nhaliday + behavioral-econ   92

[1804.04268] Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignment
We suggest that the analysis of incomplete contracting developed by law and economics researchers can provide a useful framework for understanding the AI alignment problem and help to generate a systematic approach to finding solutions. We first provide an overview of the incomplete contracting literature and explore parallels between this work and the problem of AI alignment. As we emphasize, misalignment between principal and agent is a core focus of economic analysis. We highlight some technical results from the economics literature on incomplete contracts that may provide insights for AI alignment researchers. Our core contribution, however, is to bring to bear an insight that economists have been urged to absorb from legal scholars and other behavioral scientists: the fact that human contracting is supported by substantial amounts of external structure, such as generally available institutions (culture, law) that can supply implied terms to fill the gaps in incomplete contracts. We propose a research agenda for AI alignment work that focuses on the problem of how to build AI that can replicate the human cognitive processes that connect individual incomplete contracts with this supporting external structure.
nibble  preprint  org:mat  papers  ai  ai-control  alignment  coordination  contracts  law  economics  interests  culture  institutions  number  context  behavioral-econ  composition-decomposition  rent-seeking  whole-partial-many 
april 2018 by nhaliday
Prisoner's dilemma - Wikipedia
caveat to result below:
An extension of the IPD is an evolutionary stochastic IPD, in which the relative abundance of particular strategies is allowed to change, with more successful strategies relatively increasing. This process may be accomplished by having less successful players imitate the more successful strategies, or by eliminating less successful players from the game, while multiplying the more successful ones. It has been shown that unfair ZD strategies are not evolutionarily stable. The key intuition is that an evolutionarily stable strategy must not only be able to invade another population (which extortionary ZD strategies can do) but must also perform well against other players of the same type (which extortionary ZD players do poorly, because they reduce each other's surplus).[14]

Theory and simulations confirm that beyond a critical population size, ZD extortion loses out in evolutionary competition against more cooperative strategies, and as a result, the average payoff in the population increases when the population is bigger. In addition, there are some cases in which extortioners may even catalyze cooperation by helping to break out of a face-off between uniform defectors and win–stay, lose–switch agents.[8]

https://alfanl.com/2018/04/12/defection/
Nature boils down to a few simple concepts.

Haters will point out that I oversimplify. The haters are wrong. I am good at saying a lot with few words. Nature indeed boils down to a few simple concepts.

In life, you can either cooperate or defect.

Used to be that defection was the dominant strategy, say in the time when the Roman empire started to crumble. Everybody complained about everybody and in the end nothing got done. Then came Jesus, who told people to be loving and cooperative, and boom: 1800 years later we get the industrial revolution.

Because of Jesus we now find ourselves in a situation where cooperation is the dominant strategy. A normie engages in a ton of cooperation: with the tax collector who wants more and more of his money, with schools who want more and more of his kid’s time, with media who wants him to repeat more and more party lines, with the Zeitgeist of the Collective Spirit of the People’s Progress Towards a New Utopia. Essentially, our normie is cooperating himself into a crumbling Western empire.

Turns out that if everyone blindly cooperates, parasites sprout up like weeds until defection once again becomes the standard.

The point of a post-Christian religion is to once again create conditions for the kind of cooperation that led to the industrial revolution. This necessitates throwing out undead Christianity: you do not blindly cooperate. You cooperate with people that cooperate with you, you defect on people that defect on you. Christianity mixed with Darwinism. God and Gnon meet.

This also means we re-establish spiritual hierarchy, which, like regular hierarchy, is a prerequisite for cooperation. It is this hierarchical cooperation that turns a household into a force to be reckoned with, that allows a group of men to unite as a front against their enemies, that allows a tribe to conquer the world. Remember: Scientology bullied the Cathedral’s tax department into submission.

With a functioning hierarchy, men still gossip, lie and scheme, but they will do so in whispers behind closed doors. In your face they cooperate and contribute to the group’s wellbeing because incentives are thus that contributing to group wellbeing heightens status.

Without a functioning hierarchy, men gossip, lie and scheme, but they do so in your face, and they tell you that you are positively deluded for accusing them of gossiping, lying and scheming. Seeds will not sprout in such ground.

Spiritual dominance is established in the same way any sort of dominance is established: fought for, taken. But the fight is ritualistic. You can’t force spiritual dominance if no one listens, or if you are silenced the ritual is not allowed to happen.

If one of our priests is forbidden from establishing spiritual dominance, that is a sure sign an enemy priest is in better control and has vested interest in preventing you from establishing spiritual dominance..

They defect on you, you defect on them. Let them suffer the consequences of enemy priesthood, among others characterized by the annoying tendency that very little is said with very many words.

https://contingentnotarbitrary.com/2018/04/14/rederiving-christianity/
To recap, we started with a secular definition of Logos and noted that its telos is existence. Given human nature, game theory and the power of cooperation, the highest expression of that telos is freely chosen universal love, tempered by constant vigilance against defection while maintaining compassion for the defectors and forgiving those who repent. In addition, we must know the telos in order to fulfill it.

In Christian terms, looks like we got over half of the Ten Commandments (know Logos for the First, don’t defect or tempt yourself to defect for the rest), the importance of free will, the indestructibility of evil (group cooperation vs individual defection), loving the sinner and hating the sin (with defection as the sin), forgiveness (with conditions), and love and compassion toward all, assuming only secular knowledge and that it’s good to exist.

Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma is an Ultimatum Game: http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2012/07/iterated-prisoners-dilemma-is-ultimatum.html
The history of IPD shows that bounded cognition prevented the dominant strategies from being discovered for over over 60 years, despite significant attention from game theorists, computer scientists, economists, evolutionary biologists, etc. Press and Dyson have shown that IPD is effectively an ultimatum game, which is very different from the Tit for Tat stories told by generations of people who worked on IPD (Axelrod, Dawkins, etc., etc.).

...

For evolutionary biologists: Dyson clearly thinks this result has implications for multilevel (group vs individual selection):
... Cooperation loses and defection wins. The ZD strategies confirm this conclusion and make it sharper. ... The system evolved to give cooperative tribes an advantage over non-cooperative tribes, using punishment to give cooperation an evolutionary advantage within the tribe. This double selection of tribes and individuals goes way beyond the Prisoners' Dilemma model.

implications for fractionalized Europe vis-a-vis unified China?

and more broadly does this just imply we're doomed in the long run RE: cooperation, morality, the "good society", so on...? war and group-selection is the only way to get a non-crab bucket civilization?

Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent:
http://www.pnas.org/content/109/26/10409.full
http://www.pnas.org/content/109/26/10409.full.pdf
https://www.edge.org/conversation/william_h_press-freeman_dyson-on-iterated-prisoners-dilemma-contains-strategies-that

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ultimatum_game

analogy for ultimatum game: the state gives the demos a bargain take-it-or-leave-it, and...if the demos refuses...violence?

The nature of human altruism: http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.nature.com/articles/nature02043
- Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher

Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our social relations, and the organization of society are centred around issues of altruism and selfishness. Experimental evidence indicates that human altruism is a powerful force and is unique in the animal world. However, there is much individual heterogeneity and the interaction between altruists and selfish individuals is vital to human cooperation. Depending on the environment, a minority of altruists can force a majority of selfish individuals to cooperate or, conversely, a few egoists can induce a large number of altruists to defect. Current gene-based evolutionary theories cannot explain important patterns of human altruism, pointing towards the importance of both theories of cultural evolution as well as gene–culture co-evolution.

...

Why are humans so unusual among animals in this respect? We propose that quantitatively, and probably even qualitatively, unique patterns of human altruism provide the answer to this question. Human altruism goes far beyond that which has been observed in the animal world. Among animals, fitness-reducing acts that confer fitness benefits on other individuals are largely restricted to kin groups; despite several decades of research, evidence for reciprocal altruism in pair-wise repeated encounters4,5 remains scarce6–8. Likewise, there is little evidence so far that individual reputation building affects cooperation in animals, which contrasts strongly with what we find in humans. If we randomly pick two human strangers from a modern society and give them the chance to engage in repeated anonymous exchanges in a laboratory experiment, there is a high probability that reciprocally altruistic behaviour will emerge spontaneously9,10.

However, human altruism extends far beyond reciprocal altruism and reputation-based cooperation, taking the form of strong reciprocity11,12. Strong reciprocity is a combination of altruistic rewarding, which is a predisposition to reward others for cooperative, norm-abiding behaviours, and altruistic punishment, which is a propensity to impose sanctions on others for norm violations. Strong reciprocators bear the cost of rewarding or punishing even if they gain no individual economic benefit whatsoever from their acts. In contrast, reciprocal altruists, as they have been defined in the biological literature4,5, reward and punish only if this is in their long-term self-interest. Strong reciprocity thus constitutes a powerful incentive for cooperation even in non-repeated interactions and when reputation gains are absent, because strong reciprocators will reward those who cooperate and punish those who defect.

...

We will show that the interaction between selfish and strongly reciprocal … [more]
concept  conceptual-vocab  wiki  reference  article  models  GT-101  game-theory  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  trust  cooperate-defect  coordination  iteration-recursion  sequential  axelrod  discrete  smoothness  evolution  evopsych  EGT  economics  behavioral-econ  sociology  new-religion  deep-materialism  volo-avolo  characterization  hsu  scitariat  altruism  justice  group-selection  decision-making  tribalism  organizing  hari-seldon  theory-practice  applicability-prereqs  bio  finiteness  multi  history  science  social-science  decision-theory  commentary  study  summary  giants  the-trenches  zero-positive-sum  🔬  bounded-cognition  info-dynamics  org:edge  explanation  exposition  org:nat  eden  retention  long-short-run  darwinian  markov  equilibrium  linear-algebra  nitty-gritty  competition  war  explanans  n-factor  europe  the-great-west-whale  occident  china  asia  sinosphere  orient  decentralized  markets  market-failure  cohesion  metabuch  stylized-facts  interdisciplinary  physics  pdf  pessimism  time  insight  the-basilisk  noblesse-oblige  the-watchers  ideas  l 
march 2018 by nhaliday
Are Sunk Costs Fallacies? - Gwern.net
But to what extent is the sunk cost fallacy a real fallacy?
Below, I argue the following:
1. sunk costs are probably issues in big organizations
- but maybe not ones that can be helped
2. sunk costs are not issues in animals
3. sunk costs appear to exist in children & adults
- but many apparent instances of the fallacy are better explained as part of a learning strategy
- and there’s little evidence sunk cost-like behavior leads to actual problems in individuals
4. much of what we call sunk cost looks like simple carelessness & thoughtlessness
ratty  gwern  analysis  meta-analysis  faq  biases  rationality  decision-making  decision-theory  economics  behavioral-econ  realness  cost-benefit  learning  wire-guided  marginal  age-generation  aging  industrial-org  organizing  coordination  nature  retention  knowledge  iq  education  tainter  management  government  competition  equilibrium  models  roots  chart 
december 2017 by nhaliday
Behaving Discretely: Heuristic Thinking in the Emergency Department
I find compelling evidence of heuristic thinking in this setting: patients arriving in the emergency department just after their 40th birthday are roughly 10% more likely to be tested for and 20% more likely to be diagnosed with ischemic heart disease (IHD) than patients arriving just before this date, despite the fact that the incidence of heart disease increases smoothly with age.

Figure 1: Proportion of ED patients tested for heart attack
pdf  study  economics  behavioral-econ  field-study  biases  heuristic  error  healthcare  medicine  meta:medicine  age-generation  aging  cardio  bounded-cognition  shift  trivia  cocktail  pro-rata 
december 2017 by nhaliday
The weirdest people in the world?
Abstract: Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world’s top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers – often implicitly – assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these “standard subjects” are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species – frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior – hence, there are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions of human nature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges.
pdf  study  microfoundations  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  sociology  psychology  social-psych  cog-psych  iq  biodet  behavioral-gen  variance-components  psychometrics  psych-architecture  visuo  spatial  morality  individualism-collectivism  n-factor  justice  egalitarianism-hierarchy  cooperate-defect  outliers  homo-hetero  evopsych  generalization  henrich  europe  the-great-west-whale  occident  organizing  🌞  universalism-particularism  applicability-prereqs  hari-seldon  extrema  comparison  GT-101  ecology  EGT  reinforcement  anglo  language  gavisti  heavy-industry  marginal  absolute-relative  reason  stylized-facts  nature  systematic-ad-hoc  analytical-holistic  science  modernity  behavioral-econ  s:*  illusion  cool  hmm  coordination  self-interest  social-norms  population  density  humanity  sapiens  farmers-and-foragers  free-riding  anglosphere  cost-benefit  china  asia  sinosphere  MENA  world  developing-world  neurons  theory-of-mind  network-structure  nordic  orient  signum  biases  usa  optimism  hypocrisy  humility  within-without  volo-avolo  domes 
november 2017 by nhaliday
Global Evidence on Economic Preferences
- Benjamin Enke et al

This paper studies the global variation in economic preferences. For this purpose, we present the Global Preference Survey (GPS), an experimentally validated survey dataset of time preference, risk preference, positive and negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust from 80,000 individuals in 76 countries. The data reveal substantial heterogeneity in preferences across countries, but even larger within-country heterogeneity. Across individuals, preferences vary with age, gender, and cognitive ability, yet these relationships appear partly country specific. At the country level, the data reveal correlations between preferences and bio-geographic and cultural variables such as agricultural suitability, language structure, and religion. Variation in preferences is also correlated with economic outcomes and behaviors. Within countries and subnational regions, preferences are linked to individual savings decisions, labor market choices, and prosocial behaviors. Across countries, preferences vary with aggregate outcomes ranging from per capita income, to entrepreneurial activities, to the frequency of armed conflicts.

...

This paper explores these questions by making use of the core features of the GPS: (i) coverage of 76 countries that represent approximately 90 percent of the world population; (ii) representative population samples within each country for a total of 80,000 respondents, (iii) measures designed to capture time preference, risk preference, altruism, positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, and trust, based on an ex ante experimental validation procedure (Falk et al., 2016) as well as pre-tests in culturally heterogeneous countries, (iv) standardized elicitation and translation techniques through the pre-existing infrastructure of a global polling institute, Gallup. Upon publication, the data will be made publicly available online. The data on individual preferences are complemented by a comprehensive set of covariates provided by the Gallup World Poll 2012.

...

The GPS preference measures are based on twelve survey items, which were selected in an initial survey validation study (see Falk et al., 2016, for details). The validation procedure involved conducting multiple incentivized choice experiments for each preference, and testing the relative abilities of a wide range of different question wordings and formats to predict behavior in these choice experiments. The particular items used to construct the GPS preference measures were selected based on optimal performance out of menus of alternative items (for details see Falk et al., 2016). Experiments provide a valuable benchmark for selecting survey items, because they can approximate the ideal choice situations, specified in economic theory, in which individuals make choices in controlled decision contexts. Experimental measures are very costly, however, to implement in a globally representative sample, whereas survey measures are much less costly.⁴ Selecting survey measures that can stand in for incentivized revealed preference measures leverages the strengths of both approaches.

The Preference Survey Module: A Validated Instrument for Measuring Risk, Time, and Social Preferences: http://ftp.iza.org/dp9674.pdf

Table 1: Survey items of the GPS

Figure 1: World maps of patience, risk taking, and positive reciprocity.
Figure 2: World maps of negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust.

Figure 3: Gender coefficients by country. For each country, we regress the respective preference on gender, age and its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting gender coefficients as well as their significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the coefficients.

Figure 4: Cognitive ability coefficients by country. For each country, we regress the respective preference on gender, age and its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting coefficients on subjective math skills as well as their significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the coefficients.

Figure 5: Age profiles by OECD membership.

Table 6: Pairwise correlations between preferences and geographic and cultural variables

Figure 10: Distribution of preferences at individual level.
Figure 11: Distribution of preferences at country level.

interesting digression:
D Discussion of Measurement Error and Within- versus Between-Country Variation
study  dataset  data  database  let-me-see  economics  growth-econ  broad-econ  microfoundations  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  culture  psychology  behavioral-econ  values  🎩  pdf  piracy  world  spearhead  general-survey  poll  group-level  within-group  variance-components  🌞  correlation  demographics  age-generation  gender  iq  cooperate-defect  time-preference  temperance  labor  wealth  wealth-of-nations  entrepreneurialism  outcome-risk  altruism  trust  patience  developing-world  maps  visualization  n-factor  things  phalanges  personality  regression  gender-diff  pop-diff  geography  usa  canada  anglo  europe  the-great-west-whale  nordic  anglosphere  MENA  africa  china  asia  sinosphere  latin-america  self-report  hive-mind  GT-101  realness  long-short-run  endo-exo  signal-noise  communism  japan  korea  methodology  measurement  org:ngo  white-paper  endogenous-exogenous  within-without  hari-seldon 
october 2017 by nhaliday
Culture, Ethnicity, and Diversity - American Economic Association
We investigate the empirical relationship between ethnicity and culture, defined as a vector of traits reflecting norms, values, and attitudes. Using survey data for 76 countries, we find that ethnic identity is a significant predictor of cultural values, yet that within-group variation in culture trumps between-group variation. Thus, in contrast to a commonly held view, ethnic and cultural diversity are unrelated. Although only a small portion of a country’s overall cultural heterogeneity occurs between groups, we find that various political economy outcomes (such as civil conflict and public goods provision) worsen when there is greater overlap between ethnicity and culture. (JEL D74, H41, J15, O15, O17, Z13)

definition of chi-squared index, etc., under:
II. Measuring Heterogeneity

Table 5—Incidence of Civil Conflict and Diversity
Table 6—Public Goods Provision and Diversity

https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/924002043576115202
https://archive.is/oqMnC
https://archive.is/sBqqo
https://archive.is/1AcXn
χ2 diversity: raising the risk of civil war. Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, Wacziarg, in the American Economic Review (1/N)

What predicts higher χ2 diversity? The authors tell us that, too. Here are all of the variables that have a correlation > 0.4: (7/N)

one of them is UK legal origin...

online appendix (with maps, Figures B1-3): http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/downloads/2017_culture_appendix.pdf
study  economics  growth-econ  broad-econ  world  developing-world  race  diversity  putnam-like  culture  cultural-dynamics  entropy-like  metrics  within-group  anthropology  microfoundations  political-econ  🎩  🌞  pdf  piracy  public-goodish  general-survey  cohesion  ethnocentrism  tribalism  behavioral-econ  sociology  cooperate-defect  homo-hetero  revolution  war  stylized-facts  econometrics  group-level  variance-components  multi  twitter  social  commentary  spearhead  econotariat  garett-jones  backup  summary  maps  data  visualization  correlation  values  poll  composition-decomposition  concept  conceptual-vocab  definition  intricacy  nonlinearity  anglosphere  regression  law  roots  within-without 
september 2017 by nhaliday
A cross-country empirical test of cognitive abilities and innovation nexus - Munich Personal RePEc Archive
In this study we analyze the relationship between national cognitive abilities and innovational output using data from 124 countries of the world. By employing cross-country IQ scores traditionally used by psychological literature to represent national intelligence, and Economic Complexity Index as a novel measure of innovation, our study shows that there is a positive connection between them. We use a variety of tests to check the robustness of the nexus. Overall, our findings indicate that more intelligent nations export more sophisticated and diverse products to the world market and thus are more innovative. Therefore, developing countries should consider investing in human capital and related institutions if they are to boost innovative capabilities and move up the technology ladder in producing and exporting sophisticated and varied lines of products. This should bring them greater economic diversity which could be a right lever in mitigating negative external shocks.
study  economics  broad-econ  psychology  cog-psych  growth-econ  wealth-of-nations  innovation  pop-diff  rindermann-thompson  diversity  human-capital  hive-mind  iq  correlation  entropy-like  wealth  the-world-is-just-atoms  🎩  econ-metrics  econometrics  world  group-level  spearhead  macro  stylized-facts  behavioral-econ  biophysical-econ  microfoundations  🌞  hari-seldon 
september 2017 by nhaliday
The Determinants of Trust
Both individual experiences and community characteristics influence how much people trust each other. Using data drawn from US localities we find that the strongest factors that reduce trust are: i) a recent history of traumatic experiences, even though the passage of time reduces this effect fairly rapidly; ii) belonging to a group that historically felt discriminated against, such as minorities (black in particular) and, to a lesser extent, women; iii) being economically unsuccessful in terms of income and education; iv) living in a racially mixed community and/or in one with a high degree of income disparity. Religious beliefs and ethnic origins do not significantly affect trust. The latter result may be an indication that the American melting pot at least up to a point works, in terms of homogenizing attitudes of different cultures, even though racial cleavages leading to low trust are still quite high.

Understanding Trust: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13387
In this paper we resolve this puzzle by recognizing that trust has two components: a belief-based one and a preference based one. While the sender's behavior reflects both, we show that WVS-like measures capture mostly the belief-based component, while questions on past trusting behavior are better at capturing the preference component of trust.

MEASURING TRUST: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/laibson/files/measuring_trust.pdf
We combine two experiments and a survey to measure trust and trustworthiness— two key components of social capital. Standard attitudinal survey questions about trust predict trustworthy behavior in our experiments much better than they predict trusting behavior. Trusting behavior in the experiments is predicted by past trusting behavior outside of the experiments. When individuals are closer socially, both trust and trustworthiness rise. Trustworthiness declines when partners are of different races or nationalities. High status individuals are able to elicit more trustworthiness in others.

What is Social Capital? The Determinants of Trust and Trustworthiness: http://www.nber.org/papers/w7216
Using a sample of Harvard undergraduates, we analyze trust and social capital in two experiments. Trusting behavior and trustworthiness rise with social connection; differences in race and nationality reduce the level of trustworthiness. Certain individuals appear to be persistently more trusting, but these people do not say they are more trusting in surveys. Survey questions about trust predict trustworthiness not trust. Only children are less trustworthy. People behave in a more trustworthy manner towards higher status individuals, and therefore status increases earnings in the experiment. As such, high status persons can be said to have more social capital.

Trust and Cheating: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18509
We find that: i) both parties to a trust exchange have implicit notions of what constitutes cheating even in a context without promises or messages; ii) these notions are not unique - the vast majority of senders would feel cheated by a negative return on their trust/investment, whereas a sizable minority defines cheating according to an equal split rule; iii) these implicit notions affect the behavior of both sides to the exchange in terms of whether to trust or cheat and to what extent. Finally, we show that individual's notions of what constitutes cheating can be traced back to two classes of values instilled by parents: cooperative and competitive. The first class of values tends to soften the notion while the other tightens it.

Nationalism and Ethnic-Based Trust: Evidence from an African Border Region: https://u.osu.edu/robinson.1012/files/2015/12/Robinson_NationalismTrust-1q3q9u1.pdf
These results offer microlevel evidence that a strong and salient national identity can diminish ethnic barriers to trust in diverse societies.

One Team, One Nation: Football, Ethnic Identity, and Conflict in Africa: http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/SI2017/DEV/Durante_Depetris-Chauvin.pdf
Do collective experiences that prime sentiments of national unity reduce interethnic tensions and conflict? We examine this question by looking at the impact of national football teams’ victories in sub-Saharan Africa. Combining individual survey data with information on over 70 official matches played between 2000 and 2015, we find that individuals interviewed in the days after a victory of their country’s national team are less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity and more likely to trust people of other ethnicities than those interviewed just before. The effect is sizable and robust and is not explained by generic euphoria or optimism. Crucially, national victories do not only affect attitudes but also reduce violence. Indeed, using plausibly exogenous variation from close qualifications to the Africa Cup of Nations, we find that countries that (barely) qualified experience significantly less conflict in the following six months than countries that (barely) did not. Our findings indicate that, even where ethnic tensions have deep historical roots, patriotic shocks can reduce inter-ethnic tensions and have a tangible impact on conflict.

Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?: http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/HHPW.pdf
We identify three families of mechanisms that link diversity to public goods provision—–what we term “preferences,” “technology,” and “strategy selection” mechanisms—–and run a series of experimental games that permit us to compare the explanatory power of distinct mechanisms within each of these three families. Results from games conducted with a random sample of 300 subjects from a slum neighborhood of Kampala, Uganda, suggest that successful public goods provision in homogenous ethnic communities can be attributed to a strategy selection mechanism: in similar settings, co-ethnics play cooperative equilibria, whereas non-co-ethnics do not. In addition, we find evidence for a technology mechanism: co-ethnics are more closely linked on social networks and thus plausibly better able to support cooperation through the threat of social sanction. We find no evidence for prominent preference mechanisms that emphasize the commonality of tastes within ethnic groups or a greater degree of altruism toward co-ethnics, and only weak evidence for technology mechanisms that focus on the impact of shared ethnicity on the productivity of teams.

does it generalize to first world?

Higher Intelligence Groups Have Higher Cooperation Rates in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp8499.html
The initial cooperation rates are similar, it increases in the groups with higher intelligence to reach almost full cooperation, while declining in the groups with lower intelligence. The difference is produced by the cumulation of small but persistent differences in the response to past cooperation of the partner. In higher intelligence subjects, cooperation after the initial stages is immediate and becomes the default mode, defection instead requires more time. For lower intelligence groups this difference is absent. Cooperation of higher intelligence subjects is payoff sensitive, thus not automatic: in a treatment with lower continuation probability there is no difference between different intelligence groups

Why societies cooperate: https://voxeu.org/article/why-societies-cooperate
Three attributes are often suggested to generate cooperative behaviour – a good heart, good norms, and intelligence. This column reports the results of a laboratory experiment in which groups of players benefited from learning to cooperate. It finds overwhelming support for the idea that intelligence is the primary condition for a socially cohesive, cooperative society. Warm feelings towards others and good norms have only a small and transitory effect.

individual payoff, etc.:

Trust, Values and False Consensus: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18460
Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more (less) trustworthy individuals form more optimistic (pessimistic) trust beliefs - and that this tendency continues to color trust beliefs after several rounds of game-play. Moreover, we show that one's own type/trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing. In a second closely-related experiment, we show the economic impact of mis-calibrated trust beliefs stemming from false consensus. Miscalibrated beliefs lower participants' experimental trust game earnings by about 20 percent on average.

The Right Amount of Trust: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15344
We investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance. We find that individual income is hump-shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs. Our interpretation is that highly trusting individuals tend to assume too much social risk and to be cheated more often, ultimately performing less well than those with a belief close to the mean trustworthiness of the population. On the other hand, individuals with overly pessimistic beliefs avoid being cheated, but give up profitable opportunities, therefore underperforming. The cost of either too much or too little trust is comparable to the income lost by forgoing college.

...

This framework allows us to show that income-maximizing trust typically exceeds the trust level of the average person as well as to estimate the distribution of income lost to trust mistakes. We find that although a majority of individuals has well calibrated beliefs, a non-trivial proportion of the population (10%) has trust beliefs sufficiently poorly calibrated to lower income by more than 13%.

Do Trust and … [more]
study  economics  alesina  growth-econ  broad-econ  trust  cohesion  social-capital  religion  demographics  race  diversity  putnam-like  compensation  class  education  roots  phalanges  general-survey  multi  usa  GT-101  conceptual-vocab  concept  behavioral-econ  intricacy  composition-decomposition  values  descriptive  correlation  harvard  field-study  migration  poll  status  🎩  🌞  chart  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  psychology  social-psych  sociology  cooperate-defect  justice  egalitarianism-hierarchy  inequality  envy  n-factor  axelrod  pdf  microfoundations  nationalism-globalism  africa  intervention  counter-revolution  tribalism  culture  society  ethnocentrism  coordination  world  developing-world  innovation  econ-productivity  government  stylized-facts  madisonian  wealth-of-nations  identity-politics  public-goodish  s:*  legacy  things  optimization  curvature  s-factor  success  homo-hetero  higher-ed  models  empirical  contracts  human-capital  natural-experiment  endo-exo  data  scale  trade  markets  time  supply-demand  summary 
august 2017 by nhaliday
The Rise and Fall of Cognitive Control - Behavioral Scientist
The results highlight the downsides of controlled processing. Within a population, controlled processing may—rather than ensuring undeterred progress—usher in short-sighted, irrational, and detrimental behavior, ultimately leading to population collapse. This is because the innovations produced by controlled processing benefit everyone, even those who do not act with control. Thus, by making non-controlled agents better off, these innovations erode the initial advantage of controlled behavior. This results in the demise of control and the rise of lack-of-control. In turn, this eventually leads to a return to poor decision making and the breakdown of the welfare-enhancing innovations, possibly accelerated and exacerbated by the presence of the enabling technologies themselves. Our models therefore help to explain societal cycles whereby periods of rationality and forethought are followed by plunges back into irrationality and short-sightedness.

https://static1.squarespace.com/static/51ed234ae4b0867e2385d879/t/595fac998419c208a6d99796/1499442499093/Cyclical-Population-Dynamics.pdf
Psychologists, neuroscientists, and economists often conceptualize decisions as arising from processes that lie along a continuum from automatic (i.e., “hardwired” or overlearned, but relatively inflexible) to controlled (less efficient and effortful, but more flexible). Control is central to human cognition, and plays a key role in our ability to modify the world to suit our needs. Given its advantages, reliance on controlled processing may seem predestined to increase within the population over time. Here, we examine whether this is so by introducing an evolutionary game theoretic model of agents that vary in their use of automatic versus controlled processes, and in which cognitive processing modifies the environment in which the agents interact. We find that, under a wide range of parameters and model assumptions, cycles emerge in which the prevalence of each type of processing in the population oscillates between 2 extremes. Rather than inexorably increasing, the emergence of control often creates conditions that lead to its own demise by allowing automaticity to also flourish, thereby undermining the progress made by the initial emergence of controlled processing. We speculate that this observation may have relevance for understanding similar cycles across human history, and may lend insight into some of the circumstances and challenges currently faced by our species.
econotariat  economics  political-econ  policy  decision-making  behavioral-econ  psychology  cog-psych  cycles  oscillation  unintended-consequences  anthropology  broad-econ  cultural-dynamics  tradeoffs  cost-benefit  rot  dysgenics  study  summary  multi  EGT  dynamical  volo-avolo  self-control  discipline  the-monster  pdf  error  rationality  info-dynamics  bounded-cognition  hive-mind  iq  intelligence  order-disorder  risk  microfoundations  science-anxiety  big-picture  hari-seldon  cybernetics 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Corrupting cooperation and how anti-corruption strategies may backfire | Nature Human Behaviour
https://images.nature.com/original/nature-assets/nathumbehav/2017/s41562-017-0138/extref/s41562-017-0138-s1.pdf
Exposure to Norms: https://images.nature.com/original/nature-assets/nathumbehav/2017/s41562-017-0138/extref/s41562-017-0138-s1.pdf#page=114
Here we test how exposure to corruption norms affect behavior in our game. We do so by using our exposure score (a mean of the corruption perceptions of the countries the participant has lived in) and the heritage corruption score (a mean of the corruption perceptions of the countries the participant has an ethnic heritage). Since there is no incentive to offer bribes or contribute, except when compelled to do so by punishment, we predict that exposure to norms should primarily affect Leader decisions. Nonetheless, internalized norms may also affect the behavior of players in contributing and bribing.

...

The correlation between the direct exposure and heritage measures of corruption is r = 0.67, p < .001.

...

Then we see that direct exposure to corruption norms results in increased corrupt behavior—i.e. in our Canadian sample, those who have lived in corrupt countries from which they do not derive their heritage behave in more corrupt ways.

hard to interpret

https://twitter.com/Evolving_Moloch/status/884477414100697092
http://psych.ubc.ca/when-less-is-best/

I don't think the solution is to just do nothing. Should look to history for ideas; process of "getting to Denmark" took centuries in NW Euro. Try to replicate and don't expect fast results.

Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime: http://www.nber.org/papers/w10510
I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the results through a theoretical lens that considers the implications of trust networks. A bond of trust may permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a bribe, which reduces corruption. Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents of areas with many other long-term residents, and by individuals in regions with many residents their own age. I confirm that the prevalence of bribery is lower under these circumstances, using the International Crime Victim Surveys. I also find that older people, who have had time to develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show that victims of (other) crimes bribe all types of public officials more than non-victims, and argue that both their victimization and bribery stem from a distrustful environment.

Kinship, Fractionalization and Corruption: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2847222
The theory of kin selection provides a straightforward justification for norms of nepotism and favoritism among relatives; more subtly, it also implies that the returns to such norms may be influenced by mating practices. Specifically, in societies with high levels of sub-ethnic fractionalization, where endogamous (and consanguineous) mating within kin-group, clan and tribe increases the local relatedness of individuals, the relative returns to norms of nepotism and favoritism are high. In societies with exogamous marriage practices, the relative returns to norms of impartial cooperation with non-relatives and strangers are increased. Using cross-country and within-country regression analyses and a cross-country lab experiment, we provide evidence for this account.

Ethnic favouritism: Not just an African phenomenon: http://voxeu.org/article/ethnic-favouritism-not-just-african-phenomenon
Ethnic favouritism is a global phenomenon
We find robust evidence for ethnic favouritism – ethnographic regions that are the current political leader’s ethnic homeland enjoy 7%-10% more intense night-time light, corresponding to 2%-3% higher regional GDP. Furthermore, we show that ethnic favouritism extends to ethnic groups that are linguistically close to the political leader.

Most significantly, these effects are as strong outside of Africa as they are within, challenging the preconception that ethnic favouritism is mainly or even entirely a sub-Saharan African phenomenon. For example, Bolivian presidents tended to favour areas populated by European descendants and Criollos, largely at the expense of the indigenous population. After the election of Evo Morales, a member of the indigenous Ayamara ethnic group, luminosity in indigenous areas grew substantially. Notably, critics suggest Morales gave special attention to the interests and values of the Ayamara at the expense of other indigenous peoples (e.g. Albro 2010, Postero 2010).

Democratisation is not a panacea
Our results further suggest that, while democratic institutions have a weak tendency to reduce ethnic favouritism, their effect is limited. In particular, a change from autocratic regimes to weak democracies does not seem to reduce ethnic favouritism (and may even increase it).

This result could in part be explained by political leaders’ motivations for engaging in ethnic favouritism. We find that the practice intensifies around election years in which the political leader's office is contested, suggesting that leaders may target policies towards their ethnic homelands to improve their re-election prospects, and not solely out of co-ethnic altruism. To the extent that political leaders engage in ethnic favouritism for electoral purposes, democratisation is not likely to be effective in curbing the practice.

Facebook’s war on free will: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/19/facebooks-war-on-free-will
Though Facebook will occasionally talk about the transparency of governments and corporations, what it really wants to advance is the transparency of individuals – or what it has called, at various moments, “radical transparency” or “ultimate transparency”. The theory holds that the sunshine of sharing our intimate details will disinfect the moral mess of our lives. With the looming threat that our embarrassing information will be broadcast, we’ll behave better. And perhaps the ubiquity of incriminating photos and damning revelations will prod us to become more tolerant of one another’s sins. “The days of you having a different image for your work friends or co-workers and for the other people you know are probably coming to an end pretty quickly,” Zuckerberg has said. “Having two identities for yourself is an example of a lack of integrity.”

The point is that Facebook has a strong, paternalistic view on what’s best for you, and it’s trying to transport you there. “To get people to this point where there’s more openness – that’s a big challenge. But I think we’ll do it,” Zuckerberg has said. He has reason to believe that he will achieve that goal. With its size, Facebook has amassed outsized powers. “In a lot of ways Facebook is more like a government than a traditional company,” Zuckerberg has said. “We have this large community of people, and more than other technology companies we’re really setting policies.”

Facebook and the Destruction of Private Life: http://www.socialmatter.net/2014/12/30/facebook-and-the-destruction-of-private-life/
- HENRY DAMPIER

The key value of privacy, which tends to be lost amid all the technological babble about the concept, is that it makes social cooperation more feasible among people who disagree, share different tastes, or fundamental points of view.

...

This is especially an issue with democracy. The reason why the United States has anonymous voting laws is because without them, people are persecuted for their party affiliations by people with rival party loyalties. This being forgotten, the age of Facebook and similar technologies has opened up ordinary people to this sort of ordinary political persecution. Moderating influences like that of the respect for privacy put a brake on some of the more rapacious, violent aspects of party politics.

...

The impulse for this comes less from the availability of the technology, and more because of the preexisting social trends. When there is a family life, there is communication and closeness within the family.

With more people living without a family life, they go to the public square to get their needs for social validation met. This doesn’t work so well, because strangers have no skin in the life of the atomized individual that only exists as an image on their screens.
study  org:nat  polisci  sociology  government  corruption  law  leviathan  crooked  world  developing-world  policy  cooperate-defect  free-riding  cultural-dynamics  anthropology  multi  twitter  social  commentary  scitariat  public-goodish  institutions  behavioral-econ  org:sci  summary  n-factor  trust  media  social-norms  spreading  equilibrium  🎩  🌞  broad-econ  GT-101  economics  growth-econ  org:edu  microfoundations  open-closed  leaks  canada  anglo  migration  pdf  polarization  longitudinal  social-capital  network-structure  cohesion  social-structure  axelrod  anomie  tribalism  group-level  kinship  econometrics  field-study  sapiens  stylized-facts  divergence  cliometrics  anglosphere  incentives  biodet  the-great-west-whale  populism  roots  putnam-like  behavioral-gen  sex  chart  wealth-of-nations  political-econ  polanyi-marx  eden  path-dependence  variance-components  correlation  assimilation  ethics  org:ngo  econotariat  africa  ethnocentrism  race  democracy  latin-america  asia  news  org:lite 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Kinship Systems, Cooperation and the Evolution of Culture
In the data, societies with loose ancestral kinship ties cooperate and trust broadly, which is apparently sustained through a belief in moralizing gods, universally applicable moral principles, feelings of guilt, and large-scale institutions. Societies with a historically tightly knit kinship structure, on the other hand, exhibit strong in-group favoritism: they cheat on and are distrusting of out-group members, but readily support in-group members in need. This cooperation scheme is enforced by moral values of in-group loyalty, conformity to tight social norms, emotions of shame, and strong local institutions.

Henrich, Joseph, The Secret of Our Success: How Culture is Driving Human Evolution,
Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter, Princeton University Press, 2015.
—, W.E.I.R.D People: How Westerners became Individualistic, Self-Obsessed, Guilt-Ridden,
Analytic, Patient, Principled and Prosperous, Princeton University Press, n.d.
—, Jean Ensminger, Richard McElreath, Abigail Barr, Clark Barrett, Alexander Bolyanatz, Juan Camilo Cardenas, Michael Gurven, Edwins Gwako, Natalie Hen- rich et al., “Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment,” Science, 2010, 327 (5972), 1480–1484.

...

—, —, Will M. Gervais, Aiyana K. Willard, Rita A. McNamara, Edward Slingerland, and Joseph Henrich, “The Cultural Evolution of Prosocial Religions,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2016, 39, e1.

...

Purzycki, Benjamin Grant, Coren Apicella, Quentin D. Atkinson, Emma Cohen, Rita Anne McNamara, Aiyana K. Willard, Dimitris Xygalatas, Ara Norenzayan, and Joseph Henrich, “Moralistic Gods, Supernatural Punishment and the Expansion of Human Sociality,” Nature, 2016.

Table 1 summarizes
Figure 1 has map of kinship tightness
Figure 2 has cheating and in-group vs. out-group
Table 2 has regression
Figure 3 has univeralism and shame-guilt
Figure 4 has individualism-collectivism/conformity
Table 4 has radius of trust, Table 5 same for within-country variation (ethnic)
Tables 7 and 8 do universalism

Haidt moral foundations:
In line with the research hypothesis discussed in Section 3, the analysis employs two dependent variables, i.e., (i) the measure of in-group loyalty, and (ii) an index of the importance of communal values relative to the more universal (individualizing) ones. That is, the hypothesis is explicitly not about some societies being more or less moral than others, but merely about heterogeneity in the relative importance that people attach to structurally different types of values. To construct the index, I compute the first principal component of fairness / reciprocity, harm / care, in-group / loyalty, and respect /authority. The resulting score endogenously has the appealing property that – in line with the research hypothesis – it loads positively on the first two values and negatively on the latter two, with roughly equal weights, see Appendix F for details.²⁴I compute country-level scores by averaging responses by country of residence of respondents. Importantly, in Enke (2017) I document that – in a nationally representative sample of Americans – this same index of moral communalism is strongly correlated with individuals’ propensity to favor their local community over society as a whole in issues ranging from taxation and redistribution to donations and volunteering. Thus, there is evidence that the index of communal moral values captures economically meaningful behavioral heterogeneity.

The coevolution of kinship systems, cooperation, and culture: http://voxeu.org/article/kinship-cooperation-and-culture
- Benjamin Enke

pretty short

good linguistics reference cited in this paper:
On the biological and cultural evolution of shame: Using internet search tools to weight values in many cultures: https://arxiv.org/abs/1401.1100v2
Here we explore the relative importance between shame and guilt by using Google Translate [>_>...] to produce translation for the words "shame", "guilt", "pain", "embarrassment" and "fear" to the 64 languages covered. We also explore the meanings of these concepts among the Yanomami, a horticulturist hunter-gatherer tribe in the Orinoquia. Results show that societies previously described as “guilt societies” have more words for guilt than for shame, but *the large majority*, including the societies previously described as “shame societies”, *have more words for shame than for guilt*. Results are consistent with evolutionary models of shame which predict a wide scatter in the relative importance between guilt and shame, suggesting that cultural evolution of shame has continued the work of biological evolution, and that neither provides a strong adaptive advantage to either shame or guilt [? did they not just say that most languages favor shame?].

...

The roots of the word "shame" are thought to derive from an older word meaning "to cover". The emotion of shame has clear physiological consequences. Its facial and corporal expression is a human universal, as was recognized already by Darwin (5). Looking away, reddening of the face, sinking the head, obstructing direct view, hiding the face and downing the eyelids, are the unequivocal expressions signaling shame. Shame might be an emotion specific to humans, as no clear description of it is known for animals.
...
Classical Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle, explicitly mention shame as a key element in building society.

Guilt is the emotion of being responsible for the commission of an offense, however, it seems to be distinct from shame. Guilt says “what I did was not good”, whereas shame says “I am no good"(2). For Benedict (1), shame is a violation of cultural or social values, while guilt feelings arise from violations of one's internal values.

...

Unobservable emotions such as guilt may be of value to the receiver but constitutes in economy “private information”. Thus, in economic and biological terms, adaptive pressures acting upon the evolution of shame differ from those acting on that of guilt.

Shame has evolutionary advantages to both individual and society, but the lack ofshame also has evolutionary advantages as it allows cheating and thus benefiting from public goods without paying the costs of its build up.

...

Dodds (7) coined the distinction between guilt and shame cultures and postulated that in Greek cultural history, shame as a social value was displaced, at least in part, by guilt in guiding moral behavior.
...
"[...]True guilt cultures rely on an internalized conviction of sin as the enforcer of good behavior, not, as shame cultures do, on external sanctions. Guilt cultures emphasize punishment and forgiveness as ways of restoring the moral order; shame cultures stress self-denial and humility as ways of restoring the social order”.

...

For example, Wikipedia is less error prone than Encyclopedia Britannica (12, 17); and Google Translate is as accurate as more traditional methods (35).

Table 1, Figure 1

...

This regression is close to a proportional line of two words for shame for each word for guilt.

...

For example, in the case of Chinese, no overlap between the five concepts is reported using Google Translate in Figure 1. Yet, linguistic-conceptual studies of guilt and shame revealed an important overlap between several of these concepts in Chinese (29).

...

Our results using Google Translate show no overlap between Guilt and Shame in any of the languages studied.
...
[lol:] Examples of the context when they feel “kili” are: a tiger appears in the forest; you kill somebody from another community; your daughter is going to die; everybody looks at your underwear; you are caught stealing; you soil your pants while among others; a doctor gives you an injection; you hit your wife and others find out; you are unfaithful to your husband and others find out; you are going to be hit with a machete.

...

Linguistic families do not aggregate according to the relationship of the number of synonyms for shame and guilt (Figure 3).

...

The ratios are 0.89 and 2.5 respectively, meaning a historical transition from guilt-culture in Latin to shame-culture in Italian, suggesting a historical development that is inverse to that suggested byDodds for ancient to classical Greek. [I hope their Latin corpus doesn't include stuff from Catholics...]

Joe Henrich presentation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f-unD4ZzWB4

relevant video:
Johnny Cash - God's Gonna Cut You Down: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eJlN9jdQFSc

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guilt_society
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shame_society
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guilt-Shame-Fear_spectrum_of_cultures
this says Dems more guilt-driven but Peter Frost says opposite here (and matches my perception of the contemporary breakdown both including minorities and focusing only on whites): https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:9b75881f6861
http://honorshame.com/global-map-of-culture-types/

this is an amazing paper:
The Origins of WEIRD Psychology: https://psyarxiv.com/d6qhu/
Recent research not only confirms the existence of substantial psychological variation around the globe but also highlights the peculiarity of populations that are Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD). We propose that much of this variation arose as people psychologically adapted to differing kin-based institutions—the set of social norms governing descent, marriage, residence and related domains. We further propose that part of the variation in these institutions arose historically from the Catholic Church’s marriage and family policies, which contributed to the dissolution of Europe’s traditional kin-based institutions, leading eventually to the predominance of nuclear families and impersonal institutions. By combining data on 20 psychological outcomes with historical measures of both kinship and Church exposure, we find support for these ideas in a comprehensive array of analyses across countries, among European regions and between individuals with … [more]
study  economics  broad-econ  pseudoE  roots  anthropology  sociology  culture  cultural-dynamics  society  civilization  religion  theos  kinship  individualism-collectivism  universalism-particularism  europe  the-great-west-whale  orient  integrity  morality  ethics  trust  institutions  things  pdf  piracy  social-norms  cooperate-defect  patho-altruism  race  world  developing-world  pop-diff  n-factor  ethnography  ethnocentrism  🎩  🌞  s:*  us-them  occident  political-econ  altruism  self-interest  books  todo  multi  old-anglo  big-peeps  poetry  aristos  homo-hetero  north-weingast-like  maps  data  modernity  tumblr  social  ratty  gender  history  iron-age  mediterranean  the-classics  christianity  speculation  law  public-goodish  tribalism  urban  china  asia  sinosphere  decision-making  polanyi-marx  microfoundations  open-closed  alien-character  axelrod  eden  growth-econ  social-capital  values  phalanges  usa  within-group  group-level  regional-scatter-plots  comparison  psychology  social-psych  behavioral-eco 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Validation is a Galilean enterprise
We contend that Frey's analyses actually have little bearing on the external validity of the PGG. Evidence from recent experiments using modified versions of the PGG and stringent comprehension checks indicate that individual differences in people's tendencies to contribute to the public good are better explained by individual differences in participants' comprehension of the game's payoff structure than by individual differences in cooperativeness (Burton-Chellew, El Mouden, & West, 2016). For example, only free riders reliably understand right away that complete defection maximizes one's own payoff, regardless of how much other participants contribute. This difference in comprehension alone explains the so-called free riders' low PGG contributions. These recent results also provide a new interpretation of why conditional cooperators often contribute generously in early rounds, and then less in later rounds (Fischbacher et al., 2001). Fischbacher et al. (2001) attribute the relatively high contributions in the early rounds to cooperativeness and the subsequent decline in contributions to conditional cooperators' frustration with free riders. In reality, the decline in cooperation observed over the course of PGGs occurs because so-called conditional cooperators initially believe that their payoff-maximizing decision depends on whether others contribute, but eventually learn that contributing never benefits the contributor (Burton-Chellew, Nax, & West, 2015). Because contributions in the PGG do not actually reflect cooperativeness, there is no real-world cooperative setting to which inferences about contributions in the PGG can generalize.
study  behavioral-econ  economics  psychology  social-psych  coordination  cooperate-defect  piracy  altruism  bounded-cognition  error  lol  pdf  map-territory  GT-101  realness  free-riding  public-goodish  decision-making  microfoundations  descriptive  values  interests  generalization  measurement  checking 
june 2017 by nhaliday
The Behavioral Econ of Paperwork, Bryan Caplan | EconLog | Library of Economics and Liberty
If X is good, we can noticeably encourage it by modestly simplifying the paperwork. So yes, cut red tape for employment, construction, travel, and adoption. If X is bad, though, we can noticeably discourage it by modestly complicating the paperwork. Indeed, complexity is a viable substitute for explicit means-testing: If you lack the patience to fill out ten forms, you probably don't really need the money.
econotariat  org:econlib  cracker-econ  proposal  economics  behavioral-econ  policy  political-econ  regulation  intricacy  aversion 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Assortive mating and income inequality | West Hunter
More than in the past, we have doctors marrying other doctors, rather than nurses, basically because of an increase in assortative mating for education. Ceteris paribus, this would tend to cause greater income equality among families. Is it the main driver of increasing income inequality?

Not at all. Most of the increase over the last 30 years has been among business executives and people working in finance. Since 1979, 58% of the expansion of income of the top 1% of households has this origin. For the top 0.1% of households, it’s been 67%.

...

Now I’m about to say something a little dangerous – so get your nitroglycerin pills ready.

Maybe those finance guys and CEOs are delivering enormously more value than they did in the 1950s!

For those remaining readers that haven’t died laughing, increased assortative mating probably has contributed to income inequality. Just not very much. Changes in the tax code, outsourcing, automation, smothering the board of directors in cream, and inattentive stockholders all matter more.

capital gains: https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2014/03/21/assortive-mating-and-income-inequality/#comment-24318
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/millman/assortative-mating-and-income-inequality/
Educational Homogamy and Assortative Mating Have Not Increased: http://sci-hub.cc/http://www.nber.org/papers/w22927.pdf
1960-2010, so all post WW2
https://twitter.com/whyvert/status/840379325908049920
Highly educated women partner more often “downwards” and medium educated women partner less often “upwards”
The new assortative mating (phenotypical, perhaps no change in genotypical assortative mating) due to women outnumbering men at university
If this means less genotypic assortative mating, then BAD NEWS: the smart fraction will shrink, and #decline will accelerate
Counterrevolutionary and reactionary elements warned it was a mistake to debauch higher education by over-expansion. Maybe they were right?
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10680-016-9407-z
west-hunter  scitariat  discussion  assortative-mating  inequality  winner-take-all  finance  class  trends  labor  automation  crooked  vampire-squid  capital  taxes  class-warfare  multi  poast  news  org:mag  right-wing  commentary  links  econotariat  marginal-rev  data  history  mostly-modern  usa  education  chart  coming-apart  zeitgeist  europe  twitter  social  study  summary  biodet  dysgenics  higher-ed  gender  sociology  behavioral-gen  social-norms  economics  contrarianism  hmm  regularizer  behavioral-econ  mobility  correlation  compensation  null-result  age-generation  social-capital  madisonian  rot  the-bones  modernity  realness  🎩  management  rent-seeking  elite  money  pdf  piracy  time-series  human-capital  gnon  leadership  markets  investing  ability-competence 
may 2017 by nhaliday
'Capital in the Twenty-First Century' by Thomas Piketty, reviewed | New Republic
by Robert Solow (positive)

The data then exhibit a clear pattern. In France and Great Britain, national capital stood fairly steadily at about seven times national income from 1700 to 1910, then fell sharply from 1910 to 1950, presumably as a result of wars and depression, reaching a low of 2.5 in Britain and a bit less than 3 in France. The capital-income ratio then began to climb in both countries, and reached slightly more than 5 in Britain and slightly less than 6 in France by 2010. The trajectory in the United States was slightly different: it started at just above 3 in 1770, climbed to 5 in 1910, fell slightly in 1920, recovered to a high between 5 and 5.5 in 1930, fell to below 4 in 1950, and was back to 4.5 in 2010.

The wealth-income ratio in the United States has always been lower than in Europe. The main reason in the early years was that land values bulked less in the wide open spaces of North America. There was of course much more land, but it was very cheap. Into the twentieth century and onward, however, the lower capital-income ratio in the United States probably reflects the higher level of productivity: a given amount of capital could support a larger production of output than in Europe. It is no surprise that the two world wars caused much less destruction and dissipation of capital in the United States than in Britain and France. The important observation for Piketty’s argument is that, in all three countries, and elsewhere as well, the wealth-income ratio has been increasing since 1950, and is almost back to nineteenth-century levels. He projects this increase to continue into the current century, with weighty consequences that will be discussed as we go on.

...

Now if you multiply the rate of return on capital by the capital-income ratio, you get the share of capital in the national income. For example, if the rate of return is 5 percent a year and the stock of capital is six years worth of national income, income from capital will be 30 percent of national income, and so income from work will be the remaining 70 percent. At last, after all this preparation, we are beginning to talk about inequality, and in two distinct senses. First, we have arrived at the functional distribution of income—the split between income from work and income from wealth. Second, it is always the case that wealth is more highly concentrated among the rich than income from labor (although recent American history looks rather odd in this respect); and this being so, the larger the share of income from wealth, the more unequal the distribution of income among persons is likely to be. It is this inequality across persons that matters most for good or ill in a society.

...

The data are complicated and not easily comparable across time and space, but here is the flavor of Piketty’s summary picture. Capital is indeed very unequally distributed. Currently in the United States, the top 10 percent own about 70 percent of all the capital, half of that belonging to the top 1 percent; the next 40 percent—who compose the “middle class”—own about a quarter of the total (much of that in the form of housing), and the remaining half of the population owns next to nothing, about 5 percent of total wealth. Even that amount of middle-class property ownership is a new phenomenon in history. The typical European country is a little more egalitarian: the top 1 percent own 25 percent of the total capital, and the middle class 35 percent. (A century ago the European middle class owned essentially no wealth at all.) If the ownership of wealth in fact becomes even more concentrated during the rest of the twenty-first century, the outlook is pretty bleak unless you have a taste for oligarchy.

Income from wealth is probably even more concentrated than wealth itself because, as Piketty notes, large blocks of wealth tend to earn a higher return than small ones. Some of this advantage comes from economies of scale, but more may come from the fact that very big investors have access to a wider range of investment opportunities than smaller investors. Income from work is naturally less concentrated than income from wealth. In Piketty’s stylized picture of the United States today, the top 1 percent earns about 12 percent of all labor income, the next 9 percent earn 23 percent, the middle class gets about 40 percent, and the bottom half about a quarter of income from work. Europe is not very different: the top 10 percent collect somewhat less and the other two groups a little more.

You get the picture: modern capitalism is an unequal society, and the rich-get-richer dynamic strongly suggest that it will get more so. But there is one more loose end to tie up, already hinted at, and it has to do with the advent of very high wage incomes. First, here are some facts about the composition of top incomes. About 60 percent of the income of the top 1 percent in the United States today is labor income. Only when you get to the top tenth of 1 percent does income from capital start to predominate. The income of the top hundredth of 1 percent is 70 percent from capital. The story for France is not very different, though the proportion of labor income is a bit higher at every level. Evidently there are some very high wage incomes, as if you didn’t know.

This is a fairly recent development. In the 1960s, the top 1 percent of wage earners collected a little more than 5 percent of all wage incomes. This fraction has risen pretty steadily until nowadays, when the top 1 percent of wage earners receive 10–12 percent of all wages. This time the story is rather different in France. There the share of total wages going to the top percentile was steady at 6 percent until very recently, when it climbed to 7 percent. The recent surge of extreme inequality at the top of the wage distribution may be primarily an American development. Piketty, who with Emmanuel Saez has made a careful study of high-income tax returns in the United States, attributes this to the rise of what he calls “supermanagers.” The very highest income class consists to a substantial extent of top executives of large corporations, with very rich compensation packages. (A disproportionate number of these, but by no means all of them, come from the financial services industry.) With or without stock options, these large pay packages get converted to wealth and future income from wealth. But the fact remains that much of the increased income (and wealth) inequality in the United States is driven by the rise of these supermanagers.

and Deirdre McCloskey (p critical): https://ejpe.org/journal/article/view/170
nice discussion of empirical economics, economic history, market failures and statism, etc., with several bon mots

Piketty’s great splash will undoubtedly bring many young economically interested scholars to devote their lives to the study of the past. That is good, because economic history is one of the few scientifically quantitative branches of economics. In economic history, as in experimental economics and a few other fields, the economists confront the evidence (as they do not for example in most macroeconomics or industrial organization or international trade theory nowadays).

...

Piketty gives a fine example of how to do it. He does not get entangled as so many economists do in the sole empirical tool they are taught, namely, regression analysis on someone else’s “data” (one of the problems is the word data, meaning “things given”: scientists should deal in capta, “things seized”). Therefore he does not commit one of the two sins of modern economics, the use of meaningless “tests” of statistical significance (he occasionally refers to “statistically insignificant” relations between, say, tax rates and growth rates, but I am hoping he does not suppose that a large coefficient is “insignificant” because R. A. Fisher in 1925 said it was). Piketty constructs or uses statistics of aggregate capital and of inequality and then plots them out for inspection, which is what physicists, for example, also do in dealing with their experiments and observations. Nor does he commit the other sin, which is to waste scientific time on existence theorems. Physicists, again, don’t. If we economists are going to persist in physics envy let us at least learn what physicists actually do. Piketty stays close to the facts, and does not, for example, wander into the pointless worlds of non-cooperative game theory, long demolished by experimental economics. He also does not have recourse to non-computable general equilibrium, which never was of use for quantitative economic science, being a branch of philosophy, and a futile one at that. On both points, bravissimo.

...

Since those founding geniuses of classical economics, a market-tested betterment (a locution to be preferred to “capitalism”, with its erroneous implication that capital accumulation, not innovation, is what made us better off) has enormously enriched large parts of a humanity now seven times larger in population than in 1800, and bids fair in the next fifty years or so to enrich everyone on the planet. [Not SSA or MENA...]

...

Then economists, many on the left but some on the right, in quick succession from 1880 to the present—at the same time that market-tested betterment was driving real wages up and up and up—commenced worrying about, to name a few of the pessimisms concerning “capitalism” they discerned: greed, alienation, racial impurity, workers’ lack of bargaining strength, workers’ bad taste in consumption, immigration of lesser breeds, monopoly, unemployment, business cycles, increasing returns, externalities, under-consumption, monopolistic competition, separation of ownership from control, lack of planning, post-War stagnation, investment spillovers, unbalanced growth, dual labor markets, capital insufficiency (William Easterly calls it “capital fundamentalism”), peasant irrationality, capital-market imperfections, public … [more]
news  org:mag  big-peeps  econotariat  economics  books  review  capital  capitalism  inequality  winner-take-all  piketty  wealth  class  labor  mobility  redistribution  growth-econ  rent-seeking  history  mostly-modern  trends  compensation  article  malaise  🎩  the-bones  whiggish-hegelian  cjones-like  multi  mokyr-allen-mccloskey  expert  market-failure  government  broad-econ  cliometrics  aphorism  lens  gallic  clarity  europe  critique  rant  optimism  regularizer  pessimism  ideology  behavioral-econ  authoritarianism  intervention  polanyi-marx  politics  left-wing  absolute-relative  regression-to-mean  legacy  empirical  data-science  econometrics  methodology  hypothesis-testing  physics  iron-age  mediterranean  the-classics  quotes  krugman  world  entrepreneurialism  human-capital  education  supply-demand  plots  manifolds  intersection  markets  evolution  darwinian  giants  old-anglo  egalitarianism-hierarchy  optimate  morality  ethics  envy  stagnation  nl-and-so-can-you  expert-experience  courage  stats  randy-ayndy  reason  intersection-connectedness  detail-architect 
april 2017 by nhaliday
How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment
We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision-making. We present a model in which career concerned committee members receive private information of different type-dependent accuracy, deliberate and vote. We study three levels of transparency under which career concerns are predicted to affect behavior differently, and test the model’s key predictions in a laboratory experiment. The model’s predictions are largely borne out – transparency negatively affects information aggregation at the deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different committee error rates than under secrecy. This occurs despite subjects revealing more information under transparency than theory predicts.
study  economics  micro  decision-making  decision-theory  collaboration  coordination  info-econ  info-dynamics  behavioral-econ  field-study  clarity  ethics  civic  integrity  error  unintended-consequences  🎩  org:ngo  madisonian  regularizer  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  white-paper  microfoundations  open-closed  composition-decomposition  organizing 
april 2017 by nhaliday
Trust, Trolleys and Social Dilemmas: A Replication Study
Overall, the present studies clearly confirmed the main finding of Everett et al., that deontologists are more trusted than consequentialists in social dilemma games. Study 1 replicates Everett et al.’s effect in the context of trust games. Study 2 generalizes the effect to public goods games, thus demonstrating that it is not specific to the type of social dilemma game used in Everett et al. Finally, both studies build on these results by demonstrating that the increased trust in deontologists may sometimes, but not always, be warranted: deontologists displayed increased cooperation rates but only in the public goods game and not in trust games.

The Adaptive Utility of Deontology: Deontological Moral Decision-Making Fosters Perceptions of Trust and Likeability: https://sci-hub.tw/http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40806-016-0080-6
Consistent with previous research, participants liked and trusted targets whose decisions were consistent with deontological motives more than targets whose decisions were more consistent with utilitarian motives; this effect was stronger for perceptions of trust. Additionally, women reported greater dislike for targets whose decisions were consistent with utilitarianism than men. Results suggest that deontological moral reasoning evolved, in part, to facilitate positive relations among conspecifics and aid group living and that women may be particularly sensitive to the implications of the various motives underlying moral decision-making.

Inference of Trustworthiness From Intuitive Moral Judgments: https://sci-hub.tw/10.1037/xge0000165

Exposure to moral relativism compromises moral behavior: https://sci-hub.tw/http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022103113001339

Is utilitarian sacrifice becoming more morally permissible?: http://cushmanlab.fas.harvard.edu/docs/Hannikainanetal_2017.pdf

Disgust and Deontology: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1948550617732609
Trait Sensitivity to Contamination Promotes a Preference for Order, Hierarchy, and Rule-Based Moral Judgment

We suggest that a synthesis of these two literatures points to one specific emotion (disgust) that reliably predicts one specific type of moral judgment (deontological). In all three studies, we found that trait disgust sensitivity predicted more extreme deontological judgment.

The Influence of (Dis)belief in Free Will on Immoral Behavior: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00020/full

Beyond Sacrificial Harm: A Two-Dimensional Model of Utilitarian Psychology.: http://psycnet.apa.org/record/2017-57422-001
Recent research has relied on trolley-type sacrificial moral dilemmas to study utilitarian versus nonutilitarian modes of moral decision-making. This research has generated important insights into people’s attitudes toward instrumental harm—that is, the sacrifice of an individual to save a greater number. But this approach also has serious limitations. Most notably, it ignores the positive, altruistic core of utilitarianism, which is characterized by impartial concern for the well-being of everyone, whether near or far. Here, we develop, refine, and validate a new scale—the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale—to dissociate individual differences in the ‘negative’ (permissive attitude toward instrumental harm) and ‘positive’ (impartial concern for the greater good) dimensions of utilitarian thinking as manifested in the general population. We show that these are two independent dimensions of proto-utilitarian tendencies in the lay population, each exhibiting a distinct psychological profile. Empathic concern, identification with the whole of humanity, and concern for future generations were positively associated with impartial beneficence but negatively associated with instrumental harm; and although instrumental harm was associated with subclinical psychopathy, impartial beneficence was associated with higher religiosity. Importantly, although these two dimensions were independent in the lay population, they were closely associated in a sample of moral philosophers. Acknowledging this dissociation between the instrumental harm and impartial beneficence components of utilitarian thinking in ordinary people can clarify existing debates about the nature of moral psychology and its relation to moral philosophy as well as generate fruitful avenues for further research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved)

A breakthrough in moral psychology: https://nintil.com/2017/12/28/a-breakthrough-in-moral-psychology/

Gender Differences in Responses to Moral Dilemmas: A Process Dissociation Analysis: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25840987
The principle of deontology states that the morality of an action depends on its consistency with moral norms; the principle of utilitarianism implies that the morality of an action depends on its consequences. Previous research suggests that deontological judgments are shaped by affective processes, whereas utilitarian judgments are guided by cognitive processes. The current research used process dissociation (PD) to independently assess deontological and utilitarian inclinations in women and men. A meta-analytic re-analysis of 40 studies with 6,100 participants indicated that men showed a stronger preference for utilitarian over deontological judgments than women when the two principles implied conflicting decisions (d = 0.52). PD further revealed that women exhibited stronger deontological inclinations than men (d = 0.57), while men exhibited only slightly stronger utilitarian inclinations than women (d = 0.10). The findings suggest that gender differences in moral dilemma judgments are due to differences in affective responses to harm rather than cognitive evaluations of outcomes.
study  psychology  social-psych  morality  ethics  things  trust  GT-101  coordination  hmm  adversarial  cohesion  replication  cooperate-defect  formal-values  public-goodish  multi  evopsych  gender  gender-diff  philosophy  values  decision-making  absolute-relative  universalism-particularism  intervention  pdf  piracy  deep-materialism  new-religion  stylized-facts  🌞  🎩  honor  trends  phalanges  age-generation  religion  theos  sanctity-degradation  correlation  order-disorder  egalitarianism-hierarchy  volo-avolo  organizing  impro  dimensionality  patho-altruism  altruism  exploratory  matrix-factorization  ratty  unaffiliated  commentary  summary  haidt  scitariat  reason  emotion  randy-ayndy  liner-notes  latent-variables  nature  autism  👽  focus  systematic-ad-hoc  analytical-holistic  expert-experience  economics  markets  civil-liberty  capitalism  personality  psych-architecture  cog-psych  psychometrics  tradition  left-wing  right-wing  ideology  politics  environment  big-peeps  old-anglo  good-evil  ends-means  nietzschean  effe 
march 2017 by nhaliday
Sustainability | West Hunter
There have been societies that functioned for a long time, thousands of years. They had sustainable demographic patterns. That means that they had enough children to replace themselves – not necessarily in every generation, but over the long haul. But sustainability requires more than that. Long-lived civilizations [ones with cities, literacy, governments, and all that] had a pattern of natural selection that didn’t drastically decrease intelligence – in some cases, one that favored it, at least in some subgroups. There was also ongoing selection against mutational accumulation – which meant that individuals with more genetic load than than average were significantly less likely to survive and reproduce. Basically, this happened through high child mortality, and in some cases by lower fitness in lower socioeconomic classes [starvation]. There was nothing fun about it.

Modern industrialized societies are failing on all three counts. Every population that can make a decent cuckoo clock has below-replacement fertility. The demographic pattern also selects against intelligence, something like one IQ point a generation. And, even if people at every level of intelligence had the same number of children, so that there was no selection against IQ, we would still be getting more and messed up, because there’s not enough selection going on to counter ongoing mutations.

It is possible that some country, or countries, will change in a way that avoids civilizational collapse. I doubt if this will happen by voluntary action. Some sort of technological solution might also arise – but it has to be soon.

Bruce Charlton, Victorian IQ, Episcopalians, military officers:
https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2013/05/09/sustainability/#comment-13188
https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2013/05/09/sustainability/#comment-13207
Again, I don’t believe a word of it. As for the declining rate of innovation, you have to have a really wide-ranging understanding of modern science and technology to have any feeling for what the underlying causes are. I come closer than most, and I probably don’t know enough. You don’t know enough. Let me tell you one thing: if genetic potential IQ for IQ had dropped 1 std, we’d see the end of progress in higher mathematics, and that has not happened at all.

Moreover, the selective trends disfavoring IQ all involve higher education among women and apparently nothing else – a trend which didn’t really get started until much more recently.

Not long enough, nor is dysgenic selection strong enough.

ranting on libertarians:
https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2013/05/09/sustainability/#comment-13348
About 40% of those Americans with credit cards keep a balance on their credit cards and pay ridiculous high interest. But that must be the right decision!
https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2013/05/09/sustainability/#comment-13499
” then that is their decision” – that’s fucking obvious. The question is whether they tend to make decisions that work very well – saying ‘that is their decision” is exactly the kind of crap I was referring to. As for “they probably have it coming” – if I’m smarter than you, which I surely am, using those smarts to rook you in every possible way must be just peachy. In fact, I’ll bet I could manage it even after warning you in advance.

On average, families in this country have paid between 10% and 14% of their income in debt service over the past few decades. That fraction averages considerably higher in low-income families – more like 18%. A quarter of those low income families are putting over 40% of their income into debt service. That’s mostly stuff other than credit-card debt.

Is this Straussian?

hmm:
Examining Arguments Made by Interest Rate Cap Advocates: https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/peirce_reframing_ch13.pdf

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/964972690435133440
https://archive.is/r34J8
Interest rate caps on $1,000 installment loans, by US state, today and in 1935
west-hunter  civilization  dysgenics  fertility  legacy  risk  mutation  genetic-load  discussion  rant  iq  demographics  gnon  sapiens  trends  malthus  leviathan  long-short-run  science-anxiety  error  biodet  duty  s:*  malaise  big-picture  debt  randy-ayndy  recent-selection  demographic-transition  order-disorder  deep-materialism  🌞  age-generation  scitariat  rhythm  allodium  behavioral-gen  nihil  zeitgeist  rot  the-bones  prudence  darwinian  flux-stasis  counter-revolution  modernity  microfoundations  multi  poast  civil-liberty  is-ought  track-record  time-preference  temperance  patience  antidemos  money  compensation  class  coming-apart  pro-rata  behavioral-econ  blowhards  history  early-modern  britain  religion  christianity  protestant-catholic  gender  science  innovation  frontier  the-trenches  speedometer  military  elite  optimate  data  intervention  aphorism  alt-inst  ethics  morality  straussian  intelligence  class-warfare  authoritarianism  hari-seldon  interests  crooked  twitter  social  back 
march 2017 by nhaliday
Edge Master Class 2008 RICHARD THALER, SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, DANIEL KAHNEMAN: A SHORT COURSE IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS | Edge.org
https://twitter.com/toad_spotted/status/878990195953205248
huge popularity of "behavioral economics"among powerful people=largely excitement at how much more control they'd exert over stupider people

Time for Behavioral Political Economy? An Analysis of Articles in Behavioral Economics: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1846184
This study analyzes leading research in behavioral economics to see whether it contains advocacy of paternalism and whether it addresses the potential cognitive limitations and biases of the policymakers who are going to implement paternalist policies. The findings reveal that 20.7% of the studied articles in behavioral economics propose paternalist policy action and that 95.5% of these do not contain any analysis of the cognitive ability of policymakers. This suggests that behavioral political economy, in which the analytical tools of behavioral economics are applied to political decision-makers as well, would offer a useful extension of the research program.

https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-07-19/some-countries-like-nudges-more-than-others
Research shows that Americans and conservatives can be less open to cues to change behavior.

It’s For Your Own Good!: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/03/07/its-your-own-good/
- Cass Sunstein

Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism
by Sarah Conly
Cambridge University Press, 206 pp., $95.00

WHO NUDGES THE NUDGERS?: https://jacobitemag.com/2017/10/26/who-nudges-the-nudgers/
org:edge  guide  video  lectures  list  expert  economics  behavioral-econ  psychology  cog-psych  unit  complex-systems  🎩  multi  twitter  social  discussion  ratty  unaffiliated  aphorism  hmm  lol  authoritarianism  managerial-state  microfoundations  news  org:mag  org:biz  org:bv  journos-pundits  technocracy  books  review  expert-experience  elite  vampire-squid  study  lmao  data  info-dynamics  error  biases  iq  distribution  pro-rata  impetus  crooked  antidemos  civil-liberty  randy-ayndy  political-econ  gnon  org:popup  paying-rent  incentives  government  world  usa  alien-character  allodium  old-anglo  big-peeps  humility  noblesse-oblige  institutions  interests  org:local  utopia-dystopia 
february 2017 by nhaliday
Heritability of ultimatum game responder behavior
Employing standard structural equation modeling techniques, we estimate that >40% of the variation in subjects' rejection behavior is explained by additive genetic effects. Our estimates also suggest a very modest role for common environment as a source of phenotypic variation.
study  biodet  org:nat  psychology  social-psych  behavioral-econ  variance-components  decision-theory  twin-study  europe  nordic  trust  GT-101  objective-measure  zero-positive-sum  justice  behavioral-gen  cooperate-defect  microfoundations 
february 2017 by nhaliday
Hyperbolic discounting - Wikipedia
Individuals using hyperbolic discounting reveal a strong tendency to make choices that are inconsistent over time – they make choices today that their future self would prefer not to have made, despite using the same reasoning. This dynamic inconsistency happens because the value of future rewards is much lower under hyperbolic discounting than under exponential discounting.
psychology  cog-psych  behavioral-econ  values  time-preference  wiki  reference  concept  models  distribution  time  uncertainty  decision-theory  decision-making  sequential  stamina  neurons  akrasia  contradiction  self-control  patience  article  formal-values  microfoundations  constraint-satisfaction  additive  long-short-run 
january 2017 by nhaliday
A Rejection of 'Broken Windows Policing' Over Race Actually Hurts Minority Neighborhoods | Manhattan Institute
https://twitter.com/BookOfTamara/status/778838226983268352
https://archive.is/ETLXf
Late-night slightly controversial criminal justice thread:

Proactive policing and crime control: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-017-0227-x
Evidence that curtailing proactive policing can reduce major crime: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-017-0211-5

Is Racial Profiling a Legitimate Strategy in the Fight against Violent Crime?: https://link.springer.com/epdf/10.1007/s11406-018-9945-1?author_access_token=nDM1xCesybebx7yUX2BxZ_e4RwlQNchNByi7wbcMAY6py69jTlOiEGDIgqW0Vv2HrAor6wlMLH695I2ykTiKUxf1RBnu1u_6gjXU-6vgh2gIy6CX2npHD9GR350T20x_TbCcq4MmJUPrxAqsJSe1QA%3D%3D
- Neven Sesardić

Are U.S. Cities Underpoliced?: http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2017/08/u-s-cities-underpoliced.html
Chalfin and McCrary acknowledge the endogeneity problem but they suggest that a more important reason why ordinary regression gives you poor results is that the number of police is poorly measured. Suppose the number of police jumps up and down in the data even when the true number stays constant. Fake variation obviously can’t influence real crime so when your regression “sees” a lot of (fake) variation in police which is not associated with variation in crime it’s naturally going to conclude that the effect of police on crime is small, i.e. attenuation bias.

By comparing two different measures of the number of police, Chalfin and McCrary show that a surprising amount of the ups and downs in the number of police is measurement error. Using their two measures, however, Chalfin and McCrary produce a third measure which is better than either alone. Using this cleaned-up estimate, they find that ordinary regression (with controls) gives you estimates of the effect of police on crime which are plausible and similar to those found using other techniques like natural experiments. Chalfin and McCrary’s estimates, however, are more precise since they use much more of the variation in the data.

Using these new estimates of the effect of police and crime along with estimates of the social cost of crime they conclude (as I have argued before) that U.S. cities are substantially under-policed.

Crime Imprisons and Kills: http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2018/01/crime-imprisons-kills.html
…The everyday lived experience of urban poverty has also been transformed. Analyzing rates of violent victimization over time, I found that the poorest Americans today are victimized at about the same rate as the richest Americans were at the start of the 1990s. That means that a poor, unemployed city resident walking the streets of an average city today has about the same chance of being robbed, beaten up, stabbed or shot as a well-off urbanite in 1993. Living in poverty used to mean living with the constant threat of violence. In most of the country, that is no longer true.

http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2015/09/what-was-gary-beckers-biggest-mistake.html
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Deterrence-in-Criminal-Justice.pdf
Do parole abolition and Truth-in-Sentencing deter violent crimes in Virginia?: http://link.springer.com.sci-hub.tw/article/10.1007/s00181-017-1332-4

Death penalty: https://offsettingbehaviour.blogspot.com/2011/09/death-penalty.html
And so I revise: the death penalty is wrong, and it also likely has little measurable deterrent effect. There may still be a deterrent effect; we just can't show one given available data.

The effects of DNA databases on the deterrence and detection of offenders: http://jenniferdoleac.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/DNA_Denmark.pdf
We exploit a large expansion of Denmark’s DNA database in 2005 to measure the effect of DNA registration on criminal behavior. Using a regression discontinuity strategy, we find that DNA registration reduces recidivism by 43%. Using rich data on the timing of subsequent charges to separate the deterrence and detection effects of DNA databases, we also find that DNA registration increases the probability that repeat offenders get caught, by 4%. We estimate an elasticity of criminal behavior with respect to the probability of detection to be -1.7. We also find suggestive evidence that DNA profiling changes non-criminal behavior: offenders added to the DNA database are more likely to get married, remain in a stable relationship, and live with their children.

Short- and long-term effects of imprisonment on future felony convictions and prison admissions: http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2017/09/26/1701544114.short
https://twitter.com/bswud/status/917354893907779585
Prison isn't criminogenic—offenders have higher rates of re-incarceration because of technical parole violations
news  org:mag  right-wing  policy  criminal-justice  nyc  urban  race  culture-war  rhetoric  org:ngo  sociology  criminology  journos-pundits  multi  law  crime  contrarianism  twitter  discussion  gnon  ratty  albion  wonkish  time-preference  econotariat  marginal-rev  economics  models  map-territory  error  behavioral-econ  intervention  pdf  white-paper  expectancy  microfoundations  big-peeps  piracy  study  org:nat  chart  🎩  hmm  order-disorder  morality  values  data  authoritarianism  genomics  econometrics  europe  nordic  natural-experiment  endo-exo  debate  intricacy  measurement  signal-noise  regression  methodology  summary  explanation  social  commentary  evidence-based  endogenous-exogenous  bounded-cognition  urban-rural  philosophy  essay  article  letters  ethnocentrism  prejudice  ethics  formal-values  africa  pro-rata  bayesian  priors-posteriors  discrimination 
january 2017 by nhaliday
Are Risk Aversion and Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?
relevant thread (discussion of Matt Bruenig's passive income thing): https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/815644778641571842
other study: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/089533005775196732

Our main finding is that risk aversion and impatience both vary systematically with cognitive ability. Individuals with higher cognitive ability are significantly more willing to take risks in the lottery experiments and are significantly more patient over the yearlong time horizon studied in the intertemporal choice experiment. The correlation between cognitive ability and risk aversion is present for both young and old, and for males and females, although the relationship is somewhat weaker for females and younger individuals.
study  economics  spearhead  behavioral-econ  psychology  cog-psych  iq  🎩  multi  risk  rationality  cracker-econ  econotariat  discipline  twitter  social  field-study  values  time-preference  hive-mind  garett-jones  decision-making  wonkish  objective-measure  s:*  commentary  high-variance  investing  patience  outcome-risk  stylized-facts  broad-econ  wealth  s-factor  chart  wealth-of-nations  microfoundations 
january 2017 by nhaliday
EconPapers: On the Acceptance of Apologies
After offenses with ambiguous intentionality apologizers are punished less often than nonapologizers. Victims expect an apology and punish if they do not receive one. If an apology is possible, harmdoers who apologize are punished with lower probability. An apology only affects the event of punishment but not the level of punishment. An apology does not help at all after clearly intentionally committed offenses. On the contrary, after such offenses harmdoers do better not to apologize since sending an apology in this situation strongly increases punishment compared to remaining silent.
study  economics  behavioral-econ  ritual  contracts  psychology  social-psych  hmm  field-study  🎩  decision-making  operational  justice  info-econ  social-norms  info-dynamics  duty  honor  responsibility  impro 
january 2017 by nhaliday
Bestiary of Behavioral Economics/Trust Game - Wikibooks, open books for an open world
In the trust game, like the ultimatum game and the dictator game, there are two participants that are anonymously paired. Both of these individuals are given some quantity of money. The first individual, or player, is told that he must send some amount of his money to an anonymous second player, though the amount sent may be zero. The first player is also informed that whatever he sends will be tripled by the experimenter. So, when the first player chooses a value, the experimenter will take it, triple it, and give that money to the second player. The second player is then told to make a similar choice – give some amount of the now-tripled money back to the first player, even if that amount is zero.

Even with perfect information about the mechanics of the game, the first player option to send nothing (and thus the second player option to send nothing back) is the Nash equilibrium for the game.

In the original Berg et al. experiment, thirty out of thirty-two game trials resulted in a violation of the results predicted by standard economic theory. In these thirty cases, first players sent money that averaged slightly over fifty percent of their original endowment.

Heritability of cooperative behavior in the trust game: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2268795/
- trust defined by the standard A->B->A trust game
- smallish h^2, small but nonzero shared environment, primarily non-shared environment (~70%)

The results of our mixed-effects Bayesian ACE analysis suggest that variation in how subjects play the trust game is partially accounted for by genetic differences (Tables 2 and ​and33 and Fig. 2). In the ACE model of trust, the heritability estimate is 20% (C.I. 3–38%) in the Swedish experiment and 10% (C.I. 4–21%) in the U.S. experiment. The ACE model of trust also demonstrates that environmental variation plays a role. In particular, unshared environmental variation is a much more significant source of phenotypic variation than genetic variation (e2 = 68% vs. c2 = 12% in Sweden and e2 = 82% vs. c2 = 8% in the U.S.; P < 0.0001 in both samples). In the ACE model of trustworthiness, heritability (h2) generates 18% (C.I. 8–30%) of the variance in the Swedish experiment and 17% (C.I. 5–32%) in the U.S. experiment. Once again, environmental differences play a role (e2 = 66% vs. c2 = 17% in Sweden and e2 = 71% vs. c2 = 12% in the U.S.; P < 0.0001 in both samples).

Trust and Gender: An Examination of Behavior and Beliefs in the Investment Game: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222329553_Trust_and_Gender_An_Examination_of_Behavior_and_Beliefs_in_the_Investment_Game
How does gender influence trust, the likelihood of being trusted and the level of trustworthiness? We compare choices by men and women in the Investment Game and use questionnaire data to try to understand the motivations for the behavioral differences. We find that men trust more than women, and women are more trustworthy than men. The relationship between expected return and trusting behavior is stronger among men than women, suggesting that men view the interaction more strategically than women. Women felt more obligated both to trust and reciprocate, but the impact of obligation on behavior varies.

Genetic Influences Are Virtually Absent for Trust: http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0093880
trust defined by poll

Over the past decades, numerous twin studies have revealed moderate to high heritability estimates for individual differences in a wide range of human traits, including cognitive ability, psychiatric disorders, and personality traits. Even factors that are generally believed to be environmental in nature have been shown to be under genetic control, albeit modest. Is such heritability also present in _social traits that are conceptualized as causes and consequences of social interactions_ or in other ways strongly shaped by behavior of other people? Here we examine a population-based sample of 1,012 twins and relatives. We show that the genetic influence on generalized trust in other people (trust-in-others: h2 = 5%, ns), and beliefs regarding other people’s trust in the self (trust-in-self: h2 = 13%, ns), is virtually absent. As test-retest reliability for both scales were found to be moderate or high (r = .76 and r = .53, respectively) in an independent sample, we conclude that all variance in trust is likely to be accounted for by non-shared environmental influences.

Dutch sample

Generalized Trust: Four Lessons From Genetics and Culture: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0963721414552473
We share four basic lessons on trust: (a) Generalized trust is more a matter of culture than genetics; (b) trust is deeply rooted in social interaction experiences (that go beyond childhood), networks, and media; (c) people have too little trust in other people in general; and (d) it is adaptive to regulate a “healthy dose” of generalized trust.

Trust is heritable, whereas distrust is not: http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2017/06/13/1617132114
Notably, although both trust and distrust are strongly influenced by the individual’s unique environment, interestingly, trust shows significant genetic influences, whereas distrust does not. Rather, distrust appears to be primarily socialized, including influences within the family.

[ed.: All this is consistent with my intuition that moral behavior is more subject to cultural/"free will"-type influences.]
models  economics  behavioral-econ  decision-theory  wiki  reference  classic  minimum-viable  game-theory  decision-making  trust  GT-101  putnam-like  justice  social-capital  cooperate-defect  microfoundations  multi  study  psychology  social-psych  regularizer  environmental-effects  coordination  variance-components  europe  nordic  usa  🌞  🎩  anglo  biodet  objective-measure  sociology  behavioral-gen  poll  self-report  null-result  comparison  org:nat  chart  iteration-recursion  homo-hetero  intricacy 
december 2016 by nhaliday
Partisan Bias in Factual Beliefs about Politics
The experiments show that small payments for correct and "don't know" responses sharply diminish the gap between Democrats and Republicans in responses to "partisan" factual questions. The results suggest that the apparent differences in factual beliefs between members of different parties may be more illusory than real.
study  economics  behavioral-econ  polisci  politics  tribalism  rationality  epistemic  paying-rent  psychology  social-psych  biases  field-study  incentives  decision-making  wonkish  mood-affiliation  descriptive  polarization  sociology  intervention  money  realness  info-dynamics  truth  hypocrisy  reason 
december 2016 by nhaliday
Refugee Migration and Electoral Outcomes
in Denmark, immigration into given municipalities -> anti-migrant votes there (some conditions apply)

Does Exposure to the Refugee Crisis Make Natives More Hostile?: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3042936
We provide evidence from a natural experiment in the Aegean Sea, where Greek islands close to the Turkish coast experienced a sudden and massive increase in refugee arrivals while similar islands slightly farther away did not. Leveraging distance as an instrument for between-island variation in exposure to the refugee crisis allows us to obtain causal estimates of its impact. In our targeted survey of 2,070 islands residents, we find that immediate exposure to large-scale refugee arrivals induces sizable and lasting increases in natives’ hostility toward refugee, immigrant and Muslim minorities; support for restrictive asylum and immigration policies; and political engagement to effect such policies.

Does Immigration into Their Neighborhoods Incline Voters Toward the Extreme Right? The Case of the Freedom Party of Austria: http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/jkueconwp/2012_5f05.htm
- immigration did affect FPO vote share at neighborhood level
- heterogeneous wrt skills
- high-skilled -> lower (spillover benefits), mid-skilled -> higher (competition), low-skilled -> little effect
study  europe  economics  polisci  government  politics  migrant-crisis  nordic  pdf  behavioral-econ  diversity  migration  political-econ  wonkish  intervention  elections  sociology  us-them  multi  natural-experiment  endo-exo  mediterranean  MENA  islam  econometrics  germanic  human-capital  stylized-facts  chart  microfoundations  populism  nationalism-globalism  eastern-europe  endogenous-exogenous 
december 2016 by nhaliday
Valuing Alternative Work Arrangements
The great majority of workers are not willing to pay for flexible scheduling relative to a traditional schedule: either the ability to choose the days and times of work or the number of hours they work. However, the average worker is willing to give up 20% of wages to avoid a schedule set by an employer on a week’s notice. This largely represents workers’ aversion to evening and weekend work, not scheduling unpredictability.
economics  study  labor  behavioral-econ  values  field-study  decision-making  working-stiff  compensation  time  money-for-time  time-use  supply-demand  microfoundations 
december 2016 by nhaliday
The Uniqueness of Italian Internal Divergence | Notes On Liberty
Measuring Productivity Dispersion: Lessons From Counting One-Hundred Million Ballots: http://cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=12273
We measure output per worker in nearly 8,000 municipalities in the Italian electoral process using ballot counting times in the 2013 general election and two referenda in 2016. We document large productivity dispersion across provinces in this very uniform and low-skill task that involves nearly no technology and requires limited physical capital. Using a development accounting framework, this measure explains up to half of the firm-level productivity dispersion across Italian provinces and more than half the north-south productivity gap in Italy. We explore potential drivers of our measure of labor efficiency and find that its association with measures of work ethic and trust is particularly robust.

Interregional Migration, Human Capital Externalities and Unemployment Dynamics: Evidence from Italian Provinces: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/168560/1/Econstor.pdf
Using longitudinal data over the years 2002-2011 for 103 NUTS-3 Italian regions, we document that net outflows of human capital from the South to the North have increased the unemployment rate in the South, while it did not affect the unemployment rate in the North. Our analysis contributes to the literature on interregional human capital mobility suggesting that reducing human capital flight from Southern regions should be a priority

EXPLAINING ITALY’S NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE: Experimental evidence of large differences in social norms of cooperation: http://www.res.org.uk/details/mediabrief/9633311/EXPLAINING-ITALYS-NORTH-SOUTH-DIVIDE-Experimental-evidence-of-large-differences-.html
Amoral Familism, Social Capital, or Trust? The Behavioural Foundations of the Italian North-South Divide: http://conference.iza.org/conference_files/CognitiveSkills_2014/casari_m8572.pdf

At the root of the North‐South cooperation gap in Italy Preferences or beliefs?: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecoj.12608
Southerners share the same pro‐social preferences, but differ both in their belief about cooperativeness and in the aversion to social risk ‐ respectively more pessimistic and stronger among Southerners.

Past dominations, current institutions and the Italian regional economic performance: http://www.siecon.org/online/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/DiLiberto-Sideri.pdf
We study the connection between economic performance and the quality of government institutions for the sample of 103 Italian NUTS3 regions, including new measures of institutional quality calculated using data on the provision of four areas of public service: health, educational infrastructures, environment and energy. In order to address likely endogeneity problems, we use the histories of the different foreign dominations that ruled Italian regions between the 16th and 17th century and over seven hundred years before the creation of the unified Italian State. Our results suggest a significant role of past historical institutions on the current public administration efficiency and show that the latter makes a difference to the economic performance of regions. Overall, our analysis confirms that informal institutions matter for development, and that history can be used to find suitable instruments

Figure 1 – Institutional quality: territorial distribution

Figure 5: Italy during the period 1560-1659 (part A) and corresponding current provinces (part B)

Figure 6 –Former Spanish provinces

Italy’s North-South divide (1861-2011): the state of art: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62209/1/MPRA_paper_62209.pdf
My main argument is summed up in the conclusions: there was a socio-institutional divide between the North and the South of the peninsula, that pre-exists Unification, in some respects grows stronger with it and is never bridged throughout the history of post-unification Italy. Admittedly, some socio-institutional convergence took place in the last decades, but this went in a direction opposite to the desirable one − that is, the North and Italy as a whole have begun to look similar to the South, rather than vice versa.

La cartina dell’ISTAT che mostra dove si leggono più libri in Italia: http://www.ilpost.it/flashes/istat-lettori-regioni-italiane/
ISTAT map showing where more books are read in Italy
data  mediterranean  europe  economics  growth-econ  maps  econotariat  pseudoE  history  divergence  econ-metrics  early-modern  mostly-modern  shift  broad-econ  article  wealth-of-nations  within-group  multi  econ-productivity  discipline  microfoundations  trust  cohesion  labor  natural-experiment  field-study  elections  study  behavioral-econ  GT-101  coordination  putnam-like  🎩  outcome-risk  roots  endo-exo  social-capital  social-norms  summary  cultural-dynamics  pdf  incentives  values  n-factor  efficiency  migration  longitudinal  human-capital  mobility  s-factor  econometrics  institutions  path-dependence  conquest-empire  cliometrics  survey  state-of-art  wealth  geography  input-output  endogenous-exogenous  medieval  leviathan  studying  chart  hari-seldon  descriptive 
december 2016 by nhaliday
The intelligent inheriting the earth | EVOLVING ECONOMICS
Will the intelligent inherit the earth? IQ and time preference in the global economy: http://mason.gmu.edu/~gjonesb/IITE.pdf
IQ in the Utility Function: Cognitive skills, time preference, and cross-country differences in savings rates: http://mason.gmu.edu/~gjonesb/IQsavings.pdf

"Thus, all countries except the most patient have negative net worth and negative holdings of net foreign assets: the most patient country holds title to all capital flows from the less patient. Consumption per unit of effective labor approaches zero (kept from zero consumption only by the Inada condition) because income flows are devoted to debt repayment. Indeed, in steady state all but the most patient country have savings rates near 100%—but these savings are mere debt repayments to the most patient country. In this steady state, the most patient country (or more realistically, countries) would continue to consume a non-negligible amount and would have the lowest savings rate(s) in the world."

China’s Creditor Imperialism: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-sri-lanka-hambantota-port-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-12
study  summary  economics  human-capital  hive-mind  🌞  🎩  econotariat  multi  spearhead  cracker-econ  time-preference  garett-jones  biophysical-econ  monetary-fiscal  science-anxiety  sinosphere  asia  china  models  network-structure  long-short-run  sociology  patience  winner-take-all  debt  money  psychology  cog-psych  big-peeps  capital  equilibrium  stylized-facts  s:*  nationalism-globalism  temperance  broad-econ  wealth  group-level  world  rindermann-thompson  slippery-slope  government  pop-diff  chart  stock-flow  commentary  life-history  wealth-of-nations  behavioral-econ  kumbaya-kult  microfoundations  alien-character  natural-experiment  supply-demand  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  expansionism  news  org:mag  org:davos  hari-seldon 
november 2016 by nhaliday
SSC Journal Club: Expert Prediction Of Experiments | Slate Star Codex
- simple behavioral economics experiment (predicting which incentive would work best for MTurk)
- experts did better, but w/ caveats
1. prestige didn't matter, PhD students did just as well as full professors
2. field didn't matter (w/i a group of related fields)
3. advantage only present by one measure (absolute error rather than relative)
4. advantage was small
5. averaging got rid of it (wisdom of crowds)
6. doing well w/ a little empirical data for related problem predicted doing well on general problem. so expertise doesn't seem to be important as opposed just being good at forecasting?
yvain  ssc  study  summary  economics  behavioral-econ  tetlock  social-science  ratty  rationality  cool  hmm  insight  🤖  meta:prediction  biases  bounded-cognition  incentives  ensembles  realness  info-dynamics  microfoundations 
november 2016 by nhaliday
The Financial Burden of Having Children and Fertility Differentials Across Development and Life Stages: Evidence from Satisfaction Data | SpringerLink
To address this challenge, we focus our attention on the peculiar movement of satisfaction in the financial domain of life, which is measured by standardizing financial satisfaction by overall life satisfaction, and perform regression analyses using World and European Integrated Values Survey. The results show that the negative impact of having an additional child on satisfaction becomes particularly greater in the financial domain as income increases and total fertility rate (TFR) decreases. The results also indicate that having children offers a sense of financial security to the elderly in high TFR countries while this is not the case in lower TFR countries. These results support the general idea that the heavier financial burden of having children is a major cause of fertility decline and provide policy implications to find a way out of extremely low fertility.
study  demographics  economics  class  world  comparison  fertility  behavioral-econ  biophysical-econ  legacy  sociology  broad-econ  general-survey  cost-benefit  money  chart  roots  causation  parenting  data  poll  values  nitty-gritty  solid-study  demographic-transition  correlation  marginal  emotion  meaningness  zeitgeist  rot  the-bones  explanation  phalanges  dysgenics  modernity  microfoundations  intervention  wonkish  explanans  hari-seldon  happy-sad 
october 2016 by nhaliday
« earlier      
per page:    204080120160

bundles : econframe

related tags

ability-competence  absolute-relative  abstraction  academia  accretion  accuracy  acm  additive  adversarial  africa  age-generation  aging  agriculture  ai  ai-control  akrasia  albion  alesina  alien-character  alignment  allodium  alt-inst  altruism  ama  analysis  analytical-holistic  anarcho-tyranny  anglo  anglosphere  anomie  anthropic  anthropology  antidemos  antiquity  aphorism  apollonian-dionysian  applicability-prereqs  applications  archaeology  aristos  art  article  ascetic  asia  assimilation  assortative-mating  atmosphere  attaq  audio  authoritarianism  autism  automation  aversion  axelrod  backup  barons  bayesian  behavioral-econ  behavioral-gen  berkeley  best-practices  biases  big-peeps  big-picture  bio  biodet  biophysical-econ  biotech  bits  blog  blowhards  books  bounded-cognition  branches  brands  britain  broad-econ  business  c:**  c:***  california  caltech  canada  capital  capitalism  cardio  career  cartoons  causation  characterization  charity  chart  checking  chicago  china  christianity  civic  civil-liberty  civilization  cjones-like  clarity  class  class-warfare  classic  cliometrics  coalitions  coarse-fine  cocktail  cog-psych  cohesion  collaboration  coming-apart  commentary  communication  communism  community  comparison  compensation  competition  complement-substitute  complex-systems  composition-decomposition  concept  conceptual-vocab  conference  confluence  conquest-empire  constraint-satisfaction  context  contracts  contradiction  contrarianism  convexity-curvature  cool  cooperate-defect  coordination  corporation  correlation  corruption  cost-benefit  counter-revolution  counterfactual  courage  cracker-econ  creative  crime  criminal-justice  criminology  CRISPR  critique  crooked  crux  cultural-dynamics  culture  culture-war  curiosity  current-events  curvature  cybernetics  cycles  darwinian  data  data-science  database  dataset  debate  debt  decentralized  decision-making  decision-theory  deep-materialism  definition  democracy  demographic-transition  demographics  dennett  density  descriptive  detail-architecture  developing-world  developmental  dignity  dimensionality  discipline  discovery  discrete  discrimination  discussion  distribution  divergence  diversity  domestication  duplication  duty  dynamical  dysgenics  early-modern  earth  easterly  eastern-europe  ecology  econ-metrics  econ-productivity  econometrics  economics  econotariat  eden  education  EEA  effect-size  effective-altruism  efficiency  egalitarianism-hierarchy  ego-depletion  EGT  elections  electromag  elite  embedded-cognition  embodied  embodied-cognition  emergent  emotion  empirical  endo-exo  endogenous-exogenous  ends-means  enhancement  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  ensembles  entrepreneurialism  entropy-like  environment  environmental-effects  envy  epidemiology  epistemic  equilibrium  ergodic  error  essay  essence-existence  ethics  ethnocentrism  ethnography  europe  events  evidence-based  evolution  evopsych  examples  expansionism  expectancy  expert  expert-experience  explanans  explanation  exploratory  exposition  expression-survival  externalities  extrema  facebook  faq  farmers-and-foragers  fermi  fertility  feudal  feynman  field-study  finance  finiteness  fixed-point  flexibility  flux-stasis  focus  foreign-lang  formal-values  free-riding  frontier  fungibility-liquidity  futurism  gallic  galor-like  game-theory  games  garett-jones  gavisti  gender  gender-diff  general-survey  generalization  genetic-load  genetics  genomics  geography  germanic  giants  gibbon  gnon  gnosis-logos  good-evil  government  gregory-clark  group-level  group-selection  growth  growth-econ  GT-101  guide  guilt-shame  gwern  haidt  hanson  happy-sad  hari-seldon  harvard  health  healthcare  heavy-industry  henrich  heterodox  heuristic  hidden-motives  high-variance  higher-ed  history  hive-mind  hmm  hn  homepage  homo-hetero  honor  housing  hsu  human-capital  human-study  humanity  humility  hypochondria  hypocrisy  hypothesis-testing  ideas  identity-politics  ideology  idk  illusion  impetus  impro  incentives  india  individualism-collectivism  industrial-org  industrial-revolution  inequality  info-dynamics  info-econ  info-foraging  information-theory  innovation  input-output  insight  instinct  institutions  integrity  intel  intelligence  interdisciplinary  interests  internet  interpretation  intersection  intersection-connectedness  intervention  interview  intricacy  investing  iq  iron-age  is-ought  islam  iteration-recursion  japan  journos-pundits  judaism  justice  kinship  knowledge  korea  krugman  kumbaya-kult  labor  language  latent-variables  latin-america  lattice  law  leadership  leaks  learning  lectures  left-wing  legacy  lens  let-me-see  letters  leviathan  life-history  limits  linear-algebra  liner-notes  links  list  literature  lived-experience  lmao  local-global  lol  long-short-run  long-term  longitudinal  love-hate  low-hanging  macro  madisonian  malaise  male-variability  malthus  management  managerial-state  manifolds  map-territory  maps  marginal  marginal-rev  market-failure  markets  markov  martial  matching  math  matrix-factorization  meaningness  measurement  media  medicine  medieval  mediterranean  MENA  meta-analysis  meta:medicine  meta:prediction  meta:rhetoric  metabuch  metameta  methodology  metrics  micro  microbiz  microfoundations  migrant-crisis  migration  military  minimum-viable  mobile  mobility  models  modernity  mokyr-allen-mccloskey  monetary-fiscal  money  money-for-time  mood-affiliation  morality  mostly-modern  multi  murray  music  mutation  n-factor  narrative  nationalism-globalism  natural-experiment  nature  network-structure  neuro  neuro-nitgrit  neurons  new-religion  news  nibble  nietzschean  nihil  nitty-gritty  nl-and-so-can-you  noahpinion  noble-lie  noblesse-oblige  nonlinearity  nordic  north-weingast-like  novelty  null-result  number  nyc  objective-measure  occident  old-anglo  open-closed  operational  optimate  optimism  optimization  order-disorder  org:biz  org:bv  org:davos  org:econlib  org:edge  org:edu  org:lite  org:local  org:mag  org:mat  org:med  org:nat  org:ngo  org:popup  org:rec  org:sci  organization  organizing  orient  orwellian  oscillation  other-xtian  outcome-risk  outliers  p:null  papers  paradox  parallax  parasites-microbiome  parenting  path-dependence  patho-altruism  patience  paul-romer  paying-rent  pdf  peace-violence  people  personality  pessimism  peter-singer  phalanges  phase-transition  philosophy  physics  piketty  pinker  piracy  planning  plots  poast  podcast  poetry  polanyi-marx  polarization  policy  polisci  political-econ  politics  poll  pop-diff  population  population-genetics  populism  postrat  pragmatic  pre-2013  pre-ww2  prediction  preference-falsification  prejudice  preprint  presentation  priors-posteriors  privacy  pro-rata  probability  problem-solving  productivity  prof  propaganda  property-rights  proposal  protestant-catholic  prudence  pseudoE  psych-architecture  psychology  psychometrics  public-goodish  public-health  putnam-like  q-n-a  qra  questions  quixotic  quotes  race  random  randy-ayndy  ranking  rant  rationality  ratty  reading  realness  reason  recent-selection  recommendations  recruiting  redistribution  reduction  reference  reflection  regional-scatter-plots  regression  regression-to-mean  regularizer  regulation  reinforcement  religion  rent-seeking  replication  reputation  research  research-program  responsibility  retention  revealed-preference  review  revolution  rhetoric  rhythm  right-wing  rigidity  rindermann-thompson  risk  ritual  robust  roots  rot  s-factor  s:*  s:**  s:***  sales  sampling-bias  sanctity-degradation  sapiens  scale  scholar  science  science-anxiety  scitariat  selection  self-control  self-interest  self-report  selfish-gene  sequential  sex  shalizi  shift  signal-noise  signaling  signum  simler  simplex  simulation  sinosphere  skeleton  slippery-slope  smoothness  soccer  social  social-capital  social-norms  social-psych  social-science  social-structure  sociality  society  sociology  solid-study  spatial  spearhead  speculation  speedometer  sports  spreading  ssc  stagnation  stamina  state-of-art  stats  status  stereotypes  stock-flow  stories  strategy  straussian  stream  street-fighting  stress  structure  study  studying  stylized-facts  subjective-objective  success  summary  supply-demand  survey  sv  syntax  systematic-ad-hoc  tactics  tainter  tapes  taxes  teaching  tech  technocracy  technology  temperance  terrorism  tetlock  texas  the-basilisk  the-bones  the-classics  the-great-west-whale  the-monster  the-self  the-trenches  the-watchers  the-world-is-just-atoms  theory-of-mind  theory-practice  theos  things  thinking  time  time-preference  time-series  time-use  tocqueville  todo  top-n  track-record  trade  tradeoffs  tradition  trends  tribalism  trivia  trust  truth  tumblr  turchin  tutoring  tv  twin-study  twitter  unaffiliated  uncertainty  unintended-consequences  uniqueness  unit  universalism-particularism  urban  urban-rural  us-them  usa  utopia-dystopia  values  vampire-squid  variance-components  video  virtu  visual-understanding  visualization  visuo  vitality  volo-avolo  von-neumann  war  water  wealth  wealth-of-nations  welfare-state  west-hunter  westminster  whiggish-hegelian  white-paper  whole-partial-many  wiki  winner-take-all  wire-guided  within-group  within-without  wonkish  working-stiff  world  X-not-about-Y  yvain  zeitgeist  zero-positive-sum  zooming  🌞  🎓  🎩  🐸  👽  🔬  🤖  🦀 

Copy this bookmark:



description:


tags: