nhaliday + eric-kaufmann   18

Religiosity and Fertility in the United States: The Role of Fertility Intentions
Using data from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), we show that women who report that religion is “very important” in their everyday life have both higher fertility and higher intended fertility than those saying religion is “somewhat important” or “not important.” Factors such as unwanted fertility, age at childbearing, or degree of fertility postponement seem not to contribute to religiosity differentials in fertility. This answer prompts more fundamental questions: what is the nature of this greater “religiosity”? And why do the more religious want more children? We show that those saying religion is more important have more traditional gender and family attitudes and that these attitudinal differences account for a substantial part of the fertility differential. We speculate regarding other contributing causes.

Religion, Religiousness and Fertility in the U.S. and in Europe: https://www.demogr.mpg.de/papers/working/wp-2006-013.pdf

RELIGIONS, FERTILITY, AND GROWTH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/iere.12291
Using Southeast Asian censuses, we show empirically that being Catholic, Buddhist, or Muslim significantly raises fertility, especially for couples with intermediate to high education levels. With these estimates, we identify the parameters of a structural model. Catholicism is strongly pro‐child (increasing total spending on children), followed by Buddhism, whereas Islam is more pro‐birth (redirecting spending from quality to quantity). Pro‐child religions depress growth in its early stages by lowering savings and labor supply. In the later stages of growth, pro‐birth religions impede human capital accumulation.
study  sociology  religion  theos  usa  correlation  fertility  eric-kaufmann  causation  general-survey  demographics  phalanges  intervention  gender  tradition  social-norms  parenting  values  politics  ideology  multi  europe  EU  rot  nihil  data  time-series  distribution  christianity  protestant-catholic  other-xtian  the-great-west-whale  occident  expression-survival  poll  inequality  pro-rata  mediterranean  eastern-europe  wealth  econ-metrics  farmers-and-foragers  buddhism  islam  asia  developing-world  human-capital  investing  developmental  number  quantitative-qualitative  quality  world  natural-experiment  field-study 
february 2018 by nhaliday
Land, history or modernization? Explaining ethnic fractionalization: Ethnic and Racial Studies: Vol 38, No 2
Ethnic fractionalization (EF) is frequently used as an explanatory tool in models of economic development, civil war and public goods provision. However, if EF is endogenous to political and economic change, its utility for further research diminishes. This turns out not to be the case. This paper provides the first comprehensive model of EF as a dependent variable.
study  polisci  sociology  political-econ  economics  broad-econ  diversity  putnam-like  race  concept  conceptual-vocab  definition  realness  eric-kaufmann  roots  database  dataset  robust  endogenous-exogenous  causation  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  tribalism  methodology  world  developing-world  🎩  things  metrics  intricacy  microfoundations 
december 2017 by nhaliday
PRRI: America’s Changing Religious Identity
America, that is, the United States of America, has long been a huge exception for the secularization model. Basically as a society develops and modernizes it becomes more secular. At least that’s the model.


Today everyone is talking about the Pew survey which shows the marginalization of the Anglo-Protestant America which I grew up in. This marginalization is due to secularization broadly, and non-Hispanic whites in particular. You don’t need Pew to tell you this.


Note: Robert Putnam’s American Grace is probably the best book which highlights the complex cultural forces which ushered in the second wave of secularization. The short answer is that the culture wars diminished Christianity in the eyes of liberals.

Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Political Backlash and Generational Succession, 1987-2012: https://www.sociologicalscience.com/articles-vol1-24-423/
the causal direction in the rise of the “Nones” likely runs from political identity as a liberal or conservative to religious identity

The Persistent and Exceptional Intensity of American Religion: A Response to Recent Research: https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/xd37b
But we show that rather than religion fading into irrelevance as the secularization thesis would suggest, intense religion—strong affiliation, very frequent practice, literalism, and evangelicalism—is persistent and, in fact, only moderate religion is on the decline in the United States.

As in the U.K., so now too in America: the left establishment is moving towards an open view that orthodox Christians are unfit for office.

i've had the thought that it's a plausible future where traditional notions of theism become implicitly non-white


Some writers and Christian observers deny the flight of young people altogether, but the growing statistics should alarm us enough as Church leaders to do something about the dilemma. My hope in this post is to simply consolidate some of the research (many of the summaries are directly quoted) so you can decide for yourself. I’m going to organize the recent findings in a way that illuminates the problem:

'Christianity as default is gone': the rise of a non-Christian Europe: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/21/christianity-non-christian-europe-young-people-survey-religion
In the UK, only 7% of young adults identify as Anglican, fewer than the 10% who categorise themselves as Catholic. Young Muslims, at 6%, are on the brink of overtaking those who consider themselves part of the country’s established church.

Other scholars have disputed the global decline of Christianity, and instead hypothesized of an evolution of Christianity which allows it to not only survive, but actively expand its influence in contemporary societies.

Philip Jenkins hypothesized a "Christian Revolution" in the Southern nations, such as Africa, Asia and Latin America, where instead of facing decline, Christianity is actively expanding. The relevance of Christian teachings in the global South will allow the Christian population in these areas to continually increase, and together with the shrinking of the Western Christian population, will form a "new Christendom" in which the majority of the world's Christian population can be found in the South.[9]
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september 2017 by nhaliday
Is tribalism racist? Antiracism norms and immigration | British Politics and Policy at LSE
"immigration-restrictionism=racism" by demographic and vote

As figure 3 reveals, among White Clinton voters with postgraduate degrees, support for the idea that it’s racist to want reduced immigration for ethnocultural reasons is almost total, at over 91%. By contrast, only 11.2% of Trump voters agree. Minority voters are slightly more likely to back the ‘racist’ interpretation than whites, 45-36, but this 12-point difference is dwarfed by the 62-point gap within White America between Clinton and Trump voters.

There’s no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ America: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/11/18/theres-no-good-or-bad-america/
- Shadi Hamid
org:edu  news  eric-kaufmann  wonkish  sociology  politics  polisci  elections  poll  values  race  ethnocentrism  identity-politics  migration  usa  2016-election  clinton  trump  polarization  ideology  self-interest  multi  twitter  social  commentary  scitariat  social-norms  correlation  demographics  tribalism  coalitions  class-warfare  westminster  n-factor  patho-altruism  us-them  journos-pundits  interests  gnon 
july 2017 by nhaliday
On Pinkglossianism | Wandering Near Sawtry
Steven Pinker is not wrong to say that some things have got better – or even that some things are getting better. We live longer. We have more food. We have more medicine. We have more free time. We have less chance of dying at another’s hands. My main objection to his arguments is not that some things have got worse as well (family life, for example, or social trust). It is not that he emphasises proportion when scale is more significant (such as with animal suffering). It is the fragility of these peaceful, prosperous conditions.

Antibiotics have made us healthier but antibiotic resistance threatens to plunge us into epidemics. Globalisation has made us richer but is also a powder-keg of cultural unease. Industrialisation has brought material wealth but it is also damaging the environment. Nuclear weapons have averted international conflict but it would only take one error for them to wreak havoc.

At his best, Pinker reminds us of how much we have to treasure, then. At his worst, he is like a co-passenger in a car – pointing out the sunny weather and the beautiful surroundings as it hurtles towards the edge of a cliff.

albion  rhetoric  contrarianism  critique  pinker  peace-violence  domestication  crime  criminology  trends  whiggish-hegelian  optimism  pessimism  cynicism-idealism  multi  news  org:lite  gnon  isteveish  futurism  list  top-n  eric-kaufmann  dysgenics  nihil  nationalism-globalism  nuclear  robust  scale  risk  gnxp  scitariat  faq  modernity  tetlock  the-bones  paleocon  journos-pundits  org:sci 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Levels or changes?: Ethnic context, immigration and the UK Independence party vote
It argues that high levels of established ethnic minorities reduce opposition to immigration and support for UKIP among White Britons. Conversely, more rapid ethnic changes increase opposition to immigration and support for UKIP. Longitudinal data demonstrates that these effects are not produced by self-selection.
study  sociology  politics  polisci  government  elections  britain  eric-kaufmann  causation  endo-exo  migration  diversity  putnam-like  populism  longitudinal  stock-flow  marginal  us-them  identity-politics  flux-stasis  wonkish  phalanges  endogenous-exogenous 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Le Pen and Macron Clash in Vicious Presidential Debate in France - The New York Times
"This threat will be part of the daily life of the next few years," he said, paying tribute to the victim. "The first mission of the President of the Republic is to protect."

If Le Pen wins, European leaders fear the disintegration of the E.U. after decades spent trying to bind the continent more closely together. And although she’s down in hypothetical second-round contests, Le Pen enjoys a commanding lead among France’s youngest voters in the 11-candidate first round, polls show. One survey has her winning nearly 40 percent of the vote among those 18 to 24, nearly double the total of her nearest competitor, Emmanuel Macron.

François Fillon admits no wrongdoing in putting his wife on the payroll, but his campaign is faltering

Daily chart: The centre can indeed hold in France’s presidential election: http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/04/daily-chart-5
20% per prediction markets: http://predictwise.com/politics/french-politics

Laurent Wauquiez s'insurge contre «les élites»: http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2017/10/25/01002-20171025ARTFIG00363-laurent-wauquiez-s-insurge-contre-les-elites.php
New French centre-right contender Laurent Wauquiez follows Kurz model, says elite suppressing debate over mass immigration, Islam, national identity. France for the French
Likely next leader of French Les Republicains @laurentwauquiez positions himself as populist nationalist: denounces the taboo on discussing the nation, massive immigration, identity, values, Islamism
news  org:rec  current-events  europe  gallic  elections  politics  culture-war  westminster  populism  nl-and-so-can-you  nationalism-globalism  multi  government  org:euro  terrorism  crime  order-disorder  patho-altruism  clown-world  lurid  age-generation  data  trends  org:foreign  poll  org:biz  org:anglo  anomie  corruption  business  policy  economics  anglosphere  EU  migrant-crisis  brexit  britain  islam  right-wing  prediction  debate  polisci  tetlock  meta:prediction  judaism  discrimination  leaks  media  eric-kaufmann  twitter  social  commentary  backup  scitariat  gnon 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Places and Preferences: A Longitudinal Analysis of Self-Selection and Contextual Effects | British Journal of Political Science | Cambridge Core
preferences -> place, not place -> preferences (mostly)
Cosmopolitan immigration attitudes in Europe's large cities: Adaptation or selection: https://www.dropbox.com/s/lb3yrsdlhpxprfs/RahsaanMaxwellAPSACosmopolitanImmigrationCities.pdf?dl=0
The myth of London exceptionalism: https://quarterly.demos.co.uk/article/issue-5/ukip-in-london/
London is not as invulnerable to the appeal of UKIP as commonly reported, finds new research from Eric Kaufmann.

Are White British Londoners more accepting of immigration than White British elsewhere? The British Election Study (BES)’s 2015 panel survey asks whether immigration enriches or undermines cultural life. 34.7 per cent of White British outside London say immigration strongly undermines cultural life. But so do 34.4 per cent of White British Londoners. Not much difference there. 44 per cent of White Brits outside London want to leave the EU, but so do 42.3 per cent of White British Londoners. Again, not much in it.


Finally, when we control for a fuller range of demographic and attitudinal characteristics, as in figure 4, London and the South East emerge as significantly more likely than the rest of England and Wales to have voted UKIP in 2014, according to the BES.

Cosmopolitan cities and their country cousins – UK in a changing Europe: http://ukandeu.ac.uk/london-voted-leave-or-why-local-differences-in-populist-right-voting-are-overstated/
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may 2017 by nhaliday
The wheel of history turns to the gods - Gene Expression
The inevitable rise of Amish machines: http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/gnxp/2011/01/the-inevitable-rise-of-amish-machines/
The authors make a nod to the idea that religion may have spread through group selection: but this is also an argument for why very fertile and religious groups such as the Amish and Roma will reach their “limits to growth.” If they persist in their atypical lifestyles their host societies will simply collapse. Or at least restructure in a fashion to make extremely high endogenous growth of minorities impossible.
gnxp  scitariat  books  review  sociology  culture  society  demographics  fertility  religion  demographic-transition  theos  new-religion  israel  MENA  judaism  europe  islam  gallic  britain  nordic  poll  values  morality  gender  sexuality  anthropology  org:sci  rot  the-bones  eric-kaufmann  history  early-modern  usa  elite  flux-stasis  modernity  multi  context  cycles  study  summary  commentary  critique  prediction  trends  pop-structure  free-riding  subculture  hetero-advantage  russia  population  comparison  time-series  :/ 
may 2017 by nhaliday
The lopsided age distribution of partisan politics, visualized - The Washington Post
controlling for demographics: http://www.pleeps.org/2016/06/23/the-mystery-of-millennial-politics/
White millennials in US relatively similar to older whites in both partisanship & conservatism, shows Deborah Schildkraut at #APSA2017
Incredibly important paper from #APSA2017 by @debbiejsr & Satia Marotta on racial views of white millennials
cf: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:8bdede501f24
People mistakenly believe that younger people have always been more liberal. In reality, the current age divide is larger than ever.

The future belongs to the Left: http://www.edwest.co.uk/spectator-blogs/the-future-belongs-to-the-left/
Labour is now the party of the middle class: http://www.edwest.co.uk/spectator-blogs/labour-is-now-the-party-of-the-middle-class/

The Zero-Sum Society: https://spottedtoad.wordpress.com/2017/06/12/the-zero-sum-society/
Record house prices are stopping couples having 160,000 children because they cannot afford bigger homes or are stuck in rental flats: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4699862/House-prices-stopping-couples-having-160-000-children.html
Conservatism has no future unless it tackles housing: https://inews.co.uk/opinion/conservatism-no-future-unless-tackles-housing/
Wealth is unevenly distributed generally, but much less so in property than financial wealth - far bigger constituency for protecting it (Bristol Uni 2015)
This is why the 'house prices should fall' line is a dead end. Ex-pensions it's most of all the wealth majority of people have.

US at min wage: https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/06/rent-is-affordable-to-low-wage-workers-in-exactly-12-us-counties/529782/

How Britain voted at the 2017 general election: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2017/06/13/how-britain-voted-2017-general-election/
In electoral terms, age seems to be the new dividing line in British politics. The starkest way to show this is to note that, amongst first time voters (those aged 18 and 19), Labour was forty seven percentage points ahead. Amongst those aged over 70, the Conservatives had a lead of fifty percentage points.
This has got to embarrass most sensible Tory MPs
(poll numbers for specific issues)
John Curtice giving us @DUConservatives a slightly painful talk 😬
John Curtice is explaining that Labour’s economic policies did almost nothing to galvanise the young. It was their social liberalism.
Older voters more likely to care about rent control or redistribution than young.
Tuition fees are a misdiagnosis.
“In many ways the cues and mood music are more important than the policy.”
“The prominence of social issues have never been as big a dimension as they played in 2017.
Neither had the disparity in age.”
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march 2017 by nhaliday
The Future of Secularism: a Biologically Informed Theory Supplemented with Cross-Cultural Evidence | SpringerLink
While cross-sectional in nature, when our results are combined with evidence that both religiosity and fertility are substantially heritable traits, findings are consistent with view that earlier trends toward secularization (due to science education surrounding advancements in science) are currently being counter-balanced by genetic and reproductive forces. We also propose that the inverse association between intelligence and religiosity, and the inverse correlation between intelligence and fertility lead to predictions of a decline in secularism in the foreseeable future. A contra-secularization hypothesis is proposed and defended in the discussion. It states that secularism is likely to undergo a decline throughout the remainder of the twenty-first century, including Europe and other industrial societies.

Secularism and Fertility Worldwide: https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/pvwpy/
This study hypothesizes a link between societal secularism and fertility. Using country-level data from multiple sources (N=181) and multilevel data from 55 countries in the World Values Survey (N=78,639), I document a strong negative relationship between societal secularism and both country-level and individual-level fertility. Secularism, even in small amounts, is associated with population stagnation or even decline, whereas highly religious countries have higher fertility. This country-level pattern is driven by more than aggregate lower fertility of individual nonreligious people. In fact, secularism is more closely linked to religious than nonreligious people’s fertility and appears to be a function of different cultural values related to gender and reproduction in more secular societies. Beyond its importance for the religious composition of the world population, the societal-level association between secularism and fertility is relevant to key fertility theories and may help account, in part, for below-replacement fertility.
study  psychology  social-psych  anthropology  culture  society  religion  trends  dysgenics  fertility  evopsych  biodet  usa  developing-world  asia  prediction  correlation  recent-selection  sociology  demographic-transition  deep-materialism  new-religion  stylized-facts  expression-survival  individualism-collectivism  theos  zeitgeist  rot  the-bones  eric-kaufmann  modernity  multi  general-survey  preprint  hari-seldon 
march 2017 by nhaliday
Kaufmann’s Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?: Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century | EVOLVING ECONOMICS
Kaufmann’s basic argument is that the higher fertility of fundamentalist religious groups, together with their high rates of retention, is going to shift in the make up of the populations in the West over the next century, profoundly affecting our politics and freedoms.

The important word in that above sentence is fundamentalist. This is not a case of religious groups breeding faster than the irreligious. Fertility levels for many groups are rapidly converging in the West. Muslim family sizes are shrinking. Catholic families are no larger than those of Protestants.

Where the action lies is within each faith. There _the fundamentalists have markedly higher fertility than both the moderates and seculars_. And, if anything, that gap is widening.
trends  sapiens  religion  prediction  contrarianism  demographics  essay  pessimism  econotariat  fertility  dysgenics  protestant-catholic  sociology  demographic-transition  deep-materialism  new-religion  stylized-facts  expression-survival  broad-econ  chart  theos  zeitgeist  rot  the-bones  eric-kaufmann  modernity  hari-seldon 
july 2016 by nhaliday

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