asterisk2a + 2008   88

Austerity Now: Brazil's Downgrade and Reckoning - Bloomberg View
Brazil faces its deepest recession in 25 years, policy drift and now a reputation deficit that threaten to undo years of prosperity and social gains. [...] even years on, with the economy set to shrink by two percent this year, and unemployment and consumer debt spiking, Brazil looks more likely cast as the leader of submerging markets and the sick man of the BRICS, the club of outsize developing nations -- Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa -- once touted to lead world growth.
liberal  economic  reform  economic  reform  BRIC  credit  bubble  2015  Brazil  China  India  Russia  hot-money  currency-war  currency  debasement  currency  war  centralbanks  BIS  distortion  ZIRP  NIRP  QE  global  trade  global  economy  GFC  recovery  PBOC  economic  history  monetary  policy  unconventional  monetary  policy  monetary  transmission  mechanism  liquidity  liquidity  trap  2008  asset  allocation  asset  bubble  Carry  speculative  bubbles  speculative  speculation  hunt  for  yield  FOMO  equity  bubble  reflate  reflation  commodity  prices  South  Africa  democracy  Career  Politicians  No  Representation  bribery  corruption 
september 2015 by asterisk2a
After the Crisis - Mark Blyth - YouTube
>> what if rise of the banks (deregulation, easy credit, global financial markets - arbitrage, and making money with money) fuelled the growth of the last ~25-30 years. // min 47 3 asset bubbles popped // USA - 40% of corporate profits came from 10% of corporate sector (banks) // 30% of MIT grads went to banks instead of real world engineering and manufacturing. // underwater private sector! via credit bubble: student loans (now 1trn and still rising in USA and UK, future disposable income/discretionary spending lower than babyboomers because of wage stagnation, no wage growth) credit cards, mortgages, heloc (home equity line of credit) --- all will have to focus on paying back debt. // 2015 - us student loans 1.25trn - + auto loans << bubble to eventually pop when collateral is falling! ie stagnant wages for 10 more years. and more and more cant repay their student loans. // 1:12:00 Bubbles move on;, real estate (property) & commodities, China,
Mark  Blyth  austerity  GFC  recovery  banking  crisis  sovereign  debt  crisis  economic  history  PIIGSFB  bank  bailout  fairness  Generationengerechtigkeit  toobigtofail  too  big  to  jail  too  big  to  bail  TBTF  ECB  NPL  deleveraging  balance  sheet  recession  underwater  credit  bubble  trickle-down  economics  China  2015  2008  western  world  secular  stagnation  debt  servitude  student  loan  debt  student  loan  student  debt  generationy  generation  rent  Millennials  disposable  income  discretionary  spending  marginal  propensity  to  consume  Super  Rich  squeezed  middle  class  Sozialer  Abstieg  self-employment  Zero  Hour  Contract  Contractor  underemployed  precarious  work  working  poor  inequality  Gini  coefficient  post-capitalism  crony  capitalism  capitalism  manufactured  consent  Polarisation  Thomas  Piketty  developed  world  income  inequality  propaganda  populism  corporate  state  corporate  media  democracy  Career  Politicians  lobbyist  Lobbying  lobby  deregulation  self-regulation  Workers  Union  wage  stagnation  wage  growth  income  distribution  income  growth  income  mobility  low  income  income  redistribution  stagnation  consumer  debt  debtoverhang  Super  Cycle  debt  bubble  household  debt  private  debt  asset  bubble  reflate  reflation  asset  allocation  distortion  monetary  policy  monetary  stimulus  monetary  monetary 
september 2015 by asterisk2a
[PreMoney MIAMI] Upfront Ventures, Mark Suster, "Venture Outlook 2015 - Goldrush or Fool's Gold" - YouTube
(1) Change from Sales Funnel to Funnel of Intent on Mobile and Social Media. Lower Marketing/Early user acquisition cost at scale. And tap to credit cards to with one click through third party Platforms. And also Open Source Software Stacks and buying 'by time' the hardware stack on Google, AWS or Azure is paradigm shift. Results also in noise one has to break through first - raising the bar (by user choice) for everyone. (2) min10 - Value Creation held inside Private Market through growth & late-stage investing instead of IPO with single-class share structure with wobbily business numbers 'help you god that you aren't out 24m later' because of impatient Wall Street. (3) min14 Series D valuations show Private Market highest bidder wins phenomenon. But Valuations are up across the board. And with more Seed/Angel Investors, Seed Valuations are also bid up higher compared to ABC. // &! min29 - 500 Startups, Dave McClure "4 Years of Moneyball - What Have We Learned"
Silicon  Valley  Seed  Round  A  Round  growth  Venture  Capital  Sales  Funnel  Funnel  of  Intent  mobile  first  mobile  homescreen  mobile  phone  Social  Media  Start-Up  lesson  Start-Up  advice  hunt  for  yield  ZIRP  NIRP  QE  secular  stagnation  productive  investment  Private  Market  Platform  TOS  2000  bubble  2008  IPO  Wall  Street  single-class  share  structure  SPV  short-term  thinking  short-term  view  Hedge  Fund  Mutual  Fund  Private  Equity  late-stage  funding  Unicorn  seedround  seedfunding  angelinvestor  angel-list  Angel  Investor  angelinvestors  incomplete  information  complexity  unintended  consequences  Dave  McClure  Mark  Suster  UpFront  Ventures  500  Start-ups  paradigm  shift 
april 2015 by asterisk2a
The Bebo Lawsuit, and the Tragedy of Departed Founders Who Can’t Let Go | PandoDaily
In my early twenties, as I’ve written before in painful detail, I was kicked out of several companies that I co-founded. Like after any relationship gone sour, I decided the best approach was to simply move on and never look back. (Note: I was less good following that advice when actual relationships went sour). Really that’s the only sensible approach. To many entrepreneurs, the company that made their name and fortune is like a first-born child. Suddenly finding oneself no longer intimately involved in its upbringing is impossibly difficult to deal with, especially when its new parents are — to one’s own mind at least — mistreating it. But there’s a difference between a child and a company: You can put a price on a company. And many entrepreneurs, including Michael Birch have done precisely that.
Bebo  Michael  Birch  AOL  M&A  Facebook  Social  Media  Web  2.0  Digg  2008  Silicon  Valley  Start-Up  lesson  Start-Up  advice 
april 2015 by asterisk2a
If You Thought The European Crisis Was Over... | Zero Hedge [...] Austerity has failed. European Banks remain Rotten to the Core Sovereigns remain in Crisis [...] Since the start of the debt crisis financial markets have provided wrong signals; led by fear and panic, they pushed the spreads to artificially high levels and forced cash-strapped nations into intense austerity that produced great suffering. [...] Panic and fear are not good guides for economic policies. [...] The intense austerity programs that have been dictated by financial markets create new risks for the Eurozone. While the ECB 2012 decision to be a lender of last resort in the government bond markets eliminated the existential fears about the future of the Eurozone, the new risks for the future of the Eurozone now have shifted into the social and political sphere.
2008  debtoverhang  2013  Politics  GFC  lostgeneration  economic  history  Europe  zombie  banks  sovereign  debt  crisis  austerity  PIIGS  banking  crisis  greatdepression  WallStreet  deleveraging  lostdecade  greatrecession  balance  sheet  recession 
february 2013 by asterisk2a
US-Klage gegen S&P: Details der Klageschrift - SPIEGEL ONLINE
Der Analyst scheint ziemlich baff. "Dieser Deal ist lächerlich", schreibt er einer Kollegin in einer E-Mail. "Wir sollten ihm kein Rating geben." Die Kollegin sieht das ähnlich - wenn auch nur bedingt: "Das Modell erfasst nicht mal die Hälfte des Risikos", stimmt sie zu. Aber: "Wir geben jedem Deal ein Rating… Er könnte von Kühen strukturiert werden, wir würden ihm ein Rating geben." Der saloppe Wortwechsel stammt vom April 2007, dem Beginn der US-Kreditkrise. Besagter "Deal" war ein besonders wackliges Hypothekenpapier - und die Analysten, die sich darüber lustig machen, arbeiten für Standard & Poor's (S&P), eine der drei großen Rating-Agenturen Amerikas. ist ein regelrechter Finanzkrimi: Gnadenlos enthüllt er, wie Insider lange vor anderen wussten, dass der Crash kommen würde - und trotzdem fleißig weiterzockten, um abzukassieren.
2008  GFC  creditrating  CDS  accountability  creditcrunch  WallStreet  creditrisk  corruption  subprime  CDO  ratingagencies  insider-trading 
february 2013 by asterisk2a
Five years on, the Great Recession is turning into a life sentence - Telegraph
Five years on it is clear that subprime was merely the first bubble to pop, a symptom not a cause. Europe had its own parallel follies. Britons were extracting almost 5pc of GDP each year in home equity by the end. Spain built 800,00 homes in 2007 for a market of 250,000. Iceland ran amok, so did Latvia and Hungary. The credit debacle was global. If there was an epicentre, it was Europe’s €35 trillion banking nexus.

There comes a point when extra debt draws down prosperity from the future. The future arrived in 2008.

A study by Stephen Cecchetti at the Bank for International Settlements concludes that debt turns “bad” at roughly 85pc of GDP for public debt, 85pc for household debt, and 90pc corporate debt. If all three break the limit together, the system loses its shock absorbers.

Much of the debt will have to be written off. Whether this done by inflation (1945-1952) or default (1930-1934) will be the great political battle of this decade.
politics  policy  folly  policy  error  default  scenario  inflation  reflation  debt  jubilee  economic  history  globalisation  global-economy  global  imbalances  savings  glut  creditcrunch  economic-thought  economic  model  BIS  banking  crisis  bank  crisis  balance  sheet  recession  deleveraging  debt  bubble  debtoverhang  credit  bubble  subprime  property  bubble  sovereign  debt  crisis  UK  China  USA  Europe  2012  2008  lostdecade  GFC  greatrecession 
august 2012 by asterisk2a
BBC Today Show 'We didn't expect a total meltdown'
It is five years to the day since the start of the credit crunch. Sir John Gieve, former deputy governor of the Bank of England, economist Frances Cairncross, and Danny Gabay, who runs the Fathom Financial Consulting look back at half a decade of global economic uncertainty.

economic  model  economic-thought  economic  history  greatrecession  subprime  debtoverhang  UK  2008  2007  creditcrunch  GFC 
august 2012 by asterisk2a
Simon Johnson: The Federal Reserve and the Libor Scandal -
Bernanke on banking scandals: “I think the real issue is too big to fail,” correct, but the market cannot fix this
This New York Fed memo stands out as a model of clear thinking about the deep governance problems that allowed Libor to become rigged.
At the same time, the timing and content of the memo raises troubling questions regarding the Fed’s own involvement in the Libor scandal – both then and now.

According to the recent order against and settlement with Barclays by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the Libor “market” had by 2005 become a hotbed of collusion and price-fixing

Fed is responsible 4 the “safety and soundness” of the financial system in the USA, THEY had to make a decision, either to let them fail (GFC) and thus the economy, the people and the world. LIBOR rigging scandal and TBTF is the aftermath et al
lobby  credibility  society  double-standard  WallStreet  corporate  governance  governance  accountability  confidence  trustagent  trust  2012  2008  bailout  BBA  misconduct  fraud  barclays  CFTC  MervynKing  timgeithner  PaulTucker  BOJ  ECB  BOE  Fed  NYFed  bank  crisis  banking  crisis  greatrecession  moral  moralhazard  GFC  toobigtofail  LIBOR  rigging  scandal  benbernake 
july 2012 by asterisk2a
Bank of England governor claims he only knew of misreporting of Libor TWO WEEKS ago despite US warning in 2008 | Mail Online
Bank of England governor claims he only knew of misreporting of Libor TWO WEEKS ago despite US warning in 2008

Deputy governor Paul Tucker said the warning from the US 'did not set alarm bells ringing'
Emails have emerged showing the close relationship between Mr Tucker and former Barclays boss Bob Diamond
Labour MP claims the emails show the Bank of England 'tried to get banks to lower Libor rate'
Sir Mervyn told MPs that Barclays was in a 'state of denial' over regulatory concerns with the bank
He said the bank sailed 'too close to the wind' several times with regulators and said it was time to create 'a new bank with a new culture'

* Obvious that during 2007/08/09 - everything was on the table to save the banks from collapse (the financial system, and global economy) and national bailouts. Obvious that they don't want to admit that they were willing to cross several lines (morally, ethically, and concerning laws). DOJ's & SFO job is to prosecute even at the top now!
confidence  trustagent  trust  2008  banking  crisis  bank  crisis  transparency  accountability  Willful  ignorance  fraud  misconduct  GFC  NYFed  BBA  bobdiamond  BOE  MervynKing  PaulTucker  LIBOR  rigging  scandal 
july 2012 by asterisk2a
US-Studie: Weltweit sinkt Glaube an Kapitalismus und Marktwirtschaft - SPIEGEL ONLINE
Lediglich rund jeder zehnte Europäer oder Japaner glaubt zudem noch, dass es seinen Nachkommen leichtfallen werde, größeren Wohlstand oder besseren Verdienst zu erreichen.

Enttäuschte Bürger rund um den Globus verlieren in der Krise auch den Glauben an ihre Regierungen: In 16 der 21 an der Pew-Studie beteiligten Staaten macht die Mehrheit der Befragten ihre Politiker maßgeblich für die aktuelle wirtschaftliche Misere verantwortlich.
Germany  Japan  austerity  sovereign  debt  crisis  accountability  democracy  moralhazard  bailout  policy  folly  policy  error  lostdecade  lostgeneration  society  confidence  2008  2012  UK  USA  PIIGS  greatrecession  GFC  banking  crisis  bank  crisis  Politics  trustagent  trust  capitalism 
july 2012 by asterisk2a
Skandal um Libor: Neue Vorwürfe gegen Bank of England - SPIEGEL ONLINE
Die Bank of England hängt mittendrin im vielleicht größten Finanzskandal der vergangenen Jahre. Immer mehr Hinweise deuten darauf hin, dass sie von den mutmaßlichen Manipulationen des Bankenzinses Libor wusste - auch wenn sie dies beharrlich zurückweist.

Der Deutschen Bank drohen Milliardenkosten

Anderen Banken drohen noch höhere Kosten durch die Affäre. Analysten des US-Instituts Morgan Stanley schätzen, dass allein die Bußgelder für die beteiligten Banken zwischen 450 und 850 Millionen Dollar liegen könnten. Hinzu könnten mögliche Schadensersatzzahlungen an Investoren kommen. Hier sieht Morgan Stanley die Deutsche Bank besonders gefährdet. Auf das Frankfurter Institut könnten in den Jahren 2013 und 2014 Kosten von mehr als einer Milliarde Dollar zukommen. In den USA wurden bereits mehrere Sammelklagen eingereicht, ...
deutschebank  barclays  PaulTucker  GFC  2008  BBA  NYFed  timgeithner  MervynKing  BOE  LIBOR  rigging  scandal 
july 2012 by asterisk2a
Geithner to King - Memo about LIBOR - June 2008
NY Fed understood depth of problem with Libor in June 2008, did they work with CFTC for immediate corrective action?


"1. Strengthen governance and establish a credible reporting procedure


"6. Eliminate incentive to misreport"

Meaning they knew things were murky with LIBOR, making it a secret secret among the few. Not publicly talking about it, and ignoring media reports about LIBOR.
GFC  2012  2008  PaulTucker  Fed  NYFed  BBA  BOE  timgeithner  MervynKing  LIBOR  rigging  scandal 
july 2012 by asterisk2a
What to watch for in the Fed's Libor doc dump - Decoder - YouTube
The New York Fed plans to release documents showing it took "prompt action" four years ago to highlight problems with the benchmark interest rate known as Libor and to press for reform. Karey Wutkowski offers 3 key things to look for in the paper avalanche. (July 12, 2012)
LIBOR  LIBOR  rigging  scandal  GFC  2008  2007  timgeithner  barclays  Fed  NYFed 
july 2012 by asterisk2a
Bagehot: Simple pleasures | The Economist
(UK) Both parties have an interest in banker-bashing. That is unfortunate

The government, too, has faced two ways in its dealings with the bankers. Attacking them has a certain electoral appeal—bankers were unpopular long before the posh Italians set about persecuting Shylock—but the bankers have been generous to the Tories. According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, in 2010 half of the party’s donations came from the City. More important, the government understands the danger of undermining a sector so important to jobs, growth and tax receipts. So it has dealt gently with the banks in, for instance, watering down somewhat last year’s recommendations by the Independent Commission on Banking about how to tighten regulation.

Gov has announced a parliamentary inquiry into the behaviour of the banks, brushing aside Labour’s demands for a judicial inquiry as an attempt to postpone the post-mortem.
greatrecession  GFC  moral  politicalscience  political  economy  2008  2012  gordonbrown  EdMiliband  EdBalls  bank  crisis  banking  crisis  banking  GeorgeOsborne  nickclegg  davidcameron  politics  UK  Labour  Tories  LIBOR  rigging  scandal 
july 2012 by asterisk2a
BBC News - Barclays - a day of unanswered questions
A whistleblower at the Financial Services Authority (FSA) has already told the committee he believes the FSA has e-mail evidence of exchanges between the Barclays and the Bank of England about the Libor rate.

At the very least we need Tucker's written account of his own side of that conversation. So far he has volunteered no account and has been screened behind the Bank of England's press operation, which says they can't comment on anything not in the FSA judgment.

At the level of Barclays' senior management we need to know - and this is the critical question: why did Jerry del Missier form the opinion that Tucker had ordered the rigging of Libor?

If that were me, and I was ordered to breach my professional and industry rules, I would be checking the exact meaning with the boss I have just spoken to. We need to know what Del Missier actually did.

Bob Diamond, so far, he has not admitted culpability - only responsibility.

SFO, FSA and DOJ (USA) need to start bringing charges.
confidence  2012  2008  creditcrunch  greatrecession  GFC  bank  crisis  banking  crisis  manipulation  DOJ  SFO  transparency  accountability  trustagent  trust  Willful  ignorance  misconduct  fraud  politics  AlistairDarling  EdBalls  gordonbrown  USA  Fed  NYFed  MervynKing  UK  BBA  FSA  bobdiamond  barclays  EURIBOR  LIBOR  LIBOR  rigging  scandal  BOE  PaulTucker 
july 2012 by asterisk2a
BOE Minutes Show Tucker Aware Of Libor Fixing Claims In 2007 | ForexLive
BOE Minutes Show Tucker Aware Of Libor Fixing Claims In 2007
- Tucker Chaired Nov 2007 Meeting At Which Libor Rigging Was Discussed

Bank of England Deputy Governor Paul Tucker, long the BOE’s leading internal candidate for the top job when Mervyn King’s
term comes to an end at the middle of 2013, was fully aware from the early days of the financial crisis that market participants believed Libor was being rigged.

The minutes of a money markets group meeting chaired by Tucker himself back up what a participant recalls privately, that there were frank discussions dating back to 2007 involving Tucker about banks submitting Libor rates below actual rates.

“Several group members thought that Libor fixings had been lower than actual traded interbank rates through the period of stress.”

They add a cautionary note, saying “Libor indices need to be of the highest quality given their important role as a benchmark for corporate lending.”

Everything was on the table to stabilise markets.
henrypaulson  benbernake  Fed  NYFed  NorthernRock  moralhazard  Willful  ignorance  trustagent  trust  banking  crisis  bank  crisis  credicrunch  GFC  2007  2008  collusion  fraud  misconduct  BBA  BOE  bobdiamond  barclays  PaulTucker  EURIBOR  LIBOR 
july 2012 by asterisk2a
Bankers Cast Doubt On Key Rate Amid Crisis -
One of the most important barometers of the world's financial health could be sending false signals.

In a development that has implications for borrowers everywhere, from Russian oil producers to homeowners in Detroit, bankers and traders are expressing concerns that the London inter-bank offered rate, known as Libor, is becoming unreliable.
GFC  2008  barclays  EURIBOR  LIBOR 
july 2012 by asterisk2a
Diamond lets loose over Libor -
Mr Diamond quit after the governor of the Bank of England, Sir Mervyn King, and the head of the Financial Services Authority, Lord Turner, in effect called for his departure in late night phone calls on Monday to Marcus Agius, Barclays chairman.

But Barclays soon dragged Paul Tucker, deputy BoE governor, and “senior Whitehall figures” from the previous government into the controversy by publishing a document suggesting they may have known of – and even condoned – the bank’s repeated “lowballing” of its submissions to the rate-setting process during the financial crisis.
The bank released Mr Diamond’s contemporaneous notes of a 2008 conversation – one of only three “notes to file” he has written in his career – in which he wrote that Mr Tucker had passed on concerns from Whitehall about Barclays’ Libor submissions, adding that “it did not always need to be the case that we appeared as high as we have recently”.
AlistairDarling  EdBalls  gordonbrown  MervynKing  GeorgeOsborne  davidcameron  UK  politics  culture  negligence  misconduct  fraud  creditcrunch  bank  crisis  banking  crisis  FSA  BBA  greatrecession  GFC  BoE  2012  2008  EURIBOR  LIBOR  PaulTucker  barclays  bobdiamond 
july 2012 by asterisk2a
Libor scandal: Bob Diamond resigns as Barclays chief executive | Mail Online
Memo from Barclays implies Bank of England knew about Libor-rigging scam

'Bob Diamond did not believe he received an instruction (to fix rates) from Paul Tucker or that he gave an instruction to Jerry del Missier.
'However, Jerry del Missier concluded that an instruction had been passed down from the Bank of England not to keep Libors so high and he therefore passed down a direction to that effect to the submitters.'
The FSA investigated Jerry del Missier but closed the investigation without taking any enforcement action, Barclays added.

My Take::
During the hight of the financial crisis 2008; everything seemed to be on the table to stabilise the markets and safe the banks and rebuild confidence.

*** (3 July 2012)

Behold, the British establishment, panicked
The chairman resigns to save the CEO. The CEO makes a public threat to drag the central bank into the mire. And the previous government. And the Treasury.
misconduct  negligence  capitalism  corporate  governance  Barcap  2012  2008  lehmanbrothers  AlistairDarling  bank  crisis  banking  crisis  GeorgeOsborne  davidcameron  UK  politics  CFTC  SEC  NYFed  Fed  centralbanks  culture  BIS  trustagent  trust  confidence  collusion  creditcrunch  greatrecession  GFC  BBA  FSA  PaulTucker  BOE  barclays  EURIBOR  LIBOR 
july 2012 by asterisk2a
Bob Diamond's daughter comes out fighting for her beleaguered father with offensive Tweet directed at Osborne and Miliband | Mail Online
'George Osborne and Ed Miliband you can go ahead and #HMD': Bob Diamond's daughter comes out fighting for her beleaguered father with offensive Tweet

Nell Diamond works as an analyst at Deutsche Bank
#HMD is Twitter slang for 'hold my d***'
Mr Diamond to appear before Treasury Select Committee tomorrow
Osborne: 'Diamond resignation was right for Barclays and the country'
The American, 60, expected to receive 13.2million shares worth £22.9million
Barclays chief operating officer Jerry del Missier also resigns
Chairman Marcus Agius - who also announced he was standing down yesterday - will stay on to find new chief executive
Agius revealed he has known about Libor fixing for 'more than two years'
MPs will vote tomorrow on plans to set up a full judge-led inquiry into the bank rate-rigging scandal
Barclays release memo which points finger at Bank of England and Whitehall

Regulators turned blind eye on matter, knowing to stabilise market, everything is on the table.
culture  banking  crisis  bank  crisis  accountability  confidence  trustagent  trust  2012  2008  creditcrunch  FSA  fraud  collusion  Fed  NYFed  PaulTucker  greatrecession  GFC  BOE  BBA  EURIBOR  LIBOR  bobdiamond  barclays 
july 2012 by asterisk2a
How Paulson Gave Hedge Funds Advance Word - Bloomberg
“If you have a bazooka, and people know you have it, you’re not likely to take it out,”
henrypaulson  GFC  2008  FannieMea  freddiemac  GSE 
november 2011 by asterisk2a
Fed Loans to Big Banks Undisclosed to Congress - Video - Bloomberg
Nov. 29 (Bloomberg) -- Bloomberg's Bob Ivry reports on how bankers failed to mention that they took tens of billions of dollars in emergency loans at the same time they were assuring investors their firms were healthy. He speaks with Erik Schatzker on Bloomberg Television's "InsideTrack." (Source: Bloomberg)
TermAuctionFacility  TAF  discountwindow  FED  bailout  bank  2008  TARP  GFC  transparency  disclosure  history 
november 2011 by asterisk2a
Secret Fed Loans Helped Banks Net $13 Billion - Bloomberg
A fresh narrative of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 emerges from 29,000 pages of Fed documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and central bank records of more than 21,000 transactions. While Fed officials say that almost all of the loans were repaid and there have been no losses, details suggest taxpayers paid a price beyond dollars as the secret funding helped preserve a broken status quo and enabled the biggest banks to grow even bigger.

$7.77 Trillion
The amount of money the central bank parceled out was surprising even to Gary H. Stern, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis from 1985 to 2009, who says he “wasn’t aware of the magnitude.” It dwarfed the Treasury Department’s better-known $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP. Add up guarantees and lending limits, and the Fed had committed $7.77 trillion as of March 2009 to rescuing the financial system, more than half the value of everything produced in the U.S. that year.
Fed  bailout  finance  banks  bank  2008  GFC  meltdown  TARP  disclosure  transparency  trust  TAF  TermAuctionFacility  discountwindow  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  history  Dodd-Frank  moralhazard  Glass-Steagall  toobigtofail  systemicrisk 
november 2011 by asterisk2a
Credit-Default Swap Risk Bomb Is Wired to Explode: Mark Buchanan - Bloomberg
The European nations are linked in a network of debts, as Bill Marsh recently illustrated in the New York Times with a beautiful piece of graphic art. Greece and Italy are prominent; Ireland, Portugal and Spain lurk ominously nearby. France and Germany seem exposed, too, as does the U.S.
The image is like a complex wiring diagram for a ticking debt bomb. Yet what it shows may be less important than what it leaves out: a largely invisible network of ties among institutions around the world, which could ultimately cause global financial chaos.
This hidden network has been created by institutions that buy and sell unregulated credit-default swaps. These are essentially insurance contracts on bonds; in the event of a default on the bond, the seller of the swap promises to pay the buyer the bond’s value.

The researchers showed that too much risk sharing can make it easy for distress to spread like a virus.
CDS  Europe  bomb  debt  bubble  2011  OTC  sovereign  crisis  unknown  toobigtofail  2008  AIG  risk  system  systemicrisk  problems  exposure  Greece  PIIGS  tippingpoint  history  lesson  economics  Financalmeltdown  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  financialmarket  financialmarkets  financialcrisis  finance 
november 2011 by asterisk2a
UK GDP revisions: Bigger boom, deeper bust, earlier recovery | The Economist
The new figures clear up some puzzles. For instance, net exports made a bigger contribution to GDP growth in 2009 and 2010 than previously thought and consumer spending was weaker. That points to greater"rebalancing" in the economy and a larger effect of a weaker currency on the mix of spending. But the resilience of the jobs market (until very recently) is still hard to reconcile with a fairly sluggish recovery in 2009 and 2010. That suggests more upward revisions are likely. GDP figures (in Britain, at least) are always provisional. It takes years for the true picture to emerge.
GDP  economy  economics  UK  revision  2009  2010  2011  rebalancing  greatrecession  2008  recession  recovery 
october 2011 by asterisk2a
TARPed, RETARPed, And Then DETARPed | ZeroHedge
Former Merrill Lynch CEO John Thain accurately described the problem to the FCIC in September 2010:
 "when you have a system where you pay someone for originating mortgages simply on volume and nothing happens to them if the credit quality is bad, and nothing happens to them if the borrower is fraudulent on his loan application, and nothing happens to him if the appraisal’s fraudulent, then that’s probably not a very smart system."

Some of the firms sued today had asked the Treasury and the Fed to slow the process so they could settle the claims out of court, according to a person briefed on the private conversation who spoke on condition of anonymity. The impending lawsuits were one subject of an Aug. 10 meeting at Treasury between Bank of America Chief Executive Officer Brian Moynihan and Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner, the person said.

his purchase of Countrywide is now the single worst M&A transaction in history,
FHFA  FCIC  subprime  mortage  fraud  misleading  security  securities  securities-fraud  2011  Bofa  toobigtofail  CountrywideFinancial  KenLewis  merrylllynch  M&A  2008  henrypaulson  history 
september 2011 by asterisk2a
Morgan Stanley at Brink Got $107B From Fed - Bloomberg

Hedge Funds pulled money out ... out of banks who facilitate their trades.
Prime brokers facilitate short trades, the sale of borrowed stock in the hope of buying it back later at a lower price. They also make margin loans to finance stock purchases. In exchange, hedge funds usually keep their cash and stock in accounts at the prime-brokerage companies.

“So if clients pulled their money out, the view was that money had not been lent out, so the cash would have been sitting there able to hand over. It turns out that that was not entirely correct.”

In reality, “prime brokers were able to reuse clients’ assets to raise cash for their own activities,” the financial crisis commission wrote in its final report, published in January. Azarchs said that in her years covering Morgan Stanley for S&P she never heard executives discuss the risk that the funding might evaporate.
Fed  meltdown  fiancial  crisis  discountwindow  2008  jpmorgan  morganstanley  interbank  liquidity  freeze  emergency-lending  operation  benbernanke  henrypaulson  hedgefunds  panic  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  banking  lehmanbrothers  history  goldmansachs  broker  service  lesson  financialcrisis  PrimaryDealerCreditFacility  lenderoflastresort  PDCF  JimChanos  JohnMack  TermSecuritiesLendingFacility  TSLF  TARP  POMO  counterpartyrisk  toobigtofail 
august 2011 by asterisk2a
Wall Street Aristocracy Got $1.2 Trillion in Secret Fed Loans - Bloomberg
By 2008, the housing market’s collapse forced those companies to take more than six times as much, $669 billion, in emergency loans from the U.S. Federal Reserve. The loans dwarfed the $160 billion in public bailouts the top 10 got from the U.S. Treasury, yet until now the full amounts have remained secret.
Fed  financialcrisis  GFC  bailout  TARP  discountwindow  2008  meltdown  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  liquidity  creditcrunch 
august 2011 by asterisk2a
Barofsky Says Fed's Secret Loans Needed More Oversight - YouTube
Neil Barofsky, former special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program and a Bloomberg Television contributing editor, talks about the Federal Reserve's emergency loans during the financial crisis. Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke's effort to keep the economy from plunging into depression included lending banks and other companies as much as $1.2 trillion of public money, according to a Bloomberg News compilation of data obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests, months of litigation and an act of Congress. Barofsky speaks with Erik Schatzker on Bloomberg Television's "InsideTrack."
barofsky  Fed  bailout  discountwindow  monetary  policy  transparency  oversight  TARP  GFC  financialcrisis  meltdown  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  centralbanks  2008  dollar 
august 2011 by asterisk2a
Recession Took Bigger Bite Than Estimated - Bloomberg
Gross domestic product shrank 5.1 percent from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2009, compared with the previously reported 4.1 percent drop, the Commerce Department said today in Washington. The second-worst contraction in the post-World War II era was a 3.7 percent decline in 1957-58.The depth of the economic slump better explains why the jobless rate doubled, climbing from 5 percent at the start of the downturn to a 26-year high 10.1 percent in October 2009. The strongest quarter of the recovery is now the first three months of last year. Growth decelerated every quarter thereafter.“The overall recession is indeed deeper,” Steven Landefeld, director of the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, told reporters this week. “This is the Great Recession, the deepest one we’ve had in the post-WWII era.”
greatrecession  2008  2009  USA  statistics  GDP  revision 
july 2011 by asterisk2a
Fuel economy: The Difference Engine: Four bangs for the buck | The Economist
Europeans snigger at how little it costs even Californians to fill the tank. But people in the United States pay through the nose for many other things in life (health, education, property taxes, wireless services, etc) that foreigners get for far less or even free. ... 

all previous recessions, petrol consumption has been a leading indicator of recovery, bouncing back sharply as people started using their vehicles more to shop, to dine out, to seek the curious and the entertaining, and, above all, to take vacations. Despite the American economy’s belated and still timid recovery—seen in increasing sales of cars, clothing, hospitality, entertainment, and consumer goods generally (though still not housing)—the amount of petrol being consumed across the country has tumbled to 2001 levels, and shows every sign of falling further.  

Reason; BC Americans buying frugal - more fuel efficient cars now. $4-a-gallon gas, Americans want cars that do 40mpg or more.
greatrecession  recession  USA  economy  behaviour  consumer  consumption  study  research  signs  SUV  patterns  oil  oilprice  2008  2011  change  frugal  austerity  budget  analysis  efficient  efficiency 
june 2011 by asterisk2a
In Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top Figures -
[Tim Geithner & Co. their] worry, according to these people, sprang from a desire to calm markets, a goal that could be complicated by a hard-charging attorney general.

Whether prosecutors and regulators have been aggressive enough in pursuing wrongdoing is likely to long be a subject of debate. All say they have done the best they could under difficult circumstances.
But several years after the financial crisis, which was caused in large part by reckless lending and excessive risk taking by major financial institutions, no senior executives have been charged or imprisoned, and a collective government effort has not emerged. This stands in stark contrast to the failure of many savings and loan institutions in the late 1980s. In the wake of that debacle, special government task forces referred 1,100 cases to prosecutors, resulting in more than 800 bank officials going to jail. 

SEC cautious ... taxpayer money in effect being used to pay for settlements.
bailout  fed  timgeithner  andrewcuomo  fraud  misleading  prosecution  SEC  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  financialcrisis  2008  2007  settelment  proptrading  ethics  henrypaulson  benbernanke  mortage  analysis  insight  2011 
april 2011 by asterisk2a
Senate report hits Goldman | City A.M.
arl Levin, chairman of the senate permanent subcommittee on investigations, tore into Goldman at a press briefing on his panel’s 639-page report, which is based on a review of tens of millions of documents over two years. Levin accused Goldman of profiting at clients’ expense as the mortgage market crashed in 2007. “In my judgment, Goldman clearly misled their clients and they misled Congress,” he said.
A Goldman Sachs spokesman said: “While we disagree with many of the conclusions of the report, we take seriously the issues explored by the subcommittee.”
The report also criticised Deutsche Bank and credit rating agencies Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.
“Blame for this mess lies everywhere – from federal regulators who cast a blind eye, Wall Street bankers who let greed run wild, and members of Congress who failed to provide oversight,” said Republican senator and report co-author Tom Coburn.
goldmansachs  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  2011  congress  fraud  greed  greatrecession  2008  oversight  foreclosure  deutschebank  moody's  ratingagencies  blamegame  wallstreet  report  financialcrisis  analysis 
april 2011 by asterisk2a
Fed has provided all the liquidity U.S. needs: Fisher | Reuters
The U.S. Federal Reserve Bank has provided the economy all the liquidity it needs, "and then some," Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher said on Tuesday.

- but liquidity does not solve solvency issues (pay your debt down, grow out of your debt burden)

- applies to all economic entities; countries, municipalities, cities, companies, each person.
greatrecession  Fed  liquidity  liquidity-trap  2008  QE  ZIRP  insolvent  insolvency  economics  economy 
april 2011 by asterisk2a
The Real Housewives of Wall Street | Rolling Stone Politics
Christy and her pal Susan launched their investment initiative called Waterfall TALF. [.//] But with an upfront investment of $15 million, they quickly received $220 million in cash from the Fed, most of which they used to purchase student loans and commercial mortgages. The loans were set up so that Christy and Susan would keep 100 percent of any gains on the deals, while the Fed and the Treasury (read: the taxpayer) would eat 90 percent of the losses. Given out as part of a bailout program ostensibly designed to help ordinary people by kick-starting consumer lending, the deals were a classic heads-I-win, tails-you-lose investment.

What started off as a targeted effort to stop the bleeding in a few specific trouble spots became a gigantic feeding frenzy. It was "free money for shit," says Barry Ritholtz, author of Bailout Nation. "It turned into 'Give us your crap that you can't get rid of otherwise.' "
TALF  2011  Fed  wallstreet  hostage  bailout  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  TARP  2008  USA  fraud  creditcrunch  financialcrisis  liquidity  insolvent  insolvency 
april 2011 by asterisk2a
Alan Greenspan: The ultimate double agent | ForexLive
My pet Gordon Brown theory was that he was a descendant of Rob Roy or William Wallace and that he was secretly planning to bring down the UK from the inside. Funnily enough this theory never did take hold despite the mountains of evidence in my favour Now come the Greenspan conspiracy theories, like this in the Sydney Morning Herald, which state that Alan is in fact an old closet Libertarian who’s ultimate goal is the demise of the Fiat system. Well it’s more fun than reading some more RBA analysis!
gordonbrown  alangreenspan  conspiracy  greatrecession  financialcrisis  2008 
april 2011 by asterisk2a
YouTube - Barofsky Says U.S. `Hopelessly Naive' on Bank Bailouts
TARP Inspector - Neil Barofsky, special inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, talks about the performance of and outlook for TARP.- Banks got w TARP major advantage - home owners and business owners and unemployed either let down or in the case of the latter scrutinized- Moral Hazard - TARP was a present from Hank and Ben; had no to very little strings attached in order to guide banking
barofsky  TARP  henrypaulson  benbernanke  2011  fraud  banking  transparency  presidency  barackobama  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  finance  financialcrisis  2008  meltdown  abuse  policy 
march 2011 by asterisk2a
Another Inside Job -
That settlement is a “shakedown,” says Senator Richard Shelby of Alabama. The money banks would be required to allot to mortgage modification would be “extorted,” declares The Wall Street Journal. And the bankers themselves warn that any action against them would place economic recovery at risk.
All of which goes to confirm that the rich are different from you and me: when they break the law, it’s the prosecutors who find themselves on trial.

"held hostage"
 the biggest obstacle to recovery isn’t the financial condition of major banks, which were bailed out once and are now profiting from the widespread perception that they’ll be bailed out again if anything goes wrong. It is, instead, the overhang of household debt combined with paralysis in the housing market. Getting banks to clear up mortgage debts — instead of stringing families along to extract a few more dollars — would help, not hurt, the economy.
fraud  2008  BofA  banking  power  money  WallStreet  corruption  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  financialcrisis  subprime  settelment  SEC  CFTC  Law  politics  abuse  debtoverhang  debt  public  private 
march 2011 by asterisk2a
Energy prices: Tax away vulnerability | The Economist
Analysts at Morgan Stanley say sharp increases in oil prices pose the biggest threat to growth because consumers suffer a sudden hit to purchasing power. They note a 85 percent to 90 percent increase in the price of oil over a year was followed by U.S. recessions in 1975, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2008.
taxation  greatrecession  oilprice  oil  jasminrevolution  2011  2008  tax  USA 
february 2011 by asterisk2a
Trade: Better safety nets needed | The Economist
The Paper , it's pointing out that there are costs from trade liberalisation, that these costs are often concentrated on relatively small groups of people, and that the transfer mechanisms used to compensate the losers are themselves quite costly.
Once upon a time, America had a relatively good system for dealing with displaced workers. But the shallowness of its recessions and the rapidity with which employment tended to spring back led to complacency and neglect of these institutions. In Europe, by contrast, governments responded to persistent high unemployment with a wave of labour market reforms and investments in retraining and other measures to return workers to the labour force. Recent jobless recoveries have therefore left the American economy with a declining participation rate, while Europe has done better.

reason trade w China looks like a wash is because Americas labour market policies ar dismal.
economics  globalisation  globalization  trade  USA  unemployment  greatrecession  2008  labour  economy  China  policy  politics 
february 2011 by asterisk2a
Capitalism for the Long Term - Harvard Business Review
3. Act Like You Own the Place
2. Serve Stakeholders, Enrich Shareholders
1. Fight the Tyranny of Short-Termism

That challenge did not just arise in the wake of the Great Recession. Recall that trust in business hit historically low levels more than a decade ago. But the crisis and the surge in public antagonism it unleashed have exacerbated the friction between business and society. On top of anxiety about persistent problems such as rising income inequality, we now confront understandable anger over high unemployment, spiraling budget deficits, and a host of other issues. Governments feel pressure to reach ever deeper inside businesses to exert control and prevent another system-shattering event.
capitalism  long-term  growth  culture  business  recession  recovery  greatrecession  2008  governance  risk-management  inequality  society 
february 2011 by asterisk2a
Opening Bell: 02.17.11 Dealbreaker: A Wall Street Tabloid Business News Headlines and Financial Gossip
BofA Subpoenaed over Countrywide VIP Home Loans (Reuters)The subpoena is the latest in a two-year probe by U.S. Representative Daniel Issa, chairman of the committee, into Countrywide Financial Corp’s mortgage program that allegedly gave better loan terms and preferential treatment to allies of former Chief Executive Angelo Mozilo. Te program was known informally as the “Friends of Angelo” inside the mortgage lender.
Mozilo  2008  fraud  politics  lobby  CountrywideFinancial  financialcrisis 
february 2011 by asterisk2a
Buffett Tells Crisis Commission It's Powerless to Stop `Too Big to Fail' - Bloomberg
Buffett Tells FCIC It’s Powerless to Stop `Too Big to Fail (Bloomberg)“You will always have institutions that are too big to fail, and sometimes they will fail,” Buffett, 80, told the FCIC in a May 26 interview, according to a recording released by the panel yesterday. “We still have them now. We’ll have them after your commission report.”
bailout  oversight  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  financialcrisis  2008  warrenbuffet  Dodd-Frank 
february 2011 by asterisk2a
3 Ex-IndyMac Executives Are Accused of Fraud -
The Securities and Exchange Commission on Friday accused three former top IndyMac executives of fraud, saying they painted a rosy picture of the California lender’s health even as it was collapsing in 2008.
By announcing civil fraud charges against senior executives of what was once one of the country’s largest mortgage lenders, the S.E.C. has injected new life into its investigations into the financial crisis. The IndyMac charges are shaping up to be among the agency’s biggest cases stemming from the crisis.
2008  fraud  SEC  2011  IndyMac 
february 2011 by asterisk2a
Thain Says He Should've `Grabbed, Shaken' Paulson to Aid Lehman - Bloomberg
Banking chiefs weren’t “strong enough” during 2008 meetings in insisting that then-Treasury Department Secretary Henry Paulson reverse his opposition to a U.S.-led rescue of Lehman, Thain told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, according to audio files released yesterday.

“We collectively, the group of us, we should have just grabbed them and shaken them and said, ‘Look, you guys cannot do this,’” Thain told FCIC interviewers in a Sept. 17, 2010, interview. “Allowing Lehman to go bankrupt was the single biggest mistake of the financial crisis.”
lehmanbrothers  henrypaulson  2008  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  financialcrisis 
february 2011 by asterisk2a
Inequality, leverage and crises | vox - Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists
Of the many origins of the global crisis, one that has received comparatively little attention is income inequality. This column provides a theoretical framework for understanding the connection between inequality, leverage and financial crises. It shows how rising inequality in a climate of rising consumption can lead poorer households to increase their leverage, thereby making a crisis more likely.
inequality  debt  finance  macroeconomics  crisis  microeconomics  income  Gini-coefficient  leverage  2008  2007 
february 2011 by asterisk2a
When Irish Eyes Are Crying | Business | Vanity Fair
September 29, 2008, that Morgan Kelly became the startled object of popular interest. The stocks of the three main Irish banks, Anglo Irish, A.I.B., and Bank of Ireland, had fallen by between a fifth and a half in a single trading session, and a run on Irish bank deposits had started. The Irish government was about to guarantee all the obligations of the six biggest Irish banks. The most plausible explanation for all of this was Morgan Kelly’s narrative: the Irish economy had become a giant Ponzi scheme and the country was effectively bankrupt. But it was so starkly at odds with the story peddled by Irish government officials and senior Irish bankers—that the banks merely had a “liquidity” problem and that Anglo Irish was “fundamentally sound”—that the two could not be reconciled. The government had a report thrown together by Merrill Lynch, which declared that “all of the Irish banks are profitable and well capitalised.” ...
financialcrisis  Ireland  2008  bubble  AIB  AngloIrish  Financalmeltdown  bankrun 
february 2011 by asterisk2a
Fed Lending Benefited Banks Far and Wide -
The Fed data showed that the biggest recipient of taxpayer assistance was, naturally, Citigroup. It was followed closely by Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch and Bank of America. Goldman Sachs was also a large beneficiary during the darkest moments of 2008.
Remember that the Wall Street firms were imperiled by their excessive use of borrowed money, which generated huge paydays when the cost of those funds was cheap and the values of the assets they were buying were rising at a steady clip. After the bubble burst and financing evaporated, the firms were able to tap into a lending program created by the Fed in mid-March 2008 after Bear Stearns collapsed. It was called the Primary Dealer Credit Facility.
The program allowed firms to borrow at low interest rates — ranging from 3.25 percent when the program began to 0.5 percent when the last loan was made in May 2009. The firms had to post various securities as collateral when they borrowed, and some of those securities were risky indeed.
fed  benbernanke  balancesheet  interbank  report  financialcrisis  FinancialCrisisInquiryCommission  2008  2009  bearstearns  citigroup  goldmansachs  shadowbanking  fanniemae  freddiemac  aig  lending  overnight 
december 2010 by asterisk2a
Romer Says Stimulus Averted a 2nd Great Depression -
“What was not clear at the time was how quickly and strongly the financial crisis would affect the economy,” she said. Because such financial shocks are rare, she added, “to this day economists don’t fully understand why firms cut production as much as they did, and why they cut labor so much more than they normally would.”

Ms. Romer, a scholar of the Depression who is returning to the University of California, Berkeley, to resume teaching, said economists would be studying those questions for years.

“In any event,” she added, “almost all analysts were surprised by the violent reaction.”

“I am proud of the recovery actions we have taken,” she said. “I believe they have made the difference between a second Great Depression and a slow but genuine recovery. And the passage of health care reform and financial regulatory reform are accomplishments that will be with us long after the recession is over.”
recession  usa  2008  2009  unemployment  economics  behaviour  irrational 
september 2010 by asterisk2a
Merrills Downfall Provides Disclosure Lesson -
Only after the housing bubble began to deflate did Merrill and other banks begin to clearly divulge the many billions of dollars of troubled securities that were linked to them, often through opaque vehicles like Pyxis.

In the third quarter of 2007, for instance, Merrill reported that its potential exposure to certain subprime investments was $15.2 billion. Three months later, it said that exposure was actually $46 billion. At the time, Merrill said it had initially excluded the difference because it thought it had protected itself with various hedges.

But many of those hedges later failed, and Merrill, the brokerage giant that brought Wall Street to Main Street, soon collapsed into the arms of Bank of America.

“It’s like the parable of the blind man and the elephant: you had some people feeling the trunk and some the legs, and there was nobody putting it all together,”
merrylllynch  bankofamerica  BofA  subprime  hedge  bubble  property  2007  2008  2009  fraud  practice  banking  SEC  FDIC  disclosure  shadowbanking 
august 2010 by asterisk2a
Global Village: Schiffbruch in Dubai - SPIEGEL ONLINE - Nachrichten - Panorama
Die Bank weigert sich: "Wir haben eine wichtige Verantwortung, die Interessen unserer Kunden und Anteilseigner zu schützen - eine Verantwortung, die wir sehr ernst nehmen." Warner habe das Land verlassen, ohne sie darüber zu informieren. Außerdem habe er sich "oft unkooperativ" gezeigt. Nicholas Warner hat das Pech, nun für alle mitbezahlen zu müssen, die Dubai während der Finanzkrise Hals über Kopf verlassen haben, verlassen mussten, ohne ihre Kredite abbezahlt zu haben.

Die britische Botschaft hat ihm Geld gegeben: "Ich sollte mir einen Chickenburger kaufen. Das war's." Warner macht das System Dubai für seine Lage mitverantwortlich: "Es soll die neue Welt sein hier. Aber es ist wie in England im 18. Jahrhundert. Wer Schulden hat, kommt in den Turm, statt sie abarbeiten zu können."
dubai  UAE  creditcrunch  recession  government  2008  2009  2010  debt 
august 2010 by asterisk2a
Fair Game - Seeing vs. Doing on Problem Loans -
“What did they do once they knew what they knew?”

As investigators delve deeper into the mortgage mess, they are finding in too many cases that Wall Street firms did nothing when they learned about problem loans or improprieties in lending. Rather than stopping practices of profligate originators like New Century, Fremont and Ameriquest, Wall Street financiers, which held the purse strings for these companies, apparently decided to simply look the other way.

Recent cases have provided glimpses of this conduct. Last week, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority accused Deutsche Bank Securities, a unit of the huge German bank, of misleading investors about how many delinquent loans went into six mortgage securities worth $2.2 billion that the firm underwrote. Deutsche Bank underreported the delinquency rates among loans when it created the securities in 2006, Finra contends, and then sold them to investors.

business as usual
business practises
deutschebank  Finra  usa  subprime  corporate  fraud  corruption  corporation  wallstreet  business  bubble  responsibility  josefackermann  2007  2008  2010  fine  regulation  regulators  reform 
july 2010 by asterisk2a
EZB in der Euro-Krise: Notenbanker in Not - SPIEGEL ONLINE - Nachrichten - Wirtschaft
Im Zuge der Krise brechen bislang sicher geglaubte Dämme. Die US-Fed und die Bank of England haben schon seit anderthalb Jahren direkt Staatsanleihen aufgekauft, und zwar mit frisch gedrucktem Geld. Eine Politik, die in normalen Zeiten inflationär wirkt. Deshalb ist der Europäischen Zentralbank diese Strategie durch den Vertrag von Maastricht verboten. Eigentlich. Aber selbst Notenbank-Insider sind sich nicht mehr sicher, inwieweit das Regelwerk noch Bestand hat. Eigentlich ist es ja den Euro-Staaten nach den EU-Verträgen auch untersagt, angeschlagenen Währungsunion-Mitgliedern finanziell unter die Arme zu greifen. Dennoch organisieren sie jetzt Hilfe für Griechenland. Und vielleicht bald für weitere Länder.
ECB  debt  monetization  sovereign  Fed  BoE  2008  2009  2010  greece  bailout  PIIGS  may  collateral  trichet  EMU  europeanunion  europe  eurozone 
may 2010 by asterisk2a
FT Alphaville » Italy ❤ currency swaps too
Germany municipalities and cities did it too.
Go on the market to get liquidity
government  debt  speculation  recession  2008  2009  2010  consequences  italy  greece  germany 
february 2010 by asterisk2a
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