nhaliday + judgement + tribalism   16

The Determinants of Trust
Both individual experiences and community characteristics influence how much people trust each other. Using data drawn from US localities we find that the strongest factors that reduce trust are: i) a recent history of traumatic experiences, even though the passage of time reduces this effect fairly rapidly; ii) belonging to a group that historically felt discriminated against, such as minorities (black in particular) and, to a lesser extent, women; iii) being economically unsuccessful in terms of income and education; iv) living in a racially mixed community and/or in one with a high degree of income disparity. Religious beliefs and ethnic origins do not significantly affect trust. The latter result may be an indication that the American melting pot at least up to a point works, in terms of homogenizing attitudes of different cultures, even though racial cleavages leading to low trust are still quite high.

Understanding Trust: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13387
In this paper we resolve this puzzle by recognizing that trust has two components: a belief-based one and a preference based one. While the sender's behavior reflects both, we show that WVS-like measures capture mostly the belief-based component, while questions on past trusting behavior are better at capturing the preference component of trust.

MEASURING TRUST: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/laibson/files/measuring_trust.pdf
We combine two experiments and a survey to measure trust and trustworthiness— two key components of social capital. Standard attitudinal survey questions about trust predict trustworthy behavior in our experiments much better than they predict trusting behavior. Trusting behavior in the experiments is predicted by past trusting behavior outside of the experiments. When individuals are closer socially, both trust and trustworthiness rise. Trustworthiness declines when partners are of different races or nationalities. High status individuals are able to elicit more trustworthiness in others.

What is Social Capital? The Determinants of Trust and Trustworthiness: http://www.nber.org/papers/w7216
Using a sample of Harvard undergraduates, we analyze trust and social capital in two experiments. Trusting behavior and trustworthiness rise with social connection; differences in race and nationality reduce the level of trustworthiness. Certain individuals appear to be persistently more trusting, but these people do not say they are more trusting in surveys. Survey questions about trust predict trustworthiness not trust. Only children are less trustworthy. People behave in a more trustworthy manner towards higher status individuals, and therefore status increases earnings in the experiment. As such, high status persons can be said to have more social capital.

Trust and Cheating: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18509
We find that: i) both parties to a trust exchange have implicit notions of what constitutes cheating even in a context without promises or messages; ii) these notions are not unique - the vast majority of senders would feel cheated by a negative return on their trust/investment, whereas a sizable minority defines cheating according to an equal split rule; iii) these implicit notions affect the behavior of both sides to the exchange in terms of whether to trust or cheat and to what extent. Finally, we show that individual's notions of what constitutes cheating can be traced back to two classes of values instilled by parents: cooperative and competitive. The first class of values tends to soften the notion while the other tightens it.

Nationalism and Ethnic-Based Trust: Evidence from an African Border Region: https://u.osu.edu/robinson.1012/files/2015/12/Robinson_NationalismTrust-1q3q9u1.pdf
These results offer microlevel evidence that a strong and salient national identity can diminish ethnic barriers to trust in diverse societies.

One Team, One Nation: Football, Ethnic Identity, and Conflict in Africa: http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/SI2017/DEV/Durante_Depetris-Chauvin.pdf
Do collective experiences that prime sentiments of national unity reduce interethnic tensions and conflict? We examine this question by looking at the impact of national football teams’ victories in sub-Saharan Africa. Combining individual survey data with information on over 70 official matches played between 2000 and 2015, we find that individuals interviewed in the days after a victory of their country’s national team are less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity and more likely to trust people of other ethnicities than those interviewed just before. The effect is sizable and robust and is not explained by generic euphoria or optimism. Crucially, national victories do not only affect attitudes but also reduce violence. Indeed, using plausibly exogenous variation from close qualifications to the Africa Cup of Nations, we find that countries that (barely) qualified experience significantly less conflict in the following six months than countries that (barely) did not. Our findings indicate that, even where ethnic tensions have deep historical roots, patriotic shocks can reduce inter-ethnic tensions and have a tangible impact on conflict.

Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?: http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/HHPW.pdf
We identify three families of mechanisms that link diversity to public goods provision—–what we term “preferences,” “technology,” and “strategy selection” mechanisms—–and run a series of experimental games that permit us to compare the explanatory power of distinct mechanisms within each of these three families. Results from games conducted with a random sample of 300 subjects from a slum neighborhood of Kampala, Uganda, suggest that successful public goods provision in homogenous ethnic communities can be attributed to a strategy selection mechanism: in similar settings, co-ethnics play cooperative equilibria, whereas non-co-ethnics do not. In addition, we find evidence for a technology mechanism: co-ethnics are more closely linked on social networks and thus plausibly better able to support cooperation through the threat of social sanction. We find no evidence for prominent preference mechanisms that emphasize the commonality of tastes within ethnic groups or a greater degree of altruism toward co-ethnics, and only weak evidence for technology mechanisms that focus on the impact of shared ethnicity on the productivity of teams.

does it generalize to first world?

Higher Intelligence Groups Have Higher Cooperation Rates in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp8499.html
The initial cooperation rates are similar, it increases in the groups with higher intelligence to reach almost full cooperation, while declining in the groups with lower intelligence. The difference is produced by the cumulation of small but persistent differences in the response to past cooperation of the partner. In higher intelligence subjects, cooperation after the initial stages is immediate and becomes the default mode, defection instead requires more time. For lower intelligence groups this difference is absent. Cooperation of higher intelligence subjects is payoff sensitive, thus not automatic: in a treatment with lower continuation probability there is no difference between different intelligence groups

Why societies cooperate: https://voxeu.org/article/why-societies-cooperate
Three attributes are often suggested to generate cooperative behaviour – a good heart, good norms, and intelligence. This column reports the results of a laboratory experiment in which groups of players benefited from learning to cooperate. It finds overwhelming support for the idea that intelligence is the primary condition for a socially cohesive, cooperative society. Warm feelings towards others and good norms have only a small and transitory effect.

individual payoff, etc.:

Trust, Values and False Consensus: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18460
Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more (less) trustworthy individuals form more optimistic (pessimistic) trust beliefs - and that this tendency continues to color trust beliefs after several rounds of game-play. Moreover, we show that one's own type/trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing. In a second closely-related experiment, we show the economic impact of mis-calibrated trust beliefs stemming from false consensus. Miscalibrated beliefs lower participants' experimental trust game earnings by about 20 percent on average.

The Right Amount of Trust: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15344
We investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance. We find that individual income is hump-shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs. Our interpretation is that highly trusting individuals tend to assume too much social risk and to be cheated more often, ultimately performing less well than those with a belief close to the mean trustworthiness of the population. On the other hand, individuals with overly pessimistic beliefs avoid being cheated, but give up profitable opportunities, therefore underperforming. The cost of either too much or too little trust is comparable to the income lost by forgoing college.

...

This framework allows us to show that income-maximizing trust typically exceeds the trust level of the average person as well as to estimate the distribution of income lost to trust mistakes. We find that although a majority of individuals has well calibrated beliefs, a non-trivial proportion of the population (10%) has trust beliefs sufficiently poorly calibrated to lower income by more than 13%.

Do Trust and … [more]
study  economics  alesina  growth-econ  broad-econ  trust  cohesion  social-capital  religion  demographics  race  diversity  putnam-like  compensation  class  education  roots  phalanges  general-survey  multi  usa  GT-101  conceptual-vocab  concept  behavioral-econ  intricacy  composition-decomposition  values  descriptive  correlation  harvard  field-study  migration  poll  status  🎩  🌞  chart  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  psychology  social-psych  sociology  cooperate-defect  justice  egalitarianism-hierarchy  inequality  envy  n-factor  axelrod  pdf  microfoundations  nationalism-globalism  africa  intervention  counter-revolution  tribalism  culture  society  ethnocentrism  coordination  world  developing-world  innovation  econ-productivity  government  stylized-facts  madisonian  wealth-of-nations  identity-politics  public-goodish  s:*  legacy  things  optimization  curvature  s-factor  success  homo-hetero  higher-ed  models  empirical  contracts  human-capital  natural-experiment  endo-exo  data  scale  trade  markets  time  supply-demand  summary 
august 2017 by nhaliday
Defection – quas lacrimas peperere minoribus nostris!
https://quaslacrimas.wordpress.com/2017/06/28/discussion-of-defection/

Kindness Against The Grain: https://srconstantin.wordpress.com/2017/06/08/kindness-against-the-grain/
I’ve heard from a number of secular-ish sources (Carse, Girard, Arendt) that the essential contribution of Christianity to human thought is the concept of forgiveness. (Ribbonfarm also has a recent post on the topic of forgiveness.)

I have never been a Christian and haven’t even read all of the New Testament, so I’ll leave it to commenters to recommend Christian sources on the topic.

What I want to explore is the notion of kindness without a smooth incentive gradient.

The Social Module: https://bloodyshovel.wordpress.com/2015/10/09/the-social-module/
Now one could propose that the basic principle of human behavior is to raise the SP number. Sure there’s survival and reproduction. Most people would forget all their socialization if left hungry and thirsty for days in the jungle. But more often than not, survival and reproduction depend on being high status; having a good name among your peers is the best way to get food, housing and hot mates.

The way to raise one’s SP number depends on thousands of different factors. We could grab most of them and call them “culture”. In China having 20 teenage mistresses as an old man raises your SP; in Western polite society it is social death. In the West making a fuss about disobeying one’s parents raises your SP, everywhere else it lowers it a great deal. People know that; which is why bureaucrats in China go to great lengths to acquire a stash of young women (who they seldom have time to actually enjoy), while teenagers in the West go to great lengths to be annoying to their parents for no good reason.

...

It thus shouldn’t surprise us that something as completely absurd as Progressivism is the law of the land in most of the world today, even though it denies obvious reality. It is not the case that most people know that progressive points are all bogus, but obey because of fear or cowardice. No, an average human brain has much more neurons being used to scan the social climate and see how SP are allotted, than neurons being used to analyze patterns in reality to ascertain the truth. Surely your brain does care a great deal about truth in some very narrow areas of concern to you. Remember Conquest’s first law: Everybody is Conservative about what he knows best. You have to know the truth about what you do, if you are to do it effectively.

But you don’t really care about truth anywhere else. And why would you? It takes time and effort you can’t really spare, and it’s not really necessary. As long as you have some area of specialization where you can make a living, all the rest you must do to achieve survival and reproduction is to raise your SP so you don’t get killed and your guts sacrificed to the mountain spirits.

SP theory (I accept suggestions for a better name) can also explains the behavior of leftists. Many conservatives of a medium level of enlightenment point out the paradox that leftists historically have held completely different ideas. Leftism used to be about the livelihood of industrial workers, now they agitate about the environment, or feminism, or foreigners. Some people would say that’s just historical change, or pull a No True Scotsman about this or that group not being really leftists. But that’s transparent bullshit; very often we see a single person shifting from agitating about Communism and worker rights, to agitate about global warming or rape culture.

...

The leftist strategy could be defined as “psychopathic SP maximization”. Leftists attempt to destroy social equilibrium so that they can raise their SP number. If humans are, in a sense, programmed to constantly raise their status, well high status people by definition can’t raise it anymore (though they can squabble against each other for marginal gains), their best strategy is to freeze society in place so that they can enjoy their superiority. High status people by definition have power, and thus social hierarchy during human history tends to be quite stable.

This goes against the interests of many. First of all the lower status people, who, well, want to raise their status, but can’t manage to do so. And it also goes against the interests of the particularly annoying members of the upper class who want to raise their status on the margin. Conservative people can be defined as those who, no matter the absolute level, are in general happy with it. This doesn’t mean they don’t want higher status (by definition all humans do), but the output of other brain modules may conclude that attempts to raise SP might threaten one’s survival and reproduction; or just that the chances of raising one’s individual SP is hopeless, so one might as well stay put.

...

You can’t blame people for being logically inconsistent; because they can’t possibly know anything about all these issues. Few have any experience or knowledge about evolution and human races, or about the history of black people to make an informed judgment on HBD. Few have time to learn about sex differences, and stuff like the climate is as close to unknowable as there is. Opinions about anything but a very narrow area of expertise are always output of your SP module, not any judgment of fact. People don’t know the facts. And even when they know; I mean most people have enough experience with sex differences and black dysfunction to be quite confident that progressive ideas are false. But you can never be sure. As Hume said, the laws of physics are a judgment of habit; who is to say that a genie isn’t going to change all you know the next morning? At any rate, you’re always better off toeing the line, following the conventional wisdom, and keeping your dear SP. Perhaps you can even raise them a bit. And that is very nice. It is niceness itself.

Leftism is just an easy excuse: https://bloodyshovel.wordpress.com/2015/03/01/leftism-is-just-an-easy-excuse/
Unless you’re not the only defector. You need a way to signal your intention to defect, so that other disloyal fucks such as yourself (and they’re bound to be others) can join up, thus reducing the likely costs of defection. The way to signal your intention to defect is to come up with a good excuse. A good excuse to be disloyal becomes a rallying point through which other defectors can coordinate and cover their asses so that the ruling coalition doesn’t punish them. What is a good excuse?

Leftism is a great excuse. Claiming that the ruling coalition isn’t leftist enough, isn’t holy enough, not inclusive enough of women, of blacks, of gays, or gorillas, of pedophiles, of murderous Salafists, is the perfect way of signalling your disloyalty towards the existing power coalition. By using the existing ideology and pushing its logic just a little bit, you ensure that the powerful can’t punish you. At least not openly. And if you’re lucky, the mass of disloyal fucks in the ruling coalition might join your banner, and use your exact leftist point to jump ship and outflank the powerful.

...

The same dynamic fuels the flattery inflation one sees in monarchical or dictatorial systems. In Mao China, if you want to defect, you claim to love Mao more than your boss. In Nazi Germany, you proclaim your love for Hitler and the great insight of his plan to take Stalingrad. In the Roman Empire, you claimed that Caesar is a God, son of Hercules, and those who deny it are treacherous bastards. In Ancient Persia you loudly proclaimed your faith in the Shah being the brother of the Sun and the Moon and King of all Kings on Earth. In Reformation Europe you proclaimed that you have discovered something new in the Bible and everybody else is damned to hell. Predestined by God!

...

And again: the precise content of the ideological point doesn’t matter. Your human brain doesn’t care about ideology. Humans didn’t evolve to care about Marxist theory of class struggle, or about LGBTQWERTY theories of social identity. You just don’t know what it means. It’s all abstract points you’ve been told in a classroom. It doesn’t actually compute. Nothing that anybody ever said in a political debate ever made any actual, concrete sense to a human being.

So why do we care so much about politics? What’s the point of ideology? Ideology is just the water you swim in. It is a structured database of excuses, to be used to signal your allegiance or defection to the existing ruling coalition. Ideology is just the feed of the rationalization Hamster that runs incessantly in that corner of your brain. But it is immaterial, and in most cases actually inaccessible to the logical modules in your brain.

Nobody ever acts on their overt ideological claims if they can get away with it. Liberals proclaim their faith in the potential of black children while clustering in all white suburbs. Communist party members loudly talk about the proletariat while being hedonistic spenders. Al Gore talks about Global Warming while living in a lavish mansion. Cognitive dissonance, you say? No; those cognitive systems are not connected in the first place.

...

And so, every little step in the way, power-seekers moved the consensus to the left. And open societies, democratic systems are by their decentralized nature, and by the size of their constituencies, much more vulnerable to this sort of signalling attacks. It is but impossible to appraise and enforce the loyalty of every single individual involved in a modern state. There’s too many of them. A Medieval King had a better chance of it; hence the slow movement of ideological innovation in those days. But the bigger the organization, the harder it is to gather accurate information of the loyalty of the whole coalition; and hence the ideological movement accelerates. And there is no stopping it.

Like the Ancients, We Have Gods. They’ll Get Greater: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2018/04/like-the-ancients-we-have-gods-they-may-get… [more]
gnon  commentary  critique  politics  polisci  strategy  tactics  thinking  GT-101  game-theory  cooperate-defect  hypocrisy  institutions  incentives  anthropology  morality  ethics  formal-values  ideology  schelling  equilibrium  multi  links  debate  ethnocentrism  cultural-dynamics  decision-making  socs-and-mops  anomie  power  info-dynamics  propaganda  signaling  axelrod  organizing  impetus  democracy  antidemos  duty  coalitions  kinship  religion  christianity  theos  n-factor  trust  altruism  noble-lie  japan  asia  cohesion  reason  scitariat  status  fashun  history  mostly-modern  world-war  west-hunter  sulla  unintended-consequences  iron-age  china  sinosphere  stories  leviathan  criminal-justice  peace-violence  nihil  wiki  authoritarianism  egalitarianism-hierarchy  cocktail  ssc  parable  open-closed  death  absolute-relative  justice  management  explanans  the-great-west-whale  occident  orient  courage  vitality  domestication  revolution  europe  pop-diff  alien-character  diversity  identity-politics  westminster  kumbaya-kult  cultu 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Logic | West Hunter
All the time I hear some public figure saying that if we ban or allow X, then logically we have to ban or allow Y, even though there are obvious practical reasons for X and obvious practical reasons against Y.

No, we don’t.

http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/005864.html
http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/002053.html

compare: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:190b299cf04a

Small Change Good, Big Change Bad?: https://www.overcomingbias.com/2018/02/small-change-good-big-change-bad.html
And on reflection it occurs to me that this is actually THE standard debate about change: some see small changes and either like them or aren’t bothered enough to advocate what it would take to reverse them, while others imagine such trends continuing long enough to result in very large and disturbing changes, and then suggest stronger responses.

For example, on increased immigration some point to the many concrete benefits immigrants now provide. Others imagine that large cumulative immigration eventually results in big changes in culture and political equilibria. On fertility, some wonder if civilization can survive in the long run with declining population, while others point out that population should rise for many decades, and few endorse the policies needed to greatly increase fertility. On genetic modification of humans, some ask why not let doctors correct obvious defects, while others imagine parents eventually editing kid genes mainly to max kid career potential. On oil some say that we should start preparing for the fact that we will eventually run out, while others say that we keep finding new reserves to replace the ones we use.

...

If we consider any parameter, such as typical degree of mind wandering, we are unlikely to see the current value as exactly optimal. So if we give people the benefit of the doubt to make local changes in their interest, we may accept that this may result in a recent net total change we don’t like. We may figure this is the price we pay to get other things we value more, and we we know that it can be very expensive to limit choices severely.

But even though we don’t see the current value as optimal, we also usually see the optimal value as not terribly far from the current value. So if we can imagine current changes as part of a long term trend that eventually produces very large changes, we can become more alarmed and willing to restrict current changes. The key question is: when is that a reasonable response?

First, big concerns about big long term changes only make sense if one actually cares a lot about the long run. Given the usual high rates of return on investment, it is cheap to buy influence on the long term, compared to influence on the short term. Yet few actually devote much of their income to long term investments. This raises doubts about the sincerity of expressed long term concerns.

Second, in our simplest models of the world good local choices also produce good long term choices. So if we presume good local choices, bad long term outcomes require non-simple elements, such as coordination, commitment, or myopia problems. Of course many such problems do exist. Even so, someone who claims to see a long term problem should be expected to identify specifically which such complexities they see at play. It shouldn’t be sufficient to just point to the possibility of such problems.

...

Fourth, many more processes and factors limit big changes, compared to small changes. For example, in software small changes are often trivial, while larger changes are nearly impossible, at least without starting again from scratch. Similarly, modest changes in mind wandering can be accomplished with minor attitude and habit changes, while extreme changes may require big brain restructuring, which is much harder because brains are complex and opaque. Recent changes in market structure may reduce the number of firms in each industry, but that doesn’t make it remotely plausible that one firm will eventually take over the entire economy. Projections of small changes into large changes need to consider the possibility of many such factors limiting large changes.

Fifth, while it can be reasonably safe to identify short term changes empirically, the longer term a forecast the more one needs to rely on theory, and the more different areas of expertise one must consider when constructing a relevant model of the situation. Beware a mere empirical projection into the long run, or a theory-based projection that relies on theories in only one area.

We should very much be open to the possibility of big bad long term changes, even in areas where we are okay with short term changes, or at least reluctant to sufficiently resist them. But we should also try to hold those who argue for the existence of such problems to relatively high standards. Their analysis should be about future times that we actually care about, and can at least roughly foresee. It should be based on our best theories of relevant subjects, and it should consider the possibility of factors that limit larger changes.

And instead of suggesting big ways to counter short term changes that might lead to long term problems, it is often better to identify markers to warn of larger problems. Then instead of acting in big ways now, we can make sure to track these warning markers, and ready ourselves to act more strongly if they appear.

Growth Is Change. So Is Death.: https://www.overcomingbias.com/2018/03/growth-is-change-so-is-death.html
I see the same pattern when people consider long term futures. People can be quite philosophical about the extinction of humanity, as long as this is due to natural causes. Every species dies; why should humans be different? And few get bothered by humans making modest small-scale short-term modifications to their own lives or environment. We are mostly okay with people using umbrellas when it rains, moving to new towns to take new jobs, etc., digging a flood ditch after our yard floods, and so on. And the net social effect of many small changes is technological progress, economic growth, new fashions, and new social attitudes, all of which we tend to endorse in the short run.

Even regarding big human-caused changes, most don’t worry if changes happen far enough in the future. Few actually care much about the future past the lives of people they’ll meet in their own life. But for changes that happen within someone’s time horizon of caring, the bigger that changes get, and the longer they are expected to last, the more that people worry. And when we get to huge changes, such as taking apart the sun, a population of trillions, lifetimes of millennia, massive genetic modification of humans, robots replacing people, a complete loss of privacy, or revolutions in social attitudes, few are blasé, and most are quite wary.

This differing attitude regarding small local changes versus large global changes makes sense for parameters that tend to revert back to a mean. Extreme values then do justify extra caution, while changes within the usual range don’t merit much notice, and can be safely left to local choice. But many parameters of our world do not mostly revert back to a mean. They drift long distances over long times, in hard to predict ways that can be reasonably modeled as a basic trend plus a random walk.

This different attitude can also make sense for parameters that have two or more very different causes of change, one which creates frequent small changes, and another which creates rare huge changes. (Or perhaps a continuum between such extremes.) If larger sudden changes tend to cause more problems, it can make sense to be more wary of them. However, for most parameters most change results from many small changes, and even then many are quite wary of this accumulating into big change.

For people with a sharp time horizon of caring, they should be more wary of long-drifting parameters the larger the changes that would happen within their horizon time. This perspective predicts that the people who are most wary of big future changes are those with the longest time horizons, and who more expect lumpier change processes. This prediction doesn’t seem to fit well with my experience, however.

Those who most worry about big long term changes usually seem okay with small short term changes. Even when they accept that most change is small and that it accumulates into big change. This seems incoherent to me. It seems like many other near versus far incoherences, like expecting things to be simpler when you are far away from them, and more complex when you are closer. You should either become more wary of short term changes, knowing that this is how big longer term change happens, or you should be more okay with big long term change, seeing that as the legitimate result of the small short term changes you accept.

https://www.overcomingbias.com/2018/03/growth-is-change-so-is-death.html#comment-3794966996
The point here is the gradual shifts of in-group beliefs are both natural and no big deal. Humans are built to readily do this, and forget they do this. But ultimately it is not a worry or concern.

But radical shifts that are big, whether near or far, portend strife and conflict. Either between groups or within them. If the shift is big enough, our intuition tells us our in-group will be in a fight. Alarms go off.
west-hunter  scitariat  discussion  rant  thinking  rationality  metabuch  critique  systematic-ad-hoc  analytical-holistic  metameta  ideology  philosophy  info-dynamics  aphorism  darwinian  prudence  pragmatic  insight  tradition  s:*  2016  multi  gnon  right-wing  formal-values  values  slippery-slope  axioms  alt-inst  heuristic  anglosphere  optimate  flux-stasis  flexibility  paleocon  polisci  universalism-particularism  ratty  hanson  list  examples  migration  fertility  intervention  demographics  population  biotech  enhancement  energy-resources  biophysical-econ  nature  military  inequality  age-generation  time  ideas  debate  meta:rhetoric  local-global  long-short-run  gnosis-logos  gavisti  stochastic-processes  eden-heaven  politics  equilibrium  hive-mind  genetics  defense  competition  arms  peace-violence  walter-scheidel  speed  marginal  optimization  search  time-preference  patience  futurism  meta:prediction  accuracy  institutions  tetlock  theory-practice  wire-guided  priors-posteriors  distribution  moments  biases  epistemic  nea 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Readings: The Gods of the Copybook Headings
When the Cambrian measures were forming, They promised perpetual peace.
They swore, if we gave them our weapons, that the wars of the tribes would cease.
But when we disarmed They sold us and delivered us bound to our foe,
And the Gods of the Copybook Headings said: "Stick to the Devil you know."

On the first Feminian Sandstones we were promised the Fuller Life
(Which started by loving our neighbour and ended by loving his wife)
Till our women had no more children and the men lost reason and faith,
And the Gods of the Copybook Headings said: "The Wages of Sin is Death."

In the Carboniferous Epoch we were promised abundance for all,
By robbing selected Peter to pay for collective Paul;
But, though we had plenty of money, there was nothing our money could buy,
And the Gods of the Copybook Headings said: "If you don't work you die."

Then the Gods of the Market tumbled, and their smooth-tongued wizards withdrew
And the hearts of the meanest were humbled and began to believe it was true
That All is not Gold that Glitters, and Two and Two make Four —
And the Gods of the Copybook Headings limped up to explain it once more.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

As it will be in the future, it was at the birth of Man —
There are only four things certain since Social Progress began: —
That the Dog returns to his Vomit and the Sow returns to her Mire,
And the burnt Fool's bandaged finger goes wabbling back to the Fire;

And that after this is accomplished, and the brave new world begins
When all men are paid for existing and no man must pay for his sins,
As surely as Water will wet us, as surely as Fire will burn,
The Gods of the Copybook Headings with terror and slaughter return!
gnon  isteveish  commentary  big-peeps  literature  poetry  values  virtu  britain  anglosphere  optimate  aristos  org:junk  prudence  paleocon  old-anglo  albion  hate  darwinian  tradition  pre-ww2  prejudice  morality  gender  sex  sexuality  fertility  demographic-transition  rot  aphorism  communism  labor  egalitarianism-hierarchy  no-go  volo-avolo  war  peace-violence  tribalism  universalism-particularism  us-them  life-history  capitalism  redistribution  flux-stasis  reason  pessimism  markets  unintended-consequences  religion  christianity  theos  nascent-state  envy  civil-liberty  sanctity-degradation  yarvin  degrees-of-freedom  civilization  paying-rent  realness  truth  westminster  duty  responsibility  cynicism-idealism  tradeoffs  s:**  new-religion  deep-materialism  2018  the-basilisk  order-disorder  eden-heaven  janus  utopia-dystopia  love-hate  afterlife  judgement 
april 2017 by nhaliday
Educational Romanticism & Economic Development | pseudoerasmus
https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/852339296358940672
deleeted

https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/943238170312929280
https://archive.is/p5hRA

Did Nations that Boosted Education Grow Faster?: http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2012/10/did_nations_tha.html
On average, no relationship. The trendline points down slightly, but for the time being let's just call it a draw. It's a well-known fact that countries that started the 1960's with high education levels grew faster (example), but this graph is about something different. This graph shows that countries that increased their education levels did not grow faster.

Where has all the education gone?: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1016.2704&rep=rep1&type=pdf

https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/948052794681966593
https://archive.is/kjxqp

https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/950952412503822337
https://archive.is/3YPic

https://twitter.com/pseudoerasmus/status/862961420065001472
http://hanushek.stanford.edu/publications/schooling-educational-achievement-and-latin-american-growth-puzzle

The Case Against Education: What's Taking So Long, Bryan Caplan: http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2015/03/the_case_agains_9.html

The World Might Be Better Off Without College for Everyone: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/01/whats-college-good-for/546590/
Students don't seem to be getting much out of higher education.
- Bryan Caplan

College: Capital or Signal?: http://www.economicmanblog.com/2017/02/25/college-capital-or-signal/
After his review of the literature, Caplan concludes that roughly 80% of the earnings effect from college comes from signalling, with only 20% the result of skill building. Put this together with his earlier observations about the private returns to college education, along with its exploding cost, and Caplan thinks that the social returns are negative. The policy implications of this will come as very bitter medicine for friends of Bernie Sanders.

Doubting the Null Hypothesis: http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/doubting-the-null-hypothesis/

Is higher education/college in the US more about skill-building or about signaling?: https://www.quora.com/Is-higher-education-college-in-the-US-more-about-skill-building-or-about-signaling
ballpark: 50% signaling, 30% selection, 20% addition to human capital
more signaling in art history, more human capital in engineering, more selection in philosophy

Econ Duel! Is Education Signaling or Skill Building?: http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2016/03/econ-duel-is-education-signaling-or-skill-building.html
Marginal Revolution University has a brand new feature, Econ Duel! Our first Econ Duel features Tyler and me debating the question, Is education more about signaling or skill building?

Against Tulip Subsidies: https://slatestarcodex.com/2015/06/06/against-tulip-subsidies/

https://www.overcomingbias.com/2018/01/read-the-case-against-education.html

https://nintil.com/2018/02/05/notes-on-the-case-against-education/

https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2018-02-19-0000/bryan-caplan-case-against-education-review

https://spottedtoad.wordpress.com/2018/02/12/the-case-against-education/
Most American public school kids are low-income; about half are non-white; most are fairly low skilled academically. For most American kids, the majority of the waking hours they spend not engaged with electronic media are at school; the majority of their in-person relationships are at school; the most important relationships they have with an adult who is not their parent is with their teacher. For their parents, the most important in-person source of community is also their kids’ school. Young people need adult mirrors, models, mentors, and in an earlier era these might have been provided by extended families, but in our own era this all falls upon schools.

Caplan gestures towards work and earlier labor force participation as alternatives to school for many if not all kids. And I empathize: the years that I would point to as making me who I am were ones where I was working, not studying. But they were years spent working in schools, as a teacher or assistant. If schools did not exist, is there an alternative that we genuinely believe would arise to draw young people into the life of their community?

...

It is not an accident that the state that spends the least on education is Utah, where the LDS church can take up some of the slack for schools, while next door Wyoming spends almost the most of any state at $16,000 per student. Education is now the one surviving binding principle of the society as a whole, the one black box everyone will agree to, and so while you can press for less subsidization of education by government, and for privatization of costs, as Caplan does, there’s really nothing people can substitute for it. This is partially about signaling, sure, but it’s also because outside of schools and a few religious enclaves our society is but a darkling plain beset by winds.

This doesn’t mean that we should leave Caplan’s critique on the shelf. Much of education is focused on an insane, zero-sum race for finite rewards. Much of schooling does push kids, parents, schools, and school systems towards a solution ad absurdum, where anything less than 100 percent of kids headed to a doctorate and the big coding job in the sky is a sign of failure of everyone concerned.

But let’s approach this with an eye towards the limits of the possible and the reality of diminishing returns.

https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2018/01/27/poison-ivy-halls/
https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2018/01/27/poison-ivy-halls/#comment-101293
The real reason the left would support Moander: the usual reason. because he’s an enemy.

https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2018/02/01/bright-college-days-part-i/
I have a problem in thinking about education, since my preferences and personal educational experience are atypical, so I can’t just gut it out. On the other hand, knowing that puts me ahead of a lot of people that seem convinced that all real people, including all Arab cabdrivers, think and feel just as they do.

One important fact, relevant to this review. I don’t like Caplan. I think he doesn’t understand – can’t understand – human nature, and although that sometimes confers a different and interesting perspective, it’s not a royal road to truth. Nor would I want to share a foxhole with him: I don’t trust him. So if I say that I agree with some parts of this book, you should believe me.

...

Caplan doesn’t talk about possible ways of improving knowledge acquisition and retention. Maybe he thinks that’s impossible, and he may be right, at least within a conventional universe of possibilities. That’s a bit outside of his thesis, anyhow. Me it interests.

He dismisses objections from educational psychologists who claim that studying a subject improves you in subtle ways even after you forget all of it. I too find that hard to believe. On the other hand, it looks to me as if poorly-digested fragments of information picked up in college have some effect on public policy later in life: it is no coincidence that most prominent people in public life (at a given moment) share a lot of the same ideas. People are vaguely remembering the same crap from the same sources, or related sources. It’s correlated crap, which has a much stronger effect than random crap.

These widespread new ideas are usually wrong. They come from somewhere – in part, from higher education. Along this line, Caplan thinks that college has only a weak ideological effect on students. I don’t believe he is correct. In part, this is because most people use a shifting standard: what’s liberal or conservative gets redefined over time. At any given time a population is roughly half left and half right – but the content of those labels changes a lot. There’s a shift.

https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2018/02/01/bright-college-days-part-i/#comment-101492
I put it this way, a while ago: “When you think about it, falsehoods, stupid crap, make the best group identifiers, because anyone might agree with you when you’re obviously right. Signing up to clear nonsense is a better test of group loyalty. A true friend is with you when you’re wrong. Ideally, not just wrong, but barking mad, rolling around in your own vomit wrong.”
--
You just explained the Credo quia absurdum doctrine. I always wondered if it was nonsense. It is not.
--
Someone on twitter caught it first – got all the way to “sliding down the razor blade of life”. Which I explained is now called “transitioning”

What Catholics believe: https://theweek.com/articles/781925/what-catholics-believe
We believe all of these things, fantastical as they may sound, and we believe them for what we consider good reasons, well attested by history, consistent with the most exacting standards of logic. We will profess them in this place of wrath and tears until the extraordinary event referenced above, for which men and women have hoped and prayed for nearly 2,000 years, comes to pass.

https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2018/02/05/bright-college-days-part-ii/
According to Caplan, employers are looking for conformity, conscientiousness, and intelligence. They use completion of high school, or completion of college as a sign of conformity and conscientiousness. College certainly looks as if it’s mostly signaling, and it’s hugely expensive signaling, in terms of college costs and foregone earnings.

But inserting conformity into the merit function is tricky: things become important signals… because they’re important signals. Otherwise useful actions are contraindicated because they’re “not done”. For example, test scores convey useful information. They could help show that an applicant is smart even though he attended a mediocre school – the same role they play in college admissions. But employers seldom request test scores, and although applicants may provide them, few do. Caplan says ” The word on the street… [more]
econotariat  pseudoE  broad-econ  economics  econometrics  growth-econ  education  human-capital  labor  correlation  null-result  world  developing-world  commentary  spearhead  garett-jones  twitter  social  pic  discussion  econ-metrics  rindermann-thompson  causation  endo-exo  biodet  data  chart  knowledge  article  wealth-of-nations  latin-america  study  path-dependence  divergence  🎩  curvature  microfoundations  multi  convexity-curvature  nonlinearity  hanushek  volo-avolo  endogenous-exogenous  backup  pdf  people  policy  monetary-fiscal  wonkish  cracker-econ  news  org:mag  local-global  higher-ed  impetus  signaling  rhetoric  contrarianism  domestication  propaganda  ratty  hanson  books  review  recommendations  distribution  externalities  cost-benefit  summary  natural-experiment  critique  rent-seeking  mobility  supply-demand  intervention  shift  social-choice  government  incentives  interests  q-n-a  street-fighting  objektbuch  X-not-about-Y  marginal-rev  c:***  qra  info-econ  info-dynamics  org:econlib  yvain  ssc  politics  medicine  stories 
april 2017 by nhaliday
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, by James Fitzjames Stephen
https://archive.org/stream/libertyequality00stepgoog
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/stephen-liberty-equality-fraternity-lf-ed

ὲδύ τι θαραλέαιξ
τὸν μακρὸν τείνειν βίον έλπίσι, φαγαɩ̑ξ
θνμὸν ὰλδαίνονσαν εύφροσύναιξ
φρίσσω δέ σε δερκομέγ’α
μνρίοιξ& μόθοιξ& διακναιόμενον.
Ζε͂να γὰρ ού& τρομέων
ένίδία γνώμη σέβει
θνατοὺξ ἄγαν, Προμηθεῠ
Prom. Vinct. 535–542

Sweet is the life that lengthens,
While joyous hope still strengthens,
And glad, bright thought sustain;
But shuddering I behold thee,
The sorrows that enfold thee
And all thine endless pain.
For Zeus thou has despised;
Thy fearless heart misprized
All that his vengeance can,
The wayward will obeying,
Excess of honour paying,
Prometheus, unto man.
Prometheus Bound (translated by G. M. Cookson)

Dedication

I. The Doctrine of Liberty in General

II. The Liberty of Thought and Discussion

III. The Distinction Between the Temporal and Spiritual Power

IV. The Doctrine of Liberty in Its Application to Morals

V. Equality

VI. Fraternity

The general result of all this is, that fraternity, mere love for the human race, is not fitted in itself to be a religion. That is to say, it is not fitted to take command of the human faculties, to give them their direction, and to assign to one faculty a rank in comparison with others which but for such interference it would not have.

I might have arrived at this result by a shorter road, for I might have pointed out that the most elementary notions of religion imply that no one human faculty or passion can ever in itself be a religion. It can but be one among many competitors. If human beings are left to themselves, their faculties, their wishes, and their passions will find a level of some sort or other. They will produce some common course of life and some social arrangement. Alter the relative strength of particular passions, and you will alter the social result, but religion means a great deal more than this. It means the establishment and general recognition of some theory about human life in general, about the relation of men to each other and to the world, by which their conduct may be determined. Every religion must contain an element of fact, real or supposed, as well as an element of feeling, and the element of fact is the one which in the long run will determine the nature and importance of the element of feeling. The following are specimens of religions, stated as generally as possible, but still with sufficient exactness to show my meaning.
I. The statements made in the Apostles' Creed are true. Believe them, and govern yourselves accordingly.
2. There is one God, and Mahomet is the prophet of God. Do as Mahomet tells you.
3. All existence is an evil, from which, if you knew your own mind, you would wish to be delivered. Such and such a course of life will deliver you most speedily from the misery of existence.
4. An infinitely powerful supreme God arranged all of you whom I address in castes, each with its own rule of life. You will be fearfully punished in all sorts of ways if you do not live according to your caste rules. Also all nature is full of invisible powers more or 1ess connected with natural objects, which must be worshipped and propitiated.

All these are religions in the proper sense of the word. Each of the four theories expressed in these few words is complete in itself. It states propositions which are either true or false, but which, if true, furnish a complete practical guide for life. No such statement of what Mr. Mill calls the ultimate sanction of the morals of utility is possible. You cannot get more than this out of it: "Love all mankind." "Influences are at work which at some remote time will make men love each other." These are respectively a piece pf advice and a prophecy, but they are not religions. If a man does not take the advice or believe in the prophecy, they pass by him idly. They have no power at all in invitos, and the great mass of men have always been inviti, or at the very least indifferent, with respect to all religions whatever. In order to make such maxims as these into religions, they must be coupled with some statement of fact about mankind and human life, which those who accept them as religions must be prepared to affirm to be true.

What statement of the sort is it possible to make? "The human race is an enormous agglomeration of bubbles which are continually bursting and ceasing to be. No one made it or knows anything worth knowlhg about it. Love it dearly, oh ye bubbles." This is a sort of religion, no doubt, but it seems to me a very silly one. "Eat and drink, for to-morrow ye die;" "Be not righteous overmuch, why shouldest thou destroy thyself?"

Huc vina et unguenta et nimiurn brevis
Flores amoenos ferre jube rosae,
Dum res et aetas et Sororum
Fila trium patiuntur atra.
...
Omnes eodem cogimur.

These are also religions, and, if true, they are, I think, infinitely more rational than the bubble theory.

...

As a matter of historical fact, no really considerable body of men either is, ever has been, or ever has professed to be Christian in the sense of taking the philanthropic passages of the four Gospels as the sole, exclusive, and complete guide of their lives. If they did, they would in sober earnest turn the world upside down. They would be a set of passionate Communists, breaking down every approved maxim of conduct and every human institution. In one word, if Christianity really is what much of the language which we often hear used implies, it is false and mischievous. Nothing can be more monstrous than a sweeping condemnation of mankind for not conforming their conduct to an ideal which they do not really acknowledge. When, for instance, we are told that it is dreadful to think that a nation pretending to believe the Sermon on the Mount should employ so many millions sterling per annum on military expenditure, the answer is that no sane nation ever did or ever will pretend to believe the Sermon on the Mount in any sense which is inconsistent with the maintenance to the very utmost by force of arms of the national independence, honour, and interest. If the Sermon on the Mount really means to forbid this, it ought to be disregarded.

VII. Conclusion

Note on Utilitarianism

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/947867371225665537
https://archive.is/WN38J
"Some people profess that the Sermon on the Mount is the only part of Christianity which they can accept. It is to me the hardest part to accept."

—James Fitzjames Stephen

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/914358533948428288
https://archive.is/qUh78
This distinguished philosopher was one day passing along a narrow footpath which formerly winded through a boggy piece of ground at the back of Edinburgh Castle, when he had the misfortune to tumble in, and stick fast in the mud. Observing a woman approaching, he civilly requested her to lend him a helping hand out of his disagreeable situation; but she, casting one hurried glance at his abbreviated figure, passed on, without regarding his request. He then shouted lustily after her; and she was at last prevailed upon by his cries to approach. “Are na ye Hume the Deist?” inquired she, in a tone which implied that an answer in the affirmative would decide her against lending him her assistance. “Well, well,” said Mr Hume, “no matter: you know, good woman, Christian charity commands you to do good, even to your enemies.” “Christian charity here, Christian charity there,” replied the woman, “I’ll do naething for ye till ye tum a Christian yoursell: ye maun first repeat baith the Lord’s Prayer and the Creed, or faith I’ll let ye groffle there as I faund ye.” The sceptic was actually obliged to accede to the woman’s terms, ere she would give him her help. He himself used to tell the story with great relish.

https://twitter.com/avermeule/status/917105006205177856
https://archive.is/I4SAT
A counterfactual world in which Mill is taught only as a foil for J.F. Stephen, Hart as a foil for Devlin, and Kelsen as a foil for Schmitt.
books  essay  philosophy  politics  polisci  right-wing  gnon  rhetoric  contrarianism  wonkish  ideology  critique  justice  civil-liberty  inequality  egalitarianism-hierarchy  europe  gallic  britain  big-peeps  social-norms  values  unaffiliated  aristos  multi  backup  envy  prudence  patho-altruism  us-them  old-anglo  optimate  antidemos  formal-values  statesmen  hate  pre-ww2  prejudice  s:*  religion  morality  ethics  theos  christianity  classic  canon  letters  tradition  🎩  history  early-modern  anglosphere  twitter  social  pic  quotes  commentary  tribalism  self-interest  discussion  journos-pundits  gedanken  aphorism  counter-revolution  people  list  top-n  law  rot  zeitgeist  gender  sex  sexuality  axioms  military  defense  poetry  the-classics  reason  humility  org:junk  org:ngo  randy-ayndy  interests  slippery-slope  noble-lie  martial  asia  creative  explanans  science  innovation  the-great-west-whale  occident  sinosphere  orient  n-factor  courage  vitality  curiosity  novelty  nietzschean 
january 2017 by nhaliday
Tocqueville on Mexico | Marginal Restoration
The Constitution of the United States resembles those beautiful creations of human industry which insure wealth and renown to their inventors, but which are profitless in other hands. This truth is exemplified by the condition of Mexico at the present time. The Mexicans were desirous of establishing a federal system, and they took the Federal Constitution of their neighbors, the Anglo-Americans, as their model, and copied it entirely. But although they had borrowed the letter of the law, they could not introduce the spirit and the sense which give it life. They were involved in ceaseless embarrassments by the mechanism of their double government; the sovereignty of the States and that of the Union perpetually exceeded their respective privileges, and came into collision; and to the present day Mexico is alternately the victim of anarchy and the slave of military despotism. … To the south, the Union has a point of contact with the empire of Mexico; and it is thence that serious hostilities may one day be expected to arise. But for a long while to come, the uncivilized state of the Mexican people, the depravity of their morals, and their extreme poverty, will prevent that country from ranking high amongst nations.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1824_Constitution_of_Mexico

Influences from the United States on the Mexican Constitution of 1824: http://sci-hub.tw/http://www.jstor.org/stable/40167747

Beyond the indirect influence of Americans on the shaping of the Mexican constitution was the fact that its draftsmen made extensive adaptations from the American instrument of 1787. In some parts theConstitution of 1824 was almost a transcript of its Philadelphia prototype, but viewed in the whole it was not a slavish copy. Much substance and many particular provisions were taken from the liberal Spanish Constitution of 1812.37 Although the Mexican lawmakers may have reposed a naive faith in the American system, they certainly altered the borrowed provisions to fit the peculiar situation in their own country. A comparison of the two documents will demonstrate this.

In certain broad aspects the two constitutions were strikingly similar.38 The basic principle of a confederation of semi-sovereign states into a single political entity - with a balance of power between executive, legislative, and judicial departments - was the same in both Moreover, each charter expressed the same general aspirations toward liberalism in providing for the advancement of education and science the establishment of patents and copyrights, the freedom of the press, and the abolition of such abuses in the administration of justice as torture, confiscation of property, ex post facto laws, search and seizure without a warrant, conviction without proper legal procedure, and imprisonment on mere suspicion. The Mexican constitution, however, did not guarantee the peculiarly Anglo-American institution of trial by jury.

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/901528359313735680
Mar 6, 1882, Sen James George:

If it were true (which I deny) that this bill is in conflict with the logic of the political theories in regard to the rights of mankind, which have heretofore prevailed in this country, that is no insuperable objection to its passage. I do not deny that every measure should be weighed and considered in the light of accepted and recognized principles, but I do deny that every measure, however necessary to the welfare and the happiness of the people of the United States, however accordant to the teachings of experience and history, should be condemned because it conflicts with the theories of a speculative and Utopian scheme for the administration of the affairs of this world.

Our Government has attained its present astonishing grandeur and vigor because it is the result of the growth and development of Anglo-Saxon ideas, put into practical operation by Anglo-Saxon common sense. It has not grown according to a rule prescribed by an inexorable logic, reasoning from premises which assumed an ideal perfection in human nature and attainable in human institutions. Our Constitution is the work of men, intended for the government of men, not of angels or demi-gods. It recognizes human frailties and human passions, and seeks no unattainable perfection. It was made by the American people for themselves and their posterity, not for the human race. It was ordained by the American people for their own happiness and their own welfare, and the welfare of such others as they should choose of their own free will to admit to American citizenship. That our institutions are stable; that they attain the ends of good government-security to life, liberty, and property, the progress and happiness of the American people; that they can stand any strain, however great, occasioned by unlocked-for and calamitous emergencies, is because they were evolved and were modified as circumstances demanded, and were not the result of the a priori reasonings of political theorists."

But even more striking than the similarities were the differences. The most significant of these were in the provisions that defined church-state relations, and in those that outlined the powers of the president. A foundation-stone of the American system was the guarantee of freedom of religious thought and worship. Although the United States Constitution contained no expression of this principle, the First Amendment in 1 79 1 specified that Congress could make no law respecting "the establishment of religion" or the prohibition of worship. In direct contrast was Article III of the Mexican Constitution, which read: "The religion of the Mexican Nation is, and shall be perpetually, the Apostolic Roman Catholic. The Nation protects it by wise and just laws, and prohibits the exercise of any other." Purity of religion had been one of the tenets of the Plan of Iguala in 1821, and this fact rendered it difficult if not impossible to omit such a provision in the Constitution of 1824.

Because they had experienced the evils of a weak central authority under the Articles of Confederation, the founding fathers of 1787 invested the office of president with strong powers. Exactly the reverse was true in Mexico in 1824. The Mexican framers had before them the example of the dictatorial rule of Iturbide, and consequently they hedged the executive office with restrictions so that the incumbent could not legally exercise extreme power. As in the American system, the Mexican president would serve four years; but unlike his northern counterpart he could neither succeed himself nor again hold the office until four years had elapsed. He was designated commander-in-chief of the national forces, but could not command in person without the consent of the federal legislature. His "regulations, decrees, and orders" were not effective until signed by the secretary of the department to be governed by them, and he had no appointive power over the courts. The judges of the Supreme Court of Mexico were to be elected by the majority vote of the state legislatures.

related: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:f6ee8773e981
(Greg mentioned common law in one interview)

https://twitter.com/NoamJStein/status/952598279359000582
https://archive.is/D68Vm
https://archive.is/GcsWK
https://archive.is/kJMAa
it's not even a hypothetical: newly independent Latin Americans in the 19th century copied the US constitution, sometimes word for word. didn't work, obviously

The word "Institutions" has become a form of stopthink.
quotes  developing-world  polisci  anglosphere  wonkish  latin-america  early-modern  big-peeps  hive-mind  unaffiliated  universalism-particularism  right-wing  madisonian  aristos  gnon  wealth-of-nations  antidemos  old-anglo  statesmen  pre-ww2  tocqueville  civilization  microfoundations  axioms  alien-character  nascent-state  multi  twitter  social  commentary  migration  usa  us-them  tribalism  prudence  prejudice  institutions  law  wiki  pdf  piracy  study  article  history  letters  revolution  roots  attaq  democracy  comparison  pragmatic  systematic-ad-hoc  discussion  backup  econotariat  garett-jones  spearhead  acemoglu  orwellian  culture  meta:rhetoric  debate  natural-experiment  the-founding  flexibility  judgement 
december 2016 by nhaliday
Overcoming Bias : Two Kinds Of Status
prestige and dominance

More here. I was skeptical at first, but now am convinced: humans see two kinds of status, and approve of prestige-status much more than domination-status. I’ll have much more to say about this in the coming days, but it is far from clear to me that prestige-status is as much better than domination-status as people seem to think. Efforts to achieve prestige-status also have serious negative side-effects.

Two Ways to the Top: Evidence That Dominance and Prestige Are Distinct Yet Viable Avenues to Social Rank and Influence: https://henrich.fas.harvard.edu/files/henrich/files/cheng_et_al_2013.pdf
Dominance (the use of force and intimidation to induce fear) and Prestige (the sharing of expertise or know-how to gain respect)

...

According to the model, Dominance initially arose in evolutionary history as a result of agonistic contests for material resources and mates that were common among nonhuman species, but continues to exist in contemporary human societies, largely in the form of psychological intimidation, coercion, and wielded control over costs and benefits (e.g., access to resources, mates, and well-being). In both humans and nonhumans, Dominance hierarchies are thought to emerge to help maintain patterns of submission directed from subordinates to Dominants, thereby minimizing agonistic battles and incurred costs.

In contrast, Prestige is likely unique to humans, because it is thought to have emerged from selection pressures to preferentially attend to and acquire cultural knowledge from highly skilled or successful others, a capacity considered to be less developed in other animals (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Laland & Galef, 2009). In this view, social learning (i.e., copying others) evolved in humans as a low-cost fitness-maximizing, information-gathering mechanism (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Once it became adaptive to copy skilled others, a preference for social models with better than average information would have emerged. This would promote competition for access to the highest quality models, and deference toward these models in exchange for copying and learning opportunities. Consequently, selection likely favored Prestige differentiation, with individuals possessing high-quality information or skills elevated to the top of the hierarchy. Meanwhile, other individuals may reach the highest ranks of their group’s hierarchy by wielding threat of force, regardless of the quality of their knowledge or skills. Thus, Dominance and Prestige can be thought of as coexisting avenues to attaining rank and influence within social groups, despite being underpinned by distinct motivations and behavioral patterns, and resulting in distinct patterns of imitation and deference from subordinates.

Importantly, both Dominance and Prestige are best conceptualized as cognitive and behavioral strategies (i.e., suites of subjective feelings, cognitions, motivations, and behavioral patterns that together produce certain outcomes) deployed in certain situations, and can be used (with more or less success) by any individual within a group. They are not types of individuals, or even, necessarily, traits within individuals. Instead, we assume that all situated dyadic relationships contain differential degrees of both Dominance and Prestige, such that each person is simultaneously Dominant and Prestigious to some extent, to some other individual. Thus, it is possible that a high degree of Dominance and a high degree of Prestige may be found within the same individual, and may depend on who is doing the judging. For example, by controlling students’ access to rewards and punishments, school teachers may exert Dominance in their relationships with some students, but simultaneously enjoy Prestige with others, if they are respected and deferred to for their competence and wisdom. Indeed, previous studies have shown that based on both self- and peer ratings, Dominance and Prestige are largely independent (mean r = -.03; Cheng et al., 2010).

Status Hypocrisy: https://www.overcomingbias.com/2017/01/status-hypocrisy.html
Today we tend to say that our leaders have prestige, while their leaders have dominance. That is, their leaders hold power via personal connections and the threat and practice of violence, bribes, sex, gossip, and conformity pressures. Our leaders, instead, mainly just have whatever abilities follow from our deepest respect and admiration regarding their wisdom and efforts on serious topics that matter for us all. Their leaders more seek power, while ours more have leadership thrust upon them. Because of this us/them split, we tend to try to use persuasion on us, but force on them, when seeking to to change behaviors.

...

Clearly, while there is some fact of the matter about how much a person gains their status via licit or illicit means, there is also a lot of impression management going on. We like to give others the impression that we personally mainly want prestige in ourselves and our associates, and that we only grant others status via the prestige they have earned. But let me suggest that, compared to this ideal, we actually want more dominance in ourselves and our associates than we like to admit, and we submit more often to dominance.

Cads, Dads, Doms: https://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/07/cads-dads-doms.html
"The proper dichotomy is not “virile vs. wimpy” as has been supposed, but “exciting vs. drab,” with the former having the two distinct sub-groups “macho man vs. pretty boy.” Another way to see that this is the right dichotomy is to look around the world: wherever girls really dig macho men, they also dig the peacocky musician type too, finding safe guys a bit boring. And conversely, where devoted dads do the best, it’s more difficult for macho men or in-town-for-a-day rockstars to make out like bandits. …

Whatever it is about high-pathogen-load areas that selects for greater polygynous behavior … will result in an increase in both gorilla-like and peacock-like males, since they’re two viable ways to pursue a polygynous mating strategy."

This fits with there being two kinds of status: dominance and prestige. Macho men, such as CEOs and athletes, have dominance, while musicians and artists have prestige. But women seek both short and long term mates. Since both kinds of status suggest good genes, both attract women seeking short term mates. This happens more when women are younger and richer, and when there is more disease. Foragers pretend they don’t respect dominance as much as they do, so prestigious men get more overt attention, while dominant men get more covert attention.

Women seeking long term mates also consider a man’s ability to supply resources, and may settle for poorer genes to get more resources. Dominant men tend to have more resources than prestigious men, so such men are more likely to fill both roles, being long term mates for some women and short term mates for others. Men who can offer only prestige must accept worse long term mates, while men who can offer only resources must accept few short term mates. Those low in prestige, resources, or dominance must accept no mates. A man who had prestige, dominance, and resources would get the best short and long term mates – what men are these?

Stories are biased toward dramatic events, and so are biased toward events with risky men; it is harder to tell a good story about the attraction of a resource-rich man. So stories naturally encourage short term mating. Shouldn’t this make long-term mates wary of strong mate attraction to dramatic stories?

https://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/07/cads-dads-doms.html#comment-518319076
Woman want three things: someone to fight for them (the Warrior), someone to provide for them (the Tycoon) and someone to excite their emotions or entertain them (the Wizard).

In this context,

Dom=Warrior
Dad= Tycoon
Cad= Wizard

To repeat:

Dom (Cocky)+ Dad (Generous) + Cad (Exciting/Funny) = Laid

https://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/07/cads-dads-doms.html#comment-518318987
There is an old distinction between "proximate" and "ultimate" causes. Evolution is an ultimate cause, physiology (and psychology, here) is a proximate cause. The flower bends to follow the sun because it gathers more light that way, but the immediate mechanism of the bending involves hormones called auxins. I see a lot of speculation about, say, sexual cognitive dimorphism whose ultimate cause is evolutionary, but not so much speculation about the proximate cause - the "how" of the difference, rather than the "why". And here I think a visit to an older mode of explanation like Marsden's - one which is psychological rather than genetic - can sensitize us to the fact that the proximate causes of a behavioral tendency need not be a straightforward matter of being hardwired differently.

This leads to my second point, which is just that we should remember that human beings actually possess consciousness. This means not only that the proximate cause of a behavior may deeply involve subjectivity, self-awareness, and an existential situation. It also means that all of these propositions about what people do are susceptible to change once they have been spelled out and become part of the culture. It is rather like the stock market: once everyone knows (or believes) something, then that information provides no advantage, creating an incentive for novelty.

Finally, the consequences of new beliefs about the how and the why of human nature and human behavior. Right or wrong, theories already begin to have consequences once they are taken up and incorporated into subjectivity. We really need a new Foucault to take on this topic.

The Economics of Social Status: http://www.meltingasphalt.com/the-economics-of-social-status/
Prestige vs. dominance. Joseph Henrich (of WEIRD fame) distinguishes two types of status. Prestige is the kind of status we get from being an impressive human specimen (think Meryl Streep), and it's governed by our 'approach' instincts. Dominance, on the other hand, is … [more]
things  status  hanson  thinking  comparison  len:short  anthropology  farmers-and-foragers  phalanges  ratty  duty  power  humility  hypocrisy  hari-seldon  multi  sex  gender  signaling  🐝  tradeoffs  evopsych  insight  models  sexuality  gender-diff  chart  postrat  yvain  ssc  simler  critique  essay  debate  paying-rent  gedanken  empirical  operational  vague  info-dynamics  len:long  community  henrich  long-short-run  rhetoric  contrarianism  coordination  social-structure  hidden-motives  politics  2016-election  rationality  links  study  summary  list  hive-mind  speculation  coalitions  values  🤖  metabuch  envy  universalism-particularism  egalitarianism-hierarchy  s-factor  unintended-consequences  tribalism  group-selection  justice  inequality  competition  cultural-dynamics  peace-violence  ranking  machiavelli  authoritarianism  strategy  tactics  organizing  leadership  management  n-factor  duplication  thiel  volo-avolo  todo  technocracy  rent-seeking  incentives  econotariat  marginal-rev  civilization  rot  gibbon 
september 2016 by nhaliday
Trust Issues | West Hunter
Imagine how we would have dealt with Japanese-Americans in 1942 if we had been informed by modern sensibilities.

Our stated and enforced policy would have been based on the notion that both Issei and Nisei were perfectly trustworthy, no more likely to aid the Empire of Japan than the Dutch in Grand Rapids

So we would have drafted them into the armed forces just like anyone else, and employed them where their skills seemed useful. We would have had them translating Japanese navy intercepts: we were short on Japanese-language translators, so why not? There would have been a bunch of them working with Hypo, down in the basement. Some would have worked in the Manhattan Project. They would have had jobs in the OSS, in the FBI. What could possibly have gone wrong?

...

Our actual response was suboptimal: people who knew the score (J. Edgar Hoover) thought that putting the Japanese into camps was a mistake. Watching and infiltrating known pro-Nippon groups, punishing those that actually committed crimes was perfectly feasible; combined with reasonable discretion in assigning Japanese to useful but nonclassified jobs, you would have a policy that was more effective than the one we actually pursued.

Locking them up (except in Hawaii !), wasn’t the best course, but it was a million times more sensible than what we would do today. Because in 1942, Americans weren’t crazy: today, they are.

https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2013/10/01/who-can-you-trust/
Could you trust Chinese immigrants? Mostly not. Chinese Americans? Certainly not all of them. But then, what do you do with them?

Let them go home? This issue has come up before. The Feds locked up H. S. Tsien [Qian Xuesen] back in the 50s because they thought he was pro-Chinese and would aid the Chinese rocket program. When they finally let him go, that’s exactly what he did.

There have been many cases in which key individuals have been allowed to go home and fight with their homies, due to chivalry or some other form of stupidity. in 1861, the Feds let many officers go home and fight for the Confederacy. Radomir Putnik, chief of the Serbian general staff, was taking the waters in Austria when the First World War broke out. They let him go home – were they ever sorry! Gernot Zippe, an Austrian POW in a Siberian camp, built a workable centrifuge for separating isotopes. Yet, to my lasting surprise, the Soviets let him go in 1956. He became the Johnny Appleseed of nuclear proliferation [along with Eisenhower – Atoms for Peace].

jfc, Eisenhower: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atoms_for_Peace
Atoms for Peace created the ideological background for the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, but also gave political cover for the U.S. nuclear weapons build-up, and the backdrop to the Cold War arms race. Under Atoms for Peace related programs the U.S. exported over 25 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to 30 countries, mostly to fuel research reactors, which is now regarded as a proliferation and terrorism risk. The Soviet Union also exported over 11 tons of HEU under a similar program.[8]

lmao: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weixian_Internment_Camp
The compound was a Japanese-run internment camp created during World War II to keep civilians of Allied countries living in Northern China. The camp's population included British, Canadian, American, Australian and other citizens who were forced to stay in the camp for nearly two and a half years until American forces liberated them on August 17, 1945.[1] Information on Weixian has been learned through papers, diaries, official reports and letters written by internees, family members, and other people affected.

...

During World War II, the Allies were at war with Japan. The Japanese invaded most of the area from the Aleutian Islands in the far North to the Southern regions of New Guinea, and from Western Burma to the Mid Pacific Ocean.[2] Japan historically invaded China on July 7, 1937, which began the second Sino-Japanese War.[3] Overall, the Japanese held approximately 125,000 civilian prisoners or internees. Of those 125,000 civilian internees, 10% were in China and Hong Kong throughout the war.[2] Many allied civilians, mostly Americans and British, lived in some of the Japanese-occupied areas and were forced to relocate themselves into internment camps. The Japanese called these Internment camps Civilian Assembly Centers. In these camps, death rates were high because of the lack of good sanitation, starvation, and poor treatment. There were the occasional executions and some internees suffered cruelty and torture.
politics  culture-war  tribalism  rhetoric  foreign-policy  contrarianism  gnon  right-wing  west-hunter  japan  asia  history  mostly-modern  realpolitik  rant  meta:war  crooked  duty  trust  clown-world  signaling  europe  germanic  russia  eastern-europe  putnam-like  expression-survival  order-disorder  free-riding  scitariat  nationalism-globalism  ethnocentrism  patho-altruism  defense  westminster  zeitgeist  us-them  world-war  intel  kumbaya-kult  cynicism-idealism  china  migration  sinosphere  discrimination  multi  the-bones  rot  realness  prudence  hate  identity-politics  is-ought  scifi-fantasy  prejudice  gedanken  self-interest  property-rights  technology  nuclear  arms  spreading  space  early-modern  pre-ww2  revolution  war  usa  the-south  error  communism  track-record  people  statesmen  wiki  deterrence  diaspora  attaq  interests  old-anglo  big-peeps  reflection  judgement 
august 2016 by nhaliday
OSF | Answering Unresolved Questions about the Relationship between Cognitive Ability and Prejudice
Previous research finds that lower cognitive ability predicts greater prejudice (Onraet et al., 2015). We test two unresolved questions about this association using a heterogeneous set of target groups and data from a representative sample of the United States (N=5914). First, we test “who are the targets of prejudice?” We replicate prior negative associations between cognitive ability and prejudice for groups who are perceived as liberal, unconventional, and having lower levels of choice over group membership. We find the opposite(i.e. positive associations), however, for groups perceived as conservative, conventional, and having higher levels of choice over group membership. Second, we test “who shows intergroup bias?” and find that people with both relatively higher and lower levels of cognitive ability show approximately equal levels of intergroup bias, but towards different sets of groups.

https://twitter.com/thomasjwood/status/907707395081752580
https://archive.is/eeqJw
@democracyfund data: @realDonaldTrump and @HillaryClinton voters' evaluations of social groups

Education is Related to Greater Ideological Prejudice: https://academic.oup.com/poq/article-abstract/81/4/930/4652248
Decades of research have shown that education reduces individuals’ prejudices toward people who belong to different groups, but this research has focused predominantly on prejudice toward ethnic/racial groups, immigrant groups, and general nonconformists. However, it is not clear whether education reduces other prejudices against groups along different dimensions, including ideological identification. An analysis of American National Election Studies data from 1964 to 2012 shows that education is related to decreases in interethnic/interracial prejudice, but also to increases in ideological (liberal vs. conservative) prejudice. This finding could not be explained simply by the greater polarization of the American electorate in the past twenty years. The results require rethinking how and why education is associated with reduced prejudice for certain groups but not others.
psychology  study  iq  anthropology  race  politics  field-study  stereotypes  correlation  tribalism  discrimination  us-them  poll  prejudice  polarization  coalitions  identity-politics  ideology  data  visualization  crosstab  religion  christianity  theos  corporation  military  protestant-catholic  class  class-warfare  labor  other-xtian  gender  redistribution  welfare-state  migration  islam  sex  sexuality  asia  latin-america  patho-altruism  ethnocentrism  chart  multi  twitter  social  commentary  emotion  values  trump  clinton  2016-election  backup  pic  phalanges  database  general-survey  polisci  education  higher-ed  human-capital  preprint  hari-seldon  judgement 
july 2016 by nhaliday

bundles : coordpatternssoft

related tags

2016-election  :/  ability-competence  absolute-relative  abstraction  academia  accuracy  acemoglu  additive  advertising  africa  afterlife  age-generation  agri-mindset  albion  alesina  alien-character  alignment  alt-inst  altruism  analogy  analytical-holistic  anglo  anglosphere  anomie  anthropology  antidemos  aphorism  arbitrage  aristos  arms  article  ascetic  asia  attaq  audio  authoritarianism  autism  automation  axelrod  axioms  backup  behavioral-econ  benevolence  biases  big-peeps  biodet  biophysical-econ  biotech  books  bounded-cognition  branches  britain  broad-econ  business  c:***  canada  canon  capitalism  career  causation  charity  chart  cheatsheet  checklists  china  christianity  civic  civil-liberty  civilization  class  class-warfare  classic  climate-change  clinton  clown-world  coalitions  cocktail  cog-psych  cohesion  collaboration  coming-apart  commentary  communism  community  comparison  compensation  competition  complement-substitute  composition-decomposition  concept  conceptual-vocab  conquest-empire  contracts  contradiction  contrarianism  convexity-curvature  cooperate-defect  coordination  core-rats  corporation  correlation  corruption  cost-benefit  counter-revolution  counterfactual  courage  cracker-econ  creative  crime  criminal-justice  criminology  critique  crooked  crosstab  cultural-dynamics  culture  culture-war  curiosity  current-events  curvature  cynicism-idealism  dark-arts  darwinian  data  database  death  debate  debt  decision-making  deep-materialism  defense  definite-planning  degrees-of-freedom  democracy  demographic-transition  demographics  dennett  descriptive  detail-architecture  deterrence  developing-world  developmental  diaspora  direct-indirect  direction  discipline  discrimination  discussion  disease  distribution  divergence  diversity  domestication  douthatish  drama  duplication  duty  early-modern  eastern-europe  econ-metrics  econ-productivity  econometrics  economics  econotariat  eden  eden-heaven  education  EEA  efficiency  egalitarianism-hierarchy  EGT  elections  elite  embedded-cognition  embodied  emergent  emotion  empirical  ems  endo-exo  endogenous-exogenous  ends-means  energy-resources  enhancement  entertainment  environment  envy  epistemic  equilibrium  error  essay  estimate  ethics  ethnocentrism  europe  evidence-based  evopsych  examples  existence  expert-experience  explanans  explore-exploit  expression-survival  externalities  farmers-and-foragers  fashun  fermi  fertility  fiction  field-study  finance  fitness  flexibility  flux-stasis  foreign-lang  foreign-policy  formal-values  free-riding  futurism  gallic  game-theory  garett-jones  gavisti  gedanken  gender  gender-diff  general-survey  generalization  genetics  germanic  gibbon  gnon  gnosis-logos  god-man-beast-victim  google  government  grad-school  gray-econ  group-selection  growth-econ  GT-101  GWAS  gwern  hanson  hanushek  hard-tech  hari-seldon  harvard  hate  health  henrich  heterodox  heuristic  hidden-motives  higher-ed  history  hive-mind  homo-hetero  honor  housing  human-capital  humility  hypocrisy  ideas  identity-politics  ideology  iidness  illusion  impact  impetus  impro  incentives  individualism-collectivism  industrial-org  inequality  inference  info-dynamics  info-econ  infographic  innovation  input-output  insight  institutions  integrity  intel  intelligence  interests  internet  intervention  interview  intricacy  intuition  iq  iron-age  is-ought  islam  isteveish  iteration-recursion  janus  japan  jargon  journos-pundits  judgement  justice  kinship  knowledge  kumbaya-kult  labor  language  latin-america  law  leadership  learning  left-wing  legacy  legibility  len:long  len:short  lens  letters  leviathan  lexical  life-history  links  list  literature  local-global  lol  long-short-run  long-term  love-hate  machiavelli  macro  madisonian  magnitude  malaise  management  managerial-state  map-territory  marginal  marginal-rev  market-failure  markets  markov  martial  matching  math  meaningness  measurement  medicine  mediterranean  mena4  meta:medicine  meta:prediction  meta:rhetoric  meta:war  metabuch  metameta  methodology  metrics  micro  microfoundations  migrant-crisis  migration  military  mobility  models  modernity  moments  monetary-fiscal  money  morality  mostly-modern  multi  n-factor  nascent-state  nationalism-globalism  natural-experiment  nature  near-far  neurons  new-religion  news  nietzschean  nihil  no-go  noble-lie  noblesse-oblige  nonlinearity  nordic  novelty  nuclear  null-result  objective-measure  objektbuch  occident  old-anglo  open-closed  operational  opioids  optimate  optimism  optimization  order-disorder  org:anglo  org:econlib  org:junk  org:mag  org:med  org:ngo  org:popup  organizing  orient  orwellian  other-xtian  paleocon  parable  parallax  parasites-microbiome  parenting  parsimony  path-dependence  patho-altruism  patience  paying-rent  pdf  peace-violence  people  personality  persuasion  pessimism  phalanges  philosophy  pic  piracy  planning  poast  podcast  poetry  polarization  policy  polisci  politics  poll  pop-diff  population  postrat  power  pragmatic  pre-ww2  preference-falsification  prejudice  preprint  presentation  priors-posteriors  privacy  problem-solving  propaganda  property-rights  proposal  protestant-catholic  prudence  pseudoE  psych-architecture  psychology  psychometrics  public-goodish  putnam-like  q-n-a  qra  quality  quantitative-qualitative  quixotic  quotes  race  randy-ayndy  ranking  rant  rat-pack  rationality  ratty  realness  realpolitik  reason  recommendations  recruiting  red-queen  redistribution  reference  reflection  regulation  religion  rent-seeking  responsibility  retention  review  revolution  rhetoric  right-wing  rigidity  rigor  rindermann-thompson  risk  robust  roots  rot  russia  s-factor  s:*  s:**  s:***  sanctity-degradation  sapiens  scale  schelling  science  scifi-fantasy  scitariat  search  self-interest  self-report  sex  sexuality  shift  sib-study  signal-noise  signaling  simler  sinosphere  skeleton  skunkworks  slippery-slope  soccer  social  social-capital  social-choice  social-norms  social-psych  social-science  social-structure  sociality  society  sociology  socs-and-mops  space  spatial  spearhead  speculation  speed  speedometer  spock  sports  spreading  ssc  stat-power  statesmen  stats  status  stereotypes  stochastic-processes  stories  strategy  street-fighting  study  studying  stylized-facts  subculture  success  sulla  summary  supply-demand  systematic-ad-hoc  tactics  technocracy  technology  telos-atelos  tetlock  the-basilisk  the-bones  the-classics  the-devil  the-founding  the-great-west-whale  the-south  the-watchers  theory-of-mind  theory-practice  theos  thiel  things  thinking  time  time-preference  time-series  tocqueville  todo  toolkit  top-n  track-record  trade  tradeoffs  tradition  transportation  trends  tribalism  troll  trump  trust  truth  twitter  unaffiliated  unintended-consequences  universalism-particularism  urban-rural  us-them  usa  utopia-dystopia  vague  values  vampire-squid  video  virtu  visualization  visuo  vitality  volo-avolo  walter-scheidel  war  wealth  wealth-of-nations  weird  welfare-state  west-hunter  westminster  whiggish-hegelian  wiki  wire-guided  wisdom  within-without  wonkish  world  world-war  X-not-about-Y  yarvin  yvain  zeitgeist  zero-positive-sum  🌞  🎩  🐝  🐸  👽  🤖 

Copy this bookmark:



description:


tags: