nhaliday + poll   195

Catholics Similar to Mainstream on Abortion, Stem Cells
The data show that regular churchgoing non-Catholics also have very conservative positions on moral issues. In fact, on most of the issues tested, regular churchgoers who are not Catholic are more conservative (i.e., less likely to find a given practice morally acceptable) than Catholic churchgoers.
news  org:data  poll  data  values  religion  christianity  protestant-catholic  comparison  morality  gender  sex  sexuality  time  density  theos  pro-rata  frequency  demographics  abortion-contraception-embryo  sanctity-degradation 
6 weeks ago by nhaliday
Links 3/19: Linkguini | Slate Star Codex
How did the descendants of the Mayan Indians end up in the Eastern Orthodox Church?

Does Parental Quality Matter? Study using three sources of parental variation that are mostly immune to genetic confounding find that “the strong parent-child correlation in education is largely causal”. For example, “the parent-child correlation in education is stronger with the parent that spends more time with the child”.

Before and after pictures of tech leaders like Jeff Bezos, Elon Musk, and Sergey Brin suggest they’re taking supplemental testosterone. And though it may help them keep looking young, Palladium points out that there might be other effects from having some of our most powerful businessmen on a hormone that increases risk-taking and ambition. They ask whether the new availability of testosterone supplements is prolonging Silicon Valley businessmen’s “brash entrepreneur” phase well past the point where they would normally become mature respectable elders. But it also hints at an almost opposite take: average testosterone levels have been falling for decades, so at this point these businessmen would be the only “normal” (by 1950s standards) men out there, and everyone else would be unprecedently risk-averse and boring. Paging Peter Thiel and everyone else who takes about how things “just worked better” in Eisenhower’s day.

China’s SesameCredit social monitoring system, widely portrayed as dystopian, has an 80% approval rate in China (vs. 19% neutral and 1% disapproval). The researchers admit that although all data is confidential and they are not affiliated with the Chinese government, their participants might not believe that confidently enough to answer honestly.

I know how much you guys love attacking EAs for “pathological altruism” or whatever terms you’re using nowadays, so here’s an article where rationalist community member John Beshir describes his experience getting malaria on purpose to help researchers test a vaccine.

Some evidence against the theory that missing fathers cause earlier menarche.

John Nerst of EverythingStudies’ political compass.
ratty  yvain  ssc  links  multi  biodet  behavioral-gen  regularizer  causation  contrarianism  education  correlation  parenting  developmental  direct-indirect  time  religion  christianity  eastern-europe  russia  latin-america  other-xtian  endocrine  trends  malaise  stagnation  thiel  barons  tech  sv  business  rot  zeitgeist  outcome-risk  critique  environmental-effects  poll  china  asia  authoritarianism  alt-inst  sentiment  policy  n-factor  individualism-collectivism  pro-rata  technocracy  managerial-state  civil-liberty  effective-altruism  subculture  wtf  disease  parasites-microbiome  patho-altruism  self-interest  lol  africa  experiment  medicine  expression-survival  things  dimensionality  degrees-of-freedom  sex  composition-decomposition  analytical-holistic  systematic-ad-hoc  coordination  alignment  cooperate-defect  politics  coalitions  ideology  left-wing  right-wing  summary  exit-voice  redistribution  randy-ayndy  welfare-state 
6 weeks ago by nhaliday
SocArXiv Papers | Gender, Religion, and Values: A Cross-National Examination of Moral Justification and Partisanship
Using data from a diverse set of 56 countries in the World Values Survey (N=85,181), I find that religiousness suppresses what would otherwise be larger and more consistent gender differences in values among Christians. Among most other groups, including Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists, and Muslims in non-Muslim contexts, religiousness does not greatly alter gender differences in values. However, among Muslims in Muslim-majority contexts—where men tend to be more religious than women—religiousness amplifies what would otherwise be smaller gender differences in values. Accordingly, gender differences in values tend to be larger among Muslims than Christians. I conclude that religions are complex and powerful social structures that can complicate group differences in values
study  sociology  preprint  general-survey  poll  values  correlation  gender  gender-diff  politics  ideology  religion  christianity  islam  trade  world  developing-world  egalitarianism-hierarchy  inequality  prejudice  westminster  identity-politics  theos  usa  europe  expression-survival  the-great-west-whale  rot 
april 2018 by nhaliday
Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios
https://twitter.com/robinhanson/status/981291048965087232
https://archive.is/dUTD5
Would you endorse choosing policy to max the expected duration of civilization, at least as a good first approximation?
Can anyone suggest a different first approximation that would get more votes?

https://twitter.com/robinhanson/status/981335898502545408
https://archive.is/RpygO
How useful would it be to agree on a relatively-simple first-approximation observable-after-the-fact metric for what we want from the future universe, such as total life years experienced, or civilization duration?

We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction: https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/
An Oxford philosopher argues that we are not adequately accounting for technology's risks—but his solution to the problem is not for Luddites.

Anderson: You have argued that we underrate existential risks because of a particular kind of bias called observation selection effect. Can you explain a bit more about that?

Bostrom: The idea of an observation selection effect is maybe best explained by first considering the simpler concept of a selection effect. Let's say you're trying to estimate how large the largest fish in a given pond is, and you use a net to catch a hundred fish and the biggest fish you find is three inches long. You might be tempted to infer that the biggest fish in this pond is not much bigger than three inches, because you've caught a hundred of them and none of them are bigger than three inches. But if it turns out that your net could only catch fish up to a certain length, then the measuring instrument that you used would introduce a selection effect: it would only select from a subset of the domain you were trying to sample.

Now that's a kind of standard fact of statistics, and there are methods for trying to correct for it and you obviously have to take that into account when considering the fish distribution in your pond. An observation selection effect is a selection effect introduced not by limitations in our measurement instrument, but rather by the fact that all observations require the existence of an observer. This becomes important, for instance, in evolutionary biology. For instance, we know that intelligent life evolved on Earth. Naively, one might think that this piece of evidence suggests that life is likely to evolve on most Earth-like planets. But that would be to overlook an observation selection effect. For no matter how small the proportion of all Earth-like planets that evolve intelligent life, we will find ourselves on a planet that did. Our data point-that intelligent life arose on our planet-is predicted equally well by the hypothesis that intelligent life is very improbable even on Earth-like planets as by the hypothesis that intelligent life is highly probable on Earth-like planets. When it comes to human extinction and existential risk, there are certain controversial ways that observation selection effects might be relevant.
bostrom  ratty  miri-cfar  skunkworks  philosophy  org:junk  list  top-n  frontier  speedometer  risk  futurism  local-global  scale  death  nihil  technology  simulation  anthropic  nuclear  deterrence  environment  climate-change  arms  competition  ai  ai-control  genetics  genomics  biotech  parasites-microbiome  disease  offense-defense  physics  tails  network-structure  epidemiology  space  geoengineering  dysgenics  ems  authoritarianism  government  values  formal-values  moloch  enhancement  property-rights  coordination  cooperate-defect  flux-stasis  ideas  prediction  speculation  humanity  singularity  existence  cybernetics  study  article  letters  eden-heaven  gedanken  multi  twitter  social  discussion  backup  hanson  metrics  optimization  time  long-short-run  janus  telos-atelos  poll  forms-instances  threat-modeling  selection  interview  expert-experience  malthus  volo-avolo  intel  leviathan  drugs  pharma  data  estimate  nature  longevity  expansionism  homo-hetero  utopia-dystopia 
march 2018 by nhaliday
Religiosity and Fertility in the United States: The Role of Fertility Intentions
Using data from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), we show that women who report that religion is “very important” in their everyday life have both higher fertility and higher intended fertility than those saying religion is “somewhat important” or “not important.” Factors such as unwanted fertility, age at childbearing, or degree of fertility postponement seem not to contribute to religiosity differentials in fertility. This answer prompts more fundamental questions: what is the nature of this greater “religiosity”? And why do the more religious want more children? We show that those saying religion is more important have more traditional gender and family attitudes and that these attitudinal differences account for a substantial part of the fertility differential. We speculate regarding other contributing causes.

Religion, Religiousness and Fertility in the U.S. and in Europe: https://www.demogr.mpg.de/papers/working/wp-2006-013.pdf
2006

RELIGIONS, FERTILITY, AND GROWTH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/iere.12291
Using Southeast Asian censuses, we show empirically that being Catholic, Buddhist, or Muslim significantly raises fertility, especially for couples with intermediate to high education levels. With these estimates, we identify the parameters of a structural model. Catholicism is strongly pro‐child (increasing total spending on children), followed by Buddhism, whereas Islam is more pro‐birth (redirecting spending from quality to quantity). Pro‐child religions depress growth in its early stages by lowering savings and labor supply. In the later stages of growth, pro‐birth religions impede human capital accumulation.
study  sociology  religion  theos  usa  correlation  fertility  eric-kaufmann  causation  general-survey  demographics  phalanges  intervention  gender  tradition  social-norms  parenting  values  politics  ideology  multi  europe  EU  rot  nihil  data  time-series  distribution  christianity  protestant-catholic  other-xtian  the-great-west-whale  occident  expression-survival  poll  inequality  pro-rata  mediterranean  eastern-europe  wealth  econ-metrics  farmers-and-foragers  buddhism  islam  asia  developing-world  human-capital  investing  developmental  number  quantitative-qualitative  quality  world  natural-experiment  field-study 
february 2018 by nhaliday
Race, Religion, and Immigration in… | Democracy Fund Voter Study Group
Figure 2 The Relationship between 2011 Attitudes and Vote Choices in 2012

Third, although perceptions of the economy are related to vote choice in both years—unsurprisingly, people who believed the economy was doing worse were more likely to vote for the out-party Republicans—its effect is similar in both years. This suggests that the 2016 vote choice was not uniquely about “economic anxiety.”

The results also show that certain factors were less strongly related to voters’ choice in 2016 than they were in 2012: social issue attitudes, economic issue attitudes, and, more notably, party identification. The smaller impact of party identification reflects the larger number of defections in 2016, as compared to 2012.

What stands out most, however, is the attitudes that became more strongly related to the vote in 2016: attitudes about immigration, feelings toward black people, and feelings toward Muslims. This pattern fits the prevailing discourse of the two campaigns and the increased attention to issues involving ethnic, racial, and religious minorities in 2016.(v)
org:ngo  wonkish  politics  polisci  data  analysis  database  visualization  correlation  phalanges  chart  2016-election  postmortem  coalitions  policy  ranking  list  impetus  trump  migration  race  poll  values  islam  education  class  obama  elections  identity-politics  demographics  roots  nationalism-globalism  religion  christianity  usa  diversity  clinton  flux-stasis  homo-hetero  emotion  crosstab  economics  trade  redistribution  taxes  welfare-state  stylized-facts  labor  cost-benefit  prediction  descriptive  2016  2017  sentiment 
november 2017 by nhaliday
Scotland’s many subcultures - Demos Quarterly
surname method

Turning to our analysis of the YouGov results, it was much to our surprise that the strongest majority support for independence was not among ‘pure’ historic Scots, but among people of Irish Catholic descent: with the latter being only 6 per cent net against independence, and historic Scots 16 per cent against. On the surface one might suppose this group would take its political lead from the Labour Party, for which it votes more consistently than any other group in Scotland.
org:ngo  org:mag  news  britain  anglo  language  trivia  cocktail  exploratory  geography  within-group  poll  values  culture  sociology  elections  polisci  politics  broad-econ  cliometrics  data  demographics  pop-structure 
november 2017 by nhaliday
THE BIG FIVE PERSONALITY TRAITS AND PARTISANSHIP IN ENGLAND
We find that supporters of the major parties (Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats) have substantively different personality traits. Moreover, we show that those not identifying with any party, who are close to holding the majority, are similar to those identifying with the Conservatives. We show that these results are robust to controlling for cognitive skills and parental party preferences, and to estimation on a subsample of siblings. The relationship between personality traits and party identification is stable across birth cohorts.

Table 2: Big Five Personality Traits: Predictions.
Figure 3: Relationship between personality traits and stable party identification

Conservative core supporters are antagonistic towards others (low Agreeableness), they are closed to new experiences (low Openness), they are energetic and enthusiastic (high Extraversion), they are goal-orientated (high Conscientiousness), and they are even-tempered (low Neuroticism).

In contrast, the core supporters of the Labour Party have a pro-social and communal attitude (high Agreeableness), they are open to new experiences and ideas (high Openness), but they are more anxious, tense and discontented (high Neuroticism) and less prone to goal-directed behavior (low Conscientiousness). The core supporters of the Liberal Democrats have similar traits to the typical Labour supporters with two exceptions. First, they do not show any particular tendency towards pro-social and communal attitudes (insignificant Agreeableness). Second, they are more reserved and introverted than the more extraverted supporters of either the Conservatives or Labour (low Extraversion).

Psychological and Personality Profiles of Political Extremists: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.00119.pdf
We revisit the debate over the appeal of extremism in the U.S. context by comparing publicly available Twitter messages written by over 355,000 political extremist followers with messages written by non-extremist U.S. users. Analysis of text-based psychological indicators supports the moral foundation theory which identifies emotion as a critical factor in determining political orientation of individuals. Extremist followers also differ from others in four of the Big Five personality traits.

Fig. 2. Comparing psychological profiles of the followers of moderate and extremist single-issue groups, compared to random users.

Overall, the differences in psychological profile between followers of extremist and moderate groups is much larger for left-wing extremists (environmentalists) than right-wing (anti-abortion and anti-immigrant).

Fig. 3. Big Five Personality Profiles.

Results show that extremist followers (whether left or right) are less agreeable, less neurotic, and more open than nonextremists.

Ideology as Motivated Cultural Cognition: How Culture Translates Personality into Policy Preferences: https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2017/Ideology%20as%20Motivated%20Cultural%20Cognition.pdf
This paper summarises the results of a quantitative analysis testing the theory that culture acts as an intermediary in the relationship between individual perceptual tendencies and political orientation. Political psychologists have long observed that more “left-wing” individuals tend to be more comfortable than “right-wing” individuals with ambiguity, disorder, and uncertainty, to equivocate more readily between conflicting viewpoints, and to be more willing to change their opinions. These traits are often summarised under the blanket term of “open-mindedness”. A recent increase in cross-cultural studies, however, has indicated that these relationships are far less robust, and even reversed, in social contexts outside of North America and Western Europe. The sociological concept of culture may provide an answer to this inconsistency: emergent idea-networks, irreducible to individuals, which nonetheless condition psychological motivations, so that perceptual factors resulting in left-wing preferences in one culture may result in opposing preferences in another. The key is that open-mindedness leads individuals to attack the dominant ideas which they encounter: if prevailing orthodoxies happen to be left-wing, then open minded individuals may become right-wing in protest. Using conditional process analysis of the British Election Study, I find evidence for three specific mechanisms whereby culture interferes with perceptual influences on politics. Conformity to the locally dominant culture mediates these influences, in the sense that open-minded people in Britain are only more left-wing because they are less culturally conformal. This relationship is itself moderated both by cultural group membership and by Philip Converse’s notion of “constraint”, individual-level connectivity between ideas, such that the strength of perceptual influence differs significantly between cultural groups and between levels of constraint to the idea of the political spectrum. Overall, I find compelling evidence for the importance of culture in shaping perceptions of policy choices.
pdf  study  polisci  sociology  politics  ideology  personality  psych-architecture  correlation  britain  coalitions  phalanges  data  things  multi  preprint  psychology  social-psych  cog-psych  culture-war  gnon  🐸  subculture  objective-measure  demographics  org:mat  creative  culture  society  cultural-dynamics  anthropology  hari-seldon  discipline  extra-introversion  stress  individualism-collectivism  expression-survival  values  poll  chart  curiosity 
november 2017 by nhaliday
Climate Risk, Cooperation, and the Co-Evolution of Culture and Institutions∗
We test this hypothesis for Europe combining high-resolution climate data for the period 1500-2000 with survey data at the sub-national level. We find that regions with higher inter-annual variability in precipitation and temperature display higher levels of trust. This effect is driven by variability in the growing season months, and by historical rather than recent variability. Regarding possible mechanisms, we show that regions with more variable climate were more closely connected to the Medieval trade network, indicating a higher propensity to engage in inter-community exchange. We also find that these regions were more likely to adopt participatory political institutions earlier on, and are characterized by a higher quality of local governments still today. Our results suggest that, by favoring the emergence of mutually-reinforcing norms and institutions, exposure to environmental risk had a long-lasting impact on human cooperation.
pdf  study  broad-econ  economics  cliometrics  path-dependence  growth-econ  political-econ  institutions  government  social-norms  culture  cultural-dynamics  correlation  history  early-modern  mostly-modern  values  poll  trust  n-factor  cooperate-defect  cohesion  democracy  environment  europe  the-great-west-whale  geography  trade  network-structure  general-survey  outcome-risk  uncertainty  branches  microfoundations  hari-seldon 
november 2017 by nhaliday
The Illusion of Moral Superiority - Social Psychological and Personality Science - Ben M. Tappin, Ryan T. McKay, 2017
Participants (N = 270) judged themselves and the average person on traits reflecting the core dimensions of social perception: morality, agency, and sociability. Adapting new methods, we reveal that virtually all individuals irrationally inflated their moral qualities, and the absolute and relative magnitude of this irrationality was greater than that in the other domains of positive self-evaluation. Inconsistent with prevailing theories of overly positive self-belief, irrational moral superiority was not associated with self-esteem. Taken together, these findings suggest that moral superiority is a uniquely strong and prevalent form of “positive illusion,” but the underlying function remains unknown.
study  sociology  psychology  social-psych  poll  descriptive  morality  comparison  biases  rationality  anthropology  realness  hypocrisy 
november 2017 by nhaliday
Global Evidence on Economic Preferences
- Benjamin Enke et al

This paper studies the global variation in economic preferences. For this purpose, we present the Global Preference Survey (GPS), an experimentally validated survey dataset of time preference, risk preference, positive and negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust from 80,000 individuals in 76 countries. The data reveal substantial heterogeneity in preferences across countries, but even larger within-country heterogeneity. Across individuals, preferences vary with age, gender, and cognitive ability, yet these relationships appear partly country specific. At the country level, the data reveal correlations between preferences and bio-geographic and cultural variables such as agricultural suitability, language structure, and religion. Variation in preferences is also correlated with economic outcomes and behaviors. Within countries and subnational regions, preferences are linked to individual savings decisions, labor market choices, and prosocial behaviors. Across countries, preferences vary with aggregate outcomes ranging from per capita income, to entrepreneurial activities, to the frequency of armed conflicts.

...

This paper explores these questions by making use of the core features of the GPS: (i) coverage of 76 countries that represent approximately 90 percent of the world population; (ii) representative population samples within each country for a total of 80,000 respondents, (iii) measures designed to capture time preference, risk preference, altruism, positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, and trust, based on an ex ante experimental validation procedure (Falk et al., 2016) as well as pre-tests in culturally heterogeneous countries, (iv) standardized elicitation and translation techniques through the pre-existing infrastructure of a global polling institute, Gallup. Upon publication, the data will be made publicly available online. The data on individual preferences are complemented by a comprehensive set of covariates provided by the Gallup World Poll 2012.

...

The GPS preference measures are based on twelve survey items, which were selected in an initial survey validation study (see Falk et al., 2016, for details). The validation procedure involved conducting multiple incentivized choice experiments for each preference, and testing the relative abilities of a wide range of different question wordings and formats to predict behavior in these choice experiments. The particular items used to construct the GPS preference measures were selected based on optimal performance out of menus of alternative items (for details see Falk et al., 2016). Experiments provide a valuable benchmark for selecting survey items, because they can approximate the ideal choice situations, specified in economic theory, in which individuals make choices in controlled decision contexts. Experimental measures are very costly, however, to implement in a globally representative sample, whereas survey measures are much less costly.⁴ Selecting survey measures that can stand in for incentivized revealed preference measures leverages the strengths of both approaches.

The Preference Survey Module: A Validated Instrument for Measuring Risk, Time, and Social Preferences: http://ftp.iza.org/dp9674.pdf

Table 1: Survey items of the GPS

Figure 1: World maps of patience, risk taking, and positive reciprocity.
Figure 2: World maps of negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust.

Figure 3: Gender coefficients by country. For each country, we regress the respective preference on gender, age and its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting gender coefficients as well as their significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the coefficients.

Figure 4: Cognitive ability coefficients by country. For each country, we regress the respective preference on gender, age and its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting coefficients on subjective math skills as well as their significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the coefficients.

Figure 5: Age profiles by OECD membership.

Table 6: Pairwise correlations between preferences and geographic and cultural variables

Figure 10: Distribution of preferences at individual level.
Figure 11: Distribution of preferences at country level.

interesting digression:
D Discussion of Measurement Error and Within- versus Between-Country Variation
study  dataset  data  database  let-me-see  economics  growth-econ  broad-econ  microfoundations  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  culture  psychology  behavioral-econ  values  🎩  pdf  piracy  world  spearhead  general-survey  poll  group-level  within-group  variance-components  🌞  correlation  demographics  age-generation  gender  iq  cooperate-defect  time-preference  temperance  labor  wealth  wealth-of-nations  entrepreneurialism  outcome-risk  altruism  trust  patience  developing-world  maps  visualization  n-factor  things  phalanges  personality  regression  gender-diff  pop-diff  geography  usa  canada  anglo  europe  the-great-west-whale  nordic  anglosphere  MENA  africa  china  asia  sinosphere  latin-america  self-report  hive-mind  GT-101  realness  long-short-run  endo-exo  signal-noise  communism  japan  korea  methodology  measurement  org:ngo  white-paper  endogenous-exogenous  within-without  hari-seldon 
october 2017 by nhaliday
The Political Typology: Beyond Red vs. Blue | Pew Research Center
The new typology has eight groups: Three are strongly ideological, highly politically engaged and overwhelmingly partisan – two on the right and one on the left. Steadfast Conservatives are staunch critics of government and the social safety net and are very socially conservative. Business Conservatives share Steadfast Conservatives’ preference for limited government, but differ in their support for Wall Street and business, as well as immigration reform. And Business Conservatives are far more moderate on social issues than are Steadfast Conservatives.

At the other end of the spectrum, Solid Liberals express liberal attitudes across almost every realm – government, the economy and business and foreign policy, as well as on race, homosexuality and abortion – and are reliable and loyal Democratic voters.

Taken together, these three groups form the electoral base of the Democratic and Republican Parties, and their influence on American politics is strong. While Solid Liberals, Steadfast Conservatives and Business Conservatives collectively make up only 36% of the American public, they represent 43% of registered voters and fully 57% of the more politically engaged segment of the American public: those who regularly vote and routinely follow government and public affairs.

The other typology groups are less partisan, less predictable and have little in common with each other or the groups at either end of the political spectrum. The one thing they do share is that they are less engaged politically than the groups on the right or left.

Young Outsiders lean Republican but do not have a strong allegiance to the Republican Party; in fact they tend to dislike both political parties. On many issues, from their support for environmental regulation to their liberal views on social issues, they diverge from traditional GOP orthodoxy. Yet in their support for limited government, Young Outsiders are firmly in the Republicans’ camp.

Hard-Pressed Skeptics have been battered by the struggling economy, and their difficult financial circumstances have left them resentful of both government and business. Despite their criticism of government performance, they back more generous government support for the poor and needy. Most Hard-Pressed Skeptics say they voted for Obama in 2012, though fewer than half approve of his job performance today.

The Next Generation Left are young, relatively affluent and very liberal on social issues like same-sex marriage and abortion. But they have reservations about the cost of social programs. And while most of the Next Generation Left support affirmative action, they decisively reject the idea that racial discrimination is the main reason why many blacks are unable to get ahead.

The Faith and Family Left lean Democratic, based on their confidence in government and support for federal programs to address the nation’s problems. But this very religious, racially and ethnically diverse group is uncomfortable with the pace of societal change, including the acceptance of homosexuality and non-traditional family structures.

And finally, an eighth group, the Bystanders, representing 10% of the public, are on the sidelines of the political process. They are not registered to vote and pay very little attention to politics.

...

The Faith and Family Left is by far the most racially and ethnically diverse group in the typology: In fact, just 41% are white non-Hispanic; 30% are black, 19% are Hispanic and 8% are other or mixed race. The Faith and Family Left also is less affluent and less educated than the other Democratically-oriented groups, and is older as well.

They also have strong religious convictions, which distinguishes them from Solid Liberals and the Next Generation Left. Fully 91% say “it is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values.” No more than about one-in-ten in the other Democratically-oriented groups agree. And the Faith and Family Left have much more conservative positions on social issues. Just 37% favor same-sex marriage, less than half the share of the other two groups on the left.

The Faith and Family Left support activist government and a strong social safety net, though by less overwhelming margins than Solid Liberals. And while the Faith and Family Left support affirmative action programs, just 31% believe that “racial discrimination is the main reason many black people can’t get ahead these days.” Among the much less racially diverse Solid Liberals, 80% think racial discrimination is the main barrier to black progress.

...

First, Steadfast Conservatives take very conservative views on key social issues like homosexuality and immigration, while Business Conservatives are less conservative – if not actually progressive – on these issues. Nearly three-quarters of Steadfast Conservatives (74%) believe that homosexuality should be discouraged by society. Among Business Conservatives, just 31% think homosexuality should be discouraged; 58% believe it should be accepted.

Business Conservatives have generally positive attitudes toward immigrants and 72% favor a “path to citizenship” for those in the U.S. illegally, if they meet certain conditions. Steadfast Conservatives are more critical of immigrants; 50% support a path to citizenship, the lowest share of any typology group.

Second, just as Steadfast Conservatives are opposed to big government, they also are skeptical of big business. They believe that large corporations have too much power, and nearly half (48%) say the economic system unfairly favors powerful interests. By contrast, as their name suggests, Business Conservatives are far more positive about the free market, and overwhelmingly regard business – and Wall Street – positively.

group profiles (including demographics): http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/26/appendix-1-typology-group-profiles/

2017 redux:
Political Typology Reveals Deep Fissures on the Right and Left: http://www.people-press.org/2017/10/24/political-typology-reveals-deep-fissures-on-the-right-and-left/
Nearly a year after Donald Trump was elected president, the Republican coalition is deeply divided on such major issues as immigration, America’s role in the world and the fundamental fairness of the U.S. economic system.

The Democratic coalition is largely united in staunch opposition to President Trump. Yet, while Trump’s election has triggered a wave of political activism within the party’s sizable liberal bloc, the liberals’ sky-high political energy is not nearly as evident among other segments in the Democratic base. And Democrats also are internally divided over U.S. global involvement, as well as some religious and social issues.

...

Divisions on the right

The political typology finds two distinctly different groups on the right – Core Conservatives and Country First Conservatives, who both overwhelmingly approve of Trump, but disagree on much else – including immigration and whether it benefits the U.S. to be active internationally.

Core Conservatives, who are in many ways the most traditional group of Republicans, have an outsized influence on the GOP coalition; while they make up just 13% of the public – and about a third (31%) of all Republicans and Republican-leaning independents – they constitute a much larger share (43%) of politically engaged Republicans.

This financially comfortable, male-dominated group overwhelmingly supports smaller government, lower corporate tax rates and believes in the fairness of the nation’s economic system. And a large majority of Core Conservatives (68%) express a positive view of U.S. involvement in the global economy “because it provides the U.S. with new markets and opportunities for growth.”

Country First Conservatives, a much smaller segment of the GOP base, are older and less educated than other Republican-leaning typology groups. Unlike Core Conservatives, Country First Conservatives are unhappy with the nation’s course, highly critical of immigrants and deeply wary of U.S. global involvement.

Nearly two-thirds of Country First Conservatives (64%) – the highest share of any typology group, right or left – say that “if America is too open to people from all over the world, we risk losing our identity as a nation.”

A third Republican group, Market Skeptic Republicans, sharply diverges from the GOP’s traditional support for business and lower taxes. Only about a third of Market Skeptic Republicans (34%) say banks and other financial institutions have a positive effect on the way things are going in the country, lowest among Republican-leaning typology groups.

Alone among the groups in the GOP coalition, a majority of Market Skeptic Republicans support raising tax rates on corporations and large businesses. An overwhelming share (94%) say the economic system unfairly favors powerful interests, which places the view of Market Skeptic Republicans on this issue much closer to Solid Liberals (99% mostly unfair) than Core Conservatives (21%).

In contrast to Market Skeptic Republicans, New Era Enterprisers are fundamentally optimistic about the state of the nation and its future. They are more likely than any other typology group to say the next generation of Americans will have it better than people today. Younger and somewhat less overwhelmingly white than the other GOP-leaning groups, New Era Enterprisers are strongly pro-business and generally think that immigrants strengthen, rather than burden, the country.

Divisions on the left

...

While there have long been racial, ethnic and income differences within the Democratic coalition, these gaps are especially striking today. Reflecting the changing demographic composition of the Democratic base, for the first time there are two majority-minority Democratic-leaning typology groups, along with two more affluent, mostly white groups.

Solid Liberals are the largest group in the Democratic coalition, and they make up close to half (48%) of politically engaged Democrats and Democratic-leaning … [more]
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october 2017 by nhaliday
Two theories of home heat control - ScienceDirect
People routinely develop their own theories to explain the world around them. These theories can be useful even when they contradict conventional technical wisdom. Based on in-depth interviews about home heating and thermostat setting behavior, the present study presents two theories people use to understand and adjust their thermostats. The two theories are here called the feedback theory and the valve theory. The valve theory is inconsistent with engineering knowledge, but is estimated to be held by 25% to 50% of Americans. Predictions of each of the theories are compared with the operations normally performed in home heat control. This comparison suggests that the valve theory may be highly functional in normal day-to-day use. Further data is needed on the ways this theory guides behavior in natural environments.
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september 2017 by nhaliday
Culture, Ethnicity, and Diversity - American Economic Association
We investigate the empirical relationship between ethnicity and culture, defined as a vector of traits reflecting norms, values, and attitudes. Using survey data for 76 countries, we find that ethnic identity is a significant predictor of cultural values, yet that within-group variation in culture trumps between-group variation. Thus, in contrast to a commonly held view, ethnic and cultural diversity are unrelated. Although only a small portion of a country’s overall cultural heterogeneity occurs between groups, we find that various political economy outcomes (such as civil conflict and public goods provision) worsen when there is greater overlap between ethnicity and culture. (JEL D74, H41, J15, O15, O17, Z13)

definition of chi-squared index, etc., under:
II. Measuring Heterogeneity

Table 5—Incidence of Civil Conflict and Diversity
Table 6—Public Goods Provision and Diversity

https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/924002043576115202
https://archive.is/oqMnC
https://archive.is/sBqqo
https://archive.is/1AcXn
χ2 diversity: raising the risk of civil war. Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, Wacziarg, in the American Economic Review (1/N)

What predicts higher χ2 diversity? The authors tell us that, too. Here are all of the variables that have a correlation > 0.4: (7/N)

one of them is UK legal origin...

online appendix (with maps, Figures B1-3): http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/downloads/2017_culture_appendix.pdf
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september 2017 by nhaliday
PRRI: America’s Changing Religious Identity
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/09/06/the-demographic-change-fueling-the-angst-of-trumps-base/
https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/09/08/as-many-americans-think-the-bible-is-a-book-of-fables-as-that-it-is-the-word-of-god/
America, that is, the United States of America, has long been a huge exception for the secularization model. Basically as a society develops and modernizes it becomes more secular. At least that’s the model.

...

Today everyone is talking about the Pew survey which shows the marginalization of the Anglo-Protestant America which I grew up in. This marginalization is due to secularization broadly, and non-Hispanic whites in particular. You don’t need Pew to tell you this.

...

Note: Robert Putnam’s American Grace is probably the best book which highlights the complex cultural forces which ushered in the second wave of secularization. The short answer is that the culture wars diminished Christianity in the eyes of liberals.

Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Political Backlash and Generational Succession, 1987-2012: https://www.sociologicalscience.com/articles-vol1-24-423/
the causal direction in the rise of the “Nones” likely runs from political identity as a liberal or conservative to religious identity

The Persistent and Exceptional Intensity of American Religion: A Response to Recent Research: https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/xd37b
But we show that rather than religion fading into irrelevance as the secularization thesis would suggest, intense religion—strong affiliation, very frequent practice, literalism, and evangelicalism—is persistent and, in fact, only moderate religion is on the decline in the United States.

https://twitter.com/avermeule/status/913823410609950721
https://archive.is/CiCok
As in the U.K., so now too in America: the left establishment is moving towards an open view that orthodox Christians are unfit for office.
https://twitter.com/avermeule/status/913880665011228673
https://archive.is/LZiyV

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/883764202539798529
https://archive.is/HvVrN
i've had the thought that it's a plausible future where traditional notions of theism become implicitly non-white

https://mereorthodoxy.com/bourgeois-christian-politics/

http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/12/living/pew-religion-study/index.html
http://coldcasechristianity.com/2017/are-young-people-really-leaving-christianity/
Some writers and Christian observers deny the flight of young people altogether, but the growing statistics should alarm us enough as Church leaders to do something about the dilemma. My hope in this post is to simply consolidate some of the research (many of the summaries are directly quoted) so you can decide for yourself. I’m going to organize the recent findings in a way that illuminates the problem:

'Christianity as default is gone': the rise of a non-Christian Europe: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/21/christianity-non-christian-europe-young-people-survey-religion
In the UK, only 7% of young adults identify as Anglican, fewer than the 10% who categorise themselves as Catholic. Young Muslims, at 6%, are on the brink of overtaking those who consider themselves part of the country’s established church.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postchristianity
Other scholars have disputed the global decline of Christianity, and instead hypothesized of an evolution of Christianity which allows it to not only survive, but actively expand its influence in contemporary societies.

Philip Jenkins hypothesized a "Christian Revolution" in the Southern nations, such as Africa, Asia and Latin America, where instead of facing decline, Christianity is actively expanding. The relevance of Christian teachings in the global South will allow the Christian population in these areas to continually increase, and together with the shrinking of the Western Christian population, will form a "new Christendom" in which the majority of the world's Christian population can be found in the South.[9]
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september 2017 by nhaliday
Career Options for Scientists
Most PhD students in the biological sciences will not go on to become academics. For these individuals, choosing the best career path can be difficult. Fortunately, there are many options that allow them to take advantage of skills they hone during graduate and postdoctoral work.

The declining interest in an academic career: http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0184130
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september 2017 by nhaliday
Does Polarization Imply Poor Representation? A New Perspective on the “Disconnect” Between Politicians and Voters*
Broockman-Ahler 2015

immigration positions under B.2: http://www.dougahler.com/uploads/2/4/6/9/24697799/ahler_broockman_ideological_innocence.pdf#page=42
distribution: http://www.dougahler.com/uploads/2/4/6/9/24697799/ahler_broockman_ideological_innocence.pdf#page=53

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/904024125030756356
https://archive.is/BrnpJ
38% support immediate mass deportation of all illegals (Broockman 2015). This view has zero representation in either house of congress.

Do you understand the GOP play here by the way? I'm genuinely puzzled. Is it a moral conviction? Because it can't be a vote play.
In my view it's a mix of mindless sentimentality, the donor class, and existing in an hermetically sealed ideological bubble.

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/951989543653265408
https://archive.is/ya2sz
cheap labor lobby, public choice (votes), & subversive elites gripped by multiculti zealotry

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/911291455762845696
https://archive.is/dw6OO
In a 2014 radio interview, Paul Ryan was asked if "immigrants from the 3rd world are more or less likely to support conservative policies":
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september 2017 by nhaliday
From Soviets to Oligarchs: Inequality and Property in Russia 1905-2016
We find that official survey-based measures vastly under-estimate the rise of inequality since 1990. According to our benchmark estimates, top income shares are now similar to (or higher than) the levels observed in the United States. We also find that inequality has increased substantially more in Russia than in China and other ex-communist countries in Eastern Europe. We relate this finding to the specific transition strategy followed in Russia. According to our benchmark estimates, the wealth held offshore by rich Russians is about three times larger than official net foreign reserves, and is comparable in magnitude to total household financial assets held in Russia.

Figure 1a, 8abc, 9b

The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/0895330053147994
2005

Using a unique dataset, we describe the degree of ownership concentration in Russian economy and its role in shaping economic and political institutions in Russia. In particular, we find that Russian "oligarchs" do control a substantial part of the economy. While the relative weight of their firms in Russian economy is huge, they do not seem to be excessively large by the standards of the global economy where most of them are operating. The oligarchs seem to run their firms more efficiently than other Russian owners controlling for industry, region and size.

Russia's Billionaires: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.p20161068
2016

Using data collected by Forbes since the 1990s, I examine the emergence and survival of the super-wealthy in Russia over the past two decades and compare Russia's record to those of other countries. The major surge in the number of Russian billionaires came in the mid-2000s, mirroring the dynamic worldwide. While early billionaires were predominantly found in the oil, gas, metals, and banking sectors, the distribution has become more diverse, now including some in trade, real estate, chemicals, and information technology. Only a minority of today's Russian billionaires acquired significant assets in the privatization of the 1990s.

Popular Attitudes towards Markets and Democracy: Russia and United States Compared 25 Years Later: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22027

While we find some differences in attitudes towards markets across countries and through time, we do not find most of the differences large or significant. Our evidence does not support a common view that the Russian personality is fundamentally illiberal or non-democratic.

The Political Economy of Transition: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/0895330027102
- Gérard Roland, 2002

The overriding importance of political constraints in the transition process has led to developments of the theory of the political economy of reform. What are the main insights from that theory? How does it reflect the transition reality? What have we learned, and what do we still need to learn? The present article will attempt to answer those questions.

https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/centrifugal-forces-why-russian-oligarchs-remain-loyal-to-the-putin-government-op-ed-59760
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august 2017 by nhaliday
Trust in Large Organizations
We argue that trust should be particularly important for the performance of large organizations. In a cross-section of countries, evidence on government performance, participation in civic and professional societies, importance of large firms, and the performance of social institutions more generally supports this hypothesis. Moreover, trust is lower in countries with dominant hierarchical religions, which may have deterred networks of cooperation trust hold up remarkably well on a cross-section of countries.

The Importance of Trust for Investment: Evidence from Venture Capital: http://www.nber.org/papers/w16923
We examine the effect of trust on financial investment and contracting decisions in a micro-economic environment where trust is exogenous. Using hand-collected data on European venture capital, we show that the Eurobarometer measure of trust among nations significantly affects investment decisions. This holds even after controlling for investor and company fixed effects, geographic distance, information and transaction costs. The national identity of venture capital firms' individual partners further contributes to the effect of trust. Education and work experience reduce the effect of trust but do not eliminate it. We also examine the relationship between trust and sophisticated contracts involving contingent control rights and find that, even after controlling for endogeneity, they are complements, not substitutes.

Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers: http://www.nber.org/papers/w2342
The paper questions the common view that share price increases of firms involved in hostile takeovers measure efficiency gains from acquisitions. Even if such gains exist, most of the increase in the combined value of the target and the acquirer is likely to come from stakeholder wealth losses, such as declines in value of subcontractors' firm-specific capital or employees' human capital. The use of event studies to gauge wealth creation in takeovers is unjustified. The paper also suggests a theory of managerial behavior, in which hiring and entrenching trustworthy managers enables shareholders to commit to upholding implicit contracts with stakeholders. Hostile takeovers are an innovation allowing shareholders to renege on such contracts ex post, against managers' will. On this view, shareholder gains are redistributions from stakeholders, and can in the long run result in deterioration of trust necessary for the functioning of the corporation.

Trust in Public Finance: http://www.nber.org/papers/w9187
Using data on trust and trustworthiness from the 1990 wave of the World Values Survey, I first investigate a model of the extent of tax cheating and the size of government that recognizes the interdependence of the two. The results reveal that tax cheating is lower in countries that exhibit more (not-government-related) trustworthiness. However, holding that constant, tax cheating becomes more acceptable as government grows. All in all, there is some weak evidence that the strong positive cross-country correlation between the size of government and tax cheating masks the fact that big government induces tax cheating while, at the same time, tax cheating constrains big government. I then add to the structural model an equation determining the level of prosperity, allowing prosperity to depend, inter alia, on the level of government and on trust in others. I find some evidence that both prosperity and government involvement are higher in more trusting societies. Moreover, holding these measures of trust constant, the association of government size with prosperity is positive until a level of government spending somewhere between 31% and 38% of GDP, after which its marginal effect is negative. Thus, although a trusting citizenry allows larger government, the tax burden this entails erodes the rule obedience taxpayers exhibit toward government.

Tax cheating among whites: http://anepigone.blogspot.com/2017/04/tax-cheating-among-whites.html
The masses still more or less assume that “against the law” is a synonym for “wrong.” It is known that the criminal law is harsh and full of anomalies and that litigation is so expensive as always to favour the rich against the poor: but there is a general feeling that the law, such as it is, will be scrupulously administered … An Englishman does not believe in his bones, as a Spanish or Italian peasant does, that the law is simply a racket.

The English People, Collins, 1947

WEIRDO societies require WEIRDOs to make them work. The less WEIRDO a society becomes, the more being a WEIRDO--characterized by high social trust, reciprocity, political compromise, generosity to those in need, isonomy, etc--switches from being an advantage to being a disadvantage. Social trust declines, reciprocity disappears, political compromise is replaced by a winner-take-all ethnic spoils system, generosity is exploited to the point that it is seen as an entitlement, and the legal system gets hijacked by racial grievance concepts like "social justice". It's a vicious circle.

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29544
Theodore Roosevelt
Third Annual Message
December 7, 1903

The consistent policy of the National Government, so far as it has the power, is to hold in check the unscrupulous man, whether employer or employee; but to refuse to weaken individual initiative or to hamper or cramp the industrial development of the country. We recognize that this is an era of federation and combination, in which great capitalistic corporations and labor unions have become factors of tremendous importance in all industrial centers. Hearty recognition is given the far-reaching, beneficent work which has been accomplished through both corporations and unions, and the line as between different corporations, as between different unions, is drawn as it is between different individuals; that is, it is drawn on conduct, the effort being to treat both organized capital and organized labor alike; asking nothing save that the interest of each shall be brought into harmony with the interest of the general public, and that the conduct of each shall conform to the fundamental rules of obedience to law, of individual freedom, and of justice and fair dealing towards all. Whenever either corporation, labor union, or individual disregards the law or acts in a spirit of arbitrary and tyrannous interference with the rights of others, whether corporations or individuals, then where the Federal Government has jurisdiction, it will see to it that the misconduct is stopped, paying not the slightest heed to the position or power of the corporation, the union or the individual, but only to one vital fact--that is, the question whether or not the conduct of the individual or aggregate of individuals is in accordance with the law of the land. Every man must be guaranteed his liberty and his right to do as he likes with his property or his labor, so long as he does not infringe the rights of others. _No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we ask any man's permission when we require him to obey it. Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not asked as a favor._
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august 2017 by nhaliday
The Determinants of Trust
Both individual experiences and community characteristics influence how much people trust each other. Using data drawn from US localities we find that the strongest factors that reduce trust are: i) a recent history of traumatic experiences, even though the passage of time reduces this effect fairly rapidly; ii) belonging to a group that historically felt discriminated against, such as minorities (black in particular) and, to a lesser extent, women; iii) being economically unsuccessful in terms of income and education; iv) living in a racially mixed community and/or in one with a high degree of income disparity. Religious beliefs and ethnic origins do not significantly affect trust. The latter result may be an indication that the American melting pot at least up to a point works, in terms of homogenizing attitudes of different cultures, even though racial cleavages leading to low trust are still quite high.

Understanding Trust: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13387
In this paper we resolve this puzzle by recognizing that trust has two components: a belief-based one and a preference based one. While the sender's behavior reflects both, we show that WVS-like measures capture mostly the belief-based component, while questions on past trusting behavior are better at capturing the preference component of trust.

MEASURING TRUST: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/laibson/files/measuring_trust.pdf
We combine two experiments and a survey to measure trust and trustworthiness— two key components of social capital. Standard attitudinal survey questions about trust predict trustworthy behavior in our experiments much better than they predict trusting behavior. Trusting behavior in the experiments is predicted by past trusting behavior outside of the experiments. When individuals are closer socially, both trust and trustworthiness rise. Trustworthiness declines when partners are of different races or nationalities. High status individuals are able to elicit more trustworthiness in others.

What is Social Capital? The Determinants of Trust and Trustworthiness: http://www.nber.org/papers/w7216
Using a sample of Harvard undergraduates, we analyze trust and social capital in two experiments. Trusting behavior and trustworthiness rise with social connection; differences in race and nationality reduce the level of trustworthiness. Certain individuals appear to be persistently more trusting, but these people do not say they are more trusting in surveys. Survey questions about trust predict trustworthiness not trust. Only children are less trustworthy. People behave in a more trustworthy manner towards higher status individuals, and therefore status increases earnings in the experiment. As such, high status persons can be said to have more social capital.

Trust and Cheating: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18509
We find that: i) both parties to a trust exchange have implicit notions of what constitutes cheating even in a context without promises or messages; ii) these notions are not unique - the vast majority of senders would feel cheated by a negative return on their trust/investment, whereas a sizable minority defines cheating according to an equal split rule; iii) these implicit notions affect the behavior of both sides to the exchange in terms of whether to trust or cheat and to what extent. Finally, we show that individual's notions of what constitutes cheating can be traced back to two classes of values instilled by parents: cooperative and competitive. The first class of values tends to soften the notion while the other tightens it.

Nationalism and Ethnic-Based Trust: Evidence from an African Border Region: https://u.osu.edu/robinson.1012/files/2015/12/Robinson_NationalismTrust-1q3q9u1.pdf
These results offer microlevel evidence that a strong and salient national identity can diminish ethnic barriers to trust in diverse societies.

One Team, One Nation: Football, Ethnic Identity, and Conflict in Africa: http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/SI2017/DEV/Durante_Depetris-Chauvin.pdf
Do collective experiences that prime sentiments of national unity reduce interethnic tensions and conflict? We examine this question by looking at the impact of national football teams’ victories in sub-Saharan Africa. Combining individual survey data with information on over 70 official matches played between 2000 and 2015, we find that individuals interviewed in the days after a victory of their country’s national team are less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity and more likely to trust people of other ethnicities than those interviewed just before. The effect is sizable and robust and is not explained by generic euphoria or optimism. Crucially, national victories do not only affect attitudes but also reduce violence. Indeed, using plausibly exogenous variation from close qualifications to the Africa Cup of Nations, we find that countries that (barely) qualified experience significantly less conflict in the following six months than countries that (barely) did not. Our findings indicate that, even where ethnic tensions have deep historical roots, patriotic shocks can reduce inter-ethnic tensions and have a tangible impact on conflict.

Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?: http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/HHPW.pdf
We identify three families of mechanisms that link diversity to public goods provision—–what we term “preferences,” “technology,” and “strategy selection” mechanisms—–and run a series of experimental games that permit us to compare the explanatory power of distinct mechanisms within each of these three families. Results from games conducted with a random sample of 300 subjects from a slum neighborhood of Kampala, Uganda, suggest that successful public goods provision in homogenous ethnic communities can be attributed to a strategy selection mechanism: in similar settings, co-ethnics play cooperative equilibria, whereas non-co-ethnics do not. In addition, we find evidence for a technology mechanism: co-ethnics are more closely linked on social networks and thus plausibly better able to support cooperation through the threat of social sanction. We find no evidence for prominent preference mechanisms that emphasize the commonality of tastes within ethnic groups or a greater degree of altruism toward co-ethnics, and only weak evidence for technology mechanisms that focus on the impact of shared ethnicity on the productivity of teams.

does it generalize to first world?

Higher Intelligence Groups Have Higher Cooperation Rates in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp8499.html
The initial cooperation rates are similar, it increases in the groups with higher intelligence to reach almost full cooperation, while declining in the groups with lower intelligence. The difference is produced by the cumulation of small but persistent differences in the response to past cooperation of the partner. In higher intelligence subjects, cooperation after the initial stages is immediate and becomes the default mode, defection instead requires more time. For lower intelligence groups this difference is absent. Cooperation of higher intelligence subjects is payoff sensitive, thus not automatic: in a treatment with lower continuation probability there is no difference between different intelligence groups

Why societies cooperate: https://voxeu.org/article/why-societies-cooperate
Three attributes are often suggested to generate cooperative behaviour – a good heart, good norms, and intelligence. This column reports the results of a laboratory experiment in which groups of players benefited from learning to cooperate. It finds overwhelming support for the idea that intelligence is the primary condition for a socially cohesive, cooperative society. Warm feelings towards others and good norms have only a small and transitory effect.

individual payoff, etc.:

Trust, Values and False Consensus: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18460
Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more (less) trustworthy individuals form more optimistic (pessimistic) trust beliefs - and that this tendency continues to color trust beliefs after several rounds of game-play. Moreover, we show that one's own type/trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing. In a second closely-related experiment, we show the economic impact of mis-calibrated trust beliefs stemming from false consensus. Miscalibrated beliefs lower participants' experimental trust game earnings by about 20 percent on average.

The Right Amount of Trust: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15344
We investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance. We find that individual income is hump-shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs. Our interpretation is that highly trusting individuals tend to assume too much social risk and to be cheated more often, ultimately performing less well than those with a belief close to the mean trustworthiness of the population. On the other hand, individuals with overly pessimistic beliefs avoid being cheated, but give up profitable opportunities, therefore underperforming. The cost of either too much or too little trust is comparable to the income lost by forgoing college.

...

This framework allows us to show that income-maximizing trust typically exceeds the trust level of the average person as well as to estimate the distribution of income lost to trust mistakes. We find that although a majority of individuals has well calibrated beliefs, a non-trivial proportion of the population (10%) has trust beliefs sufficiently poorly calibrated to lower income by more than 13%.

Do Trust and … [more]
study  economics  alesina  growth-econ  broad-econ  trust  cohesion  social-capital  religion  demographics  race  diversity  putnam-like  compensation  class  education  roots  phalanges  general-survey  multi  usa  GT-101  conceptual-vocab  concept  behavioral-econ  intricacy  composition-decomposition  values  descriptive  correlation  harvard  field-study  migration  poll  status  🎩  🌞  chart  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  psychology  social-psych  sociology  cooperate-defect  justice  egalitarianism-hierarchy  inequality  envy  n-factor  axelrod  pdf  microfoundations  nationalism-globalism  africa  intervention  counter-revolution  tribalism  culture  society  ethnocentrism  coordination  world  developing-world  innovation  econ-productivity  government  stylized-facts  madisonian  wealth-of-nations  identity-politics  public-goodish  s:*  legacy  things  optimization  curvature  s-factor  success  homo-hetero  higher-ed  models  empirical  contracts  human-capital  natural-experiment  endo-exo  data  scale  trade  markets  time  supply-demand  summary 
august 2017 by nhaliday
Dead Souls: The Denationalization of the American Elite
- Huntington, 2004

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/889953571650891776

The views of the general public on issues of national identity differ significantly from those of many elites. The public, overall, is concerned with physical security but also with societal security, which involves the sustainability--within acceptable conditions for evolution--of existing patterns of language, culture, association, religion and national identity. For many elites, these concerns are secondary to participating in the global economy, supporting international trade and migration, strengthening international institutions, promoting American values abroad, and encouraging minority identities and cultures at home. The central distinction between the public and elites is not isolationism versus internationalism, but nationalism versus cosmopolitanism.

...

Estimated to number about 20 million in 2000, of whom 40 percent were American, this elite is expected to double in size by 2010. Comprising fewer than 4 percent of the American people, these transnationalists have little need for national loyalty, view national boundaries as obstacles that thankfully are vanishing, and see national governments as residues from the past whose only useful function is to facilitate the elite's global operations. In the coming years, one corporation executive confidently predicted, "the only people who will care about national boundaries are politicians."

...

In August 1804, Walter Scott finished writing The Lay of the Last Minstrel. Therein, he
asked whether

"Breathes there the man with soul so dead
Who never to himself hath said:
'This is my own, my native Land?'
Whose heart hath ne'er within him burned
As home his footsteps he hath turned, . . .
From wandering on a foreign strand?"

A contemporary answer to Scott's question is: Yes, the number of dead souls is small
but growing among America's business, professional, intellectual and academic elites.
pdf  essay  rhetoric  huntington  big-peeps  statesmen  org:davos  nationalism-globalism  migration  identity-politics  culture-war  vampire-squid  elite  world  universalism-particularism  politics  ideology  morality  s:*  attaq  corporation  economics  efficiency  trade  government  usa  westminster  crooked  🎩  polisci  foreign-policy  anglosphere  multi  twitter  social  commentary  gnon  unaffiliated  right-wing  quotes  track-record  poetry  old-anglo  aristos  aphorism  duty  hate  meta:rhetoric  poll  values  polarization  clinton  gilens-page  trust  cohesion  institutions  academia  higher-ed  california  the-west  class  class-warfare  trends  wonkish  great-powers  democracy  latin-america  islam  MENA  conquest-empire  rot  zeitgeist  civic  religion  christianity  theos  anomie  history  mostly-modern  early-modern  pre-ww2  culture  britain  tradition  prejudice  madisonian  domestication  nascent-state  tribalism  us-them  interests  impetus  decentralized  reason  protestant-catholic  the-bones  the-founding  heterodox 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Is tribalism racist? Antiracism norms and immigration | British Politics and Policy at LSE
"immigration-restrictionism=racism" by demographic and vote
https://twitter.com/whyvert/status/886324174376927232

As figure 3 reveals, among White Clinton voters with postgraduate degrees, support for the idea that it’s racist to want reduced immigration for ethnocultural reasons is almost total, at over 91%. By contrast, only 11.2% of Trump voters agree. Minority voters are slightly more likely to back the ‘racist’ interpretation than whites, 45-36, but this 12-point difference is dwarfed by the 62-point gap within White America between Clinton and Trump voters.

There’s no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ America: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/11/18/theres-no-good-or-bad-america/
- Shadi Hamid
org:edu  news  eric-kaufmann  wonkish  sociology  politics  polisci  elections  poll  values  race  ethnocentrism  identity-politics  migration  usa  2016-election  clinton  trump  polarization  ideology  self-interest  multi  twitter  social  commentary  scitariat  social-norms  correlation  demographics  tribalism  coalitions  class-warfare  westminster  n-factor  patho-altruism  us-them  journos-pundits  interests  gnon 
july 2017 by nhaliday
the mass defunding of higher education that’s yet to come – the ANOVA
Meanwhile, in my very large network of professional academics, almost no one recognizes any threat at all. Many, I can say with great confidence, would reply to the poll above with glee. They would tell you that they don’t want the support of Republicans. There’s little attempt to grapple with the simple, pragmatic realities of political power and how it threatens vulnerable institutions whose funding is in doubt. That’s because there is no professional or social incentive in the academy to think strategically or to understand that there is a world beyond campus. Instead, all of the incentives point towards constantly affirming one’s position in the moral aristocracy that the academy has imagined itself as. The less one spends on concerns about how the university and its subsidiary departments function in our broader society, the greater one’s performed fealty to the presumed righteousness of the communal values. I cannot imagine a professional culture less equipped to deal with a crisis than that of academics in the humanities and social sciences and the current threats of today. The Iron Law of Institutions defines the modern university, and what moves someone up the professional ranks within a given field is precisely the type of studied indifference to any concerns that originate outside of the campus walls.

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/449418/right-wing-populism-next-target-american-higher-education
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/07/10/wages-campus-revolts/
http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/polarized-attitudes-about-college/

https://twitter.com/jttiehen/status/911475904731275265
https://archive.is/zN0Dh
TBH, if people like Ben Shapiro need $600k security details, universities are on borrowed time. There will be a push to defund
https://twitter.com/jttiehen/status/911618263909404672
https://archive.is/lDXly
https://twitter.com/jttiehen/status/911625626251026432
https://archive.is/GNUDM
https://twitter.com/RoundSqrCupola/status/911631431348183040
https://archive.is/KYyGy

https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/74up3r/culture_war_roundup_for_the_week_following/do4mntc/
https://archive.is/LrvLo
It's interesting that this bill was passed at Wisconsin.
I'm not sure how familiar you guys are with what's been going on there, but the University system in Wisconsin has been the site of some serious, really playing-for-keeps, both-sides-engaged-and-firing-on-all-cylinders culture war the last 8 years. Anyone interested in Freddie de Boer's claims about the significant threat Universities face from plummeting support from conservatives should probably be familiar with Wisconsin, as it's been a real beachhead.

Republicans Stuff Education Bill With Conservative Social Agenda: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/us/first-amendment-education-bill.html
Religious colleges would be able to bar openly same-sex relationships without fear of repercussions.
Religious student groups could block people who do not share their faith from becoming members.
Controversial speakers would have more leverage when they want to appear at colleges.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/opinion/whos-really-placing-limits-on-free-speech.html

https://twitter.com/ortoiseortoise/status/879785012270436352
https://archive.is/6CYck
lost in "left v. right free speech" debate is that right="don't agree with BLM"; left: "white men deserve to die" @jttiehen @iamcuriousblue
the left needs free speech protections not just bc it "has less power", contra FDB and others, but because it says far more egregious shit
fact is, it's a "microaggression" to say america's a land of opportunity, scholarly&woke to say white males are fragile idiots, deserve pain

On Tommy Curry: https://necpluribusimpar.net/on-tommy-curry/
A few days ago, Rod Dreher wrote a piece in The American Conservative about a 4 year old interview of Tommy Curry, a professor of philosophy at Texas A&M University. (I would like to add that, although I’m going to criticize Dreher’s article, I think The American Conservative is actually a pretty good publication. In particular, on foreign policy, it’s one of the few publications in the US where sanity has not totally disappeared.) In that article, among other things, Dreher quotes Curry as saying that “in order to be equal, in order to be liberated, some white people might have to die”.

...

With the context, it’s clear that, in the statement quoted by Dreher, Curry wasn’t necessarily expressing his own view, but lamenting what he takes to be the erasure of the fact that, throughout American history, many black leaders have taken seriously the possibility of resorting to violence in order to protect themselves. (I actually think he is right about that, but that’s a pretty common phenomenon. Once a political/cultural figure becomes coopted by the establishment, he is turned into a consensual figure, even though he used to be quite controversial. This happened to Martin Luther King and Gandhi, but also to Charles De Gaulle and Winston Churchill, so despite what Curry seems to think I doubt it has much to do with race.)

...

Although he deserves censure for misrepresenting Curry’s interview, there is one thing Dreher says which strikes me as correct. Indeed, even if you don’t misrepresent what Curry said, it’s clear that any white person saying even half of it would immediately become the object of universal vilification and be cast out of polite society. Indeed, it’s striking how bigoted and, let’s say it, racist and/or sexist language has become on the left, which is apparently okay as long as no minority is targeted.

Texas College Op-Ed Calls For Ethnic Cleansing: http://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/texas-college-op-ed-calls-for-ethnic-cleansing/

Opposing Liberal Academia Doesn't Make One 'Anti-Intellectual': http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/444031/opposing-liberal-academia-doesnt-make-one-anti-intellectual
David French on David Gelernter
unaffiliated  left-wing  prediction  politics  culture-war  education  higher-ed  academia  government  policy  poll  values  polarization  institutions  strategy  tactics  money  monetary-fiscal  right-wing  class  westminster  multi  news  org:mag  populism  nascent-state  econotariat  cracker-econ  org:data  commentary  org:edu  near-far  org:rec  rhetoric  civil-liberty  civic  regularizer  anomie  haidt  authoritarianism  ideology  current-events  social-norms  exit-voice  censorship  trust  douthatish  statesmen  big-peeps  meta:rhetoric  hypocrisy  homo-hetero  counter-revolution  twitter  social  discussion  backup  trump  science  culture  reddit  ssc  class-warfare  organizing  poast  usa  midwest  the-south  texas  religion  christianity  gender  sex  sexuality  regulation  law 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Political Conservatives’ Affinity for Obedience to Authority Is Loyal, Not BlindPersonality and Social Psychology Bulletin - Jeremy A. Frimer, Danielle Gaucher, Nicola K. Schaefer, 2014
Sharp Partisan Divisions in Views of National Institutions: http://www.people-press.org/2017/07/10/sharp-partisan-divisions-in-views-of-national-institutions/
Americans’ Attitudes About the News Media Deeply Divided Along Partisan Lines: http://www.journalism.org/2017/05/10/americans-attitudes-about-the-news-media-deeply-divided-along-partisan-lines/

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/925509885848059904
https://archive.is/Q2x1T
I'm going through this survey... it just keeps getting better famalam

from the Cato study here: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:75ca38a74b99

https://twitter.com/AngloRemnant/status/884984883512307712
https://archive.is/bEj6i
Near perfect symmetry between Rep/Dem positive opinion on Church/College, because, well..
Yes, it's amazing how well each of these hostile tribes recognize each other's religious institutions.
.. income & education are Inversely related to positive view of universities among right-leaning folks.
wew, means there's so much room to grow among the proles
study  polisci  politics  ideology  things  personality  psychology  social-psych  values  poll  authoritarianism  duty  military  environment  pdf  piracy  multi  news  org:data  institutions  media  higher-ed  religion  finance  polarization  data  analysis  white-paper  database  trust  wonkish  twitter  social  commentary  gnon  unaffiliated  right-wing  pic  age-generation  westminster  backup  land  correlation  education  class  coalitions  chart  🎩  phalanges  nascent-state  strategy  left-wing  organizing  pro-rata  counter-revolution  hari-seldon 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Individual Perceptions of Self-Actualization: What Functional Motives Are Linked to Fulfilling One’s Full Potential?Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin - Jaimie Arona Krems, Douglas T. Kenrick, Rebecca Neel, 2017
We examine which functional outcomes (e.g., gaining status, making friends, finding mates, caring for kin) people perceive as central to their individual self-actualizing. Three studies suggest that people most frequently link self-actualization to seeking status, and, concordant with life history theory, what people regard as self-actualizing varies in predictable ways across the life span and across individuals. Contrasting with self-actualization, people do not view other types of well-being—eudaimonic, hedonic, subjective—as furthering status-linked functional outcomes.
study  psychology  cog-psych  social-psych  values  thinking  rationality  neurons  stylized-facts  poll  status  meaningness 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Dimensions - Geert Hofstede
http://geerthofstede.com/culture-geert-hofstede-gert-jan-hofstede/6d-model-of-national-culture/

https://www.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/4g88kt/eu28_countries_ranked_by_hofstedes_cultural/
https://archive.is/rXnII

https://hbdchick.wordpress.com/2013/09/07/national-individualism-collectivism-scores/

Individualism and Collectivism in Israeli Society: Comparing Religious and Secular High-School Students: https://sci-hub.tw/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1016945121604
A common collective basis of mutual value consensus was found in the two groups; however, as predicted, there were differences between secular and religious students on the three kinds of items, since the religious scored higher than the secular students on items emphasizing collectivist orientation. The differences, however, do not fit the common theoretical framework of collectivism-individualism, but rather tend to reflect the distinction between in-group and universal collectivism.

Individualism and Collectivism in Two Conflicted Societies: Comparing Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Arab High School Students: https://sci-hub.tw/http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0044118X01033001001
Both groups were found to be more collectivistic than individualistic oriented. However, as predicted, the Palestinians scored higher than the Israeli students on items emphasizing in-group collectivist orientation (my nationality, my country, etc.). The differences between the two groups tended to reflect some subdistinctions such as different elements of individualism and collectivism. Moreover, they reflected the historical context and contemporary influences, such as the stage where each society is at in the nation-making process.

Religion as culture: religious individualism and collectivism among american catholics, jews, and protestants.: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17576356
We propose the theory that religious cultures vary in individualistic and collectivistic aspects of religiousness and spirituality. Study 1 showed that religion for Jews is about community and biological descent but about personal beliefs for Protestants. Intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity were intercorrelated and endorsed differently by Jews, Catholics, and Protestants in a pattern that supports the theory that intrinsic religiosity relates to personal religion, whereas extrinsic religiosity stresses community and ritual (Studies 2 and 3). Important life experiences were likely to be social for Jews but focused on God for Protestants, with Catholics in between (Study 4). We conclude with three perspectives in understanding the complex relationships between religion and culture.

Inglehart–Welzel cultural map of the world: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inglehart%E2%80%93Welzel_cultural_map_of_the_world
Live cultural map over time 1981 to 2015: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ABWYOcru7js

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-materialism
prof  psychology  social-psych  values  culture  cultural-dynamics  anthropology  individualism-collectivism  expression-survival  long-short-run  time-preference  uncertainty  outcome-risk  gender  egalitarianism-hierarchy  things  phalanges  group-level  world  tools  comparison  data  database  n-factor  occident  social-norms  project  microfoundations  multi  maps  visualization  org:junk  psych-architecture  personality  hari-seldon  discipline  self-control  geography  shift  developing-world  europe  the-great-west-whale  anglosphere  optimate  china  asia  japan  sinosphere  orient  MENA  reddit  social  discussion  backup  EU  inequality  envy  britain  anglo  nordic  ranking  top-n  list  eastern-europe  germanic  gallic  mediterranean  cog-psych  sociology  guilt-shame  duty  tribalism  us-them  cooperate-defect  competition  gender-diff  metrics  politics  wiki  concept  society  civilization  infographic  ideology  systematic-ad-hoc  let-me-see  general-survey  chart  video  history  metabuch  dynamic  trends  plots  time-series  reference  water  mea 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2017
Section 3.2, p. 39 has polarization data
A new way to chart ideological leanings in news media: https://www.axios.com/a-new-way-to-chart-ideological-leanings-in-news-media-2475716743.html
(using Twitter follows)
Exploring the Ideological Nature of Journalists’ Social Networks on Twitter and Associations with News Story Content: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8CcT_0LwJ8QVnJMR1QzcGNuTkk/view
Visualizing Political Polarization on Twitter: http://www.theoutgroup.org/
Dear Mainstream Media: Why so liberal?: https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2017/01/27/dear-mainstream-media-why-so-liberal/
Political Leanings of US Journalists vs. the Public in 2002

Topline Results: 2017 Texas Media & Society Survey: https://moody.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/TMASS_2017Topline_final.pdf
https://twitter.com/gelliottmorris/status/915295562123108352
https://archive.is/sE5cg
Some interesting results from a poll about media & polarization that I presented today for @AStraussInst <THREAD>
pdf  news  org:lite  media  database  data  analysis  politics  polarization  poll  values  time-use  world  usa  europe  EU  britain  internet  tv  social  white-paper  org:ngo  org:edu  ideology  multi  visualization  spatial  exploratory  polisci  wonkish  network-structure  twitter  techtariat  ssc  neocons  info-dynamics  project  org:junk  journos-pundits  info-foraging  track-record  objektbuch  chart  commentary  backup  org:rec  distribution  biases  comparison  within-without  input-output  supply-demand 
june 2017 by nhaliday
EU Sanctions Punishing Poland & Eastern Europe Are Mistaken. Muslim Migration Serious Problem | National Review
In the past year, Western European politicians often scolded Eastern European governments for retreating from European values, “the open society,” and democracy. And Eastern Europeans on social media just as often threw that rhetoric back in their face. Which looked more like an open democratic society, Paris with its landmarks patrolled by the military — or Krawkow, with its Christmas market unspoiled by the need for automatic weapons?

https://www.wsj.com/articles/europes-elites-seem-determined-to-commit-suicide-by-diversity-1497821665
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/london-terror-isis-finsbury-park/530838/
https://www.ft.com/content/022de0a4-54f4-11e7-9fed-c19e2700005f
https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/06/hate-preacher-hypocrisy/
http://thefederalist.com/2017/06/23/podcast-slow-death-european-culture-politics-identity/
https://www.samharris.org/podcast/item/is-this-the-end-of-europe
https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/879446562577018880
Convince the upper middle class of a thing, and a whole new world will open up for you
https://twitter.com/nunzioni/status/880445812689571844
https://archive.is/nggjV
There are so many people who are falsely described as "stepping stones" to the Alt-Right, but this label genuinely applies to Douglas Murray
news  org:mag  right-wing  rhetoric  douthatish  europe  EU  eastern-europe  policy  migration  assimilation  terrorism  data  poll  values  islam  clown-world  vampire-squid  elite  authoritarianism  multi  org:rec  journos-pundits  migrant-crisis  nihil  patho-altruism  diversity  culture-war  identity-politics  britain  current-events  nationalism-globalism  org:anglo  self-interest  us-them  podcast  audio  interview  twitter  social  commentary  unaffiliated  gnon  class  neocons  org:biz  backup 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Regrets of the Typical American Findings From a Nationally Representative Sample (PDF Download Available)
Results showed inaction regrets lasted longer than action regrets, and that greater loss severity corresponded to more inaction regrets. Regrets more often focused on nonfixable than fixable situations. Women more than men reported love rather than work regrets and, overall, regrets more often focused on romance than on other life domains.
study  sociology  poll  values  reflection  postmortem  long-term  planning  uncertainty  gender  sex  career  gender-diff  sociality  volo-avolo  increase-decrease  signum 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Reading | West Hunter
Reading speed and comprehension interest me, but I don’t have as much information as I would like.  I would like to see the distribution of reading speeds ( in the general population, and also in college graduates).  I have looked a bit at discussions of this, and there’s something wrong.  Or maybe a lot wrong.  Researchers apparently say that nobody reads 900 words a minute with full comprehension, but I’ve seen it done.  I would also like to know if anyone has statistically validated methods that  increase reading speed.

On related topics, I wonder how many serious readers  there are, here and also in other countries.  Are they as common in Japan or China, with their very different scripts?   Are reading speeds higher or lower there?

How many people have  their houses really, truly stuffed with books?  Here and elsewhere?  Last time I checked we had about 5000 books around the house: I figure that’s serious, verging on the pathological.

To what extent do people remember what they read?  Judging from the general results of  adult knowledge studies, not very much of what they took in school, but maybe voluntary reading is different.

https://westhunt.wordpress.com/2012/06/05/reading/#comment-3187
The researchers claim that the range of high-comprehension reading speed doesn’t go up anywhere near 900 wpm. But my daughter routinely reads at that speed. In high school, I took a reading speed test and scored a bit over 1000 wpm, with perfect comprehension.

I have suggested that the key to high reading speed is the experience of trying to finish a entire science fiction paperback in a drugstore before the proprietor tells you to buy the damn thing or get out. Helps if you can hide behind the bookrack.

hmm:
Beijingers' average daily reading time exceeds an hour: report: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201712/07/WS5a293e1aa310fcb6fafd44c0.html

Free Speed Reading Test by AceReader: http://www.freereadingtest.com/
time+comprehension

http://www.readingsoft.com/
claims: 1000 wpm with 85% comprehension at top 1%, 200 wpm at 60% for average

https://www.wsj.com/articles/speed-reading-returns-1395874723
http://projects.wsj.com/speedread/

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=929753
Take a look at "Reading Rate: A Review of Research and Theory" by Ronald P. Carver
http://www.amazon.com/Reading-Rate-Review-Research-Theory/dp...
The conclusion is, basically, that speed reading courses don't work.
You can teach people to skim at a faster rate than they'd read with maximum comprehension and retention. And you can teach people study skills, such as how to summarize salient points, and take notes.
But all these skills are not at all the same as what speed reading usually promises, which is to drastically increase the rate at which you read with full comprehension and retention. According to Carver's book, it can't be done, at least not drastically past about the rate you'd naturally read at the college level.
west-hunter  scitariat  discussion  speculation  ideas  rant  critique  learning  studying  westminster  error  realness  language  japan  china  asia  sinosphere  retention  foreign-lang  info-foraging  scale  speed  innovation  explanans  creative  multi  data  urban-rural  time  time-use  europe  the-great-west-whale  occident  orient  people  track-record  trivia  books  number  knowledge  poll  descriptive  distribution  tools  quiz  neurons  anglo  hn  poast  news  org:rec  metrics  density 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Book Review: Peter Turchin – War and Peace and War
I think Turchin’s book is a good introductory text to the new science of cliodynamics, one he himself did much to found (along with Nefedov and Korotayev). However, though readable – mostly, I suspect, because I am interested in the subject – it is not well-written. The text was too thick, there were too many awkward grammatical constructions, and the quotes are far, far too long.

More importantly, 1) the theory is not internally well-integrated and 2) there isn’t enough emphasis on the fundamental differences separating agrarian from industrial societies. For instance, Turchin makes a lot of the idea that the Italians’ low level of asabiya (“amoral familism”) was responsible for it’s only becoming politically unified in the late 19th century. But why then was it the same for Germany, the bloody frontline for the religious wars of the 17th century? And why was France able to build a huge empire under Napoleon, when it had lost all its “meta-ethnic frontiers” / marches by 1000 AD? For answers to these questions about the genesis of the modern nation-state, one would be much better off by looking at more conventional explanations by the likes of Benedict Anderson, Charles Tilly, or Gabriel Ardant.

Nowadays, modern political technologies – the history textbook, the Monument to the Unknown Soldier, the radio and Internet – have long displaced the meta-ethnic frontier as the main drivers behind the formation of asabiya. Which is certainly not to say that meta-ethnic frontiers are unimportant – they are, especially in the case of Dar al-Islam, which feels itself to be under siege on multiple fronts (the “bloody borders” of clash-of-civilizations-speak), which according to Turchin’s theory should promote a stronger Islamic identity. But their intrinsic importance has been diluted by the influence of modern media.
gnon  books  review  summary  turchin  broad-econ  anthropology  sapiens  cohesion  malthus  cliometrics  deep-materialism  inequality  cycles  oscillation  martial  europe  germanic  history  mostly-modern  world-war  efficiency  islam  MENA  group-selection  cultural-dynamics  leviathan  civilization  big-picture  frontier  conquest-empire  iron-age  mediterranean  usa  pre-ww2  elite  disease  parasites-microbiome  nihil  peace-violence  order-disorder  gallic  early-modern  medieval  EU  general-survey  data  poll  critique  comparison  society  eastern-europe  asia  china  india  korea  sinosphere  anglosphere  latin-america  japan  media  institutions  🎩  vampire-squid  winner-take-all  article  nationalism-globalism  🌞  microfoundations  hari-seldon 
june 2017 by nhaliday
[1705.08807] When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? Evidence from AI Experts
Researchers predict AI will outperform humans in many activities in the next ten years, such as translating languages (by 2024), writing high-school essays (by 2026), driving a truck (by 2027), working in retail (by 2031), writing a bestselling book (by 2049), and working as a surgeon (by 2053). Researchers believe there is a 50% chance of AI outperforming humans in all tasks in 45 years and of automating all human jobs in 120 years, with Asian respondents expecting these dates much sooner than North Americans.

https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/6dy6ex/arxiv_when_will_ai_exceed_human_performance/
study  preprint  science  meta:science  technology  ai  automation  labor  ai-control  risk  futurism  poll  expert  usa  asia  trends  hmm  idk  definite-planning  frontier  ideas  prediction  innovation  china  sinosphere  multi  reddit  social  commentary  ssc  speedometer  flux-stasis  ratty  expert-experience  org:mat  singularity  optimism  pessimism 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Are military coups based on popular opinion? Poor growth performance? - Marginal REVOLUTION
Over the course of this research, I observed that conspirators devoted very little consideration during coup plotting to the question of how the population would react. Coup makers are largely convinced that their cause is just (even when the coup comes from a partisan or personal interest), and that they will have widespread popular support for their actions, with perhaps limited opposition coming from entrenched special interests.

…there is no relationship between economic growth rates and the likelihood of a coup. Similarly, there is no relationship between regime type and coup attempts. Even though democracies are presumed to have higher levels of legitimacy than other kinds of political regimes, they were no more or less likely to experience coup attempts. Lastly, coup attempts were actually more likely to occur during presidential election years, which suggests that conspirators were acting to thwart the popular will rather than being constrained by it.

…The bottom line is that the dynamics of a coup attempt are almost entirely internal to the military.
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may 2017 by nhaliday
What are the big deals when linking demographics and politics? | We the Pleeple
You can see in the chart that religion/church (the black bars) and race/immigrant (the green bars) are just way bigger deals than education, age, gender, income, and region/density. Further, there are some kinds of items where race/immigrant variables are particularly big deals (party identification along with views on rich-poor issues, immigration, gun regulation, racial issues, and white nationalism, which combines views on immigration, race, etc.), while there are other kinds of items where religion/church variables are clearly the dominant demographic predictors (self-labelled liberal/conservative ideology along with views on homosexuality, abortion, marijuana legalization, environmental regulation, and Middle Eastern conflicts).
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may 2017 by nhaliday
What We Do Together: The State of Associational Life in America - Social Capital Project - United States Senator Mike Lee
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may 2017 by nhaliday
Genetically engineered humans will arrive sooner than you think. And we're not ready. - Vox
lol "epigenetics" makes an appearance ofc

https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/06/the-moral-question-that-stanfords-bioengineering-students-get/531876/

For now, that’s prohibitively expensive, but it won’t always be that way. In 2003, it cost 4 dollars to press one of the keys on Endy’s hypothetical synthesizer. This month, it costs just two cents—a 200-fold decrease in price in just 14 years. In the same time frame, the cost of tuition at Stanford has doubled, and is now around $50,000. Given all of that, the first question that Stanford’s budding bioengineers get is this:

At what point will the cost of printing DNA to create a human equal the cost of teaching a student in Stanford?
And the answer is: 19 years from today.

But the follow-up question is a little more complicated:

If you and your future partner are planning to have kids, would you start saving money for college tuition, or for printing the genome of your offspring?
The question tends to split students down the line, says Endy. About 60 percent say that printing a genome is wrong, and flies against what it means to be a parent. They prize the special nature of education and would opt to save for the tuition. But around 40 percent of the class will say that the value of education may change in the future, and if genetic technology becomes mature, and allows them to secure advantages for them and their lineage, they might as well do that.

https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/14/science/synthetic-human-genome.html
http://www.nature.com/news/plan-to-synthesize-human-genome-triggers-mixed-response-1.20028

https://ipscell.com/2017/06/crispr-human-genetic-modification-a-needed-course-correction/
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may 2017 by nhaliday
The Hand that Rocks the Cradle | Rachel Lu | First Things
Factoring out the differentials in fertility, the sociologists estimated that without them, the American public would be more pro-choice by about 5 percent. That doesn’t fully account for the actual shift in attitudes. But it does suggest that fertility differentials have a real impact on public opinion.
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may 2017 by nhaliday
Bagehot: Established political parties are crumbling. Why not the Tories? | The Economist
Theresa May redefines Conservatism as Tories move on from Thatcher: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/18/theresa-may-redefines-conservatism-tories-move-thatcher/
Theresa May criticized the term ‘citizen of the world.’ But half the world identifies that way: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/10/05/theresa-may-criticized-the-term-citizen-of-the-world-but-half-the-world-identifies-that-way/

welp: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom_general_election,_2017
UK 2017 General Election vote examined: income, poverty and Brexit: https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/uk-2017-general-election-vote-examined
- The Conservatives appealed to many lower income voters’ support for Brexit and immigration control. Labour instead appealed to these voters’ economic concerns over living standards, redistribution, inequality and austerity.
- Many voters who are struggling to get by and marginalized may agree with the vote for Brexit and calls to curb immigration, but were more likely to vote for Labour because of their desire for economic redistribution and to endorse Labour’s anti-austerity platform.
- Labour’s pitch to low income voters, and those in poverty, was a key driver of its performance at the 2017 election, but no political party made a major and clear breakthrough with these groups.

lol, this guy: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/jacob-rees-mogg-conservative-mp-north-east-somerset-capital-management-investment-firm-belgravia-a7902951.html
https://streamable.com/yuhyx

The polite extremist: Jacob Rees-Mogg’s seemingly unstoppable rise: https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2018/02/polite-extremist-jacob-rees-mogg-s-seemingly-unstoppable-rise
A Brexit ultra and profound reactionary, the eccentric MP is a strong contender to be the next prime minister. How dangerous is he?
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may 2017 by nhaliday
Le Pen and Macron Clash in Vicious Presidential Debate in France - The New York Times
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/world/europe/france-debate-marine-le-pen-emmanuel-macron.html
http://www.europe1.fr/politique/dans-lemission-politique-de-france-2-macron-rebondit-sur-la-fusillade-des-champs-elysees-3306584
"This threat will be part of the daily life of the next few years," he said, paying tribute to the victim. "The first mission of the President of the Republic is to protect."

https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/world/2017/04/19/a-youth-revolt-in-france-boosts-the-far-right/
If Le Pen wins, European leaders fear the disintegration of the E.U. after decades spent trying to bind the continent more closely together. And although she’s down in hypothetical second-round contests, Le Pen enjoys a commanding lead among France’s youngest voters in the 11-candidate first round, polls show. One survey has her winning nearly 40 percent of the vote among those 18 to 24, nearly double the total of her nearest competitor, Emmanuel Macron.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/04/le-pen-support-young-voters-170415161404170.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/europe/marine-le-pen-national-front-party.html

http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21715979-fran-ois-fillon-admits-no-wrongdoing-putting-his-wife-payroll-his-campaign
François Fillon admits no wrongdoing in putting his wife on the payroll, but his campaign is faltering
http://www.dw.com/en/fillon-election-favorite-despite-plotting-thatcherite-course/a-37131311
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/20/nicolas-sarkozy-risks-falling-foul-of-left-wing-tactical-vote-as/

Daily chart: The centre can indeed hold in France’s presidential election: http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/04/daily-chart-5
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2017/04/france-s-presidential-election
20% per prediction markets: http://predictwise.com/politics/french-politics

later:
Laurent Wauquiez s'insurge contre «les élites»: http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2017/10/25/01002-20171025ARTFIG00363-laurent-wauquiez-s-insurge-contre-les-elites.php
https://twitter.com/epkaufm/status/929011773155442689
New French centre-right contender Laurent Wauquiez follows Kurz model, says elite suppressing debate over mass immigration, Islam, national identity. France for the French
https://twitter.com/whyvert/status/929094212338966528
https://archive.is/xHwZ5
Likely next leader of French Les Republicains @laurentwauquiez positions himself as populist nationalist: denounces the taboo on discussing the nation, massive immigration, identity, values, Islamism
news  org:rec  current-events  europe  gallic  elections  politics  culture-war  westminster  populism  nl-and-so-can-you  nationalism-globalism  multi  government  org:euro  terrorism  crime  order-disorder  patho-altruism  clown-world  lurid  age-generation  data  trends  org:foreign  poll  org:biz  org:anglo  anomie  corruption  business  policy  economics  anglosphere  EU  migrant-crisis  brexit  britain  islam  right-wing  prediction  debate  polisci  tetlock  meta:prediction  judaism  discrimination  leaks  media  eric-kaufmann  twitter  social  commentary  backup  scitariat  gnon 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Places and Preferences: A Longitudinal Analysis of Self-Selection and Contextual Effects | British Journal of Political Science | Cambridge Core
preferences -> place, not place -> preferences (mostly)
Cosmopolitan immigration attitudes in Europe's large cities: Adaptation or selection: https://www.dropbox.com/s/lb3yrsdlhpxprfs/RahsaanMaxwellAPSACosmopolitanImmigrationCities.pdf?dl=0
The myth of London exceptionalism: https://quarterly.demos.co.uk/article/issue-5/ukip-in-london/
London is not as invulnerable to the appeal of UKIP as commonly reported, finds new research from Eric Kaufmann.

Are White British Londoners more accepting of immigration than White British elsewhere? The British Election Study (BES)’s 2015 panel survey asks whether immigration enriches or undermines cultural life. 34.7 per cent of White British outside London say immigration strongly undermines cultural life. But so do 34.4 per cent of White British Londoners. Not much difference there. 44 per cent of White Brits outside London want to leave the EU, but so do 42.3 per cent of White British Londoners. Again, not much in it.

...

Finally, when we control for a fuller range of demographic and attitudinal characteristics, as in figure 4, London and the South East emerge as significantly more likely than the rest of England and Wales to have voted UKIP in 2014, according to the BES.

Cosmopolitan cities and their country cousins – UK in a changing Europe: http://ukandeu.ac.uk/london-voted-leave-or-why-local-differences-in-populist-right-voting-are-overstated/
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may 2017 by nhaliday
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