asterisk2a + kennethrogoff   31

Central bankers on the defensive as weird policy becomes even weirder | Business | The Guardian
Growth is tepid, productivity is poor, and inflation is too low: all is not going according to policymakers’ masterplans [...] As far as the OECD is concerned, monetary policy is being forced to take too much of the strain. Its chief economist Catherine Mann made the point that lasting recovery required three things: stimulative monetary policy; activist fiscal policy; and structural reform. The OECD wants the second of these ingredients to be added to the recipe in the form of increased spending on public infrastructure, something it says would more than pay for itself at a time when governments can borrow so cheaply.
monetary  policy  G20  fiscal  policy  monetary  stimulus  monetary  system  monetary  transmission  mechanism  liquidity  trap  UK  western  world  USA  Japan  Abenomics  George  Osborne  Angela  Merkel  Wolfgang  Schäuble  Pact  Schuldenbremse  economic  history  recovery  secular  stagnation  productivity  underinvestment  MarioDraghi  ZIRP  NIRP  QE  ECB  BOE  Fed  Taper  deflationary  deflation  nominal  GDP  targeting  inflation  targeting  zombie  banks  MervynKing  zombie  corporations  zombie  consumer  Richard  Koo  Gini  coefficient  inequality  squeezed  middle  class  wage  stagnation  discretionary  spending  distortion  property  bubble  disposable  income  productive  investment  austerity  business  confidence  foreign  direct  investment  consumer  debt  household  debt  credit  card  debt  car  loan  student  loan  debt  student  loan  policy  folly  policy  error  short-termism  Career  Politicians  neoliberalism  neoliberal  trickle-down  economics  self-regulation  City  of  London  investment  banking  retail  banking  OECD  IMF  KennethRogoff  hot-money  hunt  for  yield  asset  bubble  asset  allocation  speculative  bubbles  speculative  speculation  reflate  reflation  financial  repression  New  Normal  trust 
march 2016 by asterisk2a
Interview With Mohamed El-Erian: Masters in Business (Audio) by Bloomberg View
7:50 New Normal is secular stagnation and decades-long NIRP, ZIRP, QE distortion. structural, secular. no cyclical recovery. but long secular challenges; prolonged period of low growth. // also inequality! // currently policy makers subsidise debtors, subsidise creditors - financial repression. promote risk taking. // richard koo would not agree with el-erian's notion that gov balance sheets are same as household balance sheets. // 12:10 demographic issue! political. and economic elements in it of secular stagnation. [...] borrowing growth // rise of far-right! // corps sitting on cash // inequality! // bc of lived in artificial world of borrowed growth, created massive divergence. // min 15:30 richard koo would not agree that central banks are the only game in town. central banks have complained abt austerity gov. // min 20 - Feds intellectually inflexible. comfort zone. self-regulation & great moderation. // reflation didnt work bc no fixed fundamentals // perfect storm! lost trust.
New  Normal  financial  repression  NIRP  ZIRP  QE  economic  history  secular  stagnation  GFC  credit  bubble  book  western  world  emerging  middle  class  debtoverhang  Richard  Koo  deleveraging  debt  servitude  Super  Cycle  household  debt  consumer  debt  credit  card  debt  car  loan  student  loan  debt  student  loan  student  debt  KennethRogoff  carmenreinhart  sovereign  debt  crisis  austerity  Paul  Krugman  Gini  coefficient  inequality  Joseph  Stiglitz  distortion  monetary  policy  fiscal  policy  monetary  transmission  mechanism  liquidity  trap  unconventional  monetary  policy  monetary  theory  monetary  system  retirement  demographic  bubble  ageing  population  far-right  Rechtsextremismus  Rechtsruck  zombie  consumer  zombie  corporations  zombie  banks  Pact  Schuldenbremse  tax  avoidance  tax  evasion  inflation  targeting  inflation  expectation  nominal  GDP  targeting  GDP  reflate  reflation  trust  trustagent  distrust  business  confidence  consumer  confidence  public  sentiment  public  perception  bank  bailout  Japan  Abenomics  AIIB  IMF  China  BRIC  self-regulation  Great  Moderation 
february 2016 by asterisk2a
Masters in Business: Nobel-Prize Economist Paul Krugman (Audio) by Bloomberg View
// most times conviction is lacking, trapped in the bubble, no non-conformity, too much of a comfortable life. // 28:30! Confidence Fairy >> austerity from 2010! vested interest plays big role! Policy Makers are on the side of credit, on bond holders. bond holders don't like inflationary period! ... Hyperinflation will come any day! // 31:00 econ needs to be reformulated in class rooms to be much broader subject! << see robert shiller interview! ie behaviour, sociology and psychology, irrational behaviour // 44:15 on keynes! was no left wing socialist, he tried to save capitalism! he had world changing analysis! sometimes there can not be enough demand, same with sometimes it is good to have waste vs nothing, pointless ways to spend money can have a positive effect. ie infrastructure investment - repaving roads = less private repair bills! public transportation = less drunk driving accidents. history shows fiscal stimulus gets always too early withdrawn from deficit hawks!
economic  history  GFC  Paul  Krugman  Thomas  Piketty  inequality  Gini  coefficient  income  inequality  social  mobility  income  mobility  paulkrugman  repo  bankrun  speculative  bubbles  subprime  Generationengerechtigkeit  Policy  Makers  constituency  George  Osborne  austerity  error  folly  credit  bubble  secular  stagnation  debt  servitude  Super  Cycle  Japan  Abenomics  fiscal  monetary  Richard  Koo  KennethRogoff  USA  UK  European  Union  lost  decade  lost  generation  Robert  Shiller  robertshiller  book  miltonfriedman  friedmann  JohnMaynardKeynes  keynes  Keynesianism  budget  deficit  GeorgeOsborne  fiscal  stimulus  GordonBrown  underinvestment  recovery  productivity  output  gap  liquidity  trap  ZIRP  NIRP  QE  infrastructure  investment  Richardkoo  public  investment  productive  investment  business  investment  short-termism  neoliberalism  neoliberal  Privatisation  trickle-down  economics  Super  Rich  1%  oligarchy  plutocracy  social  democracy  corporate  welfare  subsidies  subsidizing 
february 2016 by asterisk2a
Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea - YouTube
faith in capitalism can only be sustained, according to Adam Smith, if we can better ourself (vs winner takes all) & talent diversion into Finance, not Climate Change, STEM, education, sw, hw & rogoff/reinhart called 4 fiscal stimulus in 2014. &! its a banking problem, not overspend, its corporate state (Tories) PR and spin doctors, manufacturing consent, propaganda/populism! change conversation away from banks! // youtu.be/a-8ySh6nUsA // &! The Austerity Delusion - youtu.be/NQGCoiakycQ // &! Is Austerity a Dangerous Idea? - youtu.be/2v8m-J8sgik // &! youtu.be/JQuHSQXxsjM // &! Mackenzie Lecture 2015 - youtu.be/B6vV8_uQmxs // &! After the Financial Crisis: How to Tell the Forest from the Trees - youtu.be/V3FPmu2_J_0 // &! Book Panel 2013 - youtu.be/Xz4FW8GDwG4 - "debt gets cured by growth." & austerity is ideological war on welfare state & class // &! youtu.be/iM2cnMhJZyg // &! youtu.be/in5M65566iw // &! What I Learned and (Un-Learned) at the Financial Crisis - youtu.be/lhldDOp77QA /
austerity  economic  history  Gini  coefficient  social  mobility  income  mobility  downward  mobility  inequality  apathy  voter  turnout  crony  capitalism  ideology  dogma  GFC  IMF  OECD  ChristineLagarde  George  Osborne  David  Cameron  Angela  Merkel  Troika  Wolfgang  Schäuble  Conservative  Party  Schuldenbremse  Fiscal  Pact  UK  Europe  Generationengerechtigkeit  fairness  lost  generation  lost  decade  Japan  ZIRP  NIRP  QE  unintended  consequences  asset  allocation  hunt  for  yield  speculative  bubbles  property  bubble  unknown  unkown  Taper  KennethRogoff  carmenreinhart  Thomas  Piketty  debtoverhang  balance  sheet  recession  sovereign  debt  crisis  deleveraging  Richard  Koo  trickle-down  economics  neoliberalism  neoliberal  Privatisation  industrial  policy  Revolution  2.0  deflationary  deflation  secular  stagnation  globalisation  globalization  Eurogroup  Paul  Krugman  Joseph  Stiglitz  reflate  recovery  reflation  bond  bubble  asset  bubble  faultlines  structural  imbalance  Impediments  BOE  macroeconomic  policy  microeconomic  policy  short-term  Career  Politicians  political  theory  social  contract  Gesellschaft  No  Representation  Rechtsruck  stagnation  social 
august 2015 by asterisk2a
Krise ǀ Weimar reloaded — der Freitag
Das Land befindet sich schon mitten in der Depression und schuld daran sind hohe Lohnkosten und üppige Sozialpolitik. Helfen können dagegen nur Lohn-, Preis- und Budgetkürzungen. Was sich liest wie eine Mainstream-Diagnose des heutigen Europas, ist tatsächlich der Inhalt eines Artikels aus dem März 1929. Er erschien im Deutschen Volkswirt, einem damaligen Fachblatt der liberalen Ökonomie. Der Autor war kein Geringerer als Joseph Schumpeter. Was er vorschlug, ist später als die berüchtigte Deflationspolitik des bis Mai 1932 amtierenden Reichskanzlers Heinrich Brüning bekannt geworden. [ can solve debt overhang w austerity, >> is deflationary, stagnant balance sheet or shrinking, thus increases debt 2 gdp/asset ratio ] [...] den „Ruin Mitteleuropas“ zu verantworten.
austerity  economic  history  Weimar  Treaty  of  Versailles  deflationary  deflation  debtoverhang  Debt  Super  Cycle  Greece  Richard  Koo  Germany  Wolfgang  Schäuble  GroKo  Fiscal  Pact  Schuldenbremse  balance  sheet  recession  neoliberalism  neoliberal  sovereign  crisis  Europe  George  Osborne  UK  IMF  Weimarer  Republik  Troika  Umschuldung  jubilee  restructuring  PIGS  PIIGS  PIIGSFB  European  Union  Eurogroup  technocrat  John  Maynard  Keynes  carmenreinhart  KennethRogoff  Thomas  Piketty  Yanis  Varoufakis  Joseph  Stiglitz  Paul  Krugman  Weimar  Republic  European 
august 2015 by asterisk2a
Sorry to burst your bubble | The Economist
bit.ly/1IfX0s9 // "According to two new papers, the crucial variable that separates relatively harmless frenzies from disastrous ones is debt." // see China Stock Market leverage pop mid 2015 - with its huge rise in margin debt trading ... money which was flowing out of the property market into the Stock Market // // &! so if it is about debt - UK mortgage market & consumer/private debt of all kind (loans and credit card debt) does qualify as they took up what was cut by austerity. Plus the Supply Demand distortion, with new builds/project at a decades lowest. // Question for China. The China problem. Can they make their system sustainable before it will crush everyone. // The most obvious is China. But the next one will be different & greater than all came before. Period. Still, UK had not a housing bubble collapse on its own making. Only through endogenous circumstances. UK recession as UK economy runs mostly on consumer sector & debt) bit.ly/1OpClSO bit.ly/1wQITjb bit.ly/1SycLtY
leverage  debtoverhang  equity  bubble  regulation  self-regulation  regulators  debt  servitude  consumer  debt  sovereign  debt  crisis  debt  bubble  Super  Cycle  household  debt  private  debt  economic  history  KennethRogoff  carmenreinhart  Greenspan-Put  ZIRP  NIRP  QE  margin  trading  margin  debt  asset  liquidity  economic  damage  asset  bubble  asset  allocation  distortion  behavioral  economics  behavioral  finance  mortgage  market  UK  credit  card  housing  market  property  bubble  Funding  for  Lending  Scheme  Help  to  Buy  Scheme  fiscal  policy  monetary  policy  macroprudential  policy  sustainability  sustainable  NPL  zombie  banks  zombie  consumer  economic  model  economic  irrational  exuberance  macroeconomic  policy  economic  growth  debt  monetisation  reflation  debt  monetization  consumerist  consumerism  consumer  confidence  business  confidence  business  financial  financial  crisis  GFC  balance  sheet  recession  Richard  Koo  deleveraging  baddebt  non-performing  loan 
july 2015 by asterisk2a
IMF Slams Germany, Says Greece "Needs Debt Restructuring" | Zero Hedge
on the ticker. IMF'S LAGARDE SAYS DEBT RESTRUCTURING NEEDED IN GREECE. IMF'S LAGARDE SAYS FUND REMAINS 'FULLY ENGAGED' WITH GREECE. IMF'S LAGARDE SAYS IMF CANNOT GIVE GREECE SPECIAL TREATMENT // Earlier today, confirming that Germany sternly refuses to change its tune about a Greek debt haircut or even a debt "reprofiling" of Greece and would not budge an inch on Tsipras tacit request for at least some debt leeway, we reported that "the German government does not see any reason to grant Greece either a classic debt haircut or any other measures that would slash the value of money on loan to the crisis-ridden country, a spokesman for the finance ministry said on Wednesday." // IMF has admitted it was wrong to advocate for austerity, now IMF admits it was wrong to hope that its approach (together with Troika) would help Greece. // an economic model is an economic model, not the real world and especially not able to predict the future. // "Alternativlos."
Grexit  sustainable  sustainability  Greece  PIGS  sovereign  debt  crisis  debt  jubilee  haircut  debt  restructuring  ChristineLagarde  economic  history  austerity  ideology  dogma  academia  KennethRogoff  carmenreinhart  academic  economic  model  economist  economics  economic  damage  neoliberal  neoliberalism  liberal  economic  reform  Troika  IMF  ECB  MarioDraghi  BuBa  Jens  Weidmann  Angela  Merkel  Wolfgang  Schäuble  Germany  France  FrancoisHollande  European  Union  Yanis  Varoufakis  Alexis  Tsipras  referendum  Career  Politicians  No  Representation  society  bailout  zombie  banks  Gesellschaft  fairness  GFC  recovery  European  Syriza  Podemos  Indignants  Indignados  lost  generation  lost  decade  trust  trustagent  Protest  Partei  Protest  Party  symptom  voter  turnout 
july 2015 by asterisk2a
WDR Kinozeit Dokumentarfilm Agora: Sendung vom 05.02.2015 - YouTube
Die Eurokrise aus griechischer Sicht: "AGORÁ - Von der Demokratie zum Markt" // &! Post-democracy (Themes for the 21st Century Series) Paperback – 23 Jun 2004 by Colin Crouch &! Making Capitalism Fit For Society Paperback – 6 Sep 2013 - by Colin Crouch "The aim of this book is to show that the acceptance of capitalism and the market does not require us to accept the full neoliberal agenda of unrestrained markets, insecurity in our working lives, and neglect of the environment and of public services."
documentary  Greece  sovereign  debt  crisis  Eurokriese  GFC  economic  history  fractional  reserve  banking  banking  crisis  TBTF  toobigtofail  Career  Politicians  oligopoly  oligopol  systemicrisk  systemic  risk  crony  capitalism  capitalism  Wall  Street  shareholder  value  Bailout  haircut  austerity  fiscal  sovereignty  IMF  Troika  book  European  European  Union  PIGS  democracy  liberal  economic  reform  Indignados  Indignants  Social  Media  lehmanbrothers  Lehman  Brothers  Yanis  Varoufakis  neoliberal  neoliberalism  deregulation  regulators  regulation  self-regulation  game  theory  No  Representation  1%  Establishment  Super  Rich  Super  Cycle  debt  bubble  bond  bubble  Privileged  Pact  carmenreinhart  KennethRogoff  Carmen  Reinhart  Kenneth  Rogoff  greatrecession  lost  decade  lost  generation  Lobbying  lobbyist  lobby  interest  groups  inequality  Gini  coefficient  economic  damage  trickle-down  economics  UK  George  Osborne  David  Cameron  Angela  Merkel  Wolfgang  Schäuble 
february 2015 by asterisk2a
Warum wir weiter Bargeld brauchen - Münchau zu Rogoff-Vorstoß - SPIEGEL ONLINE
Ich glaube nicht, dass es möglich ist, die Inflationsziele nach Belieben hin- und herzuschieben. Wir sehen doch gerade die Schwierigkeiten, die die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) damit hat, ihr gegenwärtiges Inflationsziel von knapp zwei Prozent zu erreichen. Wenn man Inflationsziele beliebig verschiebt, verlieren sie schnell an Glaubwürdigkeit. Die Menschen würden zu Recht vermuten, dass man die Ziele bald wieder verändert, wenn es kommod ist. Anstatt zu versuchen, die Inflationsziele zu verändern oder das Bargeld abzuschaffen, sollten wir unsere existierenden Probleme ernster nehmen. Die EZB hätte viel früher und viel energischer mit der geldpolitischen Lockerung anfangen müssen. Heute stellt sich die vordringliche Frage, wie wir ein Abdriften in japanische Verhältnisse vermeiden. Wir sollten uns von diesen wichtigen Themen nicht durch störende Scheindebatten ablenken lassen. Die Abschaffung des Bargeldes wird unsere Probleme nicht lösen.
fiat  currency  inflation  targeting  deflation  deflationary  Europe  economic  history  ECB  MarioDraghi  fiscal  policy  monetary  policy  QE  ZIRP  NIRP  OMT  zombie  banks  business  confidence  Japan  lost  decade  lost  generation  LTRO  TLTRO  Structural  Impediments  PIGS  Angela  Merkel  Pact  Schuldenbremse  France  Sick  man  of  Europe  imbalance  faultlines  infrastructure  investment  business  investment  Demand  and  Supply  China  Russia  BRIC  Frontier  Markets  Exportweltmeister  GFC  recovery  liquidity  trap  Richard  Koo  KennethRogoff  balance  sheet  recession  deleveraging  debtoverhang  Debt  Super  Cycle  Wall  Street  asset  bubble  speculative  bubbles  hunt  for  yield  crony  capitalism  Lohnzurückhaltung  consumer  confidence  profit  maximisation  Future  of  Work  Software  Is  Eating  The  World  culture  society  business  Politics  short-term  thinking  short-term  view  compromise  Career  Politicians  Lobbying  lobbyist  lobby  flat  globalisation  globalization 
november 2014 by asterisk2a
Wie Europa Schulden loswerden kann - SPIEGEL ONLINE
[Rogoff & Reinhart advocating financial repression] [...] [Because Austerity didn't work.] Tatsächlich habe die europäische Wirtschaftspolitik - die Haushaltsdefizite senkt und Strukturreformen für mehr Wachstum durchführt - recht wenig getan, um den Schuldenberg wirklich zu verringern. Die Politik könnte die Last für die nächsten Jahre sogar verschlimmert haben, sagen viele Volkswirte. Die Sparpolitik hat das Wachstum überraschend stark beeinträchtigt. Während die Hinweise darauf, dass die Strukturreformen tatsächlich die Wirtschaft beflügeln, eher überschaubar ausfallen. Stattdessen sinken Einkommen, Gewinne und Steuereinnahmen, was die Schuldenlast immer schwerer erträglich macht.
debt  servicing  sovereign  debt  crisis  consumer  debt  Super  Cycle  Europe  zombie  consumer  zombie  corporations  ZIRP  liquidity-trap  QE  KennethRogoff  liberal  economic  reform  economic  history  MarioDraghi  ECB  unconventional  monetary  policy  monetary  theory  monetary  transmission  mechanism  deflation  deflationary  debtoverhang  balance  sheet  recession  GFC  greatrecession  greatdepression  lostdecade  lostgeneration  youth  unemployment  austerity  IMF  Japan  UK  USA  budget  deficit  France  financial  repression  hunt  for  yield  asset  bubble  speculative  bubbles  New  Normal  PIMCO  Mohamed  El-Erian  debt  jubilee  debt  bubble  debt  monetization  debt  monetisation  debt  restructuring  private  debt  public  debt  household  debt  carmenreinhart  WallStreet  inflation  targeting  inflation  expectation  communication  babyboomers  haircut  PIGS  toobigtofail  TBTF  Richardkoo 
january 2014 by asterisk2a
Five Years After Lehman, BIS Ex-Chief Economist Warns "It's Worse This Time" | Zero Hedge
The share of "leveraged loans" or extreme forms of credit risk, used by the poorest corporate borrowers, has soared to an all-time high of 45% - 10 percentage points higher than at the peak of the crisis in 2007. + http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-14/record-high-grade-leverage-means-pik-toggle-lbo-debt-back-and-worse-ever // The Bank Of International Settlements Warns The Monetary Kool-Aid Party Is Over www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-06-23/bank-international-settlements-warns-monetary-kool-aid-party-over ""central banks must head for the exit and stop trying to spur a global economic recovery... cheap and plentiful central bank money had merely bought time, warning that more bond buying would retard the global economy’s return to health by delaying adjustments to governments’ and households’ balance sheets." http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/10310598/BIS-veteran-says-global-credit-excess-worse-than-pre-Lehman.html
unemployment  employment  monetary  policy  Mark  Carney  ope  reflation  zombie  banks  monetary  transmission  mechanism  BOE  banking  crisis  carmenreinhart  BOJ  LBO  balancesheet  policy  folly  QE  liquidity  2013  fiscal  policy  UK  debt  monetisation  political  error  unknown  unkown  greatdepression  zombie  consumer  deleveraging  debt  monetization  Richardkoo  centralbanks  liberal  economic  reform  faultlines  GFC  monetary  theory  exuberance  MarioDraghi  unintended  consequences  global  economy  monetary  stimulus  Help  to  Buy  Scheme  liquidity-trap  zombie  corporations  ECB  monetary  system  political  folly  benbernanke  bank  crisis  Abenomics  rebalancing  China  greatrecession  policy  error  productivity  LTRO  NIRP  OMT  Fed  communication  economic  history  Super  Cycle  stagflation  leverage  KennethRogoff  sovereign  debt  crisis  recovery  unconventional  monetary  policy  ZIRP  USA  BIS  POMO  Funding  for  Lending  Scheme  corporate  governance  fiscal  deficit 
september 2013 by asterisk2a
Krisenländer: Barroso fordert eine Lockerung der Sparpolitik - SPIEGEL ONLINE
Der britische Ökonom Simon Wren-Lewis hat vor einiger Zeit eine sehr hilfreiche Analyse veröffentlicht. Er vergleicht dabei die sogenannten strukturellen Primärüberschüsse. Das Wort "strukturell" meint hier, dass man den Konjunkturzyklus berücksichtigt. Das Wort "primär" bedeutet, dass man die Haushaltsbilanz vor der Zahlung von Zinsen betrachtet. Das tut man, weil man damit den Teil der Haushaltspolitik isoliert, auf den die Politik Einfluss hat. Der Euro-Raum insgesamt hat einen strukturellen Primärüberschuss von 2,2 Prozent der Wirtschaftsleistung, was angesichts der Rezession außerordentlich viel ist. Wren-Lewis errechnete dann, wie hoch eine optimale strukturelle Primärbilanz für den langfristigen Schuldenabbau momentan wäre. Das Ergebnis: ein Überschuss von nur 0,3 Prozent.
academics  Barroso  Europe  European  Commission  academia  Kenneth  Rogoff  Troika  carmenreinhart  political  folly  macroeconomics  policy  folly  Simon  Wren-Lewis  macroeconomic  policy  political  theory  economic  history  fiscal  policy  PIGS  UK  KennethRogoff  Schuldenbremse  error  austerity  Carmen  Reinhart  PIIGS  fiscal  theory  Germany  IMF 
april 2013 by asterisk2a
BBC News - Reinhart, Rogoff... and Herndon: The student who caught out the profs
http://www.peri.umass.edu/236/hash/31e2ff374b6377b2ddec04deaa6388b1/publication/566/ "not every economy is same, times are always different." >> Reply by Rogoff & Reinhart: 'We were only arguing association, not causality.' [...] Discovering a spreadsheet error was never going to end the debate over austerity - and nor should it, according to Megan McArdle, special correspondent for Newsweek and The Daily Beast. >> http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/panne-mit-excel-tabelle-rogoff-und-reinhart-haben-sich-verrechnet-a-894893.html "Olivier Blanchard (IMF) gestand ein die negativen Effekte der Sparpolitik auf das Wachstum unterschätzt wurden." >> Updated paper from Rogoff & Reinhart http://www.nber.org/papers/w18015 >> http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/holy-coding-error-batman/ http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/apr/16/unemployment-reinhart-rogoff-arithmetic-cause
academics  complexity  sociology  unintended  consequences  zombie  banks  academia  science  liquidity-trap  banking  crisis  carmenreinhart  political  folly  bank  crisis  macroeconomics  lostdecade  policy  folly  macroeconomic  policy  debtoverhang  lostgeneration  economic  history  philosophy  fiscal  policy  social  science  confidence  KennethRogoff  error  trustagent  paulkrugman  austerity  zombie  consumer  deleveraging  IWF  Richardkoo  balance  sheet  recession  IMF 
april 2013 by asterisk2a
The President's 'Biggest Mistake' on Obamanomics - YouTube
Obama failed to communicate well the severity and extent of the situation [as they themself failed to grasp it] - failed to take on the advice of > book rogoff and reinhart, as well as > book richard koo

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/sunday-review/obamanomics-a-counterhistory.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

The Federal Reserve and many private-sector economists were also too optimistic, Obama aides note. And they argue that the Senate would not have passed a much larger stimulus in 2009, given Republican opposition, regardless of the White House’s wishes.

But from these reasonable points, the Obama team then jumps to a larger and more dubious conclusion: that their failure to grasp the severity of the slump has had no real consequences. Even if they had seen the slow recovery coming, they say, they couldn’t have done much about it. When Mr. Obama has been asked about his biggest mistake, he talks about messaging, not policy.
stephenroach  monetary  theory  monetary  policy  Fed  fiscal  policy  economic  history  Politics  communication  USA  Richardkoo  deleveraging  balance  sheet  recession  carmenreinhart  KennethRogoff  GFC  greatrecession  presidency  barackobama 
october 2012 by asterisk2a
Stephen Roach Mops Floor With Keynesianism And Former Fed Governor Larry Meyer | ZeroHedge
ex Fed member Larry Meyer:
'we do models, to do forecasts ... otherwise we don't know'

Roach replies: your models don't work, and thus your forecasts - because they use empirical (the past) data.

Your models are not based on science, what you (the Fed) is doing is working with assumptions.

-

Fed models / assumptions do not account deleveraging, debt overhang, outcome of financial crisis etc etc. disrupting and distorting the entire monetary system - which they build.

Because this is a different kind of gargantuan crisis than ever before.

One can only think about it that the system is broken (monetary system) - it may take 10-20 years to fully recover. Now one as to admit to that, that it is broken beyond patch work repair (QE, ZIRP and Co). And start think a new, and consider a debt jubilee. Basically a cold reset for the monetary system.
keynes  miltonfriedman  Europe  sovereign  debt  crisis  debt  jubilee  monetary  theory  monetary  policy  creditcrunch  deleveraging  debtoverhang  NPL  zombie  banks  Japan  UK  USA  lostdecade  greatdepression  GFC  greatrecession  benbernanke  paulkrugman  KennethRogoff  carmenreinhart  economic  history  economic-thought  economic  model  Fed  richardkoo  stephenroach 
august 2012 by asterisk2a
We're (USA) Not Japan But One Can Always Hope | ZeroHedge
3 Years on ...

July 31 (Bloomberg) -- In today's "Single Best Chart," Bloomberg's Mike McKee displays how the current U.S. recovery is the slowest since the 1970's and even lags Japan at the same point of their recovery in 1993.

__Measured in Real GDP per capita :

USA post crisis (property and credit bubble + financial crisis followed by credit crunch, deleveraging, debt overhang and non-performing loans [balance sheet recession]) recovery is worse than the recovery of Japan from 1993 (property and equity bubble followed by credit crunch, deleveraging, debt overhang and non-performing loans [balance sheet recession]).

http://www.bloomberg.com/video/single-best-chart-worst-u-s-recovery-since-1970-s-UVkghBlRT8ydic0ovJ_iVA.html

-

And Tim Geithner once said "the USA is not Japan".
paulkrugman  KennethRogoff  carmenreinhart  financialcrisis  property  bubble  creditcrunch  NPL  debtoverhang  zombie  banks  deleveraging  richardkoo  economic-thought  economic  model  Europe  GFC  greatrecession  economic  history  timgeithner  lostdecade  double-dip  UK  USA  Japan 
august 2012 by asterisk2a
Reinharts And Rogoff On Why The Debt Overhang Matters | ZeroHedge
Consequences of Debt/GDP over 90% and held it there for at least five years. The stunning reality of their empirical work is four-fold: 1) the median duration of these overhang periods in 23 years (that's a lot of can-kicking); 2) real GDP growth averages 1.2% lower than trend during these overhangs; 3) real GDP drops by on average around 25% at the end of the deleveraging episode; and 4) most critically, "waiting for markets to signal a problem may be waiting too long because governments have the ability to suppress market signals."

All coming down to “financial repression”. Financial repression includes directed lending by captive domestic audiences, explicit or implicit caps on interest rates, regulation of cross-border capital movements, high reserve and capital requirements, and moral suasion applied to regulated entities.
KennethRogoff  carmenreinhart  debtoverhang 
may 2012 by asterisk2a
Lunch with the FT: Kenneth Rogoff - FT.com
The financial crisis has made many of Rogoff and Reinhart’s observations a central part of the debate about sovereign debt. Their finding that recoveries from debt-driven recessions are slower than recoveries from business cycle recessions is regularly cited. The two authors are also associated with the idea that when a state’s debts exceed 90 per cent of gross domestic product, they will reduce the economic potential of the country.

I suggest that the US is still comfortably short of this level – but am swiftly corrected. If you count federal and state debts and, crucially, add in unfunded debts in the social security system, then Rogoff thinks that Americ
economic  history  economics  debtoverhang  carmenreinhart  KennethRogoff 
february 2012 by asterisk2a
Interactive Visual History Of Financial Crises Since 1810 - Note Where The Fed Arrives | ZeroHedge
https://www.historyshots.com/FinancialCrisis/index.cfm

"The giant wave in the top section of the graphic depicts the percentage of world GDP by region in crisis during the 200 year period. It includes the four major financial crisis types (sovereign default, banking, currency, and inflation) along with stock market crashes. The bottom section provides a detailed chart of all sovereign defaults by country, region and year. It shows the repeating nature of sovereign default, a central theme of Reinhart and Rogoff's book."

This graphic is based on the New York Times and Wall Street Journal best seller This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly by Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff. Using data developed by Reinhart and Rogoff, it maps the cyclical history of financial crisis from 1810 to 2010 for sixty-six countries representing 90% of world GDP.
book  KennethRogoff  economic-thought  economic  history  carmenreinhart  infographics  financialcrisis  history 
february 2012 by asterisk2a
Will Latest Market, Credit Woes Add Up to a 'Global Recession'? - YouTube
- downgrade in confidence, stat gov is not able to prop up economy if needed- downgrade in confidence, after gov debt ceiling debate ended with austerity shaped bill (compromise)- downgrade in confidence, after Obama could not show leadership in debate and give boundaries
- government, and other institutions (Fed, SEC, Banks, Individual) failed
- growth panic
- no leadership on both sides of the Atlantic
- slow growth below long-term average guaranteed in developed markets whose bubbles burst 
- wrong medicine currently administered 
- currently, QE, monetization does not lead into healthier moneysupply in UK, USA, EU. bc of debt overhang and deleveraging process - which will still take years.
KennethRogoff  GFC  paulkrugman  2011  greatrecession  barackobama  presidency  monetary  fiscal  policy  politics  mistake  folly  sovereign  debt  ceiling  debtceiling  crisis  August  PIIGS  Fed  ECB  economy  recovery  GDP  growth  QE  QE3  debtoverhang  inflation  deflation  deleveraging  Japan  lostdecade  history  lesson  liquidity-trap  greatdepression  austerity  unemployment  output-gap  moneysupply  monetization  BOE  UK  europe  USA 
august 2011 by asterisk2a
On Rick Santelli's "Meet The Press" Appearance, A $113 Trillion Future Rounding Error, And The Metamorphosis Of The American Dream To A Nightmare | zero hedge
And now for some facts: On February 28, 2001 George Bush said this about his 2002 Budget: “It will retire nearly $1 trillion in debt over the next four years.” Instead, US debt, which at that point was $5.7 trillion, rose to $7.7 trillion. $3 trillion rounding error? Also in the same budget, Bush predicted a $5.6 trillion surplus over the next ten years, which would wipe out all of America's debt by 2011. The latest debt figure was $14.1 trillion. A $14.1 trillion rounding error, or a nearly five fold increase in "rounding errors" in a decade. At this point, the 2021 total debt (including insolvent Social Security) is expected to be $24 trillion. Applying the same rounding error variance to government "projections" means... $113 trillion in debt?
Most jarring, total US Debt to GDP will be over 100% in under 6 months. Paging Reinhart and Rogoff...
USA  sovereign  debt  gwbush  barackobama  presidency  crisis  outlook  projection  forecast  timgeithner  budget  2011  2010  2012  GDP  KennethRogoff 
february 2011 by asterisk2a
Economist Warns of Public Bubble - Real Time Economics - WSJ
The U.S. economy has traded a public bubble for a private one, according to this forecast by California forecasting firm Beacon Economics.

The firm’s stance is that the $787 billion federal stimulus package and the Federal Reserve’s near-zero interest rates have propped up the economy but will prove unsustainable and are actually exacerbating some of the imbalances that led to the recession. “The nation seems to be trading in its private bubble for a public one, swapping one set of unsustainable economic drivers for another,” the report said.
bubble  public  debt  deficit  budget  usa  2010  outlook  forecast  benbernanke  interestrate  private  treasuries  stimulus  housing  TARP  toxicassets  losses  accounting  property  inflation  savings  consumption  package  greatrecession  recovery  double-dip  recession  deflation  richardkoo  KennethRogoff 
april 2010 by asterisk2a
Economics focus: What if? »
If Lehman had not failed, would the crisis have happened anyway?

IN AUGUST 2008 Kenneth Rogoff, a Harvard University economist, briefly rocked world stockmarkets when he warned a conference in Singapore: “We’re not just going to see midsized banks go under in the next few months, we’re going to see a whopper, we’re going to see a big one—one of the big investment banks or big banks.” A month later, in the early hours of September 15th, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.

Harold James, an economic historian at Princeton University, says Lehman’s failure was analogous to the collapse of Creditanstalt, a big Austrian bank, in 1931. Austria and Germany had borrowed heavily from foreign creditors and the bank’s failure rippled around the world, vastly intensifying the Depression. Lehman’s failure is widely seen as a similar turning-point in the current financial crisis: an unexpected blunder that came close to turning a garden-variety recession into another Depression. …
lehmanbrothers  KennethRogoff 
october 2009 by asterisk2a

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