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Talent distributions.
# Some thoughts on how policy and philosophy interact with perceived talent distributions

Really interesting rewrite of what most people would mean when they say talent. He does us the courtesy of explaining his redefinition and then uses it to pretty strong effect.

Then he walks us through a couple of competing models and shares his observations around variance in productivity (which given his previous definition acrobatics you would essentially need to equate with talent).

His discussion of performance and compensation was a little less jarring (good jarring!) to me, but there is an interesting implication that he doesn't quite call out. Too much compensation leads people to not bounce (either within or without the company) even when they're not happy. That makes sense, and I suspect we all incorporate it into our recommendations, but it's more powerful when under the spell of the talent redefinition.

And finally, the rare nod that policy without exceptions is inhumane. There is a spectrum between policy and no policy with neither point being the most effective way to build an organization.

# Notes
* "In my opinion, a company's policies and their approach to policy enforcement are the truest representation of their values: they're where folks make the hard tradeoffs between conflicting values."
* "I prefer this definition because I believe a company's talent distribution is generally a reflection of how many folks they allow to perform at a high level, not a reflection of those folks' inherent ability."
* Two models posited: "Full ownership model - the same teams are responsible for innovation and maintainance.
Research & development model - maintenance teams are responsible for work that supports immediate business value, innovation teams build things with potential future business value that they'll hand off to maintenance teams."
* "Policy over exceptions
Designing good policy is 10% of translating your values into an organization that reflects thoes values, and the remaining 90% depends on how you handle exceptions. Policy enforcement is forever the blur tool in your organizational toolkit: applied thoughtfully it can more beautiful than the original crisp lines, but enough inconsistency and it'll ruin the entire picture."
* "Compensation strategy, sometimes called compensation philosophy, is the other piece here. Folks want to work at companies whose mission they belief in, with peers they appreciate, but I find most folks will sacrifice both if they believe they're missing out on compensation to do so. Even when acknowledging they should value their happiness over compensation, folks simply can't value happiness over money."
organizations  talent  distributions  writing  compensation  productivity  philosophy 
1 hour ago by devin
"Heidegger was a Nazi." What now? | Blog of the APA
I guess the general idea behind these considerations is this: The assumption that one can cut off oneself from one’s (philosophical) past is an illusion. As philosophers in institutional contexts we cannot deny that we might be both beneficiaries of dubious heritage as well as suffering from burdens passed down. In other words, some of the bigotry will carry over. Again, this doesn’t mean that we are helpless continuants of past determinants, but it means that it is better to study our past and our involvements with it carefully rather than deny them and pretend to be starting from scratch.
philosophy  argument  history 
10 hours ago by kmt
Heidegger, Frege, Antisemitism, and worse - Digressions&Impressions
David Hume, who to this day is known as 'le Bon David' and a nice guy within philosophy, was a nasty racist. Don't believe me? Read this awful footnote. I used to think that one could accept much of Hume's moral and political philosophy without the racism. But Hume's account of the rule of law as being constitutive of 'civilization' also encourages the violent exportation of it as is illustrated by his rather favorable account of English conquest of Wales (essentially a tale of cultural genocide) and Ireland (see this article). With law-governed civilization (as opposed to barbarism) as a necessary prerequisite for (and co-development with) philosophy, Hume's approach facilitates, despite the significance of the moral virtue humanity in his project, empire and patterns of systematic cultural exclusion.* Despite vigorous eighteenth-century criticism of Hume (in Smith, Herder, Wollstonecraft, Millar, etc.), it is undeniable that these ideas survived in mitigated form, perhaps, in the works of some of the greatest philosophers, Kant, Hegel, and even Mill. 
philosophy  history  sources  argument 
12 hours ago by kmt
When Your Favorite Philosopher is a Bigot | Issue 123 | Philosophy Now
We seem to be living in a time when people are willing to overlook bigotry. Donald Trump looks at a crowd of white supremacists and sees the ‘very fine people’ among them. Trump’s own sexist remarks provoke nothing worse than exasperated sighs among his supporters. Across Europe, the frank racism of far-right parties doesn’t stop people from voting for them as an expression of unhappiness with the government. No doubt genuine racism and sexism play a role here, but it also seems that people who would be horrified to be accused of prejudice themselves are willing to ignore or forgive prejudice in others. The intelligentsia tends to be outraged by this, but I wonder, are we really so much better?
philosophy  argument  history  sources 
12 hours ago by kmt
The Screen of Enamoration: Love in the Age of Google
Today, Roland Barthes is among the less trendy of the famed French theorists of the sixties and seventies, or at least one of those considered less germane to our current moment. While revivals of Deleuze, Lacan, Foucault, and even Derrida abound as potential solutions to the social, cultural, and economic problems plaguing the planet, Barthes rarely pops his head outside of the undergraduate classroom. As a serious political conversation piece, love, too, has gone out of fashion. While the hippie movement of Barthes’s own generation united love with countercultural politics, today such attempts seem disengaged and out of touch. A data-pull from Google Scholar articles shows that academic work on love has halved in the past five years. The more pressing our political struggles become, the more love recedes into the background.

So in a time when even football has become a stage for protest, does love somehow manage to retain amnesty from politics? Even when we think about some of history’s most turbulent moments, love manages to divorce itself from the political sphere. Take, for example, Bernardo Bertolucci’s 2003 movie Dreamers, a romance set in the midst of the French 1968 riots. While Molotov cocktails are going off hourly on the streets, the characters, ensconced in their bourgeois Parisian apartment, are given vast distance from their context to experiment with sex and love.

Bertolucci’s brilliant movie embodies a long tradition of holding love separate from political concerns, but lately things seem to have shifted. Today, far-right agitators are mining OKCupid for data that proves white supremacy; Tinder is leading us into a Silicon Valley dystopia; Grindr is fomenting a revolution in desire; and pop-philosophers are agonizing over whether love can survive postmodernity and the power of Big Data. In light of this new and violent reunion between politics and love, I would like to make a brief case here for a serious re-engagement with Roland Barthes. His work on love, in particular, just might repoliticize love in the digital age and make visible a corporate organization of desire—a technology of love—that the progressive left will soon have to confront.
politics  postmodernism  philosophy 
16 hours ago by anaximander
Believing without evidence is always morally wrong | Aeon Ideas
While Clifford’s final argument rings true, it again seems exaggerated to claim that every little false belief we harbour is a moral affront to common knowledge. Yet reality, once more, is aligning with Clifford, and his words seem prophetic. Today, we truly have a global reservoir of belief into which all of our commitments are being painstakingly added: it’s called Big Data. You don’t even need to be an active netizen posting on Twitter or ranting on Facebook: more and more of what we do in the real world is being recorded and digitised, and from there algorithms can easily infer what we believe before we even express a view. In turn, this enormous pool of stored belief is used by algorithms to make decisions for and about us. And it’s the same reservoir that search engines tap into when we seek answers to our questions and acquire new beliefs. Add the wrong ingredients into the Big Data recipe, and what you’ll get is a potentially toxic output. If there was ever a time when critical thinking was a moral imperative, and credulity a calamitous sin, it is now.
philosophy  society 
19 hours ago by corrales

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