asterisk2a + glass-steagall   17

Keiser Report: Gold & World’s Debt Problems (Summer Solutions series E940) - YouTube
deflationary trap/liquidity trap - orthodox monetary policy w austerity = stagnation. & west is exporting deflation. // if it is good for consumers ... break up banks. // hedging is BS ... you double the system you double the risk. [...] banks are now bigger! ... ban most derivatives, and reintroduce glass stegall // Black-Schoeles - there is no such think as risk free rate and no such thing as the past reflect the future. risk is not equally distributed. [...] VAR is flawed. //
deflation  deflationary  NIRP  currency  war  currency  debasement  ZIRP  QE  Helicopter  Money  secular  stagnation  western  world  Abenomics  BOE  BOJ  Fed  ECB  economic  history  Richard  Koo  liquidity  trap  debt  overhang  balance  sheet  recession  consumer  debt  household  debt  mortgage  mortgage  market  mortgage  rates  distortion  hunt  for  yield  credit  boom  credit  bubble  PBOC  China  reflate  reflation  squeezed  middle  class  wage  growth  income  growth  income  distribution  income  disparity  working  poor  Precariat  Brexit  GFC  too  big  to  jail  productive  investment  underinvestment  austerity  history  productivity  gap  financial  instruments  investment  banking  global  economy  globalisation  globalization  derivatives  output  gap  productivity  recovery  neoliberal  neoliberalism  Chicago  School  neoclassical  economics  deregulation  Wall  Street  speculative  bubble  property  bubble  Beton  Gold  Betongold  stagnation  aggregate  demand  aggregate  demand  short-fall  too  big  to  bail  too  big  to  fail  TBTF  complexity  systemic  risk  systemrelevant  systemicrisk  systemrelevanz  zombie  bank  zombie  banks  non-performing  loan  leverage  hedge  Glass-Steagall  Black-Scholes  Equation 
july 2016 by asterisk2a
What Really Caused the Crisis and What to Do About It - YouTube
"There are not perfect markets, and there is no perfect planner. [...] we will never arrive at perfect solutions. [...] market will never allocate perfectly ... [...] market will always tend to lend to property and land, and less into productive means (businesses = risk of 100 loss, land or property ... you have a loss when you sell it. << China, UK ) [...] not all credit is good credit. [...] need for macroprudential policy to dampen bubbles bc rate hikes could dampen normal non-speculative area of economy. ie loan to value limits [...] interest rate setting is blunt hammer that people though is the magic wand along the line of self-regulation, free market, neoliberalism and trickle-down [...] GFC can be traced back to the 60-70's - macroecon + micro with absurd assumptions (ie rational expectations, equilibriums, no bubbles) & math & pure theoretical base (no empirical analysis ie of what banks really do ie greed) = makes job of economist as policy advisor real easy.
bank  crisis  JohnMaynardKeynes  keynes  Keynesianism  book  Richard  Koo  aggregate  demand  austerity  liquidity  trap  deleveraging  balance  sheet  recession  debtoverhang  GFC  recovery  secular  stagnation  western  world  dogma  ideology  underinvestment  productive  investment  infrastructure  investment  monetary  policy  monetary  theory  trickle-down  economics  neoliberalism  neoliberal  budget  deficit  economic  history  credit  bubble  output  gap  productivity  inflation  targeting  nominal  GDP  targeting  asset  allocation  economics  investment  banking  zombie  banks  retail  banking  financial  product  CDS  CDO  hunt  for  yield  VAR  risk  aversion  deflationary  deflation  ZIRP  NIRP  QE  debt  monetisation  debt  monetization  Glass-Steagall  self-regulation  regulators  regulation  leverage  margin  trading  property  bubble  arbitrage  speculative  bubbles  asset  bubble  UK  USA  Europe  ECB  Fed  BOE  zombie  consumer  squeezed  middle  class  zombie  corporations  NPL  junk  bond  realestate  macroprudential  policy  mortgage  market  equilibrium  disequilibrium  Economist  economists  Adair  Turner  hayek 
february 2016 by asterisk2a
Vickers warns over weaker bank safety buffers - BBC News
[ no skin in the game ] The man charged with leading an inquiry into the future safety of Britain's banks has said Bank of England plans are not strong enough. Sir John Vickers, who led the Independent Commission on Banking (ICB) said: "The Bank of England proposal is less strong than what the ICB recommended." In a BBC interview, he added "I don't think the ICB overdid it." The Bank of England declined to comment. Specifically, it is the plans to make sure that banks have enough capital that Sir John has questioned. Capital is considered vital to a bank's safety, as it serves to protect it from sudden losses. It comes in many forms, but the most common is funding from shareholders, who expect a hefty return on the risk they are taking. The backdrop to this news is the current slump in bank share prices across Europe. Since the start of the year, European banking stocks have lost a quarter of their value. //&! bit.ly/1Xs0Bac
zombie  banks  retail  banking  investment  banking  toobigtofail  too  big  to  jail  TBTF  too  big  to  bail  economic  history  lobbyist  lobby  Lobbying  GFC  speculation  CDS  CDO  derivatives  Interestrateswap  financial  product  VAR  risk-management  risk  management  Greed  bonuses  bonus  financial  crisis  blackswan  Black  Swan  Career  Politicians  No  Representation  democracy  Super  Rich  1%  plutocracy  oligarchy  Wall  Street  shareholder  value  profit  maximisation  short-termism  self-regulation  regulation  deregulation  regulators  Glass-Steagall  BOE  ECB  Bundesbank  sovereign  debt  crisis  Fed 
february 2016 by asterisk2a
Jan Kregel: The Continuing Risk of Derivatives - YouTube
The other common feature that Kregel notes is that the major objective of active, global financial institutions no longer is the maximization of profits by seeking the lowest cost funds and channeling them to the highest risk-adjusted return. Rather, they are most interested in maximizing the amount of funds intermediated in order to maximize fees and commissions, thereby maximizing the rate of return on bank capital. This means a shift from continuous risk assessment and risk monitoring of funded investment projects that produce recurring flows of interest payments over time, to the identification of riskless "trades" that produce large, single payments with as much of the residual risk as possible carried by the purchasers of the package. The upshot is that most derivative packages mask the actual risk involved in an investment and increase the difficulty in assessing the final return on funds provided.
derivatives  investment  banking  retail  banking  banking  crisis  business  model  risk  aversion  ROI  VAR  CDS  Interestrateswap  financial  literacy  financial  market  financial  crisis  financial  cycle  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  tobin-tax  FinancialCrisisResponsibilityFee  CDO  financial  instruments  bonuses  bonus  Greed  shareholder  value  profit  maximisation  Wall  Street  economic  history  self-regulation  regulation  regulators  deregulation  Glass-Steagall  Bank  Oversight  zombie  banks  financial  product 
january 2016 by asterisk2a
The Exchange: Greg Smith on Leaving Goldman Sachs - YouTube
Greg Smith, author of "Why I Left Goldman Sachs," joins Rob Cox to discuss his contention that the firm's shift away from serving clients inspired his public exit from the investment bank.
fiduciary  responsibility  derivatives  Dodd-Frank  Politics  accountability  transparency  lobbyist  lobby  Lobbying  conflict  of  interest  proptrading  WallStreet  GFC  Eliot  Spitzer  Glass-Steagall  Abacus  bank  crisis  banking  crisis  banking  book  GoldmanSachs 
october 2012 by asterisk2a
Nassim Taleb on JPMorganChase +2bn quartely loss by London unit - YouTube
Nassim Taleb argues:
- losses arise bc the math didn't work (( the model, risk metrics, too complex as the world can be )), simplifies fact - naming theses people incompetent.

- argues that investment banking needs to be split up from retail, investment banks need skin in the game - traders need skin in game - like hedge funds.
banking  politics  complexity  blackswan  Black-Scholes  Equation  black  risk-management  risk  nassimtaleb  Glass-Steagall  JamieDimon  jpmorganchase 
may 2012 by asterisk2a
Vickers Report implementation useless and flawed because of opaque accounting of banks
The report, launched in the wake of the financial crisis, recommended separating banks' retail business from their investment business.

Mr Cable said the government would proceed with separating the banks.

But the recommendation about the amount of capital banks should hold has been diluted, the BBC has learned. The chancellor will address MPs on Monday.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16235636
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16237692

opaque accounting of banks; hedges, credit risk, CDS, derivatives, contracts, counterparty risk, non market to market accounting
and because of basel2/3 which sees sov debt as risk free asset which is used to state capital hold. but is not liquid as cash etc. etc etc.
and sov debt is not risk free
banking  UK  transparency  VickersReport  RBS  accounting  reform  regulation  FSA  BoE  2011  Glass-Steagall  Basel3 
december 2011 by asterisk2a
Secret Fed Loans Helped Banks Net $13 Billion - Bloomberg
A fresh narrative of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 emerges from 29,000 pages of Fed documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and central bank records of more than 21,000 transactions. While Fed officials say that almost all of the loans were repaid and there have been no losses, details suggest taxpayers paid a price beyond dollars as the secret funding helped preserve a broken status quo and enabled the biggest banks to grow even bigger.

$7.77 Trillion
The amount of money the central bank parceled out was surprising even to Gary H. Stern, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis from 1985 to 2009, who says he “wasn’t aware of the magnitude.” It dwarfed the Treasury Department’s better-known $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP. Add up guarantees and lending limits, and the Fed had committed $7.77 trillion as of March 2009 to rescuing the financial system, more than half the value of everything produced in the U.S. that year.
Fed  bailout  finance  banks  bank  2008  GFC  meltdown  TARP  disclosure  transparency  trust  TAF  TermAuctionFacility  discountwindow  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  history  Dodd-Frank  moralhazard  Glass-Steagall  toobigtofail  systemicrisk 
november 2011 by asterisk2a
Fair Game - 3,000 Pages of Financial Reform, but Still Not Enough - NYTimes.com
Certainly the banks and the Wall Street trading shops that have so richly scored in the derivatives market are happy to keep the status quo — after all, profits flourish where opacity rules. But for most of the rest of us that’s an unsatisfactory, and possibly dangerous, outcome.
regulation  Glass-Steagall  reform  2010  politics  lobby  lobbyist  Lobbying  wallstreet  derivatives  toobigtofail 
june 2010 by asterisk2a
Regulating banks: Garrottes and sticks | The Economist
If Europe fails to follow America’s lead, it would be a blow for efforts to create a joined-up approach to global regulation. With the American plan coming on the heels of Britain’s tax on bonuses, there are fears of growing unilateralism. One danger is that this fragmentation results in what Sir Howard Davies, a former head of Britain’s Financial Services Authority, has called “reckless prudence”: a cumbersome patchwork of inconsistent, overlapping rules. That would create a second risk, regulatory arbitrage. If American banks were at a real disadvantage to foreign rivals, they would try to game the rules.

If public anger grows, a reintroduction of Glass-Steagall may just start to look possible.
FinancialCrisisResponsibilityFee  VolckerRule  MeredithWhitney  regulation  reform  banking  banks  financial  Glass-Steagall 
february 2010 by asterisk2a

related tags

1%  Abacus  Abenomics  accountability  accounting  Adair  aggregate  allocation  Amazon  America  American  Apple  arbitrage  asset  austerity  aversion  avoidance  bail  bailin  bailout  balance  bank  banking  banks  barackobama  Basel3  Bernie  Beton  Betongold  big  Bill  black  Black-Scholes  blackswan  blue-collar  BOE  BoE  BOJ  bond  bonus  bonuses  book  boom  Brexit  bribery  BRIC  bubble  bubbles  budget  Bundesbank  business  capitalism  Career  CDO  CDS  CFPA  Chicago  China  class  Clinton  coefficient  comment  complexity  conflict  conglomerate  consent  consumer  corporate  corporations  corruption  Creation  credit  crime  crisis  crony  culture  currency  cycle  David  davidcameron  Deal  debasement  debt  debtoverhang  deficit  deflation  deflationary  deleveraging  demand  democracy  deregulation  derivatives  disclosure  discountwindow  disequilibrium  disparity  distortion  distribution  Dodd-Frank  dogma  Donald  door  Dream  ECB  economic  economics  Economist  economists  economy  education  Ehtics  election  Eliot  elizabethwarren  Equation  equilibrium  Eric  Europe  evasion  exploitation  Faceboock  fail  Fear  fearmongering  Fed  fiduciary  finance  financial  financialcrisis  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  FinancialCrisisResponsibilityFee  fiscal  for  FSA  Funding  gap  Gates  GDP  GeorgeOsborne  GFC  Gini  Gini-coefficient  Glass-Steagall  global  globalisation  globalization  Gold  GoldmanSachs  Google  governance  greatrecession  Greed  groups  growth  hayek  hedge  Helicopter  Hillary  history  household  hunt  ideology  income  Industrial  inequality  inflation  infrastructure  instruments  interest  Interestrateswap  investment  jail  JamieDimon  Job  JohnMaynardKeynes  jpmorganchase  junk  Karp  keynes  Keynesianism  Koo  Larry  lessons  leverage  liquidity  literacy  loan  lobby  Lobbying  lobbyist  macroeconomic  macroprudential  management  manufactured  margin  Mark  market  maximisation  media  meltdown  MeredithWhitney  meritocracy  meritocratic  microeconomic  Microsoft  middle  middleclass  Mitt  mobility  model  monetary  monetisation  monetization  Money  Moral  moralhazard  mortgage  multinational  nassimtaleb  neoclassical  neoliberal  neoliberalism  New  NIRP  No  nominal  non-performing  NPL  occupywallstreet  of  oligarchy  opinion  output  overhang  oversight  Party  PBOC  plutocracy  Polarisation  policy  Politicians  politics  poor  populism  post-racial  Precariat  presidency  presidential  product  productive  productivity  profit  propaganda  property  proptrading  QE  rates  RBS  realestate  recession  recovery  redistribution  reflate  reflation  reform  regulation  regulators  Reich  Representation  responsibility  retail  Revolution  revolving  Rich  Richard  risk  risk-management  Robert  robertrubin  ROI  Romney  Sanders  Schmidt  School  secular  self-regulation  shareholder  sheet  short-fall  short-termism  social  Society  sovereign  speculation  speculative  Spitzer  squeezed  stagnation  Starbucks  Street  subsidies  Summers  Super  Swan  systemic  systemicrisk  systemrelevant  systemrelevanz  TAF  targeting  TARP  tax  taxevasion  TBTF  Technology  TermAuctionFacility  theory  to  tobin-tax  too  toobigtofail  trading  transparency  trap  trickle-down  Trump  trust  Tumblr  Turner  turnout  UK  underinvestment  USA  value  VAR  vested  VickersReport  VolckerRule  voter  wage  Wall  wallstreet  war  warrenbuffet  western  white-collar  working  world  WTO  yield  ZIRP  zombie  Zuckerberg 

Copy this bookmark:



description:


tags: