banks like property! more likely to lend to finance property than SME/SMB investment. because that investment is not propped up by the government. [...] min 6 subprime & credit bubble since 80's << behaviour of lenders [...] sensible people were given fraudulent debt instruments (no self-regulation, and regulators failed). [...] no prosecution because people who should have prosecuted those, didn't want to ruin their private future career. [...] min 15 - inequality and unemployment driven by inequality. [...] austerity is name of the game by the "establishment" - 20% of society that benefited from the bank bailout and reflation policy by central banks - [...] 19:15 - who do banks want to borrow in this environment?! austerity, aggregate demand shortfall, lack of confidence, volatility, uncertainty, credit bubble pain (liquidity trap) etc. [...] Solution ("an alternative way to the status quo, who made this mess): Fix Income Distribution thus Purchasing Power (aggregate demand, ie minimum wage), and restructure finance away from investment banking and speculation and derivatives towards real economy (ie tax heavily what is not real economy business) //&! James K. Galbraith on "Inequality and Instability: What's Ahead for the World Economy" - youtu.be/Mw4Bd9ols-E //&! James K. Galbraith - "The End of Normal" - youtu.be/PGFcB65l8Io

Die Bank für Internationalen Zahlungsausgleich sieht Alarmzeichen für Banken in vielen Schwellenländern. Die Kreditvergabe in China, Brasilien oder der Türkei habe ein bedrohliches Verhältnis angenommen, warnt die Notenbank. // &! Die Welt steuert auf den Bankrott zu (QE trap): Eine vorläufige Antwort: Das tieferliegende Problem besteht darin, dass sich die Weltwirtschaft insgesamt auf den Bankrott zubewegt - und das wird umso schneller gehen, je höher die Zinsen sind und je niedriger die Preissteigerungsraten.

Relying too much on the wrong instrument, monetary policy, unconventional QE2 & 3 >> little domestic positive impact but spilled over much across the world! // consequences now seen (1) taper tantrum late 2014 & then summer 2015; china slow-down/equity crash & taper anticipation moves followed up by pulling money out of emerging/developing markets! financial market are divergent from domestic business market. cycles shifted apart slightly. investor, business, financial market & consumer confidence are not linked as tightly before! // financial markets are now global, business markets itself not as much! money can be pulled out digitally in an instance. // no net-positive 4 whole world. selfishness. long-run danger. unintended consequences, unknown unknowns. // global sub-optimal monetary policy // global system (monetary system) broke // uncertainty, unknown of taper. timing debate. game of chicken. volatility bc of lots of froth, distortion! // &! youtu.be/SZe3issLIb8

Like any other bubble, it will only become one once it bursts. What is different in 2014 is that now central banks have a great tool to prevent real estate bubbles: Basel III and its countercyclical capital buffer. [...] Let us not forget the lessons of the Great War (we are now commemorating the 100-year anniversary): the butterfly effect can be deadly in politics. +++ http://ti.me/1r4NfEy "Raghuram Rajan, the governor of India's central bank, fears supereasy money from the world’s central banks is inflating assets and encouraging bad investments. [...] Long-term low interest rates and unorthodox programs to stimulate economies — like quantitative easing, or QE — could be laying the groundwork for more turmoil in financial markets, he argues. [...] With inflation not being strong, this can continue for some time until things are so stretched that any signs of inflation, and a rise in interest rates, could precipitate a fairly strong market reaction. Certainly [...] volatility hurts[.]