rvenkat + european_politics   22

Economic losers and political winners: The rise of the radical right in Sweden | TSE

We study the rise of the Sweden Democrats, a radical-right party that rose from negligible size in 2002 to Swedenís third largest party in 2014. We use comprehensive data to study both its politicians (supply side) and voters (demand side). All political candidates for the party can be identiÖed in register data, which also lets us aggregate individual social and economic conditions in municipalities or voting districts and relate them to the partyís vote share. We take a starting point in two key economic events: (i) a series of policy reforms in 2006-2011 that signiÖcantly widened the disposable- income gap between ìinsidersîand ìoutsidersîin the labor market, and (ii) the Önancial-crisis recession that doubled the job-loss risk for ìvulnerableî vs ìsecureîinsiders. On the supply side, the Sweden Democrats over-represent both losing groups relative to the population, whereas all other parties under-represent them, results which also hold when we disaggregate across time, subgroups, and municipalities. On the demand side, the local increase in the insider-outsider income gap, as well as the share of vulnerable insiders, are systematically associated with larger electoral gains for the Sweden Democrats. These Öndings can be given a citizen-candidate interpretation: economic losers (as we demonstrate) decrease their trust in established parties and institutions. As a result, some economic losers became Sweden-Democrat candidates, and many more supported the party electorally to obtain greater descriptive representation. This way, Swedish politics became potentially more inclusive. But the politicians elected for the Sweden Democrats score lower on expertise, moral values, and social trust ñas do their voters which made local political selection less valence oriented.

--A more traditional racial resentment PoV

-- It is plausible that both resentment of out-groups and economic factors simultaneously contributed to third party success. I can see parallels with what happened in India in the 1990s with the emergence of anti-establishment parties, which in turn can be traced to J.P. Narayan's socialist movement back in th3 70s. All in all, a nice way to analyze emergence and eventual success of third-parties in democracies.
political_economy  right-wing_populism  european_politics  via:nyhan 
september 2018 by rvenkat
Viktor Orban’s oligarchs: a new elite emerges in Hungary
--remarkable similarities to the co-evolution of oligarchy autocracy and right-wing populism world over. It is almost as if we are watching the emergence of potential mechanisms through which liberal democracies devolve and regress into something else. Newer the democracy, easier it seems to be to get these going.
comparative  political_science  european_politics  world_trends  autocracy  right-wing_populism  conservatism  norms  institutions  via:nyhan 
december 2017 by rvenkat
Ethno-nationalist populism and the mobilization of collective resentment - Bonikowski - 2017 - The British Journal of Sociology - Wiley Online Library
Scholarly and journalistic accounts of the recent successes of radical-right politics in Europe and the United States, including the Brexit referendum and the Trump campaign, tend to conflate three phenomena: populism, ethno-nationalism and authoritarianism. While all three are important elements of the radical right, they are neither coterminous nor limited to the right. The resulting lack of analytical clarity has hindered accounts of the causes and consequences of ethno-nationalist populism. To address this problem, I bring together existing research on nationalism, populism and authoritarianism in contemporary democracies to precisely define these concepts and examine temporal patterns in their supply and demand, that is, politicians’ discursive strategies and the corresponding public attitudes. Based on the available evidence, I conclude that both the supply and demand sides of radical politics have been relatively stable over time, which suggests that in order to understand public support for radical politics, scholars should instead focus on the increased resonance between pre-existing attitudes and discursive frames. Drawing on recent research in cultural sociology, I argue that resonance is not only a function of the congruence between a frame and the beliefs of its audience, but also of shifting context. In the case of radical-right politics, a variety of social changes have engendered a sense of collective status threat among national ethnocultural majorities. Political and media discourse has channelled such threats into resentments toward elites, immigrants, and ethnic, racial and religious minorities, thereby activating previously latent attitudes and lending legitimacy to radical political campaigns that promise to return power and status to their aggrieved supporters. Not only does this form of politics threaten democratic institutions and inter-group relations, but it also has the potential to alter the contours of mainstream public discourse, thereby creating the conditions of possibility for future successes of populist, nationalist, and authoritarian politics.

--my summary: framing effects and latent preferences produce a mechanism for ethno-nationalism, authoritarianism and populism to interact. But I don't understand this *context* business as well. Feels like a _everything is obvious_ explanation...Not very convincing

-- see also the special issue
us_politics  european_politics  brexit  trumpism  political_psychology  framing_effects  political_economy  behavioral_economics  democracy  public_opinion  social_movements  via:nyhan 
november 2017 by rvenkat
The Brexit Botnet and User-Generated Hyperpartisan NewsSocial Science Computer Review - Marco T. Bastos, Dan Mercea, 2017
In this article, we uncover a network of Twitterbots comprising 13,493 accounts that tweeted the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, only to disappear from Twitter shortly after the ballot. We compare active users to this set of political bots with respect to temporal tweeting behavior, the size and speed of retweet cascades, and the composition of their retweet cascades (user-to-bot vs. bot-to-bot) to evidence strategies for bot deployment. Our results move forward the analysis of political bots by showing that Twitterbots can be effective at rapidly generating small- to medium-sized cascades; that the retweeted content comprises user-generated hyperpartisan news, which is not strictly fake news, but whose shelf life is remarkably short; and, finally, that a botnet may be organized in specialized tiers or clusters dedicated to replicating either active users or content generated by other bots.

a dilute version here


and here

bots  european_politics  artificial_intelligence  social_media  social_networks  twitter  public_opinion  public_sphere  cybersecurity  international_affairs  via:henryfarrell  networks  teaching 
october 2017 by rvenkat
Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989 | World Politics | Cambridge Core
Like many major revolutions in history, the East European Revolution of 1989 caught its leaders, participants, victims, and observers by surprise. This paper offers an explanation whose crucial feature is a distinction between private and public preferences. By suppressing their antipathies to the political status quo, the East Europeans misled everyone, including themselves, as to the possibility of a successful uprising. In effect, they conferred on their privately despised governments an aura of invincibility. Under the circumstances, public opposition was poised to grow explosively if ever enough people lost their fear of exposing their private preferences. The currently popular theories of revolution do not make clear why uprisings easily explained in retrospect may not have been anticipated. The theory developed here fills this void. Among its predictions is that political revolutions will inevitably continue to catch the world by surprise.
european_politics  revolutions  20th_century  social_behavior  contagion  homophily  ?  social_psychology  institutions  norms  collective_dynamics  judgment_decision-making  dmce  teaching  timur.kuran 
october 2017 by rvenkat

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