asterisk2a + paulvolcker   11

The real truth about the 2008 financial crisis | Brian S. Wesbury | TEDxCountyLineRoad - YouTube
bankers are greedy & excess speculation, is the story. Fed controls short-term interest rate through interest rate setting/Fed meetings based on fundy of American economy, // NIRP (greenspan put) post dot.com, distorts market, decision makers decisions. housing bubble w help of NIRP after dot.com & home-ownership campaign in bush years (fiscal stimulus/subsidies) 2 push that "asset." Not "home" to live in. // banks got too big to fail (their balance sheet/lending book) as liabilities (toxic assets - real downside unknown (due to complexity and day to day changes during crisis years), like CDO/CDS etc) overtook book, overall, value. Banking being actually insolvent, but how insolvent one doesn't know. Thus bad bank idea. ACCOUNTING. // Paul Volker raised rates ... was able, because USA (private household, banks, corporates) were not in a balance sheet recession. Problem was endogenous. // Deregulation + Lax accounting contributed to GFC greatly, unable to value banks books.
GFC  economic  history  fractional  reserve  banking  financial  crisis  monetary  theory  systemicrisk  Greenspan-Put  NIRP  ZIRP  negative  real  interest  rate  interestrate  dot.com  reflation  reflate  balance  sheet  recession  deleveraging  debtoverhang  savings  rate  leverage  alangreenspan  greenspan  Ben  Bernanke  benbernanke  distortion  housing  market  accounting  too  big  to  jail  toobigtofail  TBTF  financial  market  financial  incentive  speculative  bubbles  speculative  speculation  hunt  for  yield  asset  allocation  asset  bubble  TARP  subprime  QE  stresstest  timgeithner  henrypaulson  economic  model  economic  damage  macroeconomic  policy  fiscal  policy  monetary  policy  history  paulvolcker  complexity  incomplete  information  business  confidence  consumer  confidence  confidence  banking  crisis  zombie  banks  mark-to-market  Janet  Yellen 
july 2015 by asterisk2a
Recovery – Who are We Kidding?
In our assessment, what we see unfolding is the latest chapter in the tug of war between inflationary and deflationary forces. During the “goldilocks” economy of the last decade, investors levered themselves up. Homeowners treated their homes as if they were ATMs; banks set up off-balance sheet Special Investment Vehicles (SIVs); governments engaging in arrangements to get cheap loans that may cost future generations dearly. Cumulatively, it was an amazing money generation process; yet, central banks remained on the sidelines, as inflation – according to the metrics focused on - appeared contained. Indeed, we have argued in the past that central banks lost control of the money creation process, as they could not keep up with the plethora of “financial innovation” that justified greater leverage. It was only a matter of time before the world no longer appeared quite so risk-free. Rational investors thus reduced their exposure: de-levered. ...
mandate  monetarism  monetary  theory  economics  economic-thought  economic  history  paulvolcker  2012  deflation  inflation  Leverage  policy  folly  policy  error  QE  reflation  fiatmoney  fiat  currency  money  creation  process  oversight  WallStreet  regulation  FDIC  SEC  Fed  alangreenspan  benbernake  monetary  policy  greatrecession  GFC 
april 2012 by asterisk2a
Dealbook - Paulson Likes What He Sees in Overhaul - NYTimes.com
In the end, though, Mr. Paulson said that regulation on its own would not be enough to prevent another crisis. No, that will come down to people.

“As I’ve thought about it, this is very people-driven,” he said. “A lot of this is about the people who have the responsibility for the regulation when there isn’t a crisis and the people who have the responsibility during a crisis. Unless you believe that the big financial institutions were intentionally trying to blow themselves up, they were unable to spot a number of the issues.”

He continued: “I think it is asking a lot for regulators to be perfect — because they won’t be. But what you h
henrypaulson  financial  regulation  reform  crisis  creditcrunch  depression  greatrecession  usa  regulators  timgeithner  larrysummers  paulvolcker  VolckerRule  2010  2011  presidency  barackobama  Fed  treasury  fdic 
july 2010 by asterisk2a
Paul Volcker Pushes for Reform, and Regrets His Past Silence - NYTimes.com
For all of what he describes as the overhaul’s strengths — particularly the limits placed on banks’ trading activities — he still feels that the legislation doesn’t go far enough in curbing potentially problematic bank activities like investing in hedge funds.

Like few other policy giants of his generation, Mr. Volcker has been a pivotal figure in the regulatory universe for decades, and as he looks back at his long, storied career he confesses to some regrets, in particular for failing to speak out more forcefully about the dangers of a seismic wave of financial deregulation that began in the 1970s and reached full force in the late 1990s.

Despite his recent efforts to ensure that the financial legislation might correct what he regards as some of the mistakes of the deregulatory years, he’s concerned that it still gives banks too much wiggle room to repeat the behavior that threw the nation into crisis in the first place.
paulvolcker  financial  regulation  deregulation  usa  financialmarket  2010  politics  history  economics 
july 2010 by asterisk2a
Bob Janjuah: "We Are Trapped In Some Sort Of Horrendous Keynesian/Monetarists' Nightmare...." | zero hedge
Kevin's work also made clear that one 5%+ GDP data point, driven by inventory, was certain - he thgt it would be Q3 09 but it ended up being in Q4. However, we both have felt and feel that the prvte sector is in the middle of a long multi-yr period of balance sheet repair, and that the questions re sustainable real 'growth' could/can only be answered once we strip out and/or see the abatement/absence of UNSUSTAINABLE government largesse/bailouts/handouts etc. To us, once you strip away the policymaker and his period of peak effectiveness, where we are now much closer to the end rather than the beginning, what is left to take grwth forward is not very much at all.

I refer of course to the key themes Sovereign Creditworthiness; and The Great Battle between Voluntary Austerity & Deflation, vs Involuntary Austerity, Inflation/Stagflation, Serial Bailouts, Debt & Debasement.

MV = PY / EMU M3 was -.3% y/y in 09, means that even with +M, V was negative. It is a balance sheet recession.
Keynesianism  monetization  balancesheet  recession  richardkoo  private  public  debt  sovereign  austerity  default  globalisation  economics  M3  moneysupply  macroeconomics  greatrecession  UK  history  Japan  argentina  Greece  PIIGS  EMU  Europe  USA  BRIC  China  brasil  emergingmarkets  paulvolcker  competitive  competitiveness  Germany  Finland  euro  reflection  double-dip  reflate  developing-world  may  2010 
may 2010 by asterisk2a
Bank Size and the Severity of Financial Shocks - CBS MoneyWatch.com
We cannot guarantee that regulation of the financial sector will prevent all shocks. Capping bank size can help to limit the extent to which a shock is magnified if one does occur, and thus limit its ability to do damage.
subprime  regulation  CFPA  reform  usa  VolckerRule  paulvolcker  paulkrugman  leverage  banking  financialmarket  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  toobigtofail  Canada  2010 
february 2010 by asterisk2a

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