review  revolution  rhetoric  right-wing  robust  roots  rot  russia  s-factor  s:*  s:**  sales  sampling-bias  sanctity-degradation  sapiens  scale  scholar  science  scitariat  securities  security  selection  self-interest  sequential  sex  sexuality  shift  signal-noise  signaling  simler  simulation  sinosphere  skeleton  sleuthin  slides  social  social-capital  social-choice  social-norms  social-psych  social-science  social-structure  sociality  society  sociology  spearhead  speculation  speedometer  spock  sports  spreading  ssc  stackex  stagnation  stanford  stat-mech  stats  status  stock-flow  stories  strategy  straussian  stream  street-fighting  structure  study  stylized-facts  subculture  sulla  summary  supply-demand  survey  sv  synthesis  tactics  taxes  tcs  tech  technocracy  technology  telos-atelos  temperance  terrorism  tetlock  the-bones  the-classics  the-devil  the-great-west-whale  the-watchers  the-world-is-just-atoms  theory-of-mind  theory-practice  theos  thermo  thiel  things  thinking  time  time-preference  time-series  time-use  todo  tools  top-n  topics  topology  traces  track-record  trade  tradeoffs  trends  tribalism  trivia  troll  trump  trust  truth  tv  twitter  unaffiliated  uncertainty  unintended-consequences  uniqueness  unit  universalism-particularism  urban  urban-rural  usa  vague  values  vampire-squid  variance-components  via:rseymour  video  visual-understanding  visualization  volo-avolo  von-neumann  walls  war  wealth  wealth-of-nations  welfare-state  westminster  white-paper  wiki  winner-take-all  winter-2017  within-group  wonkish  world  world-war  X-not-about-Y  yoga  yvain  zeitgeist  zero-positive-sum  zooming  🌞  🎓  🎩  🐝  👳  🖥  🤖  🦉 

Copy this bookmark:



description:


tags: