nhaliday + ai-control   82

[1804.04268] Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignment
We suggest that the analysis of incomplete contracting developed by law and economics researchers can provide a useful framework for understanding the AI alignment problem and help to generate a systematic approach to finding solutions. We first provide an overview of the incomplete contracting literature and explore parallels between this work and the problem of AI alignment. As we emphasize, misalignment between principal and agent is a core focus of economic analysis. We highlight some technical results from the economics literature on incomplete contracts that may provide insights for AI alignment researchers. Our core contribution, however, is to bring to bear an insight that economists have been urged to absorb from legal scholars and other behavioral scientists: the fact that human contracting is supported by substantial amounts of external structure, such as generally available institutions (culture, law) that can supply implied terms to fill the gaps in incomplete contracts. We propose a research agenda for AI alignment work that focuses on the problem of how to build AI that can replicate the human cognitive processes that connect individual incomplete contracts with this supporting external structure.
nibble  preprint  org:mat  papers  ai  ai-control  alignment  coordination  contracts  law  economics  interests  culture  institutions  number  context  behavioral-econ  composition-decomposition  rent-seeking  whole-partial-many 
april 2018 by nhaliday
Surveil things, not people – The sideways view
Technology may reach a point where free use of one person’s share of humanity’s resources is enough to easily destroy the world. I think society needs to make significant changes to cope with that scenario.

Mass surveillance is a natural response, and sometimes people think of it as the only response. I find mass surveillance pretty unappealing, but I think we can capture almost all of the value by surveilling things rather than surveilling people. This approach avoids some of the worst problems of mass surveillance; while it still has unattractive features it’s my favorite option so far.

...

The idea
We’ll choose a set of artifacts to surveil and restrict. I’ll call these heavy technology and everything else light technology. Our goal is to restrict as few things as possible, but we want to make sure that someone can’t cause unacceptable destruction with only light technology. By default something is light technology if it can be easily acquired by an individual or small group in 2017, and heavy technology otherwise (though we may need to make some exceptions, e.g. certain biological materials or equipment).

Heavy technology is subject to two rules:

1. You can’t use heavy technology in a way that is unacceptably destructive.
2. You can’t use heavy technology to undermine the machinery that enforces these two rules.

To enforce these rules, all heavy technology is under surveillance, and is situated such that it cannot be unilaterally used by any individual or small group. That is, individuals can own heavy technology, but they cannot have unmonitored physical access to that technology.

...

This proposal does give states a de facto monopoly on heavy technology, and would eventually make armed resistance totally impossible. But it’s already the case that states have a massive advantage in armed conflict, and it seems almost inevitable that progress in AI will make this advantage larger (and enable states to do much more with it). Realistically I’m not convinced this proposal makes things much worse than the default.

This proposal definitely expands regulators’ nominal authority and seems prone to abuses. But amongst candidates for handling a future with cheap and destructive dual-use technology, I feel this is the best of many bad options with respect to the potential for abuse.
ratty  acmtariat  clever-rats  risk  existence  futurism  technology  policy  alt-inst  proposal  government  intel  authoritarianism  orwellian  tricks  leviathan  security  civilization  ai  ai-control  arms  defense  cybernetics  institutions  law  unintended-consequences  civil-liberty  volo-avolo  power  constraint-satisfaction  alignment 
april 2018 by nhaliday
Complexity no Bar to AI - Gwern.net
Critics of AI risk suggest diminishing returns to computing (formalized asymptotically) means AI will be weak; this argument relies on a large number of questionable premises and ignoring additional resources, constant factors, and nonlinear returns to small intelligence advantages, and is highly unlikely. (computer science, transhumanism, AI, R)
created: 1 June 2014; modified: 01 Feb 2018; status: finished; confidence: likely; importance: 10
ratty  gwern  analysis  faq  ai  risk  speedometer  intelligence  futurism  cs  computation  complexity  tcs  linear-algebra  nonlinearity  convexity-curvature  average-case  adversarial  article  time-complexity  singularity  iteration-recursion  magnitude  multiplicative  lower-bounds  no-go  performance  hardware  humanity  psychology  cog-psych  psychometrics  iq  distribution  moments  complement-substitute  hanson  ems  enhancement  parable  detail-architecture  universalism-particularism  neuro  ai-control  environment  climate-change  threat-modeling  security  theory-practice  hacker  academia  realness  crypto  rigorous-crypto  usa  government 
april 2018 by nhaliday
The Hanson-Yudkowsky AI-Foom Debate - Machine Intelligence Research Institute
How Deviant Recent AI Progress Lumpiness?: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2018/03/how-deviant-recent-ai-progress-lumpiness.html
I seem to disagree with most people working on artificial intelligence (AI) risk. While with them I expect rapid change once AI is powerful enough to replace most all human workers, I expect this change to be spread across the world, not concentrated in one main localized AI system. The efforts of AI risk folks to design AI systems whose values won’t drift might stop global AI value drift if there is just one main AI system. But doing so in a world of many AI systems at similar abilities levels requires strong global governance of AI systems, which is a tall order anytime soon. Their continued focus on preventing single system drift suggests that they expect a single main AI system.

The main reason that I understand to expect relatively local AI progress is if AI progress is unusually lumpy, i.e., arriving in unusually fewer larger packages rather than in the usual many smaller packages. If one AI team finds a big lump, it might jump way ahead of the other teams.

However, we have a vast literature on the lumpiness of research and innovation more generally, which clearly says that usually most of the value in innovation is found in many small innovations. We have also so far seen this in computer science (CS) and AI. Even if there have been historical examples where much value was found in particular big innovations, such as nuclear weapons or the origin of humans.

Apparently many people associated with AI risk, including the star machine learning (ML) researchers that they often idolize, find it intuitively plausible that AI and ML progress is exceptionally lumpy. Such researchers often say, “My project is ‘huge’, and will soon do it all!” A decade ago my ex-co-blogger Eliezer Yudkowsky and I argued here on this blog about our differing estimates of AI progress lumpiness. He recently offered Alpha Go Zero as evidence of AI lumpiness:

...

In this post, let me give another example (beyond two big lumps in a row) of what could change my mind. I offer a clear observable indicator, for which data should have available now: deviant citation lumpiness in recent ML research. One standard measure of research impact is citations; bigger lumpier developments gain more citations that smaller ones. And it turns out that the lumpiness of citations is remarkably constant across research fields! See this March 3 paper in Science:

I Still Don’t Get Foom: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2014/07/30855.html
All of which makes it look like I’m the one with the problem; everyone else gets it. Even so, I’m gonna try to explain my problem again, in the hope that someone can explain where I’m going wrong. Here goes.

“Intelligence” just means an ability to do mental/calculation tasks, averaged over many tasks. I’ve always found it plausible that machines will continue to do more kinds of mental tasks better, and eventually be better at pretty much all of them. But what I’ve found it hard to accept is a “local explosion.” This is where a single machine, built by a single project using only a tiny fraction of world resources, goes in a short time (e.g., weeks) from being so weak that it is usually beat by a single human with the usual tools, to so powerful that it easily takes over the entire world. Yes, smarter machines may greatly increase overall economic growth rates, and yes such growth may be uneven. But this degree of unevenness seems implausibly extreme. Let me explain.

If we count by economic value, humans now do most of the mental tasks worth doing. Evolution has given us a brain chock-full of useful well-honed modules. And the fact that most mental tasks require the use of many modules is enough to explain why some of us are smarter than others. (There’d be a common “g” factor in task performance even with independent module variation.) Our modules aren’t that different from those of other primates, but because ours are different enough to allow lots of cultural transmission of innovation, we’ve out-competed other primates handily.

We’ve had computers for over seventy years, and have slowly build up libraries of software modules for them. Like brains, computers do mental tasks by combining modules. An important mental task is software innovation: improving these modules, adding new ones, and finding new ways to combine them. Ideas for new modules are sometimes inspired by the modules we see in our brains. When an innovation team finds an improvement, they usually sell access to it, which gives them resources for new projects, and lets others take advantage of their innovation.

...

In Bostrom’s graph above the line for an initially small project and system has a much higher slope, which means that it becomes in a short time vastly better at software innovation. Better than the entire rest of the world put together. And my key question is: how could it plausibly do that? Since the rest of the world is already trying the best it can to usefully innovate, and to abstract to promote such innovation, what exactly gives one small project such a huge advantage to let it innovate so much faster?

...

In fact, most software innovation seems to be driven by hardware advances, instead of innovator creativity. Apparently, good ideas are available but must usually wait until hardware is cheap enough to support them.

Yes, sometimes architectural choices have wider impacts. But I was an artificial intelligence researcher for nine years, ending twenty years ago, and I never saw an architecture choice make a huge difference, relative to other reasonable architecture choices. For most big systems, overall architecture matters a lot less than getting lots of detail right. Researchers have long wandered the space of architectures, mostly rediscovering variations on what others found before.

Some hope that a small project could be much better at innovation because it specializes in that topic, and much better understands new theoretical insights into the basic nature of innovation or intelligence. But I don’t think those are actually topics where one can usefully specialize much, or where we’ll find much useful new theory. To be much better at learning, the project would instead have to be much better at hundreds of specific kinds of learning. Which is very hard to do in a small project.

What does Bostrom say? Alas, not much. He distinguishes several advantages of digital over human minds, but all software shares those advantages. Bostrom also distinguishes five paths: better software, brain emulation (i.e., ems), biological enhancement of humans, brain-computer interfaces, and better human organizations. He doesn’t think interfaces would work, and sees organizations and better biology as only playing supporting roles.

...

Similarly, while you might imagine someday standing in awe in front of a super intelligence that embodies all the power of a new age, superintelligence just isn’t the sort of thing that one project could invent. As “intelligence” is just the name we give to being better at many mental tasks by using many good mental modules, there’s no one place to improve it. So I can’t see a plausible way one project could increase its intelligence vastly faster than could the rest of the world.

Takeoff speeds: https://sideways-view.com/2018/02/24/takeoff-speeds/
Futurists have argued for years about whether the development of AGI will look more like a breakthrough within a small group (“fast takeoff”), or a continuous acceleration distributed across the broader economy or a large firm (“slow takeoff”).

I currently think a slow takeoff is significantly more likely. This post explains some of my reasoning and why I think it matters. Mostly the post lists arguments I often hear for a fast takeoff and explains why I don’t find them compelling.

(Note: this is not a post about whether an intelligence explosion will occur. That seems very likely to me. Quantitatively I expect it to go along these lines. So e.g. while I disagree with many of the claims and assumptions in Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics, I don’t disagree with the central thesis or with most of the arguments.)
ratty  lesswrong  subculture  miri-cfar  ai  risk  ai-control  futurism  books  debate  hanson  big-yud  prediction  contrarianism  singularity  local-global  speed  speedometer  time  frontier  distribution  smoothness  shift  pdf  economics  track-record  abstraction  analogy  links  wiki  list  evolution  mutation  selection  optimization  search  iteration-recursion  intelligence  metameta  chart  analysis  number  ems  coordination  cooperate-defect  death  values  formal-values  flux-stasis  philosophy  farmers-and-foragers  malthus  scale  studying  innovation  insight  conceptual-vocab  growth-econ  egalitarianism-hierarchy  inequality  authoritarianism  wealth  near-far  rationality  epistemic  biases  cycles  competition  arms  zero-positive-sum  deterrence  war  peace-violence  winner-take-all  technology  moloch  multi  plots  research  science  publishing  humanity  labor  marginal  urban-rural  structure  composition-decomposition  complex-systems  gregory-clark  decentralized  heavy-industry  magnitude  multiplicative  endogenous-exogenous  models  uncertainty  decision-theory  time-prefer 
april 2018 by nhaliday
The Coming Technological Singularity
Within thirty years, we will have the technological
means to create superhuman intelligence. Shortly after,
the human era will be ended.

Is such progress avoidable? If not to be avoided, can
events be guided so that we may survive? These questions
are investigated. Some possible answers (and some further
dangers) are presented.

_What is The Singularity?_

The acceleration of technological progress has been the central
feature of this century. I argue in this paper that we are on the edge
of change comparable to the rise of human life on Earth. The precise
cause of this change is the imminent creation by technology of
entities with greater than human intelligence. There are several means
by which science may achieve this breakthrough (and this is another
reason for having confidence that the event will occur):
o The development of computers that are "awake" and
superhumanly intelligent. (To date, most controversy in the
area of AI relates to whether we can create human equivalence
in a machine. But if the answer is "yes, we can", then there
is little doubt that beings more intelligent can be constructed
shortly thereafter.
o Large computer networks (and their associated users) may "wake
up" as a superhumanly intelligent entity.
o Computer/human interfaces may become so intimate that users
may reasonably be considered superhumanly intelligent.
o Biological science may find ways to improve upon the natural
human intellect.

The first three possibilities depend in large part on
improvements in computer hardware. Progress in computer hardware has
followed an amazingly steady curve in the last few decades [16]. Based
largely on this trend, I believe that the creation of greater than
human intelligence will occur during the next thirty years. (Charles
Platt [19] has pointed out the AI enthusiasts have been making claims
like this for the last thirty years. Just so I'm not guilty of a
relative-time ambiguity, let me more specific: I'll be surprised if
this event occurs before 2005 or after 2030.)

What are the consequences of this event? When greater-than-human
intelligence drives progress, that progress will be much more rapid.
In fact, there seems no reason why progress itself would not involve
the creation of still more intelligent entities -- on a still-shorter
time scale. The best analogy that I see is with the evolutionary past:
Animals can adapt to problems and make inventions, but often no faster
than natural selection can do its work -- the world acts as its own
simulator in the case of natural selection. We humans have the ability
to internalize the world and conduct "what if's" in our heads; we can
solve many problems thousands of times faster than natural selection.
Now, by creating the means to execute those simulations at much higher
speeds, we are entering a regime as radically different from our human
past as we humans are from the lower animals.
org:junk  humanity  accelerationism  futurism  prediction  classic  technology  frontier  speedometer  ai  risk  internet  time  essay  rhetoric  network-structure  ai-control  morality  ethics  volo-avolo  egalitarianism-hierarchy  intelligence  scale  giants  scifi-fantasy  speculation  quotes  religion  theos  singularity  flux-stasis  phase-transition  cybernetics  coordination  cooperate-defect  moloch  communication  bits  speed  efficiency  eden-heaven  ecology  benevolence  end-times  good-evil  identity  the-self  whole-partial-many  density 
march 2018 by nhaliday
AI-complete - Wikipedia
In the field of artificial intelligence, the most difficult problems are informally known as AI-complete or AI-hard, implying that the difficulty of these computational problems is equivalent to that of solving the central artificial intelligence problem—making computers as intelligent as people, or strong AI.[1] To call a problem AI-complete reflects an attitude that it would not be solved by a simple specific algorithm.

AI-complete problems are hypothesised to include computer vision, natural language understanding, and dealing with unexpected circumstances while solving any real world problem.[2]

Currently, AI-complete problems cannot be solved with modern computer technology alone, but would also require human computation. This property can be useful, for instance to test for the presence of humans as with CAPTCHAs, and for computer security to circumvent brute-force attacks.[3][4]

...

AI-complete problems are hypothesised to include:

Bongard problems
Computer vision (and subproblems such as object recognition)
Natural language understanding (and subproblems such as text mining, machine translation, and word sense disambiguation[8])
Dealing with unexpected circumstances while solving any real world problem, whether it's navigation or planning or even the kind of reasoning done by expert systems.

...

Current AI systems can solve very simple and/or restricted versions of AI-complete problems, but never in their full generality. When AI researchers attempt to "scale up" their systems to handle more complicated, real world situations, the programs tend to become excessively brittle without commonsense knowledge or a rudimentary understanding of the situation: they fail as unexpected circumstances outside of its original problem context begin to appear. When human beings are dealing with new situations in the world, they are helped immensely by the fact that they know what to expect: they know what all things around them are, why they are there, what they are likely to do and so on. They can recognize unusual situations and adjust accordingly. A machine without strong AI has no other skills to fall back on.[9]
concept  reduction  cs  computation  complexity  wiki  reference  properties  computer-vision  ai  risk  ai-control  machine-learning  deep-learning  language  nlp  order-disorder  tactics  strategy  intelligence  humanity  speculation  crux 
march 2018 by nhaliday
Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios
https://twitter.com/robinhanson/status/981291048965087232
https://archive.is/dUTD5
Would you endorse choosing policy to max the expected duration of civilization, at least as a good first approximation?
Can anyone suggest a different first approximation that would get more votes?

https://twitter.com/robinhanson/status/981335898502545408
https://archive.is/RpygO
How useful would it be to agree on a relatively-simple first-approximation observable-after-the-fact metric for what we want from the future universe, such as total life years experienced, or civilization duration?

We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction: https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/
An Oxford philosopher argues that we are not adequately accounting for technology's risks—but his solution to the problem is not for Luddites.

Anderson: You have argued that we underrate existential risks because of a particular kind of bias called observation selection effect. Can you explain a bit more about that?

Bostrom: The idea of an observation selection effect is maybe best explained by first considering the simpler concept of a selection effect. Let's say you're trying to estimate how large the largest fish in a given pond is, and you use a net to catch a hundred fish and the biggest fish you find is three inches long. You might be tempted to infer that the biggest fish in this pond is not much bigger than three inches, because you've caught a hundred of them and none of them are bigger than three inches. But if it turns out that your net could only catch fish up to a certain length, then the measuring instrument that you used would introduce a selection effect: it would only select from a subset of the domain you were trying to sample.

Now that's a kind of standard fact of statistics, and there are methods for trying to correct for it and you obviously have to take that into account when considering the fish distribution in your pond. An observation selection effect is a selection effect introduced not by limitations in our measurement instrument, but rather by the fact that all observations require the existence of an observer. This becomes important, for instance, in evolutionary biology. For instance, we know that intelligent life evolved on Earth. Naively, one might think that this piece of evidence suggests that life is likely to evolve on most Earth-like planets. But that would be to overlook an observation selection effect. For no matter how small the proportion of all Earth-like planets that evolve intelligent life, we will find ourselves on a planet that did. Our data point-that intelligent life arose on our planet-is predicted equally well by the hypothesis that intelligent life is very improbable even on Earth-like planets as by the hypothesis that intelligent life is highly probable on Earth-like planets. When it comes to human extinction and existential risk, there are certain controversial ways that observation selection effects might be relevant.
bostrom  ratty  miri-cfar  skunkworks  philosophy  org:junk  list  top-n  frontier  speedometer  risk  futurism  local-global  scale  death  nihil  technology  simulation  anthropic  nuclear  deterrence  environment  climate-change  arms  competition  ai  ai-control  genetics  genomics  biotech  parasites-microbiome  disease  offense-defense  physics  tails  network-structure  epidemiology  space  geoengineering  dysgenics  ems  authoritarianism  government  values  formal-values  moloch  enhancement  property-rights  coordination  cooperate-defect  flux-stasis  ideas  prediction  speculation  humanity  singularity  existence  cybernetics  study  article  letters  eden-heaven  gedanken  multi  twitter  social  discussion  backup  hanson  metrics  optimization  time  long-short-run  janus  telos-atelos  poll  forms-instances  threat-modeling  selection  interview  expert-experience  malthus  volo-avolo  intel  leviathan  drugs  pharma  data  estimate  nature  longevity  expansionism  homo-hetero  utopia-dystopia 
march 2018 by nhaliday
Unaligned optimization processes as a general problem for society
TL;DR: There are lots of systems in society which seem to fit the pattern of “the incentives for this system are a pretty good approximation of what we actually want, so the system produces good results until it gets powerful, at which point it gets terrible results.”

...

Here are some more places where this idea could come into play:

- Marketing—humans try to buy things that will make our lives better, but our process for determining this is imperfect. A more powerful optimization process produces extremely good advertising to sell us things that aren’t actually going to make our lives better.
- Politics—we get extremely effective demagogues who pit us against our essential good values.
- Lobbying—as industries get bigger, the optimization process to choose great lobbyists for industries gets larger, but the process to make regulators robust doesn’t get correspondingly stronger. So regulatory capture gets worse and worse. Rent-seeking gets more and more significant.
- Online content—in a weaker internet, sites can’t be addictive except via being good content. In the modern internet, people can feel addicted to things that they wish they weren’t addicted to. We didn’t use to have the social expertise to make clickbait nearly as well as we do it today.
- News—Hyperpartisan news sources are much more worth it if distribution is cheaper and the market is bigger. News sources get an advantage from being truthful, but as society gets bigger, this advantage gets proportionally smaller.

...

For these reasons, I think it’s quite plausible that humans are fundamentally unable to have a “good” society with a population greater than some threshold, particularly if all these people have access to modern technology. Humans don’t have the rigidity to maintain social institutions in the face of that kind of optimization process. I think it is unlikely but possible (10%?) that this threshold population is smaller than the current population of the US, and that the US will crumble due to the decay of these institutions in the next fifty years if nothing totally crazy happens.
ratty  thinking  metabuch  reflection  metameta  big-yud  clever-rats  ai-control  ai  risk  scale  quality  ability-competence  network-structure  capitalism  randy-ayndy  civil-liberty  marketing  institutions  economics  political-econ  politics  polisci  advertising  rent-seeking  government  coordination  internet  attention  polarization  media  truth  unintended-consequences  alt-inst  efficiency  altruism  society  usa  decentralized  rhetoric  prediction  population  incentives  intervention  criminal-justice  property-rights  redistribution  taxes  externalities  science  monetary-fiscal  public-goodish  zero-positive-sum  markets  cost-benefit  regulation  regularizer  order-disorder  flux-stasis  shift  smoothness  phase-transition  power  definite-planning  optimism  pessimism  homo-hetero  interests  eden-heaven  telos-atelos  threat-modeling  alignment 
february 2018 by nhaliday
Information Processing: US Needs a National AI Strategy: A Sputnik Moment?
FT podcasts on US-China competition and AI: http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2018/05/ft-podcasts-on-us-china-competition-and.html

A new recommended career path for effective altruists: China specialist: https://80000hours.org/articles/china-careers/
Our rough guess is that it would be useful for there to be at least ten people in the community with good knowledge in this area within the next few years.

By “good knowledge” we mean they’ve spent at least 3 years studying these topics and/or living in China.

We chose ten because that would be enough for several people to cover each of the major areas listed (e.g. 4 within AI, 2 within biorisk, 2 within foreign relations, 1 in another area).

AI Policy and Governance Internship: https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/ai-policy-governance-internship/

https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/deciphering-chinas-ai-dream/
https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Deciphering_Chinas_AI-Dream.pdf
Deciphering China’s AI Dream
The context, components, capabilities, and consequences of
China’s strategy to lead the world in AI

Europe’s AI delusion: https://www.politico.eu/article/opinion-europes-ai-delusion/
Brussels is failing to grasp threats and opportunities of artificial intelligence.
By BRUNO MAÇÃES

When the computer program AlphaGo beat the Chinese professional Go player Ke Jie in a three-part match, it didn’t take long for Beijing to realize the implications.

If algorithms can already surpass the abilities of a master Go player, it can’t be long before they will be similarly supreme in the activity to which the classic board game has always been compared: war.

As I’ve written before, the great conflict of our time is about who can control the next wave of technological development: the widespread application of artificial intelligence in the economic and military spheres.

...

If China’s ambitions sound plausible, that’s because the country’s achievements in deep learning are so impressive already. After Microsoft announced that its speech recognition software surpassed human-level language recognition in October 2016, Andrew Ng, then head of research at Baidu, tweeted: “We had surpassed human-level Chinese recognition in 2015; happy to see Microsoft also get there for English less than a year later.”

...

One obvious advantage China enjoys is access to almost unlimited pools of data. The machine-learning technologies boosting the current wave of AI expansion are as good as the amount of data they can use. That could be the number of people driving cars, photos labeled on the internet or voice samples for translation apps. With 700 or 800 million Chinese internet users and fewer data protection rules, China is as rich in data as the Gulf States are in oil.

How can Europe and the United States compete? They will have to be commensurately better in developing algorithms and computer power. Sadly, Europe is falling behind in these areas as well.

...

Chinese commentators have embraced the idea of a coming singularity: the moment when AI surpasses human ability. At that point a number of interesting things happen. First, future AI development will be conducted by AI itself, creating exponential feedback loops. Second, humans will become useless for waging war. At that point, the human mind will be unable to keep pace with robotized warfare. With advanced image recognition, data analytics, prediction systems, military brain science and unmanned systems, devastating wars might be waged and won in a matter of minutes.

...

The argument in the new strategy is fully defensive. It first considers how AI raises new threats and then goes on to discuss the opportunities. The EU and Chinese strategies follow opposite logics. Already on its second page, the text frets about the legal and ethical problems raised by AI and discusses the “legitimate concerns” the technology generates.

The EU’s strategy is organized around three concerns: the need to boost Europe’s AI capacity, ethical issues and social challenges. Unfortunately, even the first dimension quickly turns out to be about “European values” and the need to place “the human” at the center of AI — forgetting that the first word in AI is not “human” but “artificial.”

https://twitter.com/mr_scientism/status/983057591298351104
https://archive.is/m3Njh
US military: "LOL, China thinks it's going to be a major player in AI, but we've got all the top AI researchers. You guys will help us develop weapons, right?"

US AI researchers: "No."

US military: "But... maybe just a computer vision app."

US AI researchers: "NO."

https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/4/17196818/ai-boycot-killer-robots-kaist-university-hanwha
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/technology/google-letter-ceo-pentagon-project.html
https://twitter.com/mr_scientism/status/981685030417326080
https://archive.is/3wbHm
AI-risk was a mistake.
hsu  scitariat  commentary  video  presentation  comparison  usa  china  asia  sinosphere  frontier  technology  science  ai  speedometer  innovation  google  barons  deepgoog  stories  white-paper  strategy  migration  iran  human-capital  corporation  creative  alien-character  military  human-ml  nationalism-globalism  security  investing  government  games  deterrence  defense  nuclear  arms  competition  risk  ai-control  musk  optimism  multi  news  org:mag  europe  EU  80000-hours  effective-altruism  proposal  article  realness  offense-defense  war  biotech  altruism  language  foreign-lang  philosophy  the-great-west-whale  enhancement  foreign-policy  geopolitics  anglo  jobs  career  planning  hmm  travel  charity  tech  intel  media  teaching  tutoring  russia  india  miri-cfar  pdf  automation  class  labor  polisci  society  trust  n-factor  corruption  leviathan  ethics  authoritarianism  individualism-collectivism  revolution  economics  inequality  civic  law  regulation  data  scale  pro-rata  capital  zero-positive-sum  cooperate-defect  distribution  time-series  tre 
february 2018 by nhaliday
What Peter Thiel thinks about AI risk - Less Wrong
TL;DR: he thinks its an issue but also feels AGI is very distant and hence less worried about it than Musk.

I recommend the rest of the lecture as well, it's a good summary of "Zero to One"  and a good QA afterwards.

For context, in case anyone doesn't realize: Thiel has been MIRI's top donor throughout its history.

other stuff:
nice interview question: "thing you know is true that not everyone agrees on?"
"learning from failure overrated"
cleantech a huge market, hard to compete
software makes for easy monopolies (zero marginal costs, network effects, etc.)
for most of history inventors did not benefit much (continuous competition)
ethical behavior is a luxury of monopoly
ratty  lesswrong  commentary  ai  ai-control  risk  futurism  technology  speedometer  audio  presentation  musk  thiel  barons  frontier  miri-cfar  charity  people  track-record  venture  startups  entrepreneurialism  contrarianism  competition  market-power  business  google  truth  management  leadership  socs-and-mops  dark-arts  skunkworks  hard-tech  energy-resources  wire-guided  learning  software  sv  tech  network-structure  scale  marginal  cost-benefit  innovation  industrial-revolution  economics  growth-econ  capitalism  comparison  nationalism-globalism  china  asia  trade  stagnation  things  dimensionality  exploratory  world  developing-world  thinking  definite-planning  optimism  pessimism  intricacy  politics  war  career  planning  supply-demand  labor  science  engineering  dirty-hands  biophysical-econ  migration  human-capital  policy  canada  anglo  winner-take-all  polarization  amazon  business-models  allodium  civilization  the-classics  microsoft  analogy  gibbon  conquest-empire  realness  cynicism-idealism  org:edu  open-closed  ethics  incentives  m 
february 2018 by nhaliday
Superintelligence Risk Project Update II
https://www.jefftk.com/p/superintelligence-risk-project-update

https://www.jefftk.com/p/conversation-with-michael-littman
For example, I asked him what he thought of the idea that to we could get AGI with current techniques, primarily deep neural nets and reinforcement learning, without learning anything new about how intelligence works or how to implement it ("Prosaic AGI" [1]). He didn't think this was possible, and believes there are deep conceptual issues we still need to get a handle on. He's also less impressed with deep learning than he was before he started working in it: in his experience it's a much more brittle technology than he had been expecting. Specifically, when trying to replicate results, he's often found that they depend on a bunch of parameters being in just the right range, and without that the systems don't perform nearly as well.

The bottom line, to him, was that since we are still many breakthroughs away from getting to AGI, we can't productively work on reducing superintelligence risk now.

He told me that he worries that the AI risk community is not solving real problems: they're making deductions and inferences that are self-consistent but not being tested or verified in the world. Since we can't tell if that's progress, it probably isn't. I asked if he was referring to MIRI's work here, and he said their work was an example of the kind of approach he's skeptical about, though he wasn't trying to single them out. [2]

https://www.jefftk.com/p/conversation-with-an-ai-researcher
Earlier this week I had a conversation with an AI researcher [1] at one of the main industry labs as part of my project of assessing superintelligence risk. Here's what I got from them:

They see progress in ML as almost entirely constrained by hardware and data, to the point that if today's hardware and data had existed in the mid 1950s researchers would have gotten to approximately our current state within ten to twenty years. They gave the example of backprop: we saw how to train multi-layer neural nets decades before we had the computing power to actually train these nets to do useful things.

Similarly, people talk about AlphaGo as a big jump, where Go went from being "ten years away" to "done" within a couple years, but they said it wasn't like that. If Go work had stayed in academia, with academia-level budgets and resources, it probably would have taken nearly that long. What changed was a company seeing promising results, realizing what could be done, and putting way more engineers and hardware on the project than anyone had previously done. AlphaGo couldn't have happened earlier because the hardware wasn't there yet, and was only able to be brought forward by massive application of resources.

https://www.jefftk.com/p/superintelligence-risk-project-conclusion
Summary: I'm not convinced that AI risk should be highly prioritized, but I'm also not convinced that it shouldn't. Highly qualified researchers in a position to have a good sense the field have massively different views on core questions like how capable ML systems are now, how capable they will be soon, and how we can influence their development. I do think these questions are possible to get a better handle on, but I think this would require much deeper ML knowledge than I have.
ratty  core-rats  ai  risk  ai-control  prediction  expert  machine-learning  deep-learning  speedometer  links  research  research-program  frontier  multi  interview  deepgoog  games  hardware  performance  roots  impetus  chart  big-picture  state-of-art  reinforcement  futurism  🤖  🖥  expert-experience  singularity  miri-cfar  empirical  evidence-based  speculation  volo-avolo  clever-rats  acmtariat  robust  ideas  crux  atoms  detail-architecture  software  gradient-descent 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Overcoming Bias : A Tangled Task Future
So we may often retain systems that inherit the structure of the human brain, and the structures of the social teams and organizations by which humans have worked together. All of which is another way to say: descendants of humans may have a long future as workers. We may have another future besides being retirees or iron-fisted peons ruling over gods. Even in a competitive future with no friendly singleton to ensure preferential treatment, something recognizably like us may continue. And even win.
ratty  hanson  speculation  automation  labor  economics  ems  futurism  prediction  complex-systems  network-structure  intricacy  thinking  engineering  management  law  compensation  psychology  cog-psych  ideas  structure  gray-econ  competition  moloch  coordination  cooperate-defect  risk  ai  ai-control  singularity  number  humanity  complement-substitute  cybernetics  detail-architecture  legacy  threat-modeling  degrees-of-freedom  composition-decomposition  order-disorder  analogy  parsimony  institutions  software 
june 2017 by nhaliday
The Bridge: 数字化 – 网络化 – 智能化: China’s Quest for an AI Revolution in Warfare
The PLA’s organizational tendencies could render it more inclined to take full advantage of the disruptive potential of artificial intelligence, without constraints due to concerns about keeping humans ‘in the loop.’ In its command culture, the PLA has tended to consolidate and centralize authorities at higher levels, remaining reluctant to delegate decision-making downward. The introduction of information technology has exacerbated the tendency of PLA commanders to micromanage subordinates through a practice known as “skip-echelon command” (越级指挥) that enables the circumvention of command bureaucracy to influence units and weapons systems at even a tactical level.[xxviii] This practice can be symptomatic of a culture of distrust and bureaucratic immaturity. The PLA has confronted and started to progress in mitigating its underlying human resource challenges, recruiting increasingly educated officers and enlisted personnel, while seeking to modernize and enhance political and ideological work aimed to ensure loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party. However, the employment of artificial intelligence could appeal to the PLA as a way to circumvent and work around those persistent issues. In the long term, the intersection of the PLA’s focus on ‘scientific’ approaches to warfare with the preference to consolidate and centralize decision-making could cause the PLA’s leadership to rely more upon artificial intelligence, rather than human judgment.
news  org:mag  org:foreign  trends  china  asia  sinosphere  war  meta:war  military  defense  strategy  current-events  ai  automation  technology  foreign-policy  realpolitik  expansionism  innovation  individualism-collectivism  values  prediction  deepgoog  games  n-factor  human-ml  alien-character  risk  ai-control 
june 2017 by nhaliday
[1705.08807] When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? Evidence from AI Experts
Researchers predict AI will outperform humans in many activities in the next ten years, such as translating languages (by 2024), writing high-school essays (by 2026), driving a truck (by 2027), working in retail (by 2031), writing a bestselling book (by 2049), and working as a surgeon (by 2053). Researchers believe there is a 50% chance of AI outperforming humans in all tasks in 45 years and of automating all human jobs in 120 years, with Asian respondents expecting these dates much sooner than North Americans.

https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/6dy6ex/arxiv_when_will_ai_exceed_human_performance/
study  preprint  science  meta:science  technology  ai  automation  labor  ai-control  risk  futurism  poll  expert  usa  asia  trends  hmm  idk  definite-planning  frontier  ideas  prediction  innovation  china  sinosphere  multi  reddit  social  commentary  ssc  speedometer  flux-stasis  ratty  expert-experience  org:mat  singularity  optimism  pessimism 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Annotating Greg Cochran’s interview with James Miller
https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2017/04/05/interview-2/
opinion of Scott and Hanson: https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2017/04/05/interview-2/#comment-90238
Greg's methodist: https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2017/04/05/interview-2/#comment-90256
https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2017/04/05/interview-2/#comment-90299
You have to consider the relative strengths of Japan and the USA. USA was ~10x stronger, industrially, which is what mattered. Technically superior (radar, Manhattan project). Almost entirely self-sufficient in natural resources. Japan was sure to lose, and too crazy to quit, which meant that they would lose after being smashed flat.
--
There’s a fairly common way of looking at things in which the bad guys are not at fault because they’re bad guys, born that way, and thus can’t help it. Well, we can’t help it either, so the hell with them. I don’t think we had to respect Japan’s innate need to fuck everybody in China to death.

https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2017/03/25/ramble-on/
https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2017/03/24/topics/
https://soundcloud.com/user-519115521/greg-cochran-part-1
2nd part: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:9ab84243b967

some additional things:
- political correctness, the Cathedral and the left (personnel continuity but not ideology/value) at start
- joke: KT impact = asteroid mining, every mass extinction = intelligent life destroying itself
- Alawites: not really Muslim, women liberated because "they don't have souls", ended up running shit in Syria because they were only ones that wanted to help the British during colonial era
- solution to Syria: "put the Alawites in NYC"
- Zimbabwe was OK for a while, if South Africa goes sour, just "put the Boers in NYC" (Miller: left would probably say they are "culturally incompatible", lol)
- story about Lincoln and his great-great-great-grandfather
- skepticism of free speech
- free speech, authoritarianism, and defending against the Mongols
- Scott crazy (not in a terrible way), LW crazy (genetics), ex.: polyamory
- TFP or microbio are better investments than stereotypical EA stuff
- just ban AI worldwide (bully other countries to enforce)
- bit of a back-and-forth about macroeconomics
- not sure climate change will be huge issue. world's been much warmer before and still had a lot of mammals, etc.
- he quite likes Pseudoerasmus
- shits on modern conservatism/Bret Stephens a bit
org:med  west-hunter  scitariat  summary  links  podcast  audio  big-picture  westminster  politics  culture-war  academia  left-wing  ideology  biodet  error  crooked  bounded-cognition  stories  history  early-modern  africa  developing-world  death  mostly-modern  deterrence  japan  asia  war  meta:war  risk  ai  climate-change  speculation  agriculture  environment  prediction  religion  islam  iraq-syria  gender  dominant-minority  labor  econotariat  cracker-econ  coalitions  infrastructure  parasites-microbiome  medicine  low-hanging  biotech  terrorism  civil-liberty  civic  social-science  randy-ayndy  law  polisci  government  egalitarianism-hierarchy  expression-survival  disease  commentary  authoritarianism  being-right  europe  nordic  cohesion  heuristic  anglosphere  revolution  the-south  usa  thinking  info-dynamics  yvain  ssc  lesswrong  ratty  subculture  values  descriptive  epistemic  cost-disease  effective-altruism  charity  econ-productivity  technology  rhetoric  metameta  ai-control  critique  sociology  arms  paying-rent  parsimony  writing  realness  migration  eco 
april 2017 by nhaliday
Intelligent Agent Foundations Forum | Online Learning 1: Bias-detecting online learners
apparently can maybe be used to shave exponent from Christiano's manipulation-resistant reputation system paper
ratty  clever-rats  online-learning  acm  research  ai-control  miri-cfar 
november 2016 by nhaliday
paulfchristiano/dwimmer
dwimmer means sorcery, but idk what this is otherwise, maybe a logic programming repl?

relevant?: https://ai-alignment.com/learning-and-logic-e96bd41b1ab5
rationality  programming  tools  thinking  idk  worrydream  repo  clever-rats  ratty  multi  org:med  acmtariat  ai-control 
april 2016 by nhaliday
« earlier      
per page:    204080120160

bundles : techie

related tags

2016-election  80000-hours  ability-competence  absolute-relative  abstraction  academia  accelerationism  accuracy  acemoglu  acm  acmtariat  adversarial  advertising  africa  aggregator  agriculture  ai  ai-control  akrasia  albion  algorithms  alien-character  alignment  allodium  alt-inst  altruism  amazon  analogy  analysis  analytical-holistic  anglo  anglosphere  announcement  anthropic  anthropology  antidemos  apollonian-dionysian  apple  applications  approximation  aristos  arms  art  article  asia  atmosphere  atoms  attaq  attention  audio  authoritarianism  autism  automation  average-case  axioms  backup  barons  bayesian  behavioral-econ  behavioral-gen  being-becoming  being-right  benevolence  berkeley  best-practices  biases  big-peeps  big-picture  big-yud  bio  biodet  bioinformatics  biomechanics  biophysical-econ  biotech  bitcoin  bits  blockchain  blog  books  bostrom  bounded-cognition  brain-scan  brands  brexit  britain  broad-econ  buddhism  business  business-models  c:***  california  canada  cancer  canon  capital  capitalism  career  cartoons  causation  charity  chart  china  christianity  civic  civil-liberty  civilization  class  class-warfare  classic  clever-rats  climate-change  coalitions  coarse-fine  cocktail  cog-psych  cohesion  cold-war  collaboration  comics  coming-apart  commentary  communication  community  comparison  compensation  competition  complement-substitute  complex-systems  complexity  composition-decomposition  computation  computer-vision  concept  conceptual-vocab  concrete  conference  conquest-empire  constraint-satisfaction  context  contracts  contrarianism  convexity-curvature  cool  cooperate-defect  coordination  core-rats  corporation  corruption  cost-benefit  cost-disease  counter-revolution  counterfactual  courage  course  cracker-econ  creative  crime  criminal-justice  CRISPR  critique  crooked  crux  crypto  cryptocurrency  cs  culture  culture-war  current-events  cybernetics  cycles  cynicism-idealism  dark-arts  darwinian  data  death  debate  debt  decentralized  decision-making  decision-theory  deep-learning  deep-materialism  deepgoog  defense  definite-planning  definition  degrees-of-freedom  democracy  demographics  dennett  density  descriptive  detail-architecture  deterrence  developing-world  developmental  dimensionality  diogenes  direct-indirect  dirty-hands  discrete  discrimination  discussion  disease  distribution  dominant-minority  drugs  duplication  duty  dysgenics  early-modern  ecology  econ-productivity  economics  econotariat  eden  eden-heaven  education  EEA  effective-altruism  efficiency  egalitarianism-hierarchy  EGT  einstein  elections  elite  embodied  emergent  emotion  empirical  ems  end-times  endogenous-exogenous  energy-resources  engineering  enhancement  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  entrepreneurialism  environment  envy  epidemiology  epistemic  equilibrium  error  essay  essence-existence  estimate  ethanol  ethics  EU  europe  events  evidence-based  evolution  evopsych  examples  existence  exit-voice  expansionism  experiment  expert  expert-experience  explanans  explanation  exploratory  explore-exploit  exposition  expression-survival  externalities  extra-introversion  facebook  faq  farmers-and-foragers  fashun  FDA  fermi  fertility  feudal  feynman  fiction  finance  finiteness  flexibility  flux-stasis  focus  foreign-lang  foreign-policy  formal-values  forms-instances  forum  frisson  frontier  futurism  gallic  game-theory  games  gedanken  gender  gender-diff  generalization  generative  genetics  genomics  geoengineering  geography  geopolitics  germanic  giants  gibbon  gnon  gnosis-logos  god-man-beast-victim  good-evil  google  government  gradient-descent  gray-econ  gregory-clark  group-selection  growth-econ  guide  guilt-shame  GWAS  gwern  hacker  haidt  hanson  hard-core  hard-tech  hardware  harvard  healthcare  heavy-industry  heterodox  heuristic  hi-order-bits  hidden-motives  high-dimension  high-variance  higher-ed  history  hmm  homo-hetero  honor  horror  hsu  human-capital  human-ml  humanity  humility  hypocrisy  hypothesis-testing  ideas  identity  identity-politics  ideology  idk  iidness  illusion  impetus  incentives  india  individualism-collectivism  industrial-revolution  inequality  inference  info-dynamics  info-foraging  infographic  infrastructure  innovation  insight  institutions  intel  intelligence  interdisciplinary  interests  internet  interpretability  intervention  interview  intricacy  intuition  investing  iq  iran  iraq-syria  iron-age  islam  iteration-recursion  janus  japan  jargon  jobs  journos-pundits  judaism  justice  kinship  knowledge  korea  labor  land  language  large-factor  latent-variables  latin-america  law  leadership  learning  lecture-notes  left-wing  legacy  legibility  len:long  len:short  lens  lesswrong  letters  leviathan  limits  linear-algebra  liner-notes  links  list  literature  local-global  logic  long-short-run  long-term  longevity  love-hate  lovecraft  low-hanging  lower-bounds  machine-learning  macro  madisonian  magnitude  malaise  malthus  management  marginal  market-failure  market-power  marketing  markets  math  math.CA  maxim-gun  measurement  mechanics  media  medicine  medieval  mediterranean  MENA  meta:research  meta:rhetoric  meta:science  meta:war  metabuch  metameta  methodology  metrics  microsoft  migrant-crisis  migration  military  miri-cfar  mobile  model-class  model-organism  models  moloch  moments  monetary-fiscal  morality  mostly-modern  multi  multiplicative  murray  musk  mutation  mystic  myth  n-factor  narrative  nationalism-globalism  nature  near-far  neocons  network-structure  neuro  neuro-nitgrit  neurons  new-religion  news  nibble  nietzschean  nihil  nitty-gritty  nl-and-so-can-you  nlp  no-go  noble-lie  nonlinearity  nordic  northeast  nuclear  number  nutrition  nyc  occident  offense-defense  old-anglo  online-learning  open-closed  open-problems  openai  operational  optimate  optimism  optimization  order-disorder  org:anglo  org:biz  org:bleg  org:edu  org:foreign  org:junk  org:lite  org:mag  org:mat  org:med  org:ngo  org:rec  org:sci  organization  organizing  orient  orwellian  oss  other-xtian  outcome-risk  outliers  oxbridge  papers  parable  paradox  parallax  parasites-microbiome  parenting  parsimony  patience  paying-rent  pdf  peace-violence  people  performance  personality  persuasion  pessimism  phalanges  pharma  phase-transition  philosophy  physics  pinker  planning  plots  poast  podcast  polanyi-marx  polarization  policy  polis  polisci  political-econ  politics  poll  pop-diff  popsci  population  power  power-law  pragmatic  pre-ww2  prediction  prediction-markets  prepping  preprint  presentation  primitivism  princeton  priors-posteriors  privacy  pro-rata  probability  profile  programming  project  properties  property-rights  proposal  protestant-catholic  prudence  pseudoE  psych-architecture  psychiatry  psychology  psychometrics  public-goodish  publishing  puzzles  q-n-a  quality  quantum  questions  quotes  race  random  randy-ayndy  ranking  rationality  ratty  realness  realpolitik  reason  recruiting  red-queen  reddit  redistribution  reduction  reference  reflection  regularization  regularizer  regulation  reinforcement  relativity  religion  rent-seeking  replication  repo  research  research-program  responsibility  retention  review  revolution  rhetoric  rhythm  right-wing  rigor  rigorous-crypto  risk  ritual  robotics  robust  roots  rot  russia  s:***  saas  safety  scale  science  scifi-fantasy  scitariat  search  securities  security  selection  seminar  sex  sexuality  shakespeare  shift  signal-noise  signaling  similarity  simulation  singularity  sinosphere  skeleton  skunkworks  slides  smoothness  social  social-choice  social-norms  social-psych  social-science  society  sociology  socs-and-mops  software  space  spatial  speculation  speed  speedometer  spock  spreading  ssc  stagnation  stanford  startups  state-of-art  statesmen  stats  status  stereotypes  stochastic-processes  stock-flow  stories  strategy  straussian  stream  street-fighting  structure  study  studying  stylized-facts  subculture  success  sulla  summary  supply-demand  survey  survival  sv  synchrony  synthesis  systematic-ad-hoc  systems  tactics  tails  tainter  talks  taubes-guyenet  taxes  tcs  teaching  tech  technology  telos-atelos  temperature  terrorism  the-bones  the-classics  the-devil  the-founding  the-great-west-whale  the-self  the-south  the-watchers  the-west  the-world-is-just-atoms  theory-of-mind  theory-practice  theos  thermo  thick-thin  thiel  things  thinking  threat-modeling  time  time-complexity  time-preference  time-series  todo  tools  top-n  track-record  trade  tradeoffs  tradition  transportation  travel  trends  tribalism  tricks  trivia  troll  trump  trust  truth  turing  tutoring  twitter  unaffiliated  uncertainty  unintended-consequences  universalism-particularism  unsupervised  urban-rural  us-them  usa  utopia-dystopia  values  vampire-squid  venture  video  virtu  visual-understanding  visualization  visuo  vitality  volo-avolo  vr  war  wealth  weird  welfare-state  west-hunter  westminster  white-paper  whole-partial-many  wiki  winner-take-all  wire-guided  wisdom  within-without  wordlessness  world  world-war  worrydream  writing  X-not-about-Y  xenobio  yc  yvain  zeitgeist  zero-positive-sum  zooming  🐸  👽  🖥  🤖 

Copy this bookmark:



description:


tags: