asterisk2a + basel3   24

EU finance ministers get tough with Italian bank trying for third bailout
EU rules forbid troubled Tuscan bank Monte dei Paschi from receiving state aid, but its collapse would cause a political crisis for prime minister Matteo Renzi [...] a move that would need Brussels to break new rules designed to prevent such taxpayer bailouts after the 2008 global financial crisis. [... italy had a triple dip recession from 2008/9 counting ] //&! soundcloud.com/ft-world-weekly/italys-struggling-banks-pose-3 //&! Banks missold products again, in part - bit.ly/29Fmboz //&! bit.ly/29H4VPD 360mrdEuro NPL &! bit.ly/29B0d6I &! bit.ly/2a1sfdI &! Bad Bank #2 to be set-up - bit.ly/2a9plpN [...] technical analysis - http://bit.ly/29VP2YI
Matteo  Renzi  Angela  Merkel  Wolfgang  Schäuble  European  Bank  Supervision  bailout  bailin  Italy  zombie  zombie  banks  non-performing  loan  austerity  recession  Germany  Deutsche  Bank  contagion  contamination  systemic  risk  systemicrisk  systemrelevant  systemrelevanz  BaFin  ECB  Basel  III  Basel3  stresstest  Jeroen  Dijsselbloem  sovereign  debt  crisis  economic  history 
july 2016 by asterisk2a
"Deutsche Bank Poses The Greatest Risk To The Global Financial System": IMF
via Keister Report - https://youtu.be/fbh3rndGDN8 // a Italian banking crisis could topple them. that is why they (their economist) called for a EU bank bailout (shore up). //&! IMF Warns Of "Global Contagion" From Italy's Bank Crisis; Forecasts Two-Decade Long Recession - http://bit.ly/29sFINn - [...] "Unless asset quality and profitability problems are addressed in a timely manner, lingering problems of weaker banks can eventually weigh on the rest of the system," //&! http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-07-09/charting-epic-collapse-worlds-most-systemically-dangerous-bank //&! Analyst Warns Deutsche Bank's Problems May Now Be "Insurmountable" - http://bit.ly/29LwUjv - [...] we believe DBK is still over 40x levered. [...] Seeking outside capital is also likely to be difficult as management would likely find it hard to offer any type of return on new capital invested. //&! its known balance sheet - http://bit.ly/29usGKG - 1.74 trillion balance sheet!
Italy  Germany  derivatives  Deutsche  Bank  BuBa  BaFin  Wolfgang  Schäuble  Angela  Merkel  investment  banking  systemic  risk  systemicrisk  systemrelevant  systemrelevanz  European  Bank  Supervision  stresstest  contagion  repo  trust  sovereign  debt  crisis  PIGS  Greece  Brexit  non-performing  loan  zombie  banks  zombie  austerity  secular  stagnation  recession  ECB  MarioDraghi  ZIRP  NIRP  QE  hunt  for  yield  asset  allocation  distortion  OMT  LTRO  Basel  III  Basel3  leverage  banking  union  Bank  Oversight  banking  crisis  banking  system  interbank  lending  overnight  deposit  facility 
july 2016 by asterisk2a
The new European Union | Credit Writedowns
[ EU banking system was too big to bail in case Greece and else would default even in parts on some of its debt and or make no or delay repayment with interest in full ] In conclusion, the conditions asked of Greece are not likely to be met, because they cannot be met. Greece will be blamed for not living up to its commitments, as it has been this time around. Yet, somehow, the notion of asking for the impossible from a country that has no choice but to sign is fundamentally perverse. [...] The mistake was to break the no-bailout clause that was designed to make sure the Eurozone would not find itself in this position. For selfish reasons (i.e. preventing a bank crisis in Europe and the US), Greece was convinced to accept the first bailout in 2010.
Greece  bank  bailout  banking  crisis  bank  crisis  investment  banking  retail  banking  TBTF  too  big  to  jail  too  big  to  bail  European  Union  Positioning  ECB  Career  Politicians  lobbyist  lobby  Lobbying  crony  capitalism  corporate  scandal  austerity  accounting  scandal  bailout  bail-in  Cyprus  of  Cyprus  deposit  haircut  deposit  levy  fairness  Generationengerechtigkeit  Wall  Street  profit  maximisation  shareholder  value  economic  history  fiscal  policy  monetary  policy  Basel3  banking  fractional  reserve  banking  EuropeanSystemicRiskBoard  GFC  recovery  Debt  Super  Cycle  Privatisation  ideology  dogma  PIIGSFB  PIGS  PIIGS  France  Germany  Bundesbank  trichet  Jens  Weidmann  Angela  Merkel  Peer  Steinbrück  corruption  blackmail  josefackermann  ackermann  Deutsche  subsidies  subsidizing  Mark  Blyth  social  contract  social  tension  social  cohesion  constituency  Nationalizing  badbank  badbanks  restructuring  monetary 
october 2015 by asterisk2a
8 Reasons Why A New Global Financial Crisis Could Be On The Way - NASDAQ.com
Like any other bubble, it will only become one once it bursts. What is different in 2014 is that now central banks have a great tool to prevent real estate bubbles: Basel III and its countercyclical capital buffer. [...] Let us not forget the lessons of the Great War (we are now commemorating the 100-year anniversary): the butterfly effect can be deadly in politics. +++ http://ti.me/1r4NfEy "Raghuram Rajan, the governor of India's central bank, fears supereasy money from the world’s central banks is inflating assets and encouraging bad investments. [...] Long-term low interest rates and unorthodox programs to stimulate economies — like quantitative easing, or QE — could be laying the groundwork for more turmoil in financial markets, he argues. [...] With inflation not being strong, this can continue for some time until things are so stretched that any signs of inflation, and a rise in interest rates, could precipitate a fairly strong market reaction. Certainly [...] volatility hurts[.]
equity  bubble  asset  bubble  shadow  banking  China  Basel3  Basel  III  centralbanks  BIS  bubbles  bubble  butterfly  effect  unintended  consequences  complexity  unknown  unkown  unknown  unknowns  QE  ZIRP  hunt  for  yield  liquidity  trap  monetary  stimulus  monetary  policy  NIRP  negative  real  interest  rate  Raghuram  Rajan  zombie  banks  NPL  PIGS  geopolitics  Middle  East  ISIS  Islamic  State  Ukrain  Ukraine  radicalism  Putin  vladimirputin  Russia  Europe  USA  foreign  affairs  diplomacy  NATO  IMF  austerity  secular  stagnation  stagnation  deflation  deflationary  uncertainty  Wall  Street  volatility  Taper  distortion  trust  trustagent  confidence  BRIC  India  MINT  Frontier  Markets  Developing  World  emerging  market  flat  globalisation  globalization 
august 2014 by asterisk2a
Buttonwood: The nationalisation of markets | The Economist
... price lost its signal service due to policy of QE, ZIRP
... underwater balance sheets seem not to matter anymore

... Trapped in a cage of our own making
... To get free we either cut of limbs and risk bleeding to death
... Or we starve ourself so long till we fit between the bars

history suggests that once governments get involved in a sector, they find it hard to withdraw. Given the weak outlook, it is hard to imagine the circumstances in which liquidity support for the banks will be withdrawn, or the policy of low interest rates abandoned. This is a new financial and economic era.
politics  politicalscience  political  economy  2012  financial  repression  new-normal  greatdepression  economic  history  toobigtofail  cartel  subsidies  Basel3  basel  ECB  Fed  BOE  LTRO  greatrecession  GFC  supply-demand  monetary  policy  ZIRP  unintended  consequences  QE 
may 2012 by asterisk2a
Nomura's Koo Plays The Pre-Blame Game For The Pessimism Ahead | ZeroHedge
While his diagnosis of the balance sheet recessionary outbreak that is sweeping global economies (including China now he fears) is a useful framework for understanding ZIRP's (and monetary stimulus broadly) general inability to create a sustainable recovery, his one-size-fits-all government-borrow-and-spend to infinity (fiscal deficits during balance sheet recessions are good deficits) solution is perhaps becoming (just as he said it would) politically impossible to implement. In his latest missive, the Nomura economist does not hold back with the blame-bazooka for the mess we are in and face in 2012.

LTRO may rescue financial system but cannot save real economy
LTRO should be viewed in similar light as Fed’s QE1

The banks effectively used funds borrowed from the Fed to meet payment obligations. The money was not used to fund new loans.
Consequently, neither bank lending nor the money supply grew despite all the liquidity injected under QE1, and inflation and growth ...
ECB  Japan  history  EBA  Basel3  economics  moneysupply  monetary  theory  monetary  policy  quantitative-easing  economic-thought  outlook  Europe  deflation  deleveraging  ratingagencies  LTRO  balance  sheet  recession  ZIRP  2012  2011  richardkoo  blamegame 
january 2012 by asterisk2a
Eurozone burns money while the banks fiddle their balance sheets - Telegraph
ECB's LTRO is QE in stealth. A bank bailout. And one way to prop up money supply and velocity.

It buys time, politicians have to use. If not, and all else will fail - the trust of the public / society will bring a 2nd Depression and the break-off of PIIGS et al.

The market knows what is going on, thus the Euro is justifiably under 1.30.

All that, while banks need to delever and consolidate. And sovereigns need to fix their budgets and promote growth reforms to stop demand shortfall.

There is not "one" fix that addresses all problems.

OR ... politicians stand by the people and look beyond the next election.

"So eurozone governments need to stand behind retail depositors, make the financial institutions "fess-up" and let the cards fall, forcing the bombed-out European banking sector to consolidate."
complexity  Basel3  accounting  banking  PIIGS  politics  economic-thought  deleveraging  moneysupply  sovereign  debt  crisis  2012  Europe  monetary  policy  monetarism  monetization  debt  monetisation  LTRO  ECB 
january 2012 by asterisk2a
Vickers Report implementation useless and flawed because of opaque accounting of banks
The report, launched in the wake of the financial crisis, recommended separating banks' retail business from their investment business.

Mr Cable said the government would proceed with separating the banks.

But the recommendation about the amount of capital banks should hold has been diluted, the BBC has learned. The chancellor will address MPs on Monday.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16235636
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16237692

opaque accounting of banks; hedges, credit risk, CDS, derivatives, contracts, counterparty risk, non market to market accounting
and because of basel2/3 which sees sov debt as risk free asset which is used to state capital hold. but is not liquid as cash etc. etc etc.
and sov debt is not risk free
banking  UK  transparency  VickersReport  RBS  accounting  reform  regulation  FSA  BoE  2011  Glass-Steagall  Basel3 
december 2011 by asterisk2a
Morgan Stanley warns over cuts to bank lending and dividends | City A.M.
"Many of the top 25 banks could approach likely G-SIFI (globally systemically important financial institutions) standards in the next 3-4 years, but at the cost of dividends, returns or, critically, through more aggressive deleveraging," the analysts said in a note.
They expected eight banks to be required to hold an extra 2.5 per cent of capital under tougher rules for bigger banks, including BNP Paribas, Citigroup, HSBC Holdings and J.P. Morgan.
Morgan Stanley estimated there will be five tiers, requiring banks to hold 1-3 percent extra capital. No banks are in the top tier. Six banks, including Goldman Sachs and UBS, will be in a third tier requiring them to hold two per cent more capital, the report said.
Morgan Stanley cut its price targets on several banks, including Bank of America, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and UBS.
toobigtofail  basel3  2011  Dodd-Frank 
june 2011 by asterisk2a
Dimon Challenging Bernanke Channels Wall Streets Bid to Break Regulators - Bloomberg
Dimon, 55, asked Bernanke if he’s concerned that overzealous regulation will stymie an economic rebound.“I have a great fear someone’s going to try to write a book in 20 years, and the book is going to talk about all the things that we did in the middle of the crisis to actually slow down recovery,” Dimon told the Fed chairman during a conference of bankers in Atlanta.Bernanke, 57, said Dimon’s points are valid and that the Fed lacks the quantitative tools to study the net impact of all the regulatory and market changes over the past three years.“It’s too complicated,” Bernanke said, adding that he thinks there’s a way to safely regulate banks while preserving their ability to deliver “basic financial services.”
JamieDimon  benbernanke  regulation  reform  Dodd-Frank  banking  wallstreet  credit  basel3  toobigtofail  systemicrisk 
june 2011 by asterisk2a
Deutsche Bank Maneuvers Around New Capital Rules - WSJ.com
Hoping to sidestep new financial regulations that could have forced it to raise billions in new capital, Deutsche Bank AG is planning to restructure its U.S. operations, which would allow it to operate with a thinner capital cushion than the new rules envisioned.
Dodd-Frank  basel3  deutschebank  2011  fraud  banking  finance  capital 
april 2011 by asterisk2a
Morning Take-Out - NYTimes.com
The Capital Ratio Question, Revived Debate has been renewed in recent weeks as to what is desirable in terms of bank capital levels. The Bank of England’s David Miles said that the ratio should be 15 to 20 percent of risk-weighted assets and not the 7 percent proposed by the Basel Committee. His sentiments have since been, at least in part, endorsed by other regulators.
basel3  2011 
march 2011 by asterisk2a
Banks Like Barclays Find Loophole on Dodd-Frank Capital Rule - WSJ.com
Banks Like Barclays Find Loophole On Dodd-Frank Capital Rule (WSJ)In November, Barclays PLC quietly changed the legal classification of the U.K. bank’s main subsidiary in the U.S. so that the unit would no longer be subject to federal bank-capital requirements. Several other banks based outside the U.S. are considering similar moves, according to people familiar with the matter.
barclays  2011  Dodd-Frank  regulation  Basel3  fraud 
february 2011 by asterisk2a

related tags

accounting  ackermann  affairs  allocation  Angela  angelamerkel  asset  austerity  badbank  badbanks  bafin  bail  bail-in  bailin  bailout  balance  bank  banking  banks  barclays  basel  basel3  benbernanke  big  BIS  blackmail  blamegame  Blyth  BoE  BOE  Brexit  BRIC  BuBa  bubble  bubbles  Bundesbank  butterfly  capital  capitalism  Career  cartel  CDS  centralbanks  China  cohesion  complexity  confidence  consequences  constituency  contagion  contamination  contract  corporate  corruption  credit  creditrisk  crisis  crony  Cycle  Cyprus  debt  deflation  deflationary  deleveraging  deposit  derivatives  Deutsche  deutschebank  Developing  Dijsselbloem  diplomacy  distortion  Dodd-Frank  dogma  East  EBA  ECB  economic  economic-thought  economics  economy  effect  emerging  equity  Europe  European  EuropeanSystemicRiskBoard  facility  fairness  Fed  finance  financial  fiscal  flat  for  foreign  fractional  France  fraud  Frontier  FSA  Generationengerechtigkeit  geopolitics  Germany  GFC  Glass-Steagall  globalisation  globalization  greatdepression  greatrecession  Greece  haircut  hedgefunds  history  hunt  ideology  III  IMF  India  interbank  interest  investment  ISIS  Islamic  Italy  jail  JamieDimon  Japan  Jens  Jeroen  josefackermann  lending  leverage  levy  liquidity  loan  lobby  Lobbying  lobbyist  LTRO  MarioDraghi  Mark  market  Markets  Matteo  maximisation  Merkel  Middle  MINT  monetarism  monetary  monetisation  monetization  moneysupply  Nationalizing  NATO  negative  new-normal  NIRP  non-performing  NPL  of  OMT  outlook  overnight  Oversight  Peer  PIGS  PIIGS  PIIGSFB  policy  political  politicalscience  Politicians  politics  Positioning  Privatisation  profit  Putin  QE  quantitative-easing  radicalism  Raghuram  Rajan  rate  ratingagencies  RBS  real  recession  recovery  reform  regulation  Renzi  repo  repression  reserve  restructuring  retail  richardkoo  risk  Russia  scandal  Schäuble  secular  shadow  shadowbanking  shareholder  sheet  social  sovereign  stagnation  State  Steinbrück  stimulus  Street  stresstest  subsidies  subsidizing  Super  Supervision  supply-demand  system  systemic  systemicrisk  systemrelevant  systemrelevanz  Taper  TBTF  tension  theory  to  too  toobigtofail  transparency  trap  trichet  trust  trustagent  UK  Ukrain  Ukraine  uncertainty  unintended  union  unknown  unknowns  unkown  USA  value  VickersReport  vladimirputin  volatility  Wall  wallstreet  Weidmann  Wolfgang  World  yield  ZIRP  zombie 

Copy this bookmark:



description:


tags: