nhaliday + dennett   103

What's Wrong With Growing Blobs of Brain Tissue? - The Atlantic
These increasingly complex organoids aren't conscious—but we might not know when they cross that line.

I don't know why you would even *want* to do this tbh... What's the application?
news  org:mag  popsci  hmm  :/  dignity  morality  ethics  formal-values  philosophy  biotech  neuro  dennett  within-without  weird  wtf  ed-yong  brain-scan  medicine  science 
april 2018 by nhaliday
Eliminative materialism - Wikipedia
Eliminative materialism (also called eliminativism) is the claim that people's common-sense understanding of the mind (or folk psychology) is false and that certain classes of mental states that most people believe in do not exist.[1] It is a materialist position in the philosophy of mind. Some supporters of eliminativism argue that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desire, since they are poorly defined. Rather, they argue that psychological concepts of behaviour and experience should be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level.[2] Other versions entail the non-existence of conscious mental states such as pain and visual perceptions.[3]

Eliminativism about a class of entities is the view that that class of entities does not exist.[4] For example, materialism tends to be eliminativist about the soul; modern chemists are eliminativist about phlogiston; and modern physicists are eliminativist about the existence of luminiferous aether. Eliminative materialism is the relatively new (1960s–1970s) idea that certain classes of mental entities that common sense takes for granted, such as beliefs, desires, and the subjective sensation of pain, do not exist.[5][6] The most common versions are eliminativism about propositional attitudes, as expressed by Paul and Patricia Churchland,[7] and eliminativism about qualia (subjective interpretations about particular instances of subjective experience), as expressed by Daniel Dennett and Georges Rey.[3] These philosophers often appeal to an introspection illusion.

In the context of materialist understandings of psychology, eliminativism stands in opposition to reductive materialism which argues that mental states as conventionally understood do exist, and that they directly correspond to the physical state of the nervous system.[8][need quotation to verify] An intermediate position is revisionary materialism, which will often argue that the mental state in question will prove to be somewhat reducible to physical phenomena—with some changes needed to the common sense concept.

Since eliminative materialism claims that future research will fail to find a neuronal basis for various mental phenomena, it must necessarily wait for science to progress further. One might question the position on these grounds, but other philosophers like Churchland argue that eliminativism is often necessary in order to open the minds of thinkers to new evidence and better explanations.[8]
concept  conceptual-vocab  philosophy  ideology  thinking  metameta  weird  realness  psychology  cog-psych  neurons  neuro  brain-scan  reduction  complex-systems  cybernetics  wiki  reference  parallax  truth  dennett  within-without  the-self  subjective-objective  absolute-relative  deep-materialism  new-religion  identity  analytical-holistic  systematic-ad-hoc  science  theory-practice  theory-of-mind  applicability-prereqs  nihil  lexical 
april 2018 by nhaliday
The first ethical revolution – Gene Expression
Fifty years ago Julian Jaynes published The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind. Seventy years ago Karl Jaspers introduced the concept of the Axial Age. Both point to the same dynamic historically.

Something happened in the centuries around 500 BCE all around the world. Great religions and philosophies arose. The Indian religious traditions, the Chinese philosophical-political ones, and the roots of what we can recognize as Judaism. In Greece, the precursors of many modern philosophical streams emerged formally, along with a variety of political systems.

The next few centuries saw some more innovation. Rabbinical Judaism transformed a ritualistic tribal religion into an ethical one, and Christianity universalized Jewish religious thought, as well as infusing it with Greek systematic concepts. Meanwhile, Indian and Chinese thought continued to evolve, often due to interactions each other (it is hard to imagine certain later developments in Confucianism without the Buddhist stimulus). Finally, in the 7th century, Islam emerges as the last great world religion.

...

Living in large complex societies with social stratification posed challenges. A religion such as Christianity was not a coincidence, something of its broad outlines may have been inevitable. Universal, portable, ethical, and infused with transcendence and coherency. Similarly, god-kings seem to have universally transformed themselves into the human who binds heaven to earth in some fashion.

The second wave of social-ethical transformation occurred in the early modern period, starting in Europe. My own opinion is that economic growth triggered by innovation and gains in productivity unleashed constraints which had dampened further transformations in the domain of ethics. But the new developments ultimately were simply extensions and modifications on the earlier “source code” (e.g., whereas for nearly two thousand years Christianity had had to make peace with the existence of slavery, in the 19th century anti-slavery activists began marshaling Christian language against the institution).
gnxp  scitariat  discussion  reflection  religion  christianity  theos  judaism  china  asia  sinosphere  orient  india  the-great-west-whale  occident  history  antiquity  iron-age  mediterranean  the-classics  canon  philosophy  morality  ethics  universalism-particularism  systematic-ad-hoc  analytical-holistic  confucian  big-peeps  innovation  stagnation  technology  economics  biotech  enhancement  genetics  bio  flux-stasis  automation  ai  low-hanging  speedometer  time  distribution  smoothness  shift  dennett  simler  volo-avolo  👽  mystic  marginal  farmers-and-foragers  wealth  egalitarianism-hierarchy  values  formal-values  ideology  good-evil 
april 2018 by nhaliday
Theories of humor - Wikipedia
There are many theories of humor which attempt to explain what humor is, what social functions it serves, and what would be considered humorous. Among the prevailing types of theories that attempt to account for the existence of humor, there are psychological theories, the vast majority of which consider humor to be very healthy behavior; there are spiritual theories, which consider humor to be an inexplicable mystery, very much like a mystical experience.[1] Although various classical theories of humor and laughter may be found, in contemporary academic literature, three theories of humor appear repeatedly: relief theory, superiority theory, and incongruity theory.[2] Among current humor researchers, there is no consensus about which of these three theories of humor is most viable.[2] Proponents of each one originally claimed their theory to be capable of explaining all cases of humor.[2][3] However, they now acknowledge that although each theory generally covers its own area of focus, many instances of humor can be explained by more than one theory.[2][3][4][5] Incongruity and superiority theories, for instance, seem to describe complementary mechanisms which together create humor.[6]

...

Relief theory
Relief theory maintains that laughter is a homeostatic mechanism by which psychological tension is reduced.[2][3][7] Humor may thus for example serve to facilitate relief of the tension caused by one's fears.[8] Laughter and mirth, according to relief theory, result from this release of nervous energy.[2] Humor, according to relief theory, is used mainly to overcome sociocultural inhibitions and reveal suppressed desires. It is believed that this is the reason we laugh whilst being tickled, due to a buildup of tension as the tickler "strikes".[2][9] According to Herbert Spencer, laughter is an "economical phenomenon" whose function is to release "psychic energy" that had been wrongly mobilized by incorrect or false expectations. The latter point of view was supported also by Sigmund Freud.

Superiority theory
The superiority theory of humor traces back to Plato and Aristotle, and Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan. The general idea is that a person laughs about misfortunes of others (so called schadenfreude), because these misfortunes assert the person's superiority on the background of shortcomings of others.[10] Socrates was reported by Plato as saying that the ridiculous was characterized by a display of self-ignorance.[11] For Aristotle, we laugh at inferior or ugly individuals, because we feel a joy at feeling superior to them.[12]

Incongruous juxtaposition theory
The incongruity theory states that humor is perceived at the moment of realization of incongruity between a concept involved in a certain situation and the real objects thought to be in some relation to the concept.[10]

Since the main point of the theory is not the incongruity per se, but its realization and resolution (i.e., putting the objects in question into the real relation), it is often called the incongruity-resolution theory.[10]

...

Detection of mistaken reasoning
In 2011, three researchers, Hurley, Dennett and Adams, published a book that reviews previous theories of humor and many specific jokes. They propose the theory that humor evolved because it strengthens the ability of the brain to find mistakes in active belief structures, that is, to detect mistaken reasoning.[46] This is somewhat consistent with the sexual selection theory, because, as stated above, humor would be a reliable indicator of an important survival trait: the ability to detect mistaken reasoning. However, the three researchers argue that humor is fundamentally important because it is the very mechanism that allows the human brain to excel at practical problem solving. Thus, according to them, humor did have survival value even for early humans, because it enhanced the neural circuitry needed to survive.

Misattribution theory
Misattribution is one theory of humor that describes an audience's inability to identify exactly why they find a joke to be funny. The formal theory is attributed to Zillmann & Bryant (1980) in their article, "Misattribution Theory of Tendentious Humor", published in Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. They derived the critical concepts of the theory from Sigmund Freud's Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious (note: from a Freudian perspective, wit is separate from humor), originally published in 1905.

Benign violation theory
The benign violation theory (BVT) is developed by researchers A. Peter McGraw and Caleb Warren.[47] The BVT integrates seemingly disparate theories of humor to predict that humor occurs when three conditions are satisfied: 1) something threatens one's sense of how the world "ought to be", 2) the threatening situation seems benign, and 3) a person sees both interpretations at the same time.

From an evolutionary perspective, humorous violations likely originated as apparent physical threats, like those present in play fighting and tickling. As humans evolved, the situations that elicit humor likely expanded from physical threats to other violations, including violations of personal dignity (e.g., slapstick, teasing), linguistic norms (e.g., puns, malapropisms), social norms (e.g., strange behaviors, risqué jokes), and even moral norms (e.g., disrespectful behaviors). The BVT suggests that anything that threatens one's sense of how the world "ought to be" will be humorous, so long as the threatening situation also seems benign.

...

Sense of humor, sense of seriousness
One must have a sense of humor and a sense of seriousness to distinguish what is supposed to be taken literally or not. An even more keen sense is needed when humor is used to make a serious point.[48][49] Psychologists have studied how humor is intended to be taken as having seriousness, as when court jesters used humor to convey serious information. Conversely, when humor is not intended to be taken seriously, bad taste in humor may cross a line after which it is taken seriously, though not intended.[50]

Philosophy of humor bleg: http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2017/03/philosophy-humor-bleg.html

Inside Jokes: https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/inside-jokes
humor as reward for discovering inconsistency in inferential chain

https://twitter.com/search?q=comedy%20OR%20humor%20OR%20humour%20from%3Asarahdoingthing&src=typd
https://twitter.com/sarahdoingthing/status/500000435529195520

https://twitter.com/sarahdoingthing/status/568346955811663872
https://twitter.com/sarahdoingthing/status/600792582453465088
https://twitter.com/sarahdoingthing/status/603215362033778688
https://twitter.com/sarahdoingthing/status/605051508472713216
https://twitter.com/sarahdoingthing/status/606197597699604481
https://twitter.com/sarahdoingthing/status/753514548787683328

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humour
People of all ages and cultures respond to humour. Most people are able to experience humour—be amused, smile or laugh at something funny—and thus are considered to have a sense of humour. The hypothetical person lacking a sense of humour would likely find the behaviour inducing it to be inexplicable, strange, or even irrational.

...

Ancient Greece
Western humour theory begins with Plato, who attributed to Socrates (as a semi-historical dialogue character) in the Philebus (p. 49b) the view that the essence of the ridiculous is an ignorance in the weak, who are thus unable to retaliate when ridiculed. Later, in Greek philosophy, Aristotle, in the Poetics (1449a, pp. 34–35), suggested that an ugliness that does not disgust is fundamental to humour.

...

China
Confucianist Neo-Confucian orthodoxy, with its emphasis on ritual and propriety, has traditionally looked down upon humour as subversive or unseemly. The Confucian "Analects" itself, however, depicts the Master as fond of humorous self-deprecation, once comparing his wanderings to the existence of a homeless dog.[10] Early Daoist philosophical texts such as "Zhuangzi" pointedly make fun of Confucian seriousness and make Confucius himself a slow-witted figure of fun.[11] Joke books containing a mix of wordplay, puns, situational humor, and play with taboo subjects like sex and scatology, remained popular over the centuries. Local performing arts, storytelling, vernacular fiction, and poetry offer a wide variety of humorous styles and sensibilities.

...

Physical attractiveness
90% of men and 81% of women, all college students, report having a sense of humour is a crucial characteristic looked for in a romantic partner.[21] Humour and honesty were ranked as the two most important attributes in a significant other.[22] It has since been recorded that humour becomes more evident and significantly more important as the level of commitment in a romantic relationship increases.[23] Recent research suggests expressions of humour in relation to physical attractiveness are two major factors in the desire for future interaction.[19] Women regard physical attractiveness less highly compared to men when it came to dating, a serious relationship, and sexual intercourse.[19] However, women rate humorous men more desirable than nonhumorous individuals for a serious relationship or marriage, but only when these men were physically attractive.[19]

Furthermore, humorous people are perceived by others to be more cheerful but less intellectual than nonhumorous people. Self-deprecating humour has been found to increase the desirability of physically attractive others for committed relationships.[19] The results of a study conducted by McMaster University suggest humour can positively affect one’s desirability for a specific relationship partner, but this effect is only most likely to occur when men use humour and are evaluated by women.[24] No evidence was found to suggest men prefer women with a sense of humour as partners, nor women preferring other women with a sense of humour as potential partners.[24] When women were given the forced-choice design in the study, they chose funny men as potential … [more]
article  list  wiki  reference  psychology  cog-psych  social-psych  emotion  things  phalanges  concept  neurons  instinct  👽  comedy  models  theory-of-mind  explanans  roots  evopsych  signaling  humanity  logic  sex  sexuality  cost-benefit  iq  intelligence  contradiction  homo-hetero  egalitarianism-hierarchy  humility  reinforcement  EEA  eden  play  telos-atelos  impetus  theos  mystic  philosophy  big-peeps  the-classics  literature  inequality  illusion  within-without  dennett  dignity  social-norms  paradox  parallax  analytical-holistic  multi  econotariat  marginal-rev  discussion  speculation  books  impro  carcinisation  postrat  cool  twitter  social  quotes  commentary  search  farmers-and-foragers  🦀  evolution  sapiens  metameta  insight  novelty  wire-guided  realness  chart  beauty  nietzschean  class  pop-diff  culture  alien-character  confucian  order-disorder  sociality  🐝  integrity  properties  gender  gender-diff  china  asia  sinosphere  long-short-run  trust  religion  ideology  elegance 
april 2018 by nhaliday
"Really six people present": origin of phrase commonly attributed to William James - English Language & Usage Stack Exchange
Whenever two people meet, there are really six people present. There is each man as he sees himself, each man as the other person sees him, and each man as he really is.

...

Here's a graph of the number of references of the phrase "really six people present" Click on the first range (1800-1017) and you'll see this, which attributes this statement to Oliver Wendell Holmes. What's perhaps relevant is the reference to "John and James"--I'm guessing two placeholder names.
q-n-a  stackex  quotes  aphorism  law  big-peeps  old-anglo  illusion  truth  anthropology  psychology  cog-psych  social-psych  realness  dennett  biases  neurons  rationality  within-without  theory-of-mind  subjective-objective  forms-instances  parallax  the-self 
march 2018 by nhaliday
Baldwin effect - Wikipedia
If animals entered a new environment—or their old environment rapidly changed—those that could flexibly respond by learning new behaviors or by ontogenetically adapting would be naturally preserved. This saved remnant would, over several generations, have the opportunity to exhibit spontaneously congenital variations similar to their acquired traits and have these variations naturally selected. It would look as though the acquired traits had sunk into the hereditary substance in a Lamarckian fashion, but the process would really be neo-Darwinian.

Selected offspring would tend to have an increased capacity for learning new skills rather than being confined to genetically coded, relatively fixed abilities. In effect, it places emphasis on the fact that the sustained behavior of a species or group can shape the evolution of that species. The "Baldwin effect" is better understood in evolutionary developmental biology literature as a scenario in which a character or trait change occurring in an organism as a result of its interaction with its environment becomes gradually assimilated into its developmental genetic or epigenetic repertoire (Simpson, 1953; Newman, 2002). In the words of Daniel Dennett,[2]

Thanks to the Baldwin effect, species can be said to pretest the efficacy of particular different designs by phenotypic (individual) exploration of the space of nearby possibilities. If a particularly winning setting is thereby discovered, this discovery will create a new selection pressure: organisms that are closer in the adaptive landscape to that discovery will have a clear advantage over those more distant.

An update to the Baldwin Effect was developed by Jean Piaget, Paul Weiss, and Conrad Waddington in the 1960s–1970s. This new version included an explicit role for the social in shaping subsequent natural change in humans (both evolutionary and developmental), with reference to alterations of selection pressures.[3]

...

Suppose a species is threatened by a new predator and there is a behavior that makes it more difficult for the predator to kill individuals of the species. Individuals who learn the behavior more quickly will obviously be at an advantage. As time goes on, the ability to learn the behavior will improve (by genetic selection), and at some point it will seem to be an instinct.
concept  wiki  reference  bio  evolution  learning  instinct  culture  cycles  intricacy  dennett  big-peeps  cultural-dynamics  anthropology  sapiens  flexibility  deep-materialism  new-religion  darwinian  evopsych  iteration-recursion 
march 2018 by nhaliday
Compatibilism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Compatibilism offers a solution to the free will problem, which concerns a disputed incompatibility between free will and determinism. Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. Because free will is typically taken to be a necessary condition of moral responsibility, compatibilism is sometimes expressed as a thesis about the compatibility between moral responsibility and determinism.

this (moral responsibility) was my exact intuition as to the importance of having a concept of 'free will'
concept  conceptual-vocab  article  wiki  reference  philosophy  volo-avolo  paradox  morality  ethics  formal-values  responsibility  random  dennett  order-disorder  causation  guilt-shame  being-becoming 
january 2018 by nhaliday
The Function of Reason | Edge.org
https://www.edge.org/conversation/hugo_mercier-the-argumentative-theory

How Social Is Reason?: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2017/08/how-social-is-reason.html

https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/07/02/open-thread-732017/
Reading The Enigma of Reason. Pretty good so far. Not incredibly surprising to me so far. To be clear, their argument is somewhat orthogonal to the whole ‘rationality’ debate you may be familiar with from Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s work (e.g., see Heuristics and Biases).

One of the major problems in analysis is that rationality, reflection and ratiocination, are slow and error prone. To get a sense of that, just read ancient Greek science. Eratosthenes may have calculated to within 1% of the true circumference of the world, but Aristotle’s speculations on the nature of reproduction were rather off.

You may be as clever as Eratosthenes, but most people are not. But you probably accept that the world is round and 24,901 miles around. If you are not American you probably are vague on miles anyway. But you know what the social consensus is, and you accept it because it seems reasonable.

One of the points in cultural evolution work is that a lot of the time rather than relying on your own intuition and or reason, it is far more effective and cognitively cheaper to follow social norms of your ingroup. I only bring this up because unfortunately many pathologies of our political and intellectual world today are not really pathologies. That is, they’re not bugs, but features.

https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/07/23/open-thread-07232017/
Finished The Enigma of Reason. The basic thesis that reasoning is a way to convince people after you’ve already come to a conclusion, that is, rationalization, was already one I shared. That makes sense since one of the coauthors, Dan Sperber, has been influential in the “naturalistic” school of anthropology. If you’ve read books like In Gods We Trust The Enigma of Reason goes fast. But it is important to note that the cognitive anthropology perspective is useful in things besides religion. I’m thinking in particular of politics.

https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/07/30/the-delusion-of-reasons-empire/
My point here is that many of our beliefs are arrived at in an intuitive manner, and we find reasons to justify those beliefs. One of the core insights you’ll get from The Enigma of Reason is that rationalization isn’t that big of a misfire or abuse of our capacities. It’s probably just a natural outcome for what and how we use reason in our natural ecology.

Mercier and Sperber contrast their “interactionist” model of what reason is for with an “intellectualist: model. The intellecutalist model is rather straightforward. It is one where individual reasoning capacities exist so that one may make correct inferences about the world around us, often using methods that mimic those in abstract elucidated systems such as formal logic or Bayesian reasoning. When reasoning doesn’t work right, it’s because people aren’t using it for it’s right reasons. It can be entirely solitary because the tools don’t rely on social input or opinion.

The interactionist model holds that reasoning exists because it is a method of persuasion within social contexts. It is important here to note that the authors do not believe that reasoning is simply a tool for winning debates. That is, increasing your status in a social game. Rather, their overall thesis seems to be in alignment with the idea that cognition of reasoning properly understood is a social process. In this vein they offer evidence of how juries may be superior to judges, and the general examples you find in the “wisdom of the crowds” literature. Overall the authors make a strong case for the importance of diversity of good-faith viewpoints, because they believe that the truth on the whole tends to win out in dialogic formats (that is, if there is a truth; they are rather unclear and muddy about normative disagreements and how those can be resolved).

The major issues tend to crop up when reasoning is used outside of its proper context. One of the literature examples, which you are surely familiar with, in The Enigma of Reason is a psychological experiment where there are two conditions, and the researchers vary the conditions and note wide differences in behavior. In particular, the experiment where psychologists put subjects into a room where someone out of view is screaming for help. When they are alone, they quite often go to see what is wrong immediately. In contrast, when there is a confederate of the psychologists in the room who ignores the screaming, people also tend to ignore the screaming.

The researchers know the cause of the change in behavior. It’s the introduction of the confederate and that person’s behavior. But the subjects when interviewed give a wide range of plausible and possible answers. In other words, they are rationalizing their behavior when called to justify it in some way. This is entirely unexpected, we all know that people are very good at coming up with answers to explain their behavior (often in the best light possible). But that doesn’t mean they truly understanding their internal reasons, which seem to be more about intuition.

But much of The Enigma of Reason also recounts how bad people are at coming up with coherent and well thought out rationalizations. That is, their “reasons” tend to be ad hoc and weak. We’re not very good at formal logic or even simple syllogistic reasoning. The explanation for this seems to be two-fold.

...

At this point we need to address the elephant in the room: some humans seem extremely good at reasoning in a classical sense. I’m talking about individuals such as Blaise Pascal, Carl Friedrich Gauss, and John von Neumann. Early on in The Enigma of Reason the authors point out the power of reason by alluding to Eratosthenes’s calculation of the circumference of the earth, which was only off by one percent. Myself, I would have mentioned Archimedes, who I suspect was a genius on the same level as the ones mentioned above.

Mercier and Sperber state near the end of the book that math in particular is special and a powerful way to reason. We all know this. In math the axioms are clear, and agreed upon. And one can inspect the chain of propositions in a very transparent manner. Mathematics has guard-rails for any human who attempts to engage in reasoning. By reducing the ability of humans to enter into unforced errors math is the ideal avenue for solitary individual reasoning. But it is exceptional.

Second, though it is not discussed in The Enigma of Reason there does seem to be variation in general and domain specific intelligence within the human population. People who flourish in mathematics usually have high general intelligences, but they also often exhibit a tendency to be able to engage in high levels of visual-spatial conceptualization.

One the whole the more intelligent you are the better you are able to reason. But that does not mean that those with high intelligence are immune from the traps of motivated reasoning or faulty logic. Mercier and Sperber give many examples. There are two. Linus Pauling was indisputably brilliant, but by the end of his life he was consistently pushing Vitamin C quackery (in part through a very selective interpretation of the scientific literature).* They also point out that much of Isaac Newton’s prodigious intellectual output turns out to have been focused on alchemy and esoteric exegesis which is totally impenetrable. Newton undoubtedly had a first class mind, but if the domain it was applied to was garbage, then the output was also garbage.

...

Overall, the take-homes are:

Reasoning exists to persuade in a group context through dialogue, not individual ratiocination.
Reasoning can give rise to storytelling when prompted, even if the reasons have no relationship to the underlying causality.
Motivated reasoning emerges because we are not skeptical of the reasons we proffer, but highly skeptical of reasons which refute our own.
The “wisdom of the crowds” is not just a curious phenomenon, but one of the primary reasons that humans have become more socially complex and our brains have larger.
Ultimately, if you want to argue someone out of their beliefs…well, good luck with that. But you should read The Enigma of Reason to understand the best strategies (many of them are common sense, and I’ve come to them independently simply through 15 years of having to engage with people of diverse viewpoints).

* R. A. Fisher, who was one of the pioneers of both evolutionary genetics and statistics, famously did not believe there was a connection between smoking and cancer. He himself smoked a pipe regularly.

** From what we know about Blaise Pascal and Isaac Newton, their personalities were such that they’d probably be killed or expelled from a hunter-gatherer band.
books  summary  psychology  social-psych  cog-psych  anthropology  rationality  biases  epistemic  thinking  neurons  realness  truth  info-dynamics  language  speaking  persuasion  dark-arts  impro  roots  ideas  speculation  hypocrisy  intelligence  eden  philosophy  multi  review  critique  ratty  hanson  org:edge  video  interview  communication  insight  impetus  hidden-motives  X-not-about-Y  signaling  🤖  metameta  metabuch  dennett  meta:rhetoric  gnxp  scitariat  open-things  giants  fisher  old-anglo  history  iron-age  mediterranean  the-classics  reason  religion  theos  noble-lie  intuition  instinct  farmers-and-foragers  egalitarianism-hierarchy  early-modern  britain  europe  gallic  hari-seldon  theory-of-mind  parallax  darwinian  evolution  telos-atelos  intricacy  evopsych  chart  traces 
august 2017 by nhaliday
Gnosticism - Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eric_Voegelin#Voegelin_on_gnosticism

Faith and other Epistemic Categories: https://quaslacrimas.wordpress.com/2017/03/10/faith-and-other-epistemic-categories/
In response to Bonald’s excellent little piece Faith is honesty in doubt, I wanted to offer a parallel thesis (or, if you like, a friendly amendment): faith is a matter of whom, not what.

I can have faith in a man (I believe him). Maybe I have faith in him in a general sense, or maybe I have only heard him recite one particular narrative (in which case when I say I believe him I mean I have faith in that particular narrative). I can also have faith in groups and communities, and in their reports, publications, traditions, in the names they put forward as trustworthy authorities on certain questions, and so on.

Faith (or belief) is a matter of trust; fundamentally it is your confidence in the man that makes you confident his words will ring true. (Indeed, confidence is a Latin word meaning with faith.)

You can trust a man, or a group; you can always trust every word that comes out of his mouth, or just in one incident; you can trust him on account of his honesty, his accuracy, or both; you can trust him absolutely or only casually; but wherever you say you trust, the question whom it is that you trust arises. You can’t trust things, states of affairs, trees…

...

As Christians, we believe Christ and his Apostles. When Mr. Smith tells us something that conflicts with our Christian creed, we withhold our assent from Mr. Smith’s claims because we have greater faith in Christ than in Mr. Smith. If later on Mr. Thompson tells us something that conflicts with some other rumor we heard from Mr. Smith, this conflict will cause us to experience some uncertainty and confusion; but we will have a much more vivid understanding of what is going on if we have recently had some reason to reflect on Mr. Smith and how much (or how little) we trust him.

...

Perhaps we could say that this is the difference between faith and conviction. Conviction refers to something that you have been convinced is true (and only implicitly, if at all, to those who convinced you), whereas faith refers to someone you trust (and only implicitly to opinions you hold as a result of this trust). To restate a point using this new conceptual contrast: everyone has convictions, but a Christian has faith as well.

Faith and Gullibility: https://quaslacrimas.wordpress.com/2018/05/09/faith-and-gullibility/
But Chesterton’s point is in a certain sense a petty one to score: which of the trendy superstitions in circulation today is half as trendy as barren, godless materialism?

The vulgar errors of the plebs have actually become part of the metabolism of our godless society. As the Cathedral and its choirboys have gradually improved message-discipline on science and superstition (yes, they “freaking love science”), the contrast between the amusingly rustic ignorance of the commoners and the smug confidence of the overclass has become part of the status-structure that draws ambitious youngsters into the Cathedral’s cold embrace. Abandoning the poor to the torment of demons is now part of the Left’s plan; more room to tut-tut and demonstrate that you are a reasonable bugman, more misery to justify the next stage in the revolution.

But still, this fails to get at the root of the fairies and the séances and the horoscopes, which is neither faith’s relation to superstition, nor to the arrogance of those who lift themselves up above the superstitions they despise in others, but rather faith’s relation to gullibility.

Gullibility is a more general concept than superstition. Let us define superstition as gullibility with respect to opinions and possibilities that are held in contempt by the powerful, while gullibility itself is the epistemic equivalent of pettiness — an inability to dismiss highly improbable hypotheses.

...

Not because of any special piety or zeal, but simply because it was barely yesterday that I was an atheist, I had a vivid impression of the changes in my thinking process. It was not impossible that supernatural agency was involved, of course, but it was very implausible — because it seemed too trivial and indistinct to be worth the effort of a self-respecting angel. So I set that aside immediately, and stayed focused on thinking about what might actually be going on.

Putting aside the insignificant possibility lightened my mind almost in the way pouring water out of a jug would. I seem to remember that when I was an atheist confronting this type of “superstition”, I would keep the supernatural hypothesis in front of my mind, regulating my thoughts, considering the case from every angle but only from the perspective of what might disprove the superstitious opinion.

But a superstition is the opinion of a crackpot. Why was I worried about what crackpots believe? If Eddington has a hypothesis or Einstein has a hypothesis, then falsifying the hypothesis is science. Falsifying a crackpot’s hypothesis is proof that you place a low value on your time.

...

Here is another possibility: I don’t know why the appliance turns on when it does. I wasn’t able to figure it out. It would be odd if I could, since I’m not an electrician or an engineer. The world would be a boring place if you could just suss out the answer to arbitrarily unusual questions without making any special study of the topic. Sometimes we don’t know. And often when we don’t know we don’t care. In fact, most of the time we don’t care about what we don’t know precisely because the insignificance of the topic is the very reason we never prepared ourselves to answer that type of question in the first place.
history  iron-age  mediterranean  MENA  religion  christianity  judaism  theos  duality  wiki  reference  article  homo-hetero  ideology  philosophy  gnosis-logos  janus  the-devil  multi  god-man-beast-victim  the-self  gnon  epistemic  thinking  metabuch  intricacy  meta:rhetoric  reason  inference  trust  roots  axioms  truth  anthropology  knowledge  metameta  essay  integrity  honor  the-classics  the-great-west-whale  occident  utopia-dystopia  communism  russia  track-record  prediction  authoritarianism  being-right  debate  subjective-objective  dennett  within-without  absolute-relative  politics  polisci  government  confidence  conceptual-vocab  definition  exegesis-hermeneutics 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Suspicious Banana on Twitter: ""platonic forms" seem more sinister when you realize that integers were reaching down into his head and giving him city planning advice https://t.co/4qaTdwOlry"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5040_(number)
Plato mentions in his Laws that 5040 is a convenient number to use for dividing many things (including both the citizens and the land of a state) into lesser parts. He remarks that this number can be divided by all the (natural) numbers from 1 to 12 with the single exception of 11 (however, it is not the smallest number to have this property; 2520 is). He rectifies this "defect" by suggesting that two families could be subtracted from the citizen body to produce the number 5038, which is divisible by 11. Plato also took notice of the fact that 5040 can be divided by 12 twice over. Indeed, Plato's repeated insistence on the use of 5040 for various state purposes is so evident that it is written, "Plato, writing under Pythagorean influences, seems really to have supposed that the well-being of the city depended almost as much on the number 5040 as on justice and moderation."[1]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plato%27s_number
"Now for divine begettings there is a period comprehended by a perfect number, and for mortal by the first in which augmentations dominating and dominated when they have attained to three distances and four limits of the assimilating and the dissimilating, the waxing and the waning, render all things conversable and commensurable [546c] with one another, whereof a basal four-thirds wedded to the pempad yields two harmonies at the third augmentation, the one the product of equal factors taken one hundred times, the other of equal length one way but oblong,-one dimension of a hundred numbers determined by the rational diameters of the pempad lacking one in each case, or of the irrational lacking two; the other dimension of a hundred cubes of the triad. And this entire geometrical number is determinative of this thing, of better and inferior births."[3]

Shortly after Plato's time his meaning apparently did not cause puzzlement as Aristotle's casual remark attests.[6] Half a millennium later, however, it was an enigma for the Neoplatonists, who had a somewhat mystic penchant and wrote frequently about it, proposing geometrical and numerical interpretations. Next, for nearly a thousand years, Plato's texts disappeared and it is only in the Renaissance that the enigma briefly resurfaced. During the 19th century, when classical scholars restored original texts, the problem reappeared. Schleiermacher interrupted his edition of Plato for a decade while attempting to make sense of the paragraph. Victor Cousin inserted a note that it has to be skipped in his French translation of Plato's works. In the early 20th century, scholarly findings suggested a Babylonian origin for the topic.[7]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pythagoreanism
https://www.jstor.org/stable/638781

Socrates: Surely we agree nothing more virtuous than sacrificing each newborn infant while reciting the factors of 39,916,800?

Turgidas: Uh

different but interesting: https://aeon.co/essays/can-we-hope-to-understand-how-the-greeks-saw-their-world
Another explanation for the apparent oddness of Greek perception came from the eminent politician and Hellenist William Gladstone, who devoted a chapter of his Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age (1858) to ‘perceptions and use of colour’. He too noticed the vagueness of the green and blue designations in Homer, as well as the absence of words covering the centre of the ‘blue’ area. Where Gladstone differed was in taking as normative the Newtonian list of colours (red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, violet). He interpreted the Greeks’ supposed linguistic poverty as deriving from an imperfect discrimination of prismatic colours. The visual organ of the ancients was still in its infancy, hence their strong sensitivity to light rather than hue, and the related inability to clearly distinguish one hue from another. This argument fit well with the post-Darwinian climate of the late 19th century, and came to be widely believed. Indeed, it prompted Nietzsche’s own judgment, and led to a series of investigations that sought to prove that the Greek chromatic categories do not fit in with modern taxonomies.

Today, no one thinks that there has been a stage in the history of humanity when some colours were ‘not yet’ being perceived. But thanks to our modern ‘anthropological gaze’ it is accepted that every culture has its own way of naming and categorising colours. This is not due to varying anatomical structures of the human eye, but to the fact that different ocular areas are stimulated, which triggers different emotional responses, all according to different cultural contexts.
postrat  carcinisation  twitter  social  discussion  lol  hmm  :/  history  iron-age  mediterranean  the-classics  cocktail  trivia  quantitative-qualitative  mystic  simler  weird  multi  wiki  👽  dennett  article  philosophy  alien-character  news  org:mag  org:popup  literature  quotes  poetry  concrete  big-peeps  nietzschean  early-modern  europe  germanic  visuo  language  foreign-lang  embodied  oceans  h2o  measurement  fluid  forms-instances  westminster  lexical 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Edge.org: 2017 : WHAT SCIENTIFIC TERM OR CONCEPT OUGHT TO BE MORE WIDELY KNOWN?
highlights:
- the genetic book of the dead [Dawkins]
- complementarity [Frank Wilczek]
- relative information
- effective theory [Lisa Randall]
- affordances [Dennett]
- spontaneous symmetry breaking
- relatedly, equipoise [Nicholas Christakis]
- case-based reasoning
- population reasoning (eg, common law)
- criticality [Cesar Hidalgo]
- Haldan's law of the right size (!SCALE!)
- polygenic scores
- non-ergodic
- ansatz
- state [Aaronson]: http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=3075
- transfer learning
- effect size
- satisficing
- scaling
- the breeder's equation [Greg Cochran]
- impedance matching

soft:
- reciprocal altruism
- life history [Plomin]
- intellectual honesty [Sam Harris]
- coalitional instinct (interesting claim: building coalitions around "rationality" actually makes it more difficult to update on new evidence as it makes you look like a bad person, eg, the Cathedral)
basically same: https://twitter.com/ortoiseortoise/status/903682354367143936

more: https://www.edge.org/conversation/john_tooby-coalitional-instincts

interesting timing. how woke is this dude?
org:edge  2017  technology  discussion  trends  list  expert  science  top-n  frontier  multi  big-picture  links  the-world-is-just-atoms  metameta  🔬  scitariat  conceptual-vocab  coalitions  q-n-a  psychology  social-psych  anthropology  instinct  coordination  duty  power  status  info-dynamics  cultural-dynamics  being-right  realness  cooperate-defect  westminster  chart  zeitgeist  rot  roots  epistemic  rationality  meta:science  analogy  physics  electromag  geoengineering  environment  atmosphere  climate-change  waves  information-theory  bits  marginal  quantum  metabuch  homo-hetero  thinking  sapiens  genetics  genomics  evolution  bio  GT-101  low-hanging  minimum-viable  dennett  philosophy  cog-psych  neurons  symmetry  humility  life-history  social-structure  GWAS  behavioral-gen  biodet  missing-heritability  ergodic  machine-learning  generalization  west-hunter  population-genetics  methodology  blowhards  spearhead  group-level  scale  magnitude  business  scaling-tech  tech  business-models  optimization  effect-size  aaronson  state  bare-hands  problem-solving  politics 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Reason is but a slave of passions as it always has been – Gene Expression
http://www.unz.com/gnxp/winning-isnt-everything-winning-your-team-is/
In my short jaunt through Theory writ large I have finally come that conclusion as well. I am a naive realist and a positivist. I work under the assumption that there is a world out there, that that world out there manifests itself in the order we see when we decompose it with analysis and empirical methods. As long as I kept my eyes on prize, the “score,” I felt at peace.

This was dangerously naive. Whereas before I had worked under the hypothesis that my interlocutors were falling prey to cognitive biases when they engaged in ad hominem or logical fallacy, I am now coming to suspect that one some level they are aware that they are engaging in the dialectics of ultimate victory. Every battle they lose is simply another opportunity to shore up their forces in future battles. Just like Rome against Hannibal, their contention that the structure of human society, rather than the world “out there,” is determinative, may very well be true in relation to all that matters.

hmm, women?: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:f155b33f986c

https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/03/26/open-thread-03262017/
Honestly I’ve given up on the future of classical liberalism in the West. Most people are cowards and liars when push comes to shove. I don’t want to speak of this at length, as it’s a bit like a God-is-dead moment for me, but I thought I’d come clean and be frank. The Critical Theorists are right, power trumps truth. I’m not sure they’ll enjoy what’s to come in the future when objectivity is dethroned, but I think I will probably laugh as the liars scramble to lie different lies, because that is almost certain to happen.

https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/06/12/open-thread-06112017/
Ultimately I think our society is going the way of Dutch Pillarisation (though I think the Dutch have abandoned this). Basically our professional and personal lives are going to be mediated by our socio-political tribes (and it won’t just be Left vs. Right). Too many people are getting fired or pressured over their politics or viewpoints. At some point large corporations and institutions need to just give up on the idea that they serve the whole public, and intellectuals need to concede that public reason is probably not possible.

...

I see referrals to this website now and people make comments about me elsewhere (on reddit, in the comments of Unz, on blogs). Some are wondering about my recent pessimism and darkness of spirit. Because people are stupid or socially unintelligent or something they think they can infer something about my personal or professional circumstances from what I put on this website, no matter how many times I caution them not to do that. I’m pretty clear about separating aspects of my life (I’m not a lifestyle blogger…hot sauce blogging excepted).

What I will say is that I’m very happy at my job and have plenty of friends. My third child and second son is a delight.

The darkness you perceive in my soul is that I suspect that the liberal order, which encompasses politics as well as the intellectual world we’ve cherished since the 19th century, is collapsing around us. Just as the Chinese in 1790 or the Romans in 460 were not aware that their world was coming to an end, we continue to carry on as if all is as it was. I’m sort of at the phase between the death of Optimus Prime in the 1980s cartoon and the emergence of Rodimus. I’m not going to turn into a bald-faced liar or ignoramus like so many of the people in the media around us just yet though (you know who I’m talking about I’m sure). Old ways are hard to give up! God has died but his shadow haunts me.
gnxp  scitariat  rhetoric  essay  truth  values  ideology  meta:rhetoric  anthropology  rationality  epistemic  genetics  gene-flow  europe  germanic  pop-structure  race  social-norms  cultural-dynamics  tribalism  science  within-group  zeitgeist  info-dynamics  cynicism-idealism  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  identity-politics  is-ought  whiggish-hegelian  modernity  multi  universalism-particularism  cohesion  open-things  gender  civil-liberty  exit-voice  pessimism  orwellian  feudal  the-self  reason  dennett  within-without  illusion 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Tales of the Chinese future past – Gene Expression
older: http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/gnxp/2007/09/the-past-and-the-future/
That being said, the past is likely a guide that the Chinese imperialism of the 21st century will not take the form of massed invasions and conquests, but rather client-patron relationships which reinforce the rise of a new hegemon.

Why Confucianism Matters: https://www.gnxp.com/WordPress/2018/01/10/why-confucianism-matters/
Why look to China? After all, there were ethical systems in the West. First, I’m not sure that the supernaturalistic religions work to bind elites together anymore due to lack of credibility. Christianity is getting weaker. My own personal hunch is that the current wave of Islamic assertiveness and violence is the paroxysm of a civilization confronting its irrelevance.

Second, Classical Antiquity had plenty of ethical systems, especially during the Hellenistic and Roman period. But Rome collapsed. There was a great rupture between antiquity and the medieval period. In contrast, the Confucian and Neo-Confucian system persisted down to the early 20th century in classical form and casts a strong shadow over East Asia even today. While Stoicism had personal relevance, Confucianism was designed to scale from the individual all the way to the imperial state.

The 1960s saw a radical transition to notional social egalitarianism in the West. This is the world I grew up and matured in. Arguably, I believed in its rightness, inevitability, and eternal dominance, until very recently. But I think that today that model is fraying and people are looking to find some mooring. In particular, I think we are in need of a rectification of names. From Wikipedia:

Confucius was asked what he would do if he was a governor. He said he would “rectify the names” to make words correspond to reality. The phrase has now become known as a doctrine of feudal Confucian designations and relationships, behaving accordingly to ensure social harmony. Without such accordance society would essentially crumble and “undertakings would not be completed.”

How are we supposed to behave with each given person? A lot of this is free-form and improvisational today, and it turns out that many people are not comfortable with this. Humans need scripts.

Finally, the world that Confucianism developed was highly stratified, though there was some chance of advancement. It was not a calcified caste system, but it was a hierarchical one. I believe that is the system that we are moving toward in the West, and it seems that a system that takes for granted non-egalitarianism, such as Confucianism, may benefit us.

Spandrell: https://www.gnxp.com/WordPress/2018/01/10/why-confucianism-matters/#comment-6358
I’d say that arguably Confucianism only really flourished after the Song dynasty broke the Chinese aristocracy and instituted a fully civilian ruling class. Confucianism was a force for egalitarianism if anything. It was the religion of the mandarins, not of the people.

If we were to make an analogy to Chinese history I’d say we are more like in the Eastern Han, with private patronage networks taking over the state from within. The result of that wasn’t a strong confucianism. The result was the spread of Buddhism. A very different beast.

https://twitter.com/thespandrell/status/951469782053871616
https://archive.is/m0XAq
Read and check the comments. I wish it were true; I could sell a couple of books if anything. But Confucianism is an ideology of absolutism, not of oligarchy.

The Western Rectification Of Names: https://www.gnxp.com/WordPress/2015/03/09/the-western-rectification-of-names/
The important insight we can gain from the longevity of a Confucian political philosophy is that its core theses do have some utility for complex societies. Unlike that of Rome the Chinese order of two thousand years ago actually persisted down to living memory, with the fall of the Ching in the early 20th century. Confucius believed he was a traditionalist, rediscovering ancient insights as to the proper relations between human beings. I suspect this is correct, insofar as the Golden Mean he and his humanistic followers recommended between the cold and cruel utilitarianism of the Legalists and the unrealistic one of the followers of Mozi is probably the best fit to human psychological dispositions (both the Legalists and Mohists were suspicious of the family).** In the disordered world of the late Zhou, on the precipice of the Warring States period, Confucius and his followers elucidated what was really common sense, but repackaged in a fashion which would appeal more systematically to elites, and scaffold their own more egotistical impulses (in contrast to the Legalists, who seem to have enshrined the ego of the ruler as the summum bonum).

And that is the reality which we face today. Our world is not on the precipice of war, but social and technological changes are such that we are in a period where a new rectification of names is warranted. Old categories of sex, gender, religion and race, are falling or reordering. Western society is fracturing, as the intelligentsia promote their own parochial categories, and traditionalists dissent and retreat into their own subcultures. To give two examples, there are those who might find offense if addressed by the pronoun he or she, even though this is an old convention in Western society. In contrast, traditionalist Christian subcultures no longer have unified control of the public domain which would allow for them to promulgate the basis of their values. There are those who might accede to traditional Christian claims who can not agree with their metaphysics, which the traditional Christians hold to be necessary to be in full agreement.*** In contrast, the progressive faction which declaims the morally restrictive manners of the traditionalist Right in fact belies its own assertions by the proliferation of terms which serve to define the elect from those who do not uphold proper morals and manners.

Why I Am Not A New Atheist: https://www.gnxp.com/WordPress/2018/01/11/why-i-am-not-a-new-atheist/
Fundamentally I do not think this is correct. Nor do I think that religious beliefs have much to do with logic or reason. Religion is a complex phenomenon which is rooted in supernatural intuitions and then evolves further in a cultural context, with some possible functional utility as a group-marker.

Second, I do not think religion is the “root of all evil”, and so see no need to convert the world to atheism. Obviously, the horror of Communism illustrates that removing supernatural religion does not remove the human impulse to atrocity.

More recently, I have been convinced that truth and knowledge is a minor value to most humans, including elites. Lying is pretty ubiquitous, and most people are rather satisfied with big lies girding social norms and conventions. One may try to avoid “living by lies” in private, but actually promoting this viewpoint in public is ridiculously self-destructive. Most people could care less about the truth,* while elites simply manipulate facts to buttress their social positions and engage in control.

In other words, the New Atheists seem to think that it’s a worthy to aim to enlighten humanity toward views which they believe align with reality.

At this point, I care about converting the common man to a true understanding of reality as much as I care about a cow grokking trigonometry. I don’t.

https://twitter.com/razibkhan/status/954392158198525953
https://archive.is/TXjN0
i have long believed many 'traditional' institutions and folkways which we in the post-materialist world look askance at are not traditional, but ad hoc cultural kludges and patches for ppl to manage to survive in villages where our cognitive toolkit wasn't sufficient
in an affluent liberal democratic context they may indeed be outmoded and easy to slough off. but if a different form of life, characterized by malthusian immiseration, comes to dominate then the kludges will come back
gnxp  scitariat  books  summary  review  fiction  futurism  china  asia  sinosphere  values  order-disorder  civil-liberty  truth  individualism-collectivism  philosophy  nostalgia  leviathan  civilization  zeitgeist  orient  great-powers  the-great-west-whale  realness  confucian  formal-values  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  expansionism  exit-voice  is-ought  flux-stasis  scifi-fantasy  n-factor  modernity  multi  orwellian  noble-lie  reason  europe  occident  literature  big-peeps  morality  ethics  egalitarianism-hierarchy  inequality  antidemos  democracy  sulla  conquest-empire  history  iron-age  mediterranean  the-classics  islam  terrorism  gnon  right-wing  poast  religion  theos  analogy  technocracy  christianity  trends  class  managerial-state  nationalism-globalism  the-bones  prediction  tradition  ideology  feudal  vitality  counter-revolution  nascent-state  comparison  elite  cohesion  absolute-relative  twitter  social  commentary  backup  communism  dennett  westminster  info-dynamics  signaling  coalitions  descriptiv 
may 2017 by nhaliday
When conquered pre-Greece took captive her rude Hellene conqueror – Gene Expression
For various reasons this was always less plausible for Southern Europe. The first reason is that Southern Europeans shared a lot of genetic similarities to Sardinians, who resembled Neolithic farmers. Admixture models generally suggested that in the peninsulas of Southern Europe the steppe-like ancestry was the minority component, not the majority, as was the case in Northern Europe.

different for the Romans: https://www.quora.com/Were-the-Romans-Greek-or-Italians
http://www.unz.com/gnxp/the-etruscan-origins-mystery-and-genetics/

https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/08/02/when-the-ancestors-were-cyclops/
book recommendations for Ancient Greece: https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/08/02/when-the-ancestors-were-cyclops/#comment-3356
http://www.nature.com.sci-hub.tw/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature23310.html

Roots of Mediterranean civilisations: http://sci-hub.tw/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960982217311740
gnxp  scitariat  history  antiquity  iron-age  mediterranean  europe  the-classics  gavisti  genetics  gene-flow  pop-structure  migration  sapiens  archaeology  conquest-empire  simler  dennett  👽  multi  q-n-a  qra  lived-experience  culture  myth  alien-character  study  org:nat  pdf  piracy  roots  the-great-west-whale  civilization  aDNA  books  recommendations  confluence  poast  occident  religion  christianity  traces 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Proto-Indo-European society - Wikipedia
Linguistics has allowed the reliable reconstruction of a large number of words relating to kinship relations. These all agree in exhibiting a patriarchal, patrilocal and patrilineal social fabric. Patrilocality is confirmed by lexical evidence, including the word *h2u̯edh, "to lead (away)", being the word that denotes a male wedding a female (but not vice versa). It is also the dominant pattern in historical IE societies, and matrilocality would be unlikely in a patrilineal society.[1]

Inferences have been made for sacral kingship, suggesting the tribal chief at the same time assumed the role of high priest. Georges Dumézil suggested for Proto-Indo-European society a threefold division of a clerical class, a warrior class and a class of farmers or husbandmen, on his interpretations that many historically known groups speaking Indo-European languages show such a division, but Dumézil's approach has been widely criticised.[citation needed]

If there was a separate class of warriors, it probably consisted of single young men. They would have followed a separate warrior code unacceptable in the society outside their peer-group.[citation needed] Traces of initiation rites in several Indo-European societies (e.g. early Slav, Volcae, Neuri and their lupine ritualism) suggest that this group identified itself with wolves or dogs (see Berserker, Werewolf, Wild Hunt).

The people were organized in settlements (*weiḱs; Sanskrit viś, Polish wieś "village"; Ancient Greek woikos "home"; Latin vicus), probably each with its chief (*h₃rēǵs—Sanskrit rājan, Latin rex, reg-, Gaulish -riks). These settlements or villages were further divided in households (*domos; Latin domus, Polish dom), each headed by a patriarch (*dems-potis; Ancient Greek despotes, Sanskrit dampati, Polish pan domu).

...

Proto-Indo-European society depended on animal husbandry. People valued cattle (*péḱu – Vedic Sanskrit páśu, Latin pecu- *gʷōus – Sanskrit go, Latin bo-) as their most important animals, measuring a man's wealth by the number of cows he owned (Latin pecunia 'money' from pecus). Sheep (*h₃ówis) and goats (*gʰáidos) were also kept, presumably by the less wealthy. Agriculture and catching fish (*písḱos) also featured.[original research?]

The domestication of the horse (*h₁eḱuos – Vedic Sanskrit áśvas, Latin equus, Greek hippos) (see Tarpan) may have originated with these peoples: scholars sometimes invoke this as a factor contributing to their rapid expansion.

Trifunctional hypothesis: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trifunctional_hypothesis
The trifunctional hypothesis of prehistoric Proto-Indo-European society postulates a tripartite ideology ("idéologie tripartite") reflected in the existence of three classes or castes—priests, warriors, and commoners (farmers or tradesmen)—corresponding to the three functions of the sacral, the martial and the economic, respectively. The trifunctional thesis is primarily associated with the French mythographer Georges Dumézil,[1] who proposed it in 1929 in the book Flamen-Brahman,[2] and later in Mitra-Varuna.[3]

...

According to Dumézil (1898-1986), Proto-Indo-European society comprised three main groups corresponding to three distinct functions:[2][3]

- Sovereignty, which fell into two distinct and complementary sub-parts:
* one formal, juridical and priestly but worldly;
* the other powerful, unpredictable, and also priestly but rooted in the supernatural world.
- Military, connected with force, the military and war.
- Productivity, herding, farming and crafts; ruled by the other two.

The Trinity and the Indo-European Tripartite Worldview: http://www.jedp.com/trinity.html

Proto-Indo-European religion: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proto-Indo-European_religion
Various schools of thought exist regarding the precise nature of Proto-Indo-European religion, which do not always agree with each other. Vedic mythology, Roman mythology, and Norse mythology are the main mythologies normally used for comparative reconstruction, though they are often supplemented with supporting evidence from the Baltic, Celtic, Greek, Slavic, and Hittite traditions as well.

The Proto-Indo-European pantheon includes well-attested deities such as *Dyḗus Pḥatḗr, the god of the daylit skies, his daughter *Haéusōs, the goddess of the dawn, the Horse Twins, and the storm god *Perkwunos. Other probable deities include *Péh2usōn, a pastoral god, and *Seh2ul, a Sun goddess.

Well-attested myths of the Proto-Indo-Europeans include a myth involving a storm god who slays a multi-headed serpent that dwells in water, a myth about the Sun and Moon riding in chariots across the sky, and a creation story involving two brothers, one of whom sacrifices the other to create the world. The Proto-Indo-Europeans may have believed that the Otherworld was guarded by a watchdog and could only be reached by crossing a river. They also may have believed in a world tree, bearing fruit of immortality, either guarded by or gnawed on by a serpent or dragon, and tended by three goddesses who spun the thread of life.

...

The Functionalist School holds that Proto-Indo-European society and, consequently, their religion, was largely centered around the trifunctional system proposed by Georges Dumézil,[5] which holds that Proto-Indo-European society was divided into three distinct social classes: farmers, warriors, and priests.[5][6] The Structuralist School, by contrast, argues that Proto-Indo-European religion was largely centered around the concept of dualistic opposition.[7] This approach generally tends to focus on cultural universals within the realm of mythology, rather than the genetic origins of those myths,[7] but it also offers refinements of the Dumézilian trifunctional system by highlighting the oppositional elements present within each function, such as the creative and destructive elements both found within the role of the warrior.[7]

...

Another of the most important source mythologies for comparative research is Roman mythology.[8][10] Contrary to the frequent erroneous statement made by some authors that "Rome has no myth", the Romans possessed a very complex mythological system, parts of which have been preserved through the unique Roman tendency to rationalize their myths into historical accounts.[11] Despite its relatively late attestation, Norse mythology is still considered one of the three most important of the Indo-European mythologies for comparative research,[8] simply due to the vast bulk of surviving Icelandic material.[10]

...

The usual scheme is that one of these celestial deities is male and the other female, though the exact gender of the Sun or Moon tends to vary among subsequent Indo-European mythologies.[38] The original Indo-European solar deity appears to have been female,[38] a characteristic not only supported by the higher number of sun goddesses in subsequent derivations (feminine Sól, Saule, Sulis, Solntse—not directly attested as a goddess, but feminine in gender — Étaín, Grían, Aimend, Áine, and Catha versus masculine Helios, Surya, Savitr, Usil, and Sol) (Hvare-khshaeta is of neutral gender),[38] but also by vestiges in mythologies with male solar deities (Usil in Etruscan art is depicted occasionally as a goddess, while solar characteristics in Athena and Helen of Troy still remain in Greek mythology).[38] The original Indo-European lunar deity appears to have been masculine,[38] with feminine lunar deities like Selene, Minerva, and Luna being a development exclusive to the eastern Mediterranean. Even in these traditions, remnants of male lunar deities, like Menelaus, remain.[38]

Although the sun was personified as an independent, female deity, the Proto-Indo-Europeans also visualized the sun as the eye of *Dyḗus Pḥatḗr, as seen in various reflexes: Helios as the eye of Zeus,[39][40] Hvare-khshaeta as the eye of Ahura Mazda, and the sun as "God's eye" in Romanian folklore.[41] The names of Celtic sun goddesses like Sulis and Grian may also allude to this association; the words for "eye" and "sun" are switched in these languages, hence the name of the goddesses.[42][38]
history  antiquity  sapiens  gavisti  europe  mediterranean  india  asia  nordic  iron-age  the-classics  religion  myth  theos  roots  wiki  reference  culture  archaeology  janus  multi  nature  class  society  war  martial  military  farmers-and-foragers  agriculture  law  leviathan  the-founding  sky  earth  oceans  fluid  morality  ethics  formal-values  good-evil  mystic  justice  deep-materialism  new-religion  n-factor  letters  subjective-objective  realness  truth  telos-atelos  flux-stasis  class-warfare  the-watchers  noble-lie  forms-instances  whole-partial-many  the-self  dennett  within-without  christianity  org:junk  number  polisci  institutions  ideology  linguistics  traces  paganism 
may 2017 by nhaliday
The Incoherence of the Philosophers - Wikipedia
Al-Ghazali's insistence on a radical divine immanence in the natural world has been posited[7] as one of the reasons that the spirit of scientific inquiry later withered in Islamic lands. If "Allah's hand is not chained", then there was no point in discovering the alleged laws of nature.
history  medieval  MENA  religion  islam  philosophy  science  wiki  divergence  theos  roots  explanans  causation  the-great-west-whale  occident  orient  innovation  stagnation  volo-avolo  random  order-disorder  concept  dennett  exegesis-hermeneutics  logos 
april 2017 by nhaliday
Mental Imagery > Mental Rotation (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Shepard's hypothesis was that the task would be done by forming a three-dimensional mental image of one of the depicted objects, and rotating this whole image, in the imagination, to see whether it could be brought into correspondence with the other picture. The experimental results clearly supported this idea, because it was found that, for each subject, the time taken to confirm that both objects of a pair were, in fact, identical, increased in direct proportion to the angular rotational difference between them. It was as if the subjects were rotating their mental image at a steady rate (although this might be different for each subject), so that the further they had to go to bring their image into correspondence with the reference picture, the longer it would take them. On post-experimental questioning, most of the subjects confirmed that this was indeed how they believed that they had done the task. (Interestingly, it made no difference whether the rotation was in the plane of the page, or in depth.)
org:edu  wiki  reference  philosophy  psychology  cog-psych  spatial  iq  thinking  neurons  dennett 
march 2017 by nhaliday
PsyArXiv Preprints | The blind mind: No sensory imagery in aphantasia
Unlike, the general population, experimentally naive aphantasics showed almost no imagery-based rivalry priming. Aphantasic participant's self-rated visual object imagery was also well below average, however their spatial imagery scores were above average. These data suggest that aphantasia is a condition involving a lack of sensory and phenomenal imagery, and not a lack of metacognition.
study  preprint  psychology  cog-psych  dennett  spatial  visuo 
march 2017 by nhaliday
Justified by more than logos alone - The Unz Review
The scientific study of religion is another topic where I once had a lot of interest, but where I concluded that the basic insights have stabilized. Since I stopped reading much in this area I stopped writing much about it too. To get a sense of where I’m coming from, Scott Atran’s In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion is probably the best place to start. It’s about 15 years old, but I don’t see that much has changed since then in the basics of the field.

And what are those basics? At its fundamental basics religious impulses must be understood as an outcome of our cognitive mental intuitions. All religion operates on top of this basic kernel of our mental OS. Religion may have functional utility as a social system of control, or channeling collective energies, as argued by David Sloan Wilson in Darwin’s Cathedral. Or, one might be able to fruitfully model “religious marketplaces” as argued in Marketplace of the Gods. But these are all basically simply applications installed into on top of the operating system.

...

Very few are Roman Catholic because they have read Aquinas’ Five Ways. Rather, they are Roman Catholic, in order of necessity, because God aligns with their deep intuitions, basic cognitive needs in terms of cosmological coherency, and because the church serves as an avenue for socialization and repetitive ritual which binds individuals to the greater whole. People do not believe in Catholicism as often as they are born Catholics, and the Catholic religion is rather well fitted to a range of predispositions to the typical human.

...

There are a subset of believers who are not well captured by the generalizations in books such as Slone’s, or in ethnographic descriptions which trace the assimilation of Catholicism into the American scene. They are usually highly intellectual and analytical in their orientation. Often, they seem to be converts. Rod Dreher was a convert to Catholicism from Methodism, before he became Orthodox. Leah Libresco and Eve Tushnet also seem to fall into this category. Highly intellectual. And, converts to Catholicism.

Because they are analytical and articulate, these sorts of religious people are highly prominent on the public stage, and, they also write the histories that come down to us through the centuries. These are also the type of people who are overrepresented in the clerical apparatus of any organized religion. This is a problem, because their prominence can obscure the reality that they are not as influential as you might think. As a metaphor, imagine mountainous islands scattering amidst a featureless ocean. The islands are salient. But it is the vast ocean which will ultimately be determinative. Similarly, the vast number of believers who move along a nexus of inscrutable social forces, and driven by powerful universal psychologies, may be hidden from our view.

And yet even for the “analytics” reason does not dictate. Both Dreher and Tushnet have made references to mystical and emotional occurrences and impulses which are beyond my ken. I have no need, no wish, no impulse, and no intuition as to what they are talking about in that dimension (Libresco seems a somewhat different case, but I haven’t read much of what she’s written; I suspect I’ve been in the same room with her since she worked for an organization which I have many personal connections with, but I’m not sure).

It isn’t a surprise that I think Hume was onto something when he asserted that “reason is a slave to the passions.” In many instances I suspect theological analysis is simply the analytic engine being applied to a domain whose ultimate rationale is driven by a passion.

Addendum: Leah Libresco seems to have been associated with the broad umbrella group of Bay Area rationalists. I’ve been associated in some fashion with these people as friends and acquaintances for nearly 10 years. I will admit that I’ve generally found the conceit of rationality as an ends, as opposed to a means, somewhat off-putting. Ultimately I’m more of a skeptic than a rationalist I suppose at the root.

The nature of religion and Breaking the Spell: http://www.unz.com/gnxp/the-nature-of-religion-and-breaking-the-spell/

Buddhism, a religion or not?: http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/gnxp/2007/02/buddhism-a-religion-or-not/

Against the seriousness of theology: http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/gnxp/2013/04/against-the-seriousness-of-theology/
This is the hard part for many intellectuals, religious or irreligious, to understand. For intellectuals ideas have consequences, and they shape their lives. Their religious world view is naturally inflected by this. And most importantly they confuse their own comprehension of religious life, the profession of creeds rationally understand and mystical reflection viscerally experienced, with modal religiosity. This has important consequences, because intellectuals write, and writing is permanent. It echoes down through the ages. Therefore our understanding of the broad scope of religious history is naturally shaped by how intellectuals view religion. In a superficial sense the history of religion is the history of theology, because theology is so amenable to preservation.

http://www.unz.com/gnxp/justified-by-more-than-logos-alone/

What Religion Is: https://www.gnxp.com/WordPress/2018/01/12/what-religion-is/
It’s been about 10 years since I addressed this topic. Largely because I have no new thoughts. But probably after 10 years, it’s useful to revisit/clarify on this topic to clarify confusions, since people have a lot of opinions on this topic.

People mean different things when they mean “religion,” and the different meanings are not contradictory, nor in conflict.

At the lowest level in terms of individual cognition religion emerges from deep intuitions about the nature of the universe. Colloquially one might say that religion bubbles out of our unconscious.

In relation to social units, say the clan or tribe, religion consists of these intuitions about the nature of the universe and the world around us, bound together with rituals and verbal descriptions and narratives. These rituals and communal narratives help forge some sort of group Weltanschauung that has a functional utility in terms of inter-group competition and relations. Here religion steps out of the individual and becomes an expression of collective consensus.

As human societies became more complex the role of religious professionals became more elaborated. The common role of a shaman can be thought of as a magician, one who manipulates and operates in the domain of the supernatural. Shamans are common and ubiquitous in pre-state societies (even if a tribe does not have a “professional” shaman, someone takes on the role when needed). The priest adds on top of this institutional authority, often supra-clan or tribal. No king, no priest. Eventually, though the shaman-priest took on the role of the metaphysician. The metaphysician generates abstract principles and rationales, which can transcend the tribe or ethnicity, and allows religion to generate meta-ethnic civilizational identities in the service of priestly functions.

So in the post-Axial Age, the religious professional is often shaman, priest, and philosopher.

...

What about the priest? Though I am wary of the term “political religion,” due to semantic confusion, it seems clear that the function of the priest can be stripped of its supernatural valence. Many of the most objectionable characteristics of religion for people of liberal orientations derives from the institutionalized priestly functions. Unfortunately, the persistence of the priest in the absence of gods, shamanic powers and metaphysical justification opens the doors to secular totalitarianism.

...

These different aspects of religiosity exist and persist simultaneously in most contexts, but sometimes in tension. Philosophers and priests often take a dim view of shamanic religiosity. In organized religion of the modern sort shamanism is marginalized, or highly constrained and regulated in sacraments. But the recession of state-sponsored Christianity across much of the West has arguably resulted in a resurgence of shamanism, and the proliferation of diverse supernatural beliefs which had previously been suppressed (much of East Asia is characterized by relative weakness of philosophical religion but the strength of shamanism).

The relevance of all this in relation to New Atheism is that New Atheism seems to posit a religious “Blank Slate.” That is, children are indoctrinated in religion at a small age, previous to which they had been atheists. Part of this is due to the fact that the philosophical-metaphysical aspect of religion is quite clearly indoctrination, and often of a superficial sort at that (judging by how weak most believer’s grasp of theology is). But the communal and psychological aspects are not indoctrination, as much as specific instantiations of general human sentiments, dispositions, and intuitions. The erasure of a Christian, Buddhist or Islamic religious orientation will not necessarily leave in its wake a mind primed for scientific naturalism. Rather, it will simply be one shorn of Axial-Age accretions, reverted back to the shamanic age…

Atheism As Mental Deviance: http://www.gnxp.com/WordPress/2011/09/18/atheism-as-mental-deviance/
Tyler Cowen points me to a PDF, Religious Belief Systems of Persons with High Functioning Autism, which has some fascinating results on the religiosity (or lack thereof) of people with high functioning autism. I’ve seen speculation about the peculiar psychological profile of atheists before in the cognitive science literature, and there’s a fair amount of social psychological data on the different personality profile of atheists (e.g., more disagreeable). But there hasn’t been a lot of systematic investigation of the possibility that autistic individuals are more likely to be atheist because they lack a fully fleshed “theory of mind,” which … [more]
gnxp  scitariat  religion  anthropology  books  summary  culture  sapiens  eden  roots  theos  multi  dennett  chart  org:sci  rhetoric  buddhism  ideology  realness  elite  philosophy  islam  peace-violence  christianity  comparison  history  medieval  MENA  iron-age  mediterranean  the-classics  protestant-catholic  lived-experience  systematic-ad-hoc  analytical-holistic  revolution  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  causation  commentary  news  org:mag  right-wing  douthatish  thinking  contrarianism  pseudoE  broad-econ  econotariat  cultural-dynamics  hidden-motives  noble-lie  reason  rationality  lesswrong  subculture  impetus  impact  cohesion  organizing  institutions  asia  sinosphere  usa  europe  the-great-west-whale  community  trends  zeitgeist  counter-revolution  nascent-state  marginal-rev  study  autism  👽  instinct  gnosis-logos  theory-practice  big-peeps  old-anglo 
february 2017 by nhaliday
Links 1/17: Inaugurl Address | Slate Star Codex
“Fanatics got into the Capitol building and committed a mass shooting on Congress while it was in session, and you’ve never heard of them…people have completely forgotten that in 1972 we had over nineteen hundred domestic bombings in the United States” A review of Days Of Rage and history lesson on the 1970s underground. Highly recommended.

New Yorker: The Mosul Dam in Iraq could fail soon, potentially causing a flash flood and hundreds of thousands of deaths.

An ecologist denounces calls to “drain the swamp” as an insult to swamps: “Given the sea of misinformation we currently find ourselves swimming in, I feel this is as good a time as any to clarify what swamps actually are and why they should be regarded as wonderful and valuable parts of nature rather than objects of derision and hatred.” If any of you are oceanographers, can you troll the Washington Post for me by denouncing their use of the term “sea of misinformation”?

The Seasteading Institute announces a deal with French Polynesia to build the first seastead in a lagoon there. I’m still confused on whether they’ve got funding or anything else besides the location. Still a big step.

80,000 Hours’ guide to what charities to give to this season. A good supplement to GiveWell’s Top Charities list

Vox: Why the war on poverty failed, and what to do now. In the form of a long and detailed history of Brooklyn’s Bedford-Stuyveysant neighborhood. Not clear that anyone actually knows what to do now beyond a few good common-sense suggestions.

RIP utilitarian philosopher Derek Parfit: “When I believed the non-reductionist view [of personal identity], I also cared more about my inevitable death. After my death, there will [be] no one living who will be me. I can now redescribe this fact. Though there will later be many experiences, none of these experiences will be connected to my present experiences by chains of such direct connections as those involved in experience-memory, or in the carrying out of an earlier intention. Some of these future experiences may be related to my present experiences in less direct ways. There will later be some memories about my life. And there may later be thoughts that are influenced by mine, or things done as the result of my advice. My death will break the more direct relations between my present experiences and future experiences, but it will not break various other relations. This is all there is to the fact that there will be no one living who will be me. Now that I have seen this, my death seems to me less bad.”

Alex K. Chen on Quora on the speculation that Ritalin may be long-term safer than Adderall. See also this review article. This is definitely not yet psychiatric common knowledge or consensus.

Meta-analysis in the American Journal Of Nutrition: Red meat does not increase risk of cardiovascular disease.

Acemoglu and Restropo: Economic stagnation is not due to aging populations.

User dogtasteslikechicken at the r/slatestarcodex subreddit gives a good summary of the Flynn Effect. But it looks like he is confused about some of the same things I am. For example, rich people and the nobility probably had good nutrition and education in the past. So we might expect a Flynn effect based on nutrition and education not to affect them as much. But if this were true, we would expect a skewed or bimodal distribution in the past (un-Flynned poor people with bad nutrition + Flynned rich people with good nutrition), which I don’t think ever clearly showed up.

Some fallout from the Buzzfeed story on growth mindset I linked last week. The Spectator published what I think is a really nasty and evidence-free denunciation of the phenomenon. Mindset researcher David Yeager has tried to set the record straight and argues that growth mindset actually replicates just fine, eg in this paper, and that several other large and rigorous replications are being attempted. Dweck herself has a reply up here. And Timothy Bates put his failed replications online here. Looks like it will be an interesting year in this field.

Does pupil size correlate with intelligence? (blog post, paper)
ratty  yvain  ssc  links  politics  terrorism  history  left-wing  risk  trump  lol  randy-ayndy  thiel  announcement  effective-altruism  charity  checklists  news  org:data  class  inequality  philosophy  death  profile  dennett  drugs  nootropics  attention  safety  neuro  study  meta-analysis  cardio  nutrition  food  acemoglu  economics  growth-econ  stagnation  demographics  contrarianism  trends  reddit  social  discussion  iq  growth  psychology  social-psych  albion  critique  replication  org:lite  iraq-syria  MENA  biodet  commentary  multi  current-events  growth-mindset 
january 2017 by nhaliday
The Stupidity of Dignity | New Republic
Conservative bioethics' latest, most dangerous ploy.
This spring, the President's Council on Bioethics released a 555-page report, titled Human Dignity and Bioethics. The Council, created in 2001 by George W. Bush, is a panel of scholars charged with advising the president and exploring policy issues related to the ethics of biomedical innovation, including drugs that would enhance cognition, genetic manipulation of animals or humans, therapies that could extend the lifespan, and embryonic stem cells and so-called "therapeutic cloning" that could furnish replacements for diseased tissue and organs. Advances like these, if translated into freely undertaken treatments, could make millions of people better off and no one worse off. So what's not to like? The advances do not raise the traditional concerns of bioethics, which focuses on potential harm and coercion of patients or research subjects. What, then, are the ethical concerns that call for a presidential council?

Many people are vaguely disquieted by developments (real or imagined) that could alter minds and bodies in novel ways. Romantics and Greens tend to idealize the natural and demonize technology. Traditionalists and conservatives by temperament distrust radical change. Egalitarians worry about an arms race in enhancement techniques. And anyone is likely to have a "yuck" response when contemplating unprecedented manipulations of our biology. The President's Council has become a forum for the airing of this disquiet, and the concept of "dignity" a rubric for expounding on it. This collection of essays is the culmination of a long effort by the Council to place dignity at the center of bioethics. The general feeling is that, even if a new technology would improve life and health and decrease suffering and waste, it might have to be rejected, or even outlawed, if it affronted human dignity.

Whatever that is. The problem is that "dignity" is a squishy, subjective notion, hardly up to the heavyweight moral demands assigned to it. The bioethicist Ruth Macklin, who had been fed up with loose talk about dignity intended to squelch research and therapy, threw down the gauntlet in a 2003 editorial, "Dignity Is a Useless Concept." Macklin argued that bioethics has done just fine with the principle of personal autonomy--the idea that, because all humans have the same minimum capacity to suffer, prosper, reason, and choose, no human has the right to impinge on the life, body, or freedom of another. This is why informed consent serves as the bedrock of ethical research and practice, and it clearly rules out the kinds of abuses that led to the birth of bioethics in the first place, such as Mengele's sadistic pseudoexperiments in Nazi Germany and the withholding of treatment to indigent black patients in the infamous Tuskegee syphilis study. Once you recognize the principle of autonomy, Macklin argued, "dignity" adds nothing.
news  org:mag  politics  values  morality  biotech  ethics  rhetoric  contrarianism  essay  religion  christianity  error  critique  westminster  policy  enhancement  dennett  civil-liberty  rant  philosophy  pinker  ideology  🌞  🔬  current-events  dignity  theos  formal-values  statesmen  abortion-contraception-embryo 
january 2017 by nhaliday
Notes - Gwern.net : OPTIMIZING THE ALPHABET
Dehaene describes some fascinating and convincing evidence for the first kind of innateness. In one of the most interesting chapters, he argues that the shapes we use to make written letters mirror the shapes that primates use to recognize objects. After all, I could use any arbitrary squiggle to encode the sound at the start of “Tree” instead of a T. But actually the shapes of written symbols are strikingly similar across many languages.

It turns out that T shapes are important to monkeys, too. When a monkey sees a T shape in the world, it is very likely to indicate the edge of an object — something the monkey can grab and maybe even eat. A particular area of its brain pays special attention to those significant shapes. Human brains use the same area to process letters. Dehaene makes a compelling case that these brain areas have been “recycled” for reading. “We did not invent most of our letter shapes,” he writes. “They lay dormant in our brains for millions of years, and were merely rediscovered when our species invented writing and the alphabet.”
ratty  gwern  speculation  language  writing  visuo  eden  dennett  news  org:rec  books  review  summary  roots  deep-materialism 
january 2017 by nhaliday
Shtetl-Optimized » Blog Archive » Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or, The Unconscious Expander)
In my opinion, how to construct a theory that tells us which physical systems are conscious and which aren’t—giving answers that agree with “common sense” whenever the latter renders a verdict—is one of the deepest, most fascinating problems in all of science. Since I don’t know a standard name for the problem, I hereby call it the Pretty-Hard Problem of Consciousness. Unlike with the Hard Hard Problem, I don’t know of any philosophical reason why the Pretty-Hard Problem should be inherently unsolvable; but on the other hand, humans seem nowhere close to solving it (if we had solved it, then we could reduce the abortion, animal rights, and strong AI debates to “gentlemen, let us calculate!”).

Now, I regard IIT as a serious, honorable attempt to grapple with the Pretty-Hard Problem of Consciousness: something concrete enough to move the discussion forward. But I also regard IIT as a failed attempt on the problem. And I wish people would recognize its failure, learn from it, and move on.

In my view, IIT fails to solve the Pretty-Hard Problem because it unavoidably predicts vast amounts of consciousness in physical systems that no sane person would regard as particularly “conscious” at all: indeed, systems that do nothing but apply a low-density parity-check code, or other simple transformations of their input data. Moreover, IIT predicts not merely that these systems are “slightly” conscious (which would be fine), but that they can be unboundedly more conscious than humans are.

To justify that claim, I first need to define Φ. Strikingly, despite the large literature about Φ, I had a hard time finding a clear mathematical definition of it—one that not only listed formulas but fully defined the structures that the formulas were talking about. Complicating matters further, there are several competing definitions of Φ in the literature, including ΦDM (discrete memoryless), ΦE (empirical), and ΦAR (autoregressive), which apply in different contexts (e.g., some take time evolution into account and others don’t). Nevertheless, I think I can define Φ in a way that will make sense to theoretical computer scientists. And crucially, the broad point I want to make about Φ won’t depend much on the details of its formalization anyway.

We consider a discrete system in a state x=(x1,…,xn)∈Sn, where S is a finite alphabet (the simplest case is S={0,1}). We imagine that the system evolves via an “updating function” f:Sn→Sn. Then the question that interests us is whether the xi‘s can be partitioned into two sets A and B, of roughly comparable size, such that the updates to the variables in A don’t depend very much on the variables in B and vice versa. If such a partition exists, then we say that the computation of f does not involve “global integration of information,” which on Tononi’s theory is a defining aspect of consciousness.
aaronson  tcstariat  philosophy  dennett  interdisciplinary  critique  nibble  org:bleg  within-without  the-self  neuro  psychology  cog-psych  metrics  nitty-gritty  composition-decomposition  complex-systems  cybernetics  bits  information-theory  entropy-like  forms-instances  empirical  walls  arrows  math.DS  structure  causation  quantitative-qualitative  number  extrema  optimization  abstraction  explanation  summary  degrees-of-freedom  whole-partial-many  network-structure  systematic-ad-hoc  tcs  complexity  hardness  no-go  computation  measurement  intricacy  examples  counterexample  coding-theory  linear-algebra  fields  graphs  graph-theory  expanders  math  math.CO  properties  local-global  intuition  error  definition  coupling-cohesion 
january 2017 by nhaliday
How To Be Good - The New Yorker
Parfit is thought by many to be the most original moral philosopher in the English-speaking world.
news  org:mag  morality  philosophy  dennett  profile  big-peeps  formal-values  ethics 
january 2017 by nhaliday
Are synesthetes exceptional beyond their synesthetic associations? A systematic comparison of creativity, personality, cognition, and mental imager... - PubMed - NCBI
Synesthetes scored higher on some measures of creativity, personality traits of absorption and openness, and cognitive abilities of verbal comprehension and mental imagery. The differences were smaller than those reported in the literature, indicating that previous studies may have overestimated group differences, perhaps due to biased recruitment procedures.
study  psychology  cog-psych  personality  dennett  visuo  iq 
december 2016 by nhaliday
Mental rotation and real-world wayfinding. - PubMed - NCBI
r ≈ .3

The results indicate that mental rotation skills are significantly correlated with wayfinding performance on an orienteering task. The findings also replicate sex differences in spatial ability as found in laboratory-scale studies. However, the findings complicate the discussion of mental rotation skills and sex because women often performed as well as men despite having lower mean test scores. This suggests that mental rotation ability may not be as necessary for some women's wayfinding as it is for men's navigation.

Sex Differences in Furniture Assembly Performance: An Experimental Study: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/acp.3182/abstract
fucking lol

Sex hormones predict the sensory strength and vividness of mental imagery: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25703930
- not in the direction I would expect (women have more vivid mental imagery)
- visual working memory is different

Sex hormones and mental rotation: An intensive longitudinal investigation: http://www.sciencedirect.com.sci-hub.tw/science/article/pii/S0018506X12003066
For males and females, estradiol and testosterone were significantly linearly and quadratically related to interindividual variation in performance at the beginning of the study (progesterone was linearly related to performance for females). The association between testosterone and performance differed across sexes: for males, it had an inverse U-shape, for females it was U-shaped. Towards the end of the study, none of the hormones were significantly related to performance anymore. Thus, the relationship between hormones and mental rotation performance disappeared with repeated testing.

very confusing study. seems sketchy.

Is There a Relationship Between the Performance in a Chronometric Mental-Rotations Test and Salivary Testosterone and Estradiol Levels in Children Aged 9–14 Years?: http://sci-hub.tw/10.1002/dev.21333
Results showed a significant gender difference in reaction time and rotational speed in favor of boys, and a significant age, but no gender difference in testosterone and estradiol levels. We found no significant relationships between hormonal levels and any measure of mental-rotation performance.

Having a Male Co-Twin Masculinizes Mental Rotation Performance in Females: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4438761/
There were 351 females from same-sex pairs, 223 males from same-sex pairs, 120 females from opposite-sex pairs, and 110 males from opposite-sex pairs.

hmm:
Sex Differences in Mental Rotation Ability Are a Consequence of Procedure and Artificiality of Stimuli: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40806-017-0120-x
Our results suggest that the sex difference found on this test is not due to a male advantage in spatial ability, but is an artifact of the stimuli.
study  psychology  cog-psych  psychometrics  spatial  iq  gender  correlation  comparison  psych-architecture  gender-diff  multi  embodied  lmao  attaq  pdf  piracy  🌞  hmm  visuo  dennett  endocrine  neuro-nitgrit  longitudinal  curvature  regression  oscillation  twin-study  developmental  chart  navigation  convexity-curvature 
december 2016 by nhaliday
Overcoming Bias : Why Men Are Bad At “Feelings”
Mating in mammals has a basic asymmetry – females must invest more in each child than males. This can lead to an equilibrium where males focus on impressing and having sex with as many females as possible, while females do most of the child-rearing and choose impressive males.

Since human kids require extra child-rearing, human foragers developed pair-bonding, wherein for a few years a male gave substantial resource support to help raising a kid in trade for credible signs that the kid was his. Farmers strengthened such bonds into “marriage” — while both lived, the man gave resources sufficient to raise kids, and the woman only had sex with him. Such strong pair-bonds were held together not only by threats of social punishment, but also by strong feelings of attachment.

Such bonds can break, however. And because they are asymmetric, their betrayal is also asymmetric. Women betray bonds more by temporarily having fertile sex with other men, while men betray bonds more by directing resources more permanently to other women. So when farmer husbands and wives watch for signs of betrayal, they watch for different things. Husbands watch wives more for signs of a temporary inclination toward short-term mating with other men, while wives watch husbands more for signs of an inclination to shift toward a long-term resource-giving bond with other women. (Of course they both watch for both sorts of inclinations; the issue is emphasis.)

Emotionally, Men Are Far, Women Near: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2011/08/emotional-men-are-far-women-near.html
Now add two more assumptions:
1. Each gender is more emotional about the topic area (short vs. long term mating) where its feelings are more complex, layered, and opaque.
2. Long term mating thoughts tend to be in far mode, while short term mating thoughts tend to be in near mode. (Love is far, sex is near.)

Given these assumptions we should expect emotional men to be more in far mode, and emotional women to be more in near mode. (At least if mating-related emotions are a big part of emotions overall.) And since far modes tend to have a more positive mood, we should expect men to have more positive emotions, and women more negative.

In fact, even though overall men and women are just as emotional, men report more positive and less negative emotions than women. Also, after listening to an emotional story, male hormones help one remember its far-mode-abstract gist, while female hormones help one remembrer its near-mode-concrete details. (Supporting study quotes below.)

I’ve been wondering for a while why we don’t see a general correlation between near vs. far and emotionality, and I guess this explains it – the correlation is there but it flips between genders. This also helps explain common patterns in when the genders see each other as overly or underly emotional. Women are more emotional about details (e.g., his smell, that song), while men are more emotional about generalities (e.g., patriotism, fairness). Now for those study quotes:

Love Is An Interpretation: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2013/10/love-is-an-interpretation.html
What does it mean to feel loved: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0265407517724600
Cultural consensus and individual differences in felt love

We examined different romantic and nonromantic scenarios that occur in daily life and asked people if they perceived those scenarios as loving signals and if they aligned with the cultural agreement... More specifically, we found that male participants show less knowledge of the consensus on felt love than female participants... Men are more likely to think about sexual commitment and the pleasure of intercourse when thinking about love, whereas women are more prone to thinking about love as emotional commitment and security... In terms of relationship status, we also found that people in relationships know more about the consensus on felt love than people who are single... Our results also demonstrated personality differences in people’s ability to know the consensus on felt love. Based on our findings, people who were higher in agreeableness and/ or higher in neuroticism showed more knowledge about the consensus on felt love... The finding that neuroticism is related to more knowledge of the consensus on felt love is surprising when considering the literature which typically links neuroticism to problematic relationship outcomes, such as divorce, low relationship satisfaction, marital instability, and shorter relationships... Results indicated that in this U.S. sample Black people showed less knowledge about the consensus on felt love than other racial and ethnic groups. This finding is expected because the majority of the U.S. sample recruited is of White racial/ethnic background and thus this majority (White) mostly influences the consensus on the indicators of love.

Lost For Words, On Purpose: https://www.overcomingbias.com/2014/07/lost-for-words-on-purpose.html
But consider the two cases of food and love/sex (which I’m lumping together here). It seems to me that while these topics are of comparable importance, we have a lot more ways to clearly express distinctions on foods than on love/sex. So when people want to express feelings on love/sex, they often retreat to awkward analogies and suggestive poetry.
hanson  thinking  gender  study  summary  near-far  gender-diff  emotion  ratty  sex  sexuality  signum  endocrine  correlation  phalanges  things  multi  psychology  social-psych  wordlessness  demographics  race  language  signaling  X-not-about-Y  dimensionality  degrees-of-freedom  consilience  homo-hetero  farmers-and-foragers  social-structure  number  duty  morality  symmetry  EEA  evopsych  hidden-motives  illusion  within-without  dennett  open-closed  hypocrisy  detail-architecture  time  apollonian-dionysian  long-short-run  cooperate-defect 
october 2016 by nhaliday
Generalizing From One Example - Less Wrong
My old professor, David Berman, liked to talk about what he called the "typical mind fallacy", which he illustrated through the following example:

There was a debate, in the late 1800s, about whether "imagination" was simply a turn of phrase or a real phenomenon. That is, can people actually create images in their minds which they see vividly, or do they simply say "I saw it in my mind" as a metaphor for considering what it looked like?

Upon hearing this, my response was "How the stars was this actually a real debate? Of course we have mental imagery. Anyone who doesn't think we have mental imagery is either such a fanatical Behaviorist that she doubts the evidence of her own senses, or simply insane." Unfortunately, the professor was able to parade a long list of famous people who denied mental imagery, including some leading scientists of the era. And this was all before Behaviorism even existed.

The debate was resolved by Francis Galton, a fascinating man who among other achievements invented eugenics, the "wisdom of crowds", and standard deviation. Galton gave people some very detailed surveys, and found that some people did have mental imagery and others didn't. The ones who did had simply assumed everyone did, and the ones who didn't had simply assumed everyone didn't, to the point of coming up with absurd justifications for why they were lying or misunderstanding the question. There was a wide spectrum of imaging ability, from about five percent of people with perfect eidetic imagery to three percent of people completely unable to form mental images.

Dr. Berman dubbed this the Typical Mind Fallacy: the human tendency to believe that one's own mental structure can be generalized to apply to everyone else's.

--

my favorite comment:
Interesting illustration of mental imagery (from Dennett):

Picture a 3 by 3 grid. Then picture the words "gas", "oil", and "dry" spelled downwards in the columns left to right in that order. Looking at the picture in your mind, read the words across on the grid.

I can figure out what the words are of course, but it is very hard for me to read them off the grid. I should be able to if I could actually picture it. It was fascinating for me to think that this isn't true for everyone.
ratty  lesswrong  yvain  thinking  psychology  rationality  essay  dennett  cog-psych  operational  biases  pre-2013  gedanken  visuo  spatial  galton  neurons  giants  early-modern  big-peeps  quiz  stories  experiment  empirical  old-anglo  pre-ww2  wordlessness 
october 2016 by nhaliday
Third Man factor - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Scientific explanations consider this a coping mechanism or an example of bicameralism.
wiki  reference  psychology  weird  mystic  simler  dennett  👽  volo-avolo 
september 2016 by nhaliday
« earlier      
per page:    204080120160

bundles : softvague

related tags

2016-election  80000-hours  :/  aaronson  abortion-contraception-embryo  absolute-relative  abstraction  academia  accuracy  acemoglu  acm  acmtariat  aDNA  africa  age-generation  age-of-discovery  aging  agri-mindset  agriculture  ai  ai-control  albion  algorithmic-econ  alien-character  alignment  altruism  analogy  analysis  analytical-holistic  announcement  anthropic  anthropology  antidemos  antiquity  aphorism  apollonian-dionysian  applicability-prereqs  applications  approximation  archaeology  aristos  arms  arrows  art  article  ascetic  asia  atmosphere  attaq  attention  audio  authoritarianism  autism  automation  axelrod  axioms  backup  bare-hands  bayesian  beauty  behavioral-econ  behavioral-gen  being-becoming  being-right  biases  big-peeps  big-picture  big-surf  bio  biodet  bioinformatics  biotech  bits  blog  blowhards  books  bostrom  bounded-cognition  brain-scan  britain  broad-econ  buddhism  business  business-models  c:*  c:***  california  canon  capitalism  carcinisation  cardio  causation  chapman  charity  chart  cheatsheet  checklists  chemistry  china  christianity  civil-liberty  civilization  class  class-warfare  clever-rats  climate-change  coalitions  coarse-fine  cocktail  coding-theory  cog-psych  cohesion  cold-war  comedy  coming-apart  commentary  communication  communism  community  comparison  competition  complement-substitute  complex-systems  complexity  composition-decomposition  computation  concept  conceptual-vocab  concrete  concurrency  confidence  confluence  confucian  conquest-empire  consilience  constraint-satisfaction  context  contradiction  contrarianism  control  convergence  convexity-curvature  cool  cooperate-defect  coordination  correlation  corruption  cost-benefit  counter-revolution  counterexample  coupling-cohesion  cracker-econ  creative  crime  criminal-justice  criminology  critique  cs  cultural-dynamics  culture  culture-war  current-events  curvature  cybernetics  cycles  cynicism-idealism  dark-arts  darwinian  data  database  death  debate  decentralized  decision-making  decision-theory  deep-learning  deep-materialism  deepgoog  definite-planning  definition  degrees-of-freedom  democracy  demographics  dennett  density  descriptive  detail-architecture  developing-world  developmental  dignity  dimensionality  direct-indirect  direction  dirty-hands  discipline  discrete  discussion  disease  distribution  divergence  diversity  domestication  dominant-minority  douthatish  drugs  duality  duplication  duty  dynamic  dynamical  dysgenics  early-modern  earth  ecology  economics  econotariat  ed-yong  eden  eden-heaven  education  EEA  effect-size  effective-altruism  efficiency  egalitarianism-hierarchy  EGT  elections  electromag  elegance  elite  embedded-cognition  embodied  emergent  emotion  empirical  ems  endocrine  enhancement  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  entanglement  entropy-like  environment  envy  epistemic  equilibrium  ergodic  error  essay  essence-existence  estimate  ethics  europe  events  evidence  evolution  evopsych  examples  exegesis-hermeneutics  existence  exit-voice  expanders  expansionism  experiment  expert  expert-experience  explanans  explanation  explore-exploit  exposition  extrema  farmers-and-foragers  fashun  fertility  feudal  feynman  fiction  field-study  fields  finiteness  fisher  fitness  flexibility  fluid  flux-stasis  food  foreign-lang  formal-values  forms-instances  free-riding  frequency  frontier  futurism  gallic  galton  game-theory  garett-jones  gavisti  gedanken  gender  gender-diff  gene-drift  gene-flow  generalization  genetics  genomics  geoengineering  geography  germanic  giants  gibbon  gnon  gnosis-logos  gnxp  god-man-beast-victim  good-evil  google  gotchas  government  graph-theory  graphs  gravity  gray-econ  great-powers  gregory-clark  group-level  group-selection  growth  growth-econ  growth-mindset  GT-101  guilt-shame  GWAS  gwern  h2o  hacker  hanson  hard-tech  hardness  hardware  hari-seldon  healthcare  henrich  heterodox  heuristic  hi-order-bits  hidden-motives  hierarchy  higher-ed  history  hive-mind  hmm  hn  homepage  homo-hetero  honor  hsu  humanity  humility  hypocrisy  hypothesis-testing  ideas  identity  identity-politics  ideology  idk  illusion  impact  impetus  impro  incentives  india  individualism-collectivism  industrial-org  inequality  inference  info-dynamics  info-foraging  infographic  information-theory  innovation  insight  instinct  institutions  integrity  intel  intelligence  interdisciplinary  interests  internet  interpretability  interview  intricacy  intuition  iq  iraq-syria  iron-age  is-ought  islam  isteveish  iteration-recursion  janus  japan  journos-pundits  judaism  judgement  justice  kinship  knowledge  korea  krugman  kumbaya-kult  labor  language  large-factor  latin-america  law  learning  lecture-notes  left-wing  legacy  legibility  len:long  lens  lesswrong  letters  levers  leviathan  lexical  life-history  linear-algebra  linguistics  links  list  literature  lived-experience  lmao  local-global  logic  logos  lol  long-short-run  longform  longitudinal  low-hanging  lower-bounds  machine-learning  madisonian  magnitude  malaise  malthus  managerial-state  manifolds  map-territory  marginal  marginal-rev  markets  martial  math  math.CO  math.DS  mathtariat  meaningness  measure  measurement  mechanics  media  medicine  medieval  mediterranean  MENA  meta-analysis  meta:medicine  meta:prediction  meta:rhetoric  meta:science  metabuch  metameta  methodology  metrics  migrant-crisis  migration  military  minimalism  minimum-viable  missing-heritability  model-organism  models  modernity  moloch  morality  mostly-modern  multi  murray  music  music-theory  mutation  mystic  myth  n-factor  nascent-state  nationalism-globalism  natural-experiment  nature  navigation  near-far  network-structure  neuro  neuro-nitgrit  neurons  new-religion  news  nibble  nietzschean  nihil  nitty-gritty  no-go  noble-lie  noblesse-oblige  nonlinearity  nootropics  nordic  north-weingast-like  nostalgia  novelty  number  nutrition  occam  occident  oceans  offense-defense  old-anglo  oly  open-closed  open-things  operational  optimism  optimization  order-disorder  org:bleg  org:data  org:edge  org:edu  org:junk  org:lite  org:mag  org:mat  org:med  org:nat  org:popup  org:rec  org:sci  org:theos  organizing  orient  orwellian  oscillation  paganism  paleocon  papers  paradox  parallax  parsimony  patience  paying-rent  pdf  peace-violence  people  personality  persuasion  pessimism  phalanges  phase-transition  philosophy  phys-energy  physics  pic  pinker  piracy  play  plots  pls  poast  podcast  poetry  polarization  policy  polisci  politics  poll  pop-diff  pop-structure  popsci  population  population-genetics  postmortem  postrat  power  ppl  pragmatic  pre-2013  pre-ww2  prediction  prediction-markets  predictive-processing  preference-falsification  preprint  presentation  primitivism  priors-posteriors  privacy  problem-solving  profile  programming  propaganda  properties  property-rights  protestant-catholic  prudence  pseudoE  psych-architecture  psychedelics  psychiatry  psychology  psychometrics  public-goodish  putnam-like  q-n-a  qra  QTL  quality  quantitative-qualitative  quantum  quantum-info  questions  quixotic  quiz  quotes  race  random  randy-ayndy  rant  rat-pack  rationality  ratty  reading  realness  reason  recent-selection  recommendations  reddit  reduction  reference  reflection  regression  regression-to-mean  regulation  reinforcement  relativity  religion  rent-seeking  replication  responsibility  retention  revealed-preference  review  revolution  rhetoric  right-wing  rigor  risk  ritual  roots  rot  russia  s:*  s:**  safety  sanctity-degradation  sapiens  scale  scaling-tech  schelling  science  scifi-fantasy  scitariat  search  selection  self-control  self-interest  sequential  sex  sexuality  shift  signal-noise  signaling  signum  simler  simulation  singularity  sinosphere  skeleton  skunkworks  sky  sleep  slippery-slope  smoothness  social  social-capital  social-choice  social-norms  social-psych  social-science  social-structure  sociality  society  software  space  spatial  speaking  spearhead  speculation  speed  speedometer  spengler  spock  sports  ssc  stackex  stagnation  stat-mech  stat-power  state  statesmen  stats  status  stereotypes  stoic  stories  strategy  straussian  stream  street-fighting  structure  study  stylized-facts  subculture  subjective-objective  sulla  summary  survey  symmetry  synthesis  systematic-ad-hoc  tainter  taxes  tcs  tcstariat  teaching  tech  technocracy  technology  telos-atelos  terrorism  tetlock  the-basilisk  the-bones  the-classics  the-devil  the-founding  the-great-west-whale  the-self  the-trenches  the-watchers  the-west  the-world-is-just-atoms  theory-of-mind  theory-practice  theos  thermo  thick-thin  thiel  things  thinking  threat-modeling  time  time-preference  tocqueville  todo  top-n  toxoplasmosis  traces  track-record  trade  tradeoffs  tradition  trees  trends  tribalism  trivia  trump  trust  truth  turchin  turing  twin-study  twitter  unaffiliated  unintended-consequences  unit  universalism-particularism  urban  urban-rural  us-them  usa  utopia-dystopia  vague  values  variance-components  video  virginia-DC  virtu  visualization  visuo  vitality  volo-avolo  walls  war  water  waves  wealth  wealth-of-nations  web  weird  west-hunter  westminster  whiggish-hegelian  whole-partial-many  wiki  wire-guided  wisdom  within-group  within-without  woah  wonkish  wordlessness  workshop  world-war  writing  wtf  X-not-about-Y  yvain  zeitgeist  🌞  🎓  🐝  👽  🔬  🤖  🦀 

Copy this bookmark:



description:


tags: