nhaliday + industrial-org   82

The Western Elite from a Chinese Perspective - American Affairs Journal
I don’t claim to be a modern-day Alexis de Tocqueville, nor do I have much in common with this famous observer of American life. He grew up in Paris, a city renowned for its culture and architecture. I grew up in Shijiazhuang, a city renowned for being the headquarters of the company that produced toxic infant formula. He was a child of aristocrats; I am the child of modest workers.

Nevertheless, I hope my candid observations can provide some insights into the elite institutions of the West. Certain beliefs are as ubiquitous among the people I went to school with as smog was in Shijiazhuang. The doctrines that shape the worldviews and cultural assumptions at elite Western institutions like Cambridge, Stanford, and Goldman Sachs have become almost religious. Nevertheless, I hope that the perspective of a candid Chinese atheist can be of some instruction to them.


So I came to the UK in 2001, when I was 16 years old. Much to my surprise, I found the UK’s exam-focused educational system very similar to the one in China. What is more, in both countries, going to the “right schools” and getting the “right job” are seen as very important by a large group of eager parents. As a result, scoring well on exams and doing well in school interviews—or even the play session for the nursery or pre-prep school—become the most important things in the world. Even at the university level, the undergraduate degree from the University of Cambridge depends on nothing else but an exam at the end of the last year.

On the other hand, although the UK’s university system is considered superior to China’s, with a population that is only one-twentieth the size of my native country, competition, while tough, is less intimidating. For example, about one in ten applicants gets into Oxbridge in the UK, and Stanford and Harvard accept about one in twenty-five applicants. But in Hebei province in China, where I am from, only one in fifteen hundred applicants gets into Peking or Qinghua University.

Still, I found it hard to believe how much easier everything became. I scored first nationwide in the GCSE (high school) math exam, and my photo was printed in a national newspaper. I was admitted into Trinity College, University of Cambridge, once the home of Sir Isaac Newton, Francis Bacon, and Prince Charles.

I studied economics at Cambridge, a field which has become more and more mathematical since the 1970s. The goal is always to use a mathematical model to find a closed-form solution to a real-world problem. Looking back, I’m not sure why my professors were so focused on these models. I have since found that the mistake of blindly relying on models is quite widespread in both trading and investing—often with disastrous results, such as the infamous collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management. Years later, I discovered the teaching of Warren Buffett: it is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong. But our professors taught us to think of the real world as a math problem.

The culture of Cambridge followed the dogmas of the classroom: a fervent adherence to rules and models established by tradition. For example, at Cambridge, students are forbidden to walk on grass. This right is reserved for professors only. The only exception is for those who achieve first class honors in exams; they are allowed to walk on one area of grass on one day of the year.

The behavior of my British classmates demonstrated an even greater herd mentality than what is often mocked in American MBAs. For example, out of the thirteen economists in my year at Trinity, twelve would go on to join investment banks, and five of us went to work for Goldman Sachs.


To me, Costco represents the best of American capitalism. It is a corporation known for having its customers and employees in mind, while at the same time it has compensated its shareholders handsomely over the years. To the customers, it offers the best combination of quality and low cost. Whenever it manages to reduce costs, it passes the savings on to customers immediately. Achieving a 10 percent gross margin with prices below Amazon’s is truly incredible. After I had been there once, I found it hard to shop elsewhere.

Meanwhile, its salaries are much higher than similar retail jobs. When the recession hit in 2008, the company increased salaries to help employees cope with the difficult environment. From the name tags the staff wear, I have seen that frontline employees work there for decades, something hard to imagine elsewhere.

Stanford was for me a distant second to Costco in terms of the American capitalist experience. Overall, I enjoyed the curriculum at the GSB. Inevitably I found some classes less interesting, but the professors all seemed to be quite understanding, even when they saw me reading my kindle during class.

One class was about strategy. It focused on how corporate mottos and logos could inspire employees. Many of the students had worked for nonprofits or health care or tech companies, all of which had mottos about changing the world, saving lives, saving the planet, etc. The professor seemed to like these mottos. I told him that at Goldman our motto was “be long-term greedy.” The professor couldn’t understand this motto or why it was inspiring. I explained to him that everyone else in the market was short-term greedy and, as a result, we took all their money. Since traders like money, this was inspiring. He asked if perhaps there was another motto or logo that my other classmates might connect with. I told him about the black swan I kept on my desk as a reminder that low probability events happen with high frequency. He didn’t like that motto either and decided to call on another student, who had worked at Pfizer. Their motto was “all people deserve to live healthy lives.” The professor thought this was much better. I didn’t understand how it would motivate employees, but this was exactly why I had come to Stanford: to learn the key lessons of interpersonal communication and leadership.

On the communication and leadership front, I came to the GSB knowing I was not good and hoped to get better. My favorite class was called “Interpersonal Dynamics” or, as students referred to it, “Touchy Feely.” In “Touchy Feely,” students get very candid feedback on how their words and actions affect others in a small group that meets several hours per week for a whole quarter.

We talked about microaggressions and feelings and empathy and listening. Sometimes in class the professor would say things to me like “Puzhong, when Mary said that, I could see you were really feeling something,” or “Puzhong, I could see in your eyes that Peter’s story affected you.” And I would tell them I didn’t feel anything. I was quite confused.

One of the papers we studied mentioned that subjects are often not conscious of their own feelings when fully immersed in a situation. But body indicators such as heart rate would show whether the person is experiencing strong emotions. I thought that I generally didn’t have a lot of emotions and decided that this might be a good way for me to discover my hidden emotions that the professor kept asking about.

So I bought a heart rate monitor and checked my resting heart rate. Right around 78. And when the professor said to me in class “Puzhong, I can see that story brought up some emotions in you,” I rolled up my sleeve and checked my heart rate. It was about 77. And so I said, “nope, no emotion.” The experiment seemed to confirm my prior belief: my heart rate hardly moved, even when I was criticized, though it did jump when I became excited or laughed.

This didn’t land well on some of my classmates. They felt I was not treating these matters with the seriousness that they deserved. The professor was very angry. My takeaway was that my interpersonal skills were so bad that I could easily offend people unintentionally, so I concluded that after graduation I should do something that involved as little human interaction as possible.

Therefore, I decided I needed to return to work in financial markets rather than attempting something else. I went to the career service office and told them that my primary goal after the MBA was to make money. I told them that $500,000 sounded like a good number. They were very confused, though, as they said their goal was to help me find my passion and my calling. I told them that my calling was to make money for my family. They were trying to be helpful, but in my case, their advice didn’t turn out to be very helpful.

Eventually I was able to meet the chief financial officer of my favorite company, Costco. He told me that they don’t hire any MBAs. Everyone starts by pushing trolleys. (I have seriously thought about doing just that. But my wife is strongly against it.) Maybe, I thought, that is why the company is so successful—no MBAs!


Warren Buffett has said that the moment one was born in the United States or another Western country, that person has essentially won a lottery. If someone is born a U.S. citizen, he or she enjoys a huge advantage in almost every aspect of life, including expected wealth, education, health care, environment, safety, etc., when compared to someone born in developing countries. For someone foreign to “purchase” these privileges, the price tag at the moment is $1 million dollars (the rough value of the EB-5 investment visa). Even at this price level, the demand from certain countries routinely exceeds the annual allocated quota, resulting in long waiting times. In that sense, American citizens were born millionaires!

Yet one wonders how long such luck will last. This brings me back to the title of Rubin’s book, his “uncertain world.” In such a world, the vast majority things are outside our control, determined by God or luck. After we have given our best and once the final card is drawn, we should neither become too excited by what we have achieved nor too depressed by what we failed to … [more]
news  org:mag  org:popup  letters  lol  :/  china  asia  sinosphere  orient  usa  the-great-west-whale  occident  rot  zeitgeist  tocqueville  culture  comparison  malaise  aphorism  random  realness  hypocrisy  emotion  success  counter-revolution  nascent-state  communism  capitalism  education  higher-ed  britain  anglosphere  competition  oxbridge  tradition  flux-stasis  finance  innovation  autism  👽  near-far  within-without  business  gnon  🐸  twitter  social  commentary  discussion  backup  mena4  futurism  trends  elite  institutions  religion  christianity  theos  truth  scale  population  courage  vitality  models  map-territory  long-short-run  time-preference  patience  temperance  virtu  cultural-dynamics  input-output  impact  investing  monetary-fiscal  is-ought  pic  unaffiliated  right-wing  analytical-holistic  systematic-ad-hoc  stanford  n-factor  civilization  management  industrial-org  people  stream  alien-character  pro-rata  tails  gnosis-logos  signal-noise 
january 2018 by nhaliday
Are Sunk Costs Fallacies? - Gwern.net
But to what extent is the sunk cost fallacy a real fallacy?
Below, I argue the following:
1. sunk costs are probably issues in big organizations
- but maybe not ones that can be helped
2. sunk costs are not issues in animals
3. sunk costs appear to exist in children & adults
- but many apparent instances of the fallacy are better explained as part of a learning strategy
- and there’s little evidence sunk cost-like behavior leads to actual problems in individuals
4. much of what we call sunk cost looks like simple carelessness & thoughtlessness
ratty  gwern  analysis  meta-analysis  faq  biases  rationality  decision-making  decision-theory  economics  behavioral-econ  realness  cost-benefit  learning  wire-guided  marginal  age-generation  aging  industrial-org  organizing  coordination  nature  retention  knowledge  iq  education  tainter  management  government  competition  equilibrium  models  roots  chart 
december 2017 by nhaliday
Relative Quality of Foreign Nurses in the United States
We find a positive wage premium for nurses educated in the Philippines, but not for foreign nurses educated elsewhere. The premium peaked at 8% in 2000, and decreased to 4% in 2010.
pdf  study  economics  labor  industrial-org  migration  human-capital  healthcare  usa  asia  developing-world  general-survey  compensation  econ-productivity  data  ability-competence  quality 
december 2017 by nhaliday
Dressed for Success? The Effect of School Uniforms on Student Achievement and Behavior
Each school in the district determines adoption independently, providing variation over schools and time. By including student and school fixed-effects we find evidence that uniform adoption improves attendance in secondary grades, while in elementary schools they generate large increases in teacher retention.
study  economics  sociology  econometrics  natural-experiment  endo-exo  usa  the-south  social-norms  intervention  policy  wonkish  education  human-capital  management  industrial-org  organizing  input-output  evidence-based  endogenous-exogenous 
october 2017 by nhaliday
The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade
Adjustment in local labor markets is remarkably slow, with wages and labor-force participation rates remaining depressed and unemployment rates remaining elevated for at least a full decade after the China trade shock commences. Exposed workers experience greater job churning and reduced lifetime income. At the national level, employment has fallen in the US industries more exposed to import competition, as expected, but offsetting employment gains in other industries have yet to materialize.

Slicing the Pie: Quantifying the Aggregate and Distributional Effects of Trade: http://www.nber.org/papers/w23737
We find that the China shock increases average welfare but some groups experience losses as high as five times the average gain. Adjusted for plausible measures of inequality aversion, gains in social welfare are positive and only slightly lower than with the standard aggregation.

The Surprisingly Swift Decline of US Manufacturing Employment: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20131578
- Justin R. Pierce, Peter K. Schott
This paper links the sharp drop in US manufacturing employment after 2000 to a change in US trade policy that eliminated potential tariff increases on Chinese imports. Industries more exposed to the change experience greater employment loss, increased imports from China, and higher entry by US importers and foreign-owned Chinese exporters. At the plant level, shifts toward less labor-intensive production and exposure to the policy via input-output linkages also contribute to the decline in employment. Results are robust to other potential explanations of employment loss, and there is no similar reaction in the European Union, where policy did not change.

China-Like Wages Now Part Of U.S. Employment Boom: https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/08/04/china-like-wages-now-part-of-u-s-employment-boom/

U.S. Companies Were Hurt by Trade With China Too: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-12-12/u-s-companies-were-hurt-by-trade-with-china-too
David Autor and David Dorn are two human wrecking balls smashing the edifice of economics consensus. For decades, the one big thing economists could agree on was that free trade, on balance, was good for the U.S. economy. Now, in a series of papers with a variety of co-authors, Autor and Dorn have shown that the dramatic increase in U.S. trade with China in the 2000s was a different and far more destructive beast -- a phenomenon commonly called the China Shock.

The first of these papers showed that the China Shock left deep and lasting scars on huge swathes of the American workforce. The second demonstrated that the China Shock increased political polarization. Now, together with Gordon Hanson, Pian Shu, and Gary Pisano, the wrecking-ball duo have a third paper, showing that the China Shock decreased U.S. corporate innovation.

Importing Political Polarization?: The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure: http://economics.mit.edu/files/11499
Trade-exposed districts with an initial majority white population or initially in Republican hands became substantially more likely to elect a conservative Republican, while trade-exposed districts with an initial majority-minority population or initially in Democratic hands became more likely to elect a liberal Democrat.

The China Shock was Matched by a China Boom: http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2018/01/china-shock-matched-china-boom.html
Our results fit the textbook story that job opportunities in exports make up for jobs lost in import-competing industries, or nearly so. Once we consider the export side, the negative employment effect of trade is much smaller than is implied in the previous literature. Although our analysis finds net job losses in the manufacturing sector for the US, there are remarkable job gains in services, suggesting that international trade has an impact on the labour market according to comparative advantage. The US has comparative advantages in services, so that overall trade led to higher employment through the increased demand for service jobs.
pdf  study  economics  labor  econometrics  autor  china  asia  trade  nationalism-globalism  intervention  inequality  compensation  🎩  trends  zeitgeist  heavy-industry  automation  multi  distribution  usa  macro  noahpinion  econotariat  contrarianism  politics  trump  europe  current-events  2016-election  postmortem  input-output  news  org:mag  org:biz  org:bv  business  innovation  links  summary  list  industrial-org  wonkish  roots  polarization  article  org:lite  class  class-warfare  chart  political-econ  polisci  government  tribalism  sociology  cost-benefit  unintended-consequences  marginal-rev  definite-planning  the-world-is-just-atoms  amazon  winner-take-all  malaise  gnosis-logos  endogenous-exogenous 
august 2017 by nhaliday
From Soviets to Oligarchs: Inequality and Property in Russia 1905-2016
We find that official survey-based measures vastly under-estimate the rise of inequality since 1990. According to our benchmark estimates, top income shares are now similar to (or higher than) the levels observed in the United States. We also find that inequality has increased substantially more in Russia than in China and other ex-communist countries in Eastern Europe. We relate this finding to the specific transition strategy followed in Russia. According to our benchmark estimates, the wealth held offshore by rich Russians is about three times larger than official net foreign reserves, and is comparable in magnitude to total household financial assets held in Russia.

Figure 1a, 8abc, 9b

The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/0895330053147994

Using a unique dataset, we describe the degree of ownership concentration in Russian economy and its role in shaping economic and political institutions in Russia. In particular, we find that Russian "oligarchs" do control a substantial part of the economy. While the relative weight of their firms in Russian economy is huge, they do not seem to be excessively large by the standards of the global economy where most of them are operating. The oligarchs seem to run their firms more efficiently than other Russian owners controlling for industry, region and size.

Russia's Billionaires: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.p20161068

Using data collected by Forbes since the 1990s, I examine the emergence and survival of the super-wealthy in Russia over the past two decades and compare Russia's record to those of other countries. The major surge in the number of Russian billionaires came in the mid-2000s, mirroring the dynamic worldwide. While early billionaires were predominantly found in the oil, gas, metals, and banking sectors, the distribution has become more diverse, now including some in trade, real estate, chemicals, and information technology. Only a minority of today's Russian billionaires acquired significant assets in the privatization of the 1990s.

Popular Attitudes towards Markets and Democracy: Russia and United States Compared 25 Years Later: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22027

While we find some differences in attitudes towards markets across countries and through time, we do not find most of the differences large or significant. Our evidence does not support a common view that the Russian personality is fundamentally illiberal or non-democratic.

The Political Economy of Transition: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/0895330027102
- Gérard Roland, 2002

The overriding importance of political constraints in the transition process has led to developments of the theory of the political economy of reform. What are the main insights from that theory? How does it reflect the transition reality? What have we learned, and what do we still need to learn? The present article will attempt to answer those questions.

pdf  study  economics  broad-econ  history  mostly-modern  pre-ww2  cold-war  russia  communism  authoritarianism  inequality  data  class  econ-metrics  wealth  compensation  money  usa  china  asia  capitalism  visualization  elite  vampire-squid  time-series  distribution  piketty  multi  chart  heavy-industry  nationalism-globalism  flux-stasis  🎩  political-econ  polisci  winner-take-all  poll  values  democracy  institutions  industrial-org  property-rights  efficiency  energy-resources  roots  corruption  group-level  market-power  rent-seeking  regression-to-mean  legacy  anomie  quality  econ-productivity  leviathan  technocracy  civic  madisonian  redistribution  world  growth-econ  developing-world  markets  news  org:foreign 
august 2017 by nhaliday
Trust in Large Organizations
We argue that trust should be particularly important for the performance of large organizations. In a cross-section of countries, evidence on government performance, participation in civic and professional societies, importance of large firms, and the performance of social institutions more generally supports this hypothesis. Moreover, trust is lower in countries with dominant hierarchical religions, which may have deterred networks of cooperation trust hold up remarkably well on a cross-section of countries.

The Importance of Trust for Investment: Evidence from Venture Capital: http://www.nber.org/papers/w16923
We examine the effect of trust on financial investment and contracting decisions in a micro-economic environment where trust is exogenous. Using hand-collected data on European venture capital, we show that the Eurobarometer measure of trust among nations significantly affects investment decisions. This holds even after controlling for investor and company fixed effects, geographic distance, information and transaction costs. The national identity of venture capital firms' individual partners further contributes to the effect of trust. Education and work experience reduce the effect of trust but do not eliminate it. We also examine the relationship between trust and sophisticated contracts involving contingent control rights and find that, even after controlling for endogeneity, they are complements, not substitutes.

Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers: http://www.nber.org/papers/w2342
The paper questions the common view that share price increases of firms involved in hostile takeovers measure efficiency gains from acquisitions. Even if such gains exist, most of the increase in the combined value of the target and the acquirer is likely to come from stakeholder wealth losses, such as declines in value of subcontractors' firm-specific capital or employees' human capital. The use of event studies to gauge wealth creation in takeovers is unjustified. The paper also suggests a theory of managerial behavior, in which hiring and entrenching trustworthy managers enables shareholders to commit to upholding implicit contracts with stakeholders. Hostile takeovers are an innovation allowing shareholders to renege on such contracts ex post, against managers' will. On this view, shareholder gains are redistributions from stakeholders, and can in the long run result in deterioration of trust necessary for the functioning of the corporation.

Trust in Public Finance: http://www.nber.org/papers/w9187
Using data on trust and trustworthiness from the 1990 wave of the World Values Survey, I first investigate a model of the extent of tax cheating and the size of government that recognizes the interdependence of the two. The results reveal that tax cheating is lower in countries that exhibit more (not-government-related) trustworthiness. However, holding that constant, tax cheating becomes more acceptable as government grows. All in all, there is some weak evidence that the strong positive cross-country correlation between the size of government and tax cheating masks the fact that big government induces tax cheating while, at the same time, tax cheating constrains big government. I then add to the structural model an equation determining the level of prosperity, allowing prosperity to depend, inter alia, on the level of government and on trust in others. I find some evidence that both prosperity and government involvement are higher in more trusting societies. Moreover, holding these measures of trust constant, the association of government size with prosperity is positive until a level of government spending somewhere between 31% and 38% of GDP, after which its marginal effect is negative. Thus, although a trusting citizenry allows larger government, the tax burden this entails erodes the rule obedience taxpayers exhibit toward government.

Tax cheating among whites: http://anepigone.blogspot.com/2017/04/tax-cheating-among-whites.html
The masses still more or less assume that “against the law” is a synonym for “wrong.” It is known that the criminal law is harsh and full of anomalies and that litigation is so expensive as always to favour the rich against the poor: but there is a general feeling that the law, such as it is, will be scrupulously administered … An Englishman does not believe in his bones, as a Spanish or Italian peasant does, that the law is simply a racket.

The English People, Collins, 1947

WEIRDO societies require WEIRDOs to make them work. The less WEIRDO a society becomes, the more being a WEIRDO--characterized by high social trust, reciprocity, political compromise, generosity to those in need, isonomy, etc--switches from being an advantage to being a disadvantage. Social trust declines, reciprocity disappears, political compromise is replaced by a winner-take-all ethnic spoils system, generosity is exploited to the point that it is seen as an entitlement, and the legal system gets hijacked by racial grievance concepts like "social justice". It's a vicious circle.

Theodore Roosevelt
Third Annual Message
December 7, 1903

The consistent policy of the National Government, so far as it has the power, is to hold in check the unscrupulous man, whether employer or employee; but to refuse to weaken individual initiative or to hamper or cramp the industrial development of the country. We recognize that this is an era of federation and combination, in which great capitalistic corporations and labor unions have become factors of tremendous importance in all industrial centers. Hearty recognition is given the far-reaching, beneficent work which has been accomplished through both corporations and unions, and the line as between different corporations, as between different unions, is drawn as it is between different individuals; that is, it is drawn on conduct, the effort being to treat both organized capital and organized labor alike; asking nothing save that the interest of each shall be brought into harmony with the interest of the general public, and that the conduct of each shall conform to the fundamental rules of obedience to law, of individual freedom, and of justice and fair dealing towards all. Whenever either corporation, labor union, or individual disregards the law or acts in a spirit of arbitrary and tyrannous interference with the rights of others, whether corporations or individuals, then where the Federal Government has jurisdiction, it will see to it that the misconduct is stopped, paying not the slightest heed to the position or power of the corporation, the union or the individual, but only to one vital fact--that is, the question whether or not the conduct of the individual or aggregate of individuals is in accordance with the law of the land. Every man must be guaranteed his liberty and his right to do as he likes with his property or his labor, so long as he does not infringe the rights of others. _No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we ask any man's permission when we require him to obey it. Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not asked as a favor._
study  economics  growth-econ  broad-econ  trust  cohesion  cooperate-defect  n-factor  phalanges  things  industrial-org  business  management  institutions  civic  social-capital  scale  religion  theos  world  putnam-like  government  leviathan  diversity  corruption  technocracy  efficiency  society  sociology  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  network-structure  social-norms  social-structure  🎩  multi  investing  venture  finance  europe  EU  nationalism-globalism  endo-exo  natural-experiment  general-survey  taxes  redistribution  securities  larry-summers  labor  gnon  usa  data  analysis  poll  values  morality  ethics  mediterranean  britain  the-great-west-whale  patho-altruism  free-riding  slippery-slope  equilibrium  integrity  anglosphere  big-peeps  quotes  isteveish  commentary  optimate  truth  law  order-disorder  old-anglo  formal-values  pop-diff  identity-politics  pre-ww2  public-goodish  class-warfare  alien-character  chart  contracts  axelrod  models  coordination  honor  organizing  endogenous-exogenous  speaking  statesme 
august 2017 by nhaliday
加雷特•琼斯 on Twitter: "The hottest take would be Krehbiel's Legislative Organization angle: Five members are more than enough if they're on the same subcommittee. https://t.co/kebW0la9bF"

As if more than five members of Congress could understand this.

Don't know! I know that we're all supposed to endorse open government, but that presumption should be interrogated.

Bring Back the Smoke-Filled Rooms: http://web.archive.org/web/20150503211359/http://cookpolitical.com/story/8407

Lowi's End of Liberalism & McCubbins/Schwartz 🔥 Alarms haunt CBO oversight:
Members won't get expertise: Delegation is the only option.

Lowi: https://medium.com/amor-mundi/ted-lowi-in-memoriam-of-his-work-bc88822b3419
basically the managerial state

A second, and more dangerous form of bureaucracy, is “government by decree.” It is a government that sees the law as a hindrance, an obstacle to be overcome in the bureaucratic effort to govern the people directly. Decrees are anonymous. They give the impression of constant action. It is government that eschews principles for the quick and personalized response to ever-changing circumstances. Arendt writes, “People ruled by decree never know what rules them because of the impossibility of understanding decrees in themselves and the carefully organized ignorance of specific circumstances and their practical significance in which all administrators keep their subjects.”

Reflecting Arendt, Lowi argues that liberalism has led in the United States to a government of “policy without law,” something like a government by decree. An essential part of this government by decree is the abandonment by the Congress of its governing responsibility, which it has increasingly delegated to the administrative state. The effort of liberal government, Lowi argues, is to “avoid enunciating a rule” and to replace clear rules and standards with “the principle of bargaining on each decision.” This is in fact Lowi’s overarching thesis: That liberalism replaces power with bargaining. “Liberal governments cannot plan. Planning requires the authoritative use of authority. Planning requires law, choice, priorities, moralities. Liberalism replaces planning with bargaining. Yet at bottom, power is unacceptable without planning.”

In the second edition of The End of Liberalism, Lowi added a subtitle, “The Second Republic of the United States.” The book tells a story of the transformation from the First to the Second Republic. In the First Republic, which goes from 1787 until about 1960, the states did most of the governing. The national government was both small and, more importantly, did very little governing. To the extent the federal government did govern, government was “Congress-centered.” The Congress was the main legislative arm of government. It was where the power of the Federal government was located.


The result of such a government by administration is what Lowi calls “socialism for the organized, capitalism for the unorganized.” It is a system that favors bigger and more organized businesses, unions, and interest groups. “It is biased not so much in favor of the rich as in favor of the established and the organized…. Above all it respects the established jurisdictions of government agencies and the established territories of private corporations and groups.” In short, the Second Republic offers a kind of politics that is “supportive of the clientele it seeks to deal with,” the organized interest groups that make claims upon it.

The Strength of a Weak State: The Rights Revolution and the Rise of Human Resources Management Divisions: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/dobbin/files/1998_ajs_sutton.pdf

related: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:e295cdb33beb

'police patrol' vs. 'faire alarms': https://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/teaching/PLSC541_Fall08/mcubbins_schwartz_1984.pdf
econotariat  garett-jones  twitter  social  commentary  current-events  politics  government  polisci  institutions  ideology  books  recommendations  multi  pdf  study  usa  🎩  open-closed  decision-making  managerial-state  anarcho-tyranny  trust  rot  zeitgeist  leviathan  org:med  summary  law  authoritarianism  antidemos  technocracy  trends  history  mostly-modern  capitalism  madisonian  regulation  redistribution  nascent-state  cohesion  cynicism-idealism  sociology  labor  industrial-org  gender  race  identity-politics  management  corporation  backup  gibbon  cold-war  local-global  ideas 
august 2017 by nhaliday
Is the U.S. Aggregate Production Function Cobb-Douglas? New Estimates of the Elasticity of Substitution∗
world-wide: http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~duffy/papers/jeg2.pdf
We find that IPP capital entirely explains the observed decline of the US labor share, which otherwise is secularly constant over the past 65 years for structures and equipment capital. The labor share decline simply reflects the fact that the US economy is undergoing a transition toward a larger IPP sector.
The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms: http://www.nber.org/papers/w23396
The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share: https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2013b_elsby_labor_share.pdf
Table 2 has industry disaggregation
Estimating the U.S. labor share: https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2017/article/estimating-the-us-labor-share.htm

Why Workers Are Losing to Capitalists: https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-09-20/why-workers-are-losing-to-capitalists
Automation and offshoring may be conspiring to reduce labor's share of income.
pdf  study  economics  growth-econ  econometrics  usa  data  empirical  analysis  labor  capital  econ-productivity  manifolds  magnitude  multi  world  🎩  piketty  econotariat  compensation  inequality  winner-take-all  org:ngo  org:davos  flexibility  distribution  stylized-facts  regularizer  hmm  history  mostly-modern  property-rights  arrows  invariance  industrial-org  trends  wonkish  roots  synthesis  market-power  efficiency  variance-components  business  database  org:gov  article  model-class  models  automation  nationalism-globalism  trade  news  org:mag  org:biz  org:bv  noahpinion  explanation  summary  methodology  density  polarization  map-territory  input-output 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Does Management Matter? Evidence from India
We have shown that management matters, with improvements in management practices improving plant-level outcomes. One response from economists might then be to argue that poor management can at most be a short-run problem, since in the long run better managed firms should take over the market. Yet many of our firms have been in business for 20 years and more.

One reason why better run firms do not dominate the market is constraints on growth derived from limited managerial span of control. In every firm in our sample only members of the owning family have positions with major decision-making power over finance, purchasing, operations or employment. Non-family members are given only lower-level managerial positions with authority only over basic day-to-day activities. The principal reason is that family members do not trust non-family members. For example, they are concerned if they let their plant managers procure yarn they may do so at inflated rates from friends and receive kick-backs.

A key reason for this inability to decentralize is the poor rule of law in India. Even if directors found managers stealing, their ability to successfully prosecute them and recover the assets is minimal because of the inefficiency of Indian civil courts. A compounding reason for the inability to decentralize in Indian firms is bad management practices, as this means the owners cannot keep good track of materials and finance, so may not even able to identify mismanagement or theft within their firms.30

As a result of this inability to delegate, firms can expand beyond the size that can be managed by a single director only if other family members are available to share directorial duties. Thus, an important predictor of firm size was the number of male family members of the owners. In particular, the number of brothers and sons of the leading director has a correlation of 0.689 with the total employment of the firm, compared to a correlation between employment and the average management score of 0.223. In fact the best managed firm in our sample had only one (large) production plant, in large part because the owner had no brothers or sons to help run a larger organization. This matches the ideas of the Lucas (1978) span of control model, that there are diminishing returns to how much additional productivity better management technology can generate from a single manager. In the Lucas model, the limits to firm growth restrict the ability of highly productive firms to drive lower productivity ones from the market. In our Indian firms, this span of control restriction is definitely binding, so unproductive firms are able to survive because more productive firms cannot expand.


However, when we reverse the employment statistic–only ~15% of Indians work for a firm compared to approximately 90% of US workers we see the problem. Entrepreneurship in India isn’t a choice, it’s a requirement. Indian entrepreneurship is a consequence of India’s failed economy. As a I wrote in my Cato paper with Goldschlag, less developed countries in general, not just India, have more entrepreneurs.


The modal size of an Indian firm is 1 employee and the mean is just over 2. The mean number of employees in a US firm is closer to 20 but even though that is ten times the Indian number it obscures the real difference. The US has many small firms but what makes it different is that it also has large firms that employ lots of people. In fact, over half of all US workers are employed by the tiny minority (0.3%) of firms with over 500 employees.

blames colonialism, idk, might have contributed

Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India: https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20150029
Students in India who cheat on a simple laboratory task are more likely to prefer public sector jobs. This paper shows that cheating on this task predicts corrupt behavior by civil servants, implying that it is a meaningful predictor of future corruption. Students who demonstrate pro-social preferences are less likely to prefer government jobs, while outcomes on an explicit game and attitudinal measures to measure corruption do not systematically predict job preferences. _A screening process that chooses high-ability applicants would not alter the average propensity for corruption._ The findings imply that differential selection into government may contribute, in part, to corruption.

Where Does the Good Shepherd Go? Civic Virtue and Sorting into Public Sector Employment: http://repec.business.uzh.ch/RePEc/iso/leadinghouse/0134_lhwpaper.pdf
Our study extends the understanding of the motivational basis of public sector employment by considering civic virtue in addition to altruism and risk aversion and by investigating selection and socialization. Using a largely representative, longitudinal data set of employees in Germany including 63,101 observations of 13,673 different individuals, we find that civic virtue relates positively to public sector employment beyond altruism and risk aversion. We find evidence on selection and no evidence on socialization as an explanation for this result.

Sadly, this is not a book about some small, shady corner of Indian politics: 34% of the members of parliament (MPs) in the Lok Sabha (lower house) have criminal charges filed against them; and the figure is rising (see chart). Some of the raps are peccadillos, such as rioting or unlawful assembly—par for the course in India’s raucous local politics. But over a fifth of MPs are in the dock for serious crimes, often facing reams of charges for anything from theft to intimidation and worse. (Because the Indian judicial system has a backlog of 31m cases, even serious crimes can take a decade or more to try, so few politicians have been convicted.) One can walk just about the whole way from Mumbai to Kolkata without stepping foot outside a constituency whose MP isn’t facing a charge.


What is more surprising is that the supply of willing criminals-cum-politicians was met with eager demand from voters. Over the past three general elections, a candidate with a rap sheet of serious charges has had an 18% chance of winning his or her race, compared with 6% for a “clean” rival. Mr Vaishnav dispels the conventional wisdom that crooks win because they can get voters to focus on caste or some other sectarian allegiance, thus overlooking their criminality. If anything, the more serious the charge, the bigger the electoral boost, as politicians well know.

As so often happens in India, poverty plays a part. India is almost unique in having adopted universal suffrage while it was still very poor. The upshot has been that underdeveloped institutions fail to deliver what citizens vote for. Getting the state to perform its most basic functions—building a school, disbursing a subsidy, repaving a road—is a job that can require banging a few heads together. Sometimes literally. Who better to represent needy constituents in these tricky situations than someone who “knows how to get things done”? If the system doesn’t work for you, a thuggish MP can be a powerful ally.

study  economics  broad-econ  growth-econ  econometrics  field-study  india  asia  pseudoE  management  industrial-org  cultural-dynamics  institutions  trust  intervention  coordination  cohesion  n-factor  kinship  orient  multi  twitter  social  commentary  econotariat  spearhead  wealth-of-nations  pop-diff  pdf  scale  gender  leviathan  econ-productivity  marginal-rev  world  developing-world  comparison  usa  business  network-structure  labor  social-structure  lived-experience  entrepreneurialism  hmm  microfoundations  culture  corruption  anomie  crooked  human-capital  technocracy  government  data  crime  criminology  north-weingast-like  news  org:rec  org:biz  org:anglo  politics  populism  incentives  transportation  society  GT-101  integrity  🎩  endo-exo  cooperate-defect  ethics  attaq  selection  europe  the-great-west-whale  germanic  correlation  altruism  outcome-risk  uncertainty  impetus  longitudinal  civic  public-goodish  organizing  endogenous-exogenous 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Revealing the Economic Consequences of Group Cohesion
A comprehensive program of new experiments reveals the considerable economic impact of cohesion: higher cohesion groups are significantly more likely to achieve Pareto-superior outcomes in classic weak-link coordination games. We show that effects of cohesion are economically large, robust, and portable. We identify social preferences as a primary mechanism explaining the effects of cohesion.


Our workhorse to study group outcomes is a weak-link coordination game chosen because it captures economically interesting problems endemic to organizations and teams (e.g., Camerer and Weber (2013)). In our version of the weak-link game, inspired by Brandts and Cooper (2006), group members simultaneously choose an effort level. Payoffs to each group member then depend on their own effort and the lowest effort chosen by anyone (the “weakest link”) in the group. The game has multiple strict Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria in material payoffs. This feature makes it particularly interesting for our purposes because it combines two dimensions of group success: features of coordination (choosing the same effort level as other group members) and cooperation (groups achieving Pareto-superior Nash equilibria). We expected our weak-link game to be a “harsh” environment in the sense that most groups who play this game under anonymity and in the absence of pre-existing social relationships will collapse to the Pareto-worst equilibrium and never escape from it (Brandts and Cooper (2006), and own replication).

As we show in Section V, group cohesion is a key determinant of behavior in our experiments: low cohesion groups usually descend rapidly to minimum effort; high cohesion groups fare much better and high cohesion appears necessary (though not sufficient) for achieving Pareto-superior outcomes. Surprisingly, our measure of group cohesion is the only variable that successfully predicts cooperation success; none of more than twenty control variables (demographics and group characteristics) explain minimum effort. Further experiments show that our results are robust to the timing of oneness measurement (before or after play of the weak-link game). By benchmarking our results against the effect of monetary incentives, we also show (Section VI) that the effortenhancing effects of group cohesion are sizeable: large financial incentives are needed to achieve the levels of minimum effort expected for high cohesion groups.

In Section VII we turn to an explanation of our results. A rational choice perspective suggests three natural channels through which group cohesion could operate: it might affect some combination of group members’ social preferences, their beliefs or the form of their strategic reasoning. Considering social preferences, it is plausible to assume that members of highly cohesive groups care about one another and so place weight on each other’s earnings.1 In our weak-link game, if players do draw utility from each other’s earnings, this is tantamount to (some) sharing of earnings, which reduces strategic risk and fosters coordination on Pareto-superior equilibria.2 In relation to beliefs, highly cohesive groups may be more confident in simulating other group members’ thought processes and likely actions, perhaps because of a history of interactions in different (related) situations, which allows for implicit learning (e.g., Holyoak and Spellman (1993), Rick and Weber (2010)). Finally, group cohesion might influence the nature of strategic reasoning in more substantive ways. For instance, according to one model of strategic thinking, “team reasoning” (e.g., Sugden (2003), Bacharach (2006)), people think in terms of what would be best for the team (e.g., picking the Pareto-best equilibrium) and are inclined to do their part in implementing the group-optimal outcome. An interesting possibility is that team reasoning may be more likely the more cohesive the team is. These three channels might operate jointly and potentially reinforce each other in high cohesion groups. By contrast, low cohesion groups may have low levels of social preferences, little implicit learning to draw on from shared situations, and no team perception to facilitate team reasoning.

We probe these possibilities in two steps. We first show that subjects who report high oneness with their fellow group members are indeed more likely to expose themselves to the strategic risk of choosing high initial effort in our weak-link games; they are also less “harsh” in their responses when others’ effort levels are below their own. In highly cohesive groups, these tendencies apply across group members promoting coordination on equilibria above the Pareto-worst.

Our second step is to identify the social preferences channel as a promising route for explaining observed effects of group cohesion. We demonstrate this via additional experiments in which unrelated and anonymous group members play weak-link games but with all earnings shared equally. We interpret this manipulation as inducing a limiting form of social preferences (where all put equal weight on everyone’s material payoffs). The results show patterns of effort (opening levels and dynamics) very comparable to the top third most cohesive groups from our main experiment. Thus, social preferences provide a parsimonious candidate explanation of how group cohesion promotes Pareto-superior equilibria.

Smart groups of smart people: Evidence for IQ as the origin of collective intelligence in the performance of human groups: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160289616303282
Group-IQ almost exclusively reflects individual cognition. (80% variance explained)
pdf  study  org:ngo  economics  growth-econ  behavioral-gen  psychology  social-psych  cohesion  putnam-like  coordination  trust  social-capital  values  tribalism  descriptive  collaboration  pareto  efficiency  anthropology  altruism  🎩  white-paper  info-econ  microfoundations  industrial-org  n-factor  broad-econ  cooperate-defect  axelrod  organizing  roots  interests  hive-mind  multi  iq  gender  contrarianism  critique  management  diversity  individualism-collectivism  objective-measure  biophysical-econ  wealth-of-nations  variance-components  null-result  attaq  intelligence  psychometrics  decision-making  GT-101  public-goodish 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Yale Law Journal - Amazon's Antitrust Paradox
This Note argues that the current framework in antitrust—specifically its pegging competition to “consumer welfare,” defined as short-term price effects—is unequipped to capture the architecture of market power in the modern economy. We cannot cognize the potential harms to competition posed by Amazon’s dominance if we measure competition primarily through price and output. Specifically, current doctrine underappreciates the risk of predatory pricing and how integration across distinct business lines may prove anticompetitive. These concerns are heightened in the context of online platforms for two reasons. First, the economics of platform markets create incentives for a company to pursue growth over profits, a strategy that investors have rewarded. Under these conditions, predatory pricing becomes highly rational—even as existing doctrine treats it as irrational and therefore implausible. Second, because online platforms serve as critical intermediaries, integrating across business lines positions these platforms to control the essential infrastructure on which their rivals depend. This dual role also enables a platform to exploit information collected on companies using its services to undermine them as competitors.

Amazon Must Be Stopped: https://newrepublic.com/article/119769/amazons-monopoly-must-be-broken-radical-plan-tech-giant

Amazon Will Go To Denver: https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/09/10/amazon-will-go-to-denver/
Real things cities are offering to get Amazon HQ2
*Chicago: Let Amazon keep employees' income tax
*SoCal: Give away $100M in land
*Boston: City employees working just for Amazon
*Fresno: Let Amazon decide how to spend tax dollars

Washington, D.C., might have a leg up, having already hosted Amazon Chief Executive Jeff Bezos for visits when he considered acquiring the Washington Post, which he now owns. Mr. Bezos also purchased the former Textile Museum in Washington’s Kalorama neighborhood for $23 million in 2016 and is currently turning it into a private residence.

28-year-old makes millions buying from Walmart, selling on Amazon: https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/companies/28-year-old-makes-millions-buying-from-walmart-selling-on-amazon/ar-AAupB8i

Thread: Why Amazon’s HQ2 is going to Fairfax County


walmart is the only entity that has even a slim chance at preventing jeff bezos from intermediating every commodity exchange in the world, u must respect

"I tried to save you, but you didn't listen. Now you'll have to face Him alone..."

What Amazon does to wages: https://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21735020-worlds-largest-retailer-underpaying-its-employees-what-amazon-does-wages
Is the world’s largest retailer underpaying its employees?

Flat or falling industry wages are common in the cities and towns where Amazon opens distribution centres, according to an analysis by The Economist. Government figures show that after Amazon opens a storage depot, local wages for warehouse workers fall by an average of 3%. In places where Amazon operates, such workers earn about 10% less than similar workers employed elsewhere.

What Amazon Does to Poor Cities: https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/02/amazon-warehouses-poor-cities/552020/
The debate over Amazon’s HQ2 obscures the company’s rapid expansion of warehouses in low-income areas.

The Facts Behind Trump’s Tweets on Amazon, Taxes and the Postal Service: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/29/us/politics/trump-amazon-post-office-fact-check.html

If Workers Slack Off, the Wristband Will Know. (And Amazon Has a Patent for It.): https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/technology/amazon-wristband-tracking-privacy.html

auto-management -> automation dystopia: http://marshallbrain.com/manna.htm

Amazon’s vision for the future: delivery drone beehives in every city: https://www.theverge.com/2017/6/23/15860668/amazon-drone-delivery-patent-city-centers
article  essay  study  law  business  industrial-org  market-power  rent-seeking  amazon  sv  tech  markets  capitalism  winner-take-all  multi  news  org:mag  org:biz  gnxp  scitariat  commentary  current-events  org:lite  right-wing  corporation  trends  zeitgeist  rhetoric  barons  management  org:rec  usa  the-west  video  profile  arbitrage  entrepreneurialism  microbiz  feudal  prediction  prediction-markets  power  org:local  twitter  social  discussion  speculation  backup  the-south  virginia-DC  planning  career  org:bv  econotariat  marginal-rev  inequality  gnon  🐸  memes(ew)  data  econ-metrics  marginal  malaise  supply-demand  labor  coming-apart  compensation  intervention  branches  org:anglo  automation  techtariat  ai  scifi-fantasy  pessimism  optimism  orwellian  vampire-squid  left-wing  trump  media  propaganda  taxes  government  capital 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Is America Encouraging the Wrong Kind of Entrepreneurship?
Of Baumol’s many contributions to economics, the most famous is cost disease, which explains why high-productivity industries raise costs and therefore prices in low-productivity industries. The insight is particularly relevant now, as economic activity has shifted into low-productivity services like health care and education, where price increases are devouring public and household budgets, and whose continued low productivity has weighed down U.S. productivity growth overall.

But there’s a lesser-known idea of Baumol’s that is equally relevant today and that may help explain America’s productivity slump. Baumol’s writing raises the possibility that U.S. productivity is low because would-be entrepreneurs are focused on the wrong kind of work.
news  org:biz  economics  business  industrial-org  startups  entrepreneurialism  trends  rot  market-power  rent-seeking  winner-take-all  corruption  anomie  government  regulation  usa  stagnation  madisonian  capitalism  class-warfare  zeitgeist  org:mag 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Companies by revenue per employee - Marginal REVOLUTION
We found that Energy companies have the highest average Revenue per Employee, while Industrials and Consumer Discretionaries perform worst on this metric.

Technology companies performed at the lower end of the range on Revenue per Employee; part of the reason for this however, is other companies in spaces like Energy and Healthcare have large non-employee costs that Technology companies do not have.
econotariat  marginal-rev  commentary  brands  economics  business  industrial-org  data  cost-benefit  money  pro-rata  labor  tech  winner-take-all 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Skin or Skim? Inside Investment and Hedge Fund Performance by Arpit Gupta, Kunal Sachdeva :: SSRN
We find that funds with greater investment by insiders outperform funds with less "skin in the game" on a factor-adjusted basis; exhibit greater return persistence; and feature lower fund flow-performance sensitivities.
study  economics  finance  ORFE  investing  paying-rent  business  industrial-org 
june 2017 by nhaliday
An Economic Analysis of the Protestant Reformation
- Ekelund, Hébert, Tollison

This paper seeks to explain the initial successes and failures of Protestantism on economic grounds. It argues that the medieval Roman Catholic Church, through doctrinal manipulation, the exclusion of rivals, and various forms of price discrimination, ultimately placed members seeking the Z good "spiritual services" on the margin of defection. These monopolistic practices encouraged entry by rival firms, some of which were aligned with civil governments. The paper hypothesizes that Protestant entry was facilitated in emergent entrepreneurial societies characterized by the decline of feudalism and relatively unstable distribution of wealth and repressed in more homogeneous, rent-seeking societies that were mostly dissipating rather than creating wealth. In these societies the Roman Church was more able to continue the practice of price discrimination. Informal tests of this proposition are conducted by considering primogeniture and urban growth as proxies for wealth stability.

Causes and Consequences of the Protestant Reformation: https://pseudoerasmus.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/becker-pfaff-rubin-2016.pdf
- Sascha O. Becker, Steven Pfaff, Jared Rubin

The Protestant Reformation is one of the defining events of the last millennium. Nearly 500 years after the Reformation, its causes and consequences have seen a renewed interest in the social sciences. Research in economics, sociology, and political science increasingly uses detailed individual-level, city-level, and regional-level data to identify drivers of the adoption of the Reformation, its diffusion pattern, and its socioeconomic consequences. We take stock of this research, pointing out what we know and what we do not know and suggesting the most promising areas for future research.

Table 1: Studies of the Supply and Demand-Side Factors of the Reformation
Table 2: Studies on the Consequences of the Reformation: Human Capital
Table 3: Studies on the Consequences of the Reformation: Work and Work Ethic
Table 4: Studies on the Consequences of the Reformation: Economic Development
Table 5: Studies on the Consequences of the Reformation: Governance
Table 6: Studies on the “Dark” Consequences of the Reformation

LUTHER AND SULEYMAN: http://www.jstor.org.sci-hub.tw/stable/40506214
- Murat Iyigun

Various historical accounts have suggested that the Ottomans' rise helped the Protestant Reformation as well as its offshoots, such as Zwinglianism, Anabaptism, and Calvinism, survive their infancy and mature. Utilizing a comprehensive data set on violent confrontations for the interval between 1401 and 1700 CE, I show that the incidence of military engagements between the Protestant Reformers and the Counter-Reformation forces between the 1520s and 1650s depended negatively on the Ottomans' military activities in Europe. Furthermore, I document that the impact of the Ottomans on Europe went beyond suppressing ecclesiastical conflicts only: at the turn of the sixteenth century, Ottoman conquests lowered the number of all newly initiated conflicts among the Europeans roughly by 25 percent, while they dampened all longer-running feuds by more than 15 percent. The Ottomans' military activities influenced the length of intra-European feuds too, with each Ottoman-European military engagement shortening the duration of intra-European conflicts by more than 50 percent. Thus, while the Protestant Reformation might have benefited from - and perhaps even capitalized on - the Ottoman advances in Europe, the latter seems to have played some role in reducing conflicts within Europe more generally.

Religious Competition and Reallocation: The Political Economy of Secularization in the Protestant Reformation: http://www.jeremiahdittmar.com/files/RRR_20170919.pdf
- Davide Cantoni, Jeremiah Dittmar, Noam Yuchtman*

Using novel microdata, we document an unintended, first-order consequence of the Protestant Reformation: a massive reallocation of resources from religious to secular purposes. To understand this process, we propose a conceptual framework in which the introduction of religious competition shifts political markets where religious authorities provide legitimacy to rulers in exchange for control over resources. Consistent with our framework, religious competition changed the balance of power between secular and religious elites: secular authorities acquired enormous amounts of wealth from monasteries closed during the Reformation, particularly in Protestant regions. This transfer of resources had important consequences. First, it shifted the allocation of upper-tail human capital. Graduates of Protestant universities increasingly took secular, especially administrative, occupations. Protestant university students increasingly studied secular subjects, especially degrees that prepared students for public sector jobs, rather than church sector-specific theology. Second, it affected the sectoral composition of fixed investment. Particularly in Protestant regions, new construction from religious toward secular purposes, especially the building of palaces and administrative buildings, which reflected the increased wealth and power of secular lords. Reallocation was not driven by pre-existing economic or cultural differences. Our findings indicate that the Reformation played an important causal role in the secularization of the West.

look at Figure 4, holy shit

History: Science and the Reformation: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v550/n7677/full/550454a.html?WT.mc_id=TWT_NatureNews&sf126429621=1
The scientific and religious revolutions that began 500 years ago were not causally related, but were both stimulated by printing, argues David Wootton.
No, the Reformation did not cause the scientific revolution. Nice brief article. 👍

No RCT = No causal claims, for or against ;)
Though I'm open to a regression discontinuity design! cc: @pseudoerasmus
pdf  study  economics  growth-econ  broad-econ  history  medieval  early-modern  religion  christianity  protestant-catholic  revolution  institutions  cliometrics  🎩  europe  the-great-west-whale  chart  roots  entrepreneurialism  wealth-of-nations  rent-seeking  inequality  market-power  industrial-org  political-econ  anglosphere  sociology  polisci  egalitarianism-hierarchy  flexibility  supply-demand  models  analysis  path-dependence  divergence  leviathan  theos  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  cultural-dynamics  s:*  multi  pseudoE  piracy  conquest-empire  war  islam  mediterranean  eastern-europe  incentives  modernity  north-weingast-like  open-closed  MENA  time  density  unintended-consequences  correlation  article  survey  marginal  equilibrium  competition  distribution  wealth  comparison  things  homo-hetero  discrimination  legacy  urban  trust  corruption  morality  ethics  n-factor  diversity  redistribution  welfare-state  flux-stasis  data  scale  causation  endo-exo  natural-experiment  meta-analysis  list  education  hum 
may 2017 by nhaliday
There Is No Such Thing as Decreasing Returns to Scale — Confessions of a Supply-Side Liberal
Besides pedagogical inertia—enforced to some extent by textbook publishers—I am not quite sure what motivates the devotion in so many economics curricula to U-shaped average cost curves. Let me make one guess: there is a desire to explain why firms are the size they are rather than larger or smaller. To my mind, such an explanation should proceed in one of three ways, appropriate to three different situations.
econotariat  economics  micro  plots  scale  marginal  industrial-org  business  econ-productivity  efficiency  cost-benefit  explanation  critique  clarity  intricacy  curvature  convexity-curvature  nonlinearity  input-output 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Concentration and Growth | Dietrich Vollrath
Ultimately, and this is my impression, not some kind of established fact, concentration likely lowers innovative activity. Put it this way, the null hypothesis should probably be that concentration lowers innovation. An individual industry needs to provide evidence they are on the “right side of the curve” in the first AAH figure to believe concentration would be good for productivity growth in the long run.
econotariat  commentary  links  economics  growth-econ  trends  market-power  business  industrial-org  flexibility  innovation  malaise  stagnation  econ-productivity  madisonian  rent-seeking  competition  correlation  frontier  stylized-facts  chart  🎩  entrepreneurialism  rot  scale  curvature  corporation  convexity-curvature  nonlinearity 
may 2017 by nhaliday
Educational Romanticism & Economic Development | pseudoerasmus


Did Nations that Boosted Education Grow Faster?: http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2012/10/did_nations_tha.html
On average, no relationship. The trendline points down slightly, but for the time being let's just call it a draw. It's a well-known fact that countries that started the 1960's with high education levels grew faster (example), but this graph is about something different. This graph shows that countries that increased their education levels did not grow faster.

Where has all the education gone?: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=




The Case Against Education: What's Taking So Long, Bryan Caplan: http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2015/03/the_case_agains_9.html

The World Might Be Better Off Without College for Everyone: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/01/whats-college-good-for/546590/
Students don't seem to be getting much out of higher education.
- Bryan Caplan

College: Capital or Signal?: http://www.economicmanblog.com/2017/02/25/college-capital-or-signal/
After his review of the literature, Caplan concludes that roughly 80% of the earnings effect from college comes from signalling, with only 20% the result of skill building. Put this together with his earlier observations about the private returns to college education, along with its exploding cost, and Caplan thinks that the social returns are negative. The policy implications of this will come as very bitter medicine for friends of Bernie Sanders.

Doubting the Null Hypothesis: http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/doubting-the-null-hypothesis/

Is higher education/college in the US more about skill-building or about signaling?: https://www.quora.com/Is-higher-education-college-in-the-US-more-about-skill-building-or-about-signaling
ballpark: 50% signaling, 30% selection, 20% addition to human capital
more signaling in art history, more human capital in engineering, more selection in philosophy

Econ Duel! Is Education Signaling or Skill Building?: http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2016/03/econ-duel-is-education-signaling-or-skill-building.html
Marginal Revolution University has a brand new feature, Econ Duel! Our first Econ Duel features Tyler and me debating the question, Is education more about signaling or skill building?

Against Tulip Subsidies: https://slatestarcodex.com/2015/06/06/against-tulip-subsidies/




Most American public school kids are low-income; about half are non-white; most are fairly low skilled academically. For most American kids, the majority of the waking hours they spend not engaged with electronic media are at school; the majority of their in-person relationships are at school; the most important relationships they have with an adult who is not their parent is with their teacher. For their parents, the most important in-person source of community is also their kids’ school. Young people need adult mirrors, models, mentors, and in an earlier era these might have been provided by extended families, but in our own era this all falls upon schools.

Caplan gestures towards work and earlier labor force participation as alternatives to school for many if not all kids. And I empathize: the years that I would point to as making me who I am were ones where I was working, not studying. But they were years spent working in schools, as a teacher or assistant. If schools did not exist, is there an alternative that we genuinely believe would arise to draw young people into the life of their community?


It is not an accident that the state that spends the least on education is Utah, where the LDS church can take up some of the slack for schools, while next door Wyoming spends almost the most of any state at $16,000 per student. Education is now the one surviving binding principle of the society as a whole, the one black box everyone will agree to, and so while you can press for less subsidization of education by government, and for privatization of costs, as Caplan does, there’s really nothing people can substitute for it. This is partially about signaling, sure, but it’s also because outside of schools and a few religious enclaves our society is but a darkling plain beset by winds.

This doesn’t mean that we should leave Caplan’s critique on the shelf. Much of education is focused on an insane, zero-sum race for finite rewards. Much of schooling does push kids, parents, schools, and school systems towards a solution ad absurdum, where anything less than 100 percent of kids headed to a doctorate and the big coding job in the sky is a sign of failure of everyone concerned.

But let’s approach this with an eye towards the limits of the possible and the reality of diminishing returns.

The real reason the left would support Moander: the usual reason. because he’s an enemy.

I have a problem in thinking about education, since my preferences and personal educational experience are atypical, so I can’t just gut it out. On the other hand, knowing that puts me ahead of a lot of people that seem convinced that all real people, including all Arab cabdrivers, think and feel just as they do.

One important fact, relevant to this review. I don’t like Caplan. I think he doesn’t understand – can’t understand – human nature, and although that sometimes confers a different and interesting perspective, it’s not a royal road to truth. Nor would I want to share a foxhole with him: I don’t trust him. So if I say that I agree with some parts of this book, you should believe me.


Caplan doesn’t talk about possible ways of improving knowledge acquisition and retention. Maybe he thinks that’s impossible, and he may be right, at least within a conventional universe of possibilities. That’s a bit outside of his thesis, anyhow. Me it interests.

He dismisses objections from educational psychologists who claim that studying a subject improves you in subtle ways even after you forget all of it. I too find that hard to believe. On the other hand, it looks to me as if poorly-digested fragments of information picked up in college have some effect on public policy later in life: it is no coincidence that most prominent people in public life (at a given moment) share a lot of the same ideas. People are vaguely remembering the same crap from the same sources, or related sources. It’s correlated crap, which has a much stronger effect than random crap.

These widespread new ideas are usually wrong. They come from somewhere – in part, from higher education. Along this line, Caplan thinks that college has only a weak ideological effect on students. I don’t believe he is correct. In part, this is because most people use a shifting standard: what’s liberal or conservative gets redefined over time. At any given time a population is roughly half left and half right – but the content of those labels changes a lot. There’s a shift.

I put it this way, a while ago: “When you think about it, falsehoods, stupid crap, make the best group identifiers, because anyone might agree with you when you’re obviously right. Signing up to clear nonsense is a better test of group loyalty. A true friend is with you when you’re wrong. Ideally, not just wrong, but barking mad, rolling around in your own vomit wrong.”
You just explained the Credo quia absurdum doctrine. I always wondered if it was nonsense. It is not.
Someone on twitter caught it first – got all the way to “sliding down the razor blade of life”. Which I explained is now called “transitioning”

What Catholics believe: https://theweek.com/articles/781925/what-catholics-believe
We believe all of these things, fantastical as they may sound, and we believe them for what we consider good reasons, well attested by history, consistent with the most exacting standards of logic. We will profess them in this place of wrath and tears until the extraordinary event referenced above, for which men and women have hoped and prayed for nearly 2,000 years, comes to pass.

According to Caplan, employers are looking for conformity, conscientiousness, and intelligence. They use completion of high school, or completion of college as a sign of conformity and conscientiousness. College certainly looks as if it’s mostly signaling, and it’s hugely expensive signaling, in terms of college costs and foregone earnings.

But inserting conformity into the merit function is tricky: things become important signals… because they’re important signals. Otherwise useful actions are contraindicated because they’re “not done”. For example, test scores convey useful information. They could help show that an applicant is smart even though he attended a mediocre school – the same role they play in college admissions. But employers seldom request test scores, and although applicants may provide them, few do. Caplan says ” The word on the street… [more]
econotariat  pseudoE  broad-econ  economics  econometrics  growth-econ  education  human-capital  labor  correlation  null-result  world  developing-world  commentary  spearhead  garett-jones  twitter  social  pic  discussion  econ-metrics  rindermann-thompson  causation  endo-exo  biodet  data  chart  knowledge  article  wealth-of-nations  latin-america  study  path-dependence  divergence  🎩  curvature  microfoundations  multi  convexity-curvature  nonlinearity  hanushek  volo-avolo  endogenous-exogenous  backup  pdf  people  policy  monetary-fiscal  wonkish  cracker-econ  news  org:mag  local-global  higher-ed  impetus  signaling  rhetoric  contrarianism  domestication  propaganda  ratty  hanson  books  review  recommendations  distribution  externalities  cost-benefit  summary  natural-experiment  critique  rent-seeking  mobility  supply-demand  intervention  shift  social-choice  government  incentives  interests  q-n-a  street-fighting  objektbuch  X-not-about-Y  marginal-rev  c:***  qra  info-econ  info-dynamics  org:econlib  yvain  ssc  politics  medicine  stories 
april 2017 by nhaliday
What Drives Differences in Management?
Partnering with the Census we implement a new survey of “structured” management practices in 32,000 US manufacturing plants. We find an enormous dispersion of management practices across plants, with 40% of this variation across plants within the same firm. This management variation accounts for about a fifth of the spread of productivity, a similar fraction as that accounted for by R&D, and twice as much as explained by IT. We find evidence for four “drivers” of management: competition, business environment, learning spillovers and human capital. Collectively, these drivers account for about a third of the dispersion of structured management practices.
study  economics  growth-econ  econ-productivity  management  variance-components  roots  competition  human-capital  distribution  heavy-industry  econometrics  industrial-org  usa  organizing 
april 2017 by nhaliday
The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in Anglo-American Business History
In a new article just published in the Columbia Law Review, I offer new answers by suggesting that if the corporate form mattered at all in Anglo-American legal history, it was not for the reasons we have long supposed. Based on a new examination of historical legal sources from the late Middle Ages to the middle of the twentieth century, I show that the basic powers of the corporate form were also available throughout most of modern history through an underappreciated but enormously important legal device known as the common law trust. The trust’s success at mimicking the corporate form meant that the corporate form was almost never the exclusive source of the legal features that have long been considered its key contribution to modern life.
study  summary  economics  industrial-org  coordination  institutions  history  law  business  anglo  usa  medieval  early-modern  mostly-modern  contracts  anglosphere  capitalism  cultural-dynamics  protocol  pre-ww2  corporation  axioms  organizing 
march 2017 by nhaliday
Social Epistasis Amplifies the Fitness Costs of Deleterious Mutations, Engendering Rapid Fitness Decline Among Modernized Populations | SpringerLink
- Michael A. Woodley

We argue that in social species, interorganismal gene-gene interactions, which in previous literatures have been termed social epistasis, allow genomes carrying deleterious mutations to reduce via group-level pleiotropy the fitness of others, including noncarriers. This fitness reduction occurs by way of degradation of group-level processes that optimize the reproductive ecology of a population for intergroup competition through, among other mechanisms, suppression of free-riding.


Fitness indicators theory (Houle 2000; Miller 2000) predicts that the behavioral and physiological condition of prospective partners strongly influences female mate choice in particular, as these constitute honest indicators of underlying genetic quality. Furthermore, as deleterious mutations are pleiotropic (i.e., they can influence the development of multiple traits simultaneously), they are a source of genetic correlation among diverse behavioral and physiological domains, yielding a latent general fitness factor( f ). This optimizes the efficiency of sexual selection, as selection for quality with respect to one domain will increase the probability of selection for quality “across the board” (Houle 2000; Miller 2000). If purifying selection is primarily cryptic—working by virtue of those lower in f simply being less successful in competition for mates and therefore producing fewer offspring relative to those higher in the factor—then considerably less reproductive failure is needed to solve the mutation load paradox (19% instead of 88% based on simulations in Leseque et al. 2012).


Theoretical work involving humans suggests a loss of intrinsic fitness of around 1% per generation in the populations of modernized countries (Lynch 2016; Muller 1950). Thus, these might yet be undergoing mutational meltdown, albeit very gradually (i.e., over the course of centuries)


An interesting observation is that the fitness of the populations of modernized nations does appear to be rapidly decreasing—although not in a manner consonant with the direct action of deleterious mutations on the fitness of individuals (as per the mutation load paradox).


Increased education has furthermore encouraged individuals to trade fertility against opportunities to enhance their social status and earning power, with the largest fitness losses occurring among those with high status who potentially carry fewer deleterious mutations (i.e., by virtue of possessing higher levels of traits that exhibit some sensitivity to mutation load, such as general intelligence; Spain et al. 2015; Woodley of Menie et al. 2016a). Hitherto not considered is the possibility that the demographic transition represents a potential change in the fitness characteristics of the group-level extended phenotype of modernized populations, indicating that there might exist pathways through which deleterious mutations that accumulate due to ecological mildness could pathologically alter fertility tradeoffs in ways that might account for the maladaptive aspects of the fertility transition (e.g., subreplacement fertility; Basten, Lutz and Scherbov, 2013).


Cooperation, though offering significant fitness benefits to individual organisms and groups, involves some costs for cooperators in order to realize mutual gains for all parties. Free riders are individuals that benefit from cooperation without suffering any of the costs needed to sustain it. Hence, free riders enjoy a fitness advantage relative to cooperators via the former’s parasitism on the latter.


The balance of selection can alternate between the different levels depending on the sorts of selective challenges that a population encounters. For example, group selection may operate on human populations during times of intergroup conflict (i.e., warfare), whereas during times of peace, selection may tend to favor the fitness of individuals instead (Woodley and Figueredo 2013; Wilson 2002). A major factor that seems to permit group-level selection to be viable under certain ecological regimes is the existence of free-rider controls, i.e., features of the group’s social ecology that curb the reproductive fitness of the carriers of “selfish” genetic variants (MacDonald 1994; Wilson 2002).


High-status individuals participate in the generation and vertical cultural transmission of free-rider controls—these take the form of religious and ideological systems which make a virtue out of behaviors that overtly benefit the group, and a vice out of those that only favor individual-level fitness, via the promotion of ethnocentrism, martyrdom, and displays of commitment (MacDonald 1994, 2009, 2010; Wilson 2002). Humans are furthermore equipped with specialized mental adaptations for coordinating as part of a group, such as effortful control—the ability to override implicit behavioral drives via the use of explicit processing systems, which allow them to regulate their behavior based on what is optimal for the group (MacDonald 2008). The interaction between individuals of different degrees of status, i.e., those that generate and maintain cultural norms and those who are merely subject to them, therefore constitutes a form of social epistasis, as the complex patterns of interactions among genomes that characterize human culture have the effect of regulating both individual- and group-level (via the curbing of free-riding) fitness (MacDonald 2009, 2010).

Mutations that push the behavior of high-status individuals away from the promotion of group-selected norms may promote a breakdown of or otherwise alter these social epistatic interactions, causing dysregulation of the group’s reproductive ecology. Behavioral changes are furthermore a highly likely consequence of mutation accumulation, as “behavior” (construed broadly) is a large potential target for new mutations (Miller 2000; Lynch 2016) 1 owing to the fact that approximately 84% of all genes in the human genome are involved in some aspect of brain development and/or maintenance (Hawrylycz et al. 2012).

Consistent with the theorized role of group-level (cultural) regulatory processes in the maintenance of fitness optima, positive correlations exist between religiosity (a major freerider control; MacDonald 1994; Wilson 2002) and fertility, both at the individual differences and cross-cultural levels (Meisenberg 2011). Religiosity has declined in modernized nations—a process that has gone hand-in-hand with the rise of a values system called postmaterialism (Inglehart 1977), which is characterized by the proliferation of individualistic, secular, and antihierarchical values (Welzel 2013). The holding of these values is negatively associated with fertility, both at the individual level (when measured as political liberalism; Goldstone et al. 2011) and across time and cultures (Inglehart and Appel 1989). The rise of postmaterialist values is also associated with increasingly delayed onset of reproduction (Klien 1990) which directly increases the (population) mutation load.

Pathological Altruism

Some of the values embodied in postmaterialism have been linked to the pathological altruism phenomenon, i.e., forms of altruism that damage the intended recipients or givers of largesse (Oakley et al. 2012; Oakley 2013). Virtues associated with altruism such as kindness, fidelity, magnanimity, and heroism, along with quasi-moral traits associated with personality and mental health, may be under sexual selection and might therefore be sensitive, through the f factor, to the deleterious effects of accumulating mutations (Miller 2007).


Another form of pathologically altruistic behavior that Oakley (2013) documents is self-righteousness, which may be increasing, consistent with secular trend data indicating elevated levels of self-regarding behavior among Western populations (sometimes called the narcissism epidemic; Twenge and Campbell 2009). This sort of behavior constitutes a key component of the clever silly phenomenon in which the embrace of counterfactual beliefs is used to leverage social status via virtue signaling (e.g., the conflation of moral equality among individuals, sexes, and populations with biological equality) (Dutton and van der Linden 2015; Charlton 2009; Woodley 2010). There may be a greater number of influential persons inclined to disseminate such beliefs, in that the prevalence of phenotypes disposed toward egoistic behaviors may have increased in Western populations (per Twenge and coworkers’ research), and because egoists, specifically Machiavellians and narcissists, appear advantaged in the acquisition of elite societal stations (Spurk et al. 2015).

[Do Bad Guys Get Ahead or Fall Behind? Relationships of the Dark Triad of Personality With Objective and Subjective Career Success: http://sci-hub.tw/http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1948550615609735

After controlling for other relevant variables (i.e., gender, age, job tenure, organization size, education, and work hours), narcissism was positively related to salary, Machiavellianism was positively related to leadership position and career satisfaction, and psychopathy was negatively related to all analyzed outcomes.]


By altering cultural norms, elite egoists may encourage the efflorescence of selfish behaviors against which some older and once highly influential cultural systems acted. For example, Christianity in various forms strongly promoted personal sacrifice for the good of groups and proscribed egoistic behaviors (Rubin 2015), but has declined significantly in terms of cultural power following modernization (Inglehart 1977). Thus, it is possible that a feedback loop exists wherein deleterious mutation accumulation raises population levels of egoism, either directly or indirectly, via the breakdown of developmental constraints on personality canalization; the resultantly greater number of egoists are then able to exploit relevant personality traits to attain positions of sociocultural influence; and through these … [more]
study  speculation  models  biodet  bio  sapiens  evolution  genetic-load  paternal-age  the-monster  slippery-slope  society  social-structure  free-riding  coordination  EGT  dynamical  🌞  fertility  dysgenics  eh  self-control  obesity  altruism  mutation  multi  twitter  social  commentary  perturbation  gnon  new-religion  science-anxiety  population-genetics  biophysical-econ  hmm  discipline  autism  scitariat  clown-world  epidemiology  malaise  sociology  demographic-transition  blowhards  model-organism  nonlinearity  civilization  expression-survival  universalism-particularism  order-disorder  trends  deep-materialism  values  ideology  domestication  cohesion  christopher-lasch  scale  patho-altruism  social-capital  behavioral-gen  madisonian  chart  nihil  aristos  piracy  theos  cultural-dynamics  roots  zeitgeist  rot  the-bones  counter-revolution  pdf  modernity  microfoundations  video  presentation  religion  christianity  health  longevity  ethnocentrism  genetic-correlation  👽  instinct 
march 2017 by nhaliday
Federal University | West Hunter
If, as a pilot program, an example, the government set up a new university, mindlessly copying a decent state school from that golden era, like Berkeley or Wisconsin (or maybe from a bit earlier, since we probably want to avoid riots too), I doubt if it would cost a lot more. All those extra administrative personnel? Just don’t hire them. We could manage this by making the project top secret (actually, special access) – that lets you violate a lot of the useless bureaucratic rules, rather like being Uber.

Some things might cost more. If you want a medical school, you have to pay the professors competitive salaries (and MDs make much more than they did back in those days). But then, we could used taped lectures, online courses, etc.

It probably wouldn’t work for long, since politicians would be irresistibly temped to add on useless crap, like preferential admission for Skoptys, or whatever they’re called nowadays.

“Between 1975 and 2005, total spending by American higher educational institutions, stated in constant dollars, tripled, to more than $325 billion per year. Over the same period, the faculty-to-student ratio has remained fairly constant, at approximately fifteen or sixteen students per instructor. One thing that has changed, dramatically, is the administrator-per-student ratio. In 1975, colleges employed one administrator for every eighty-four students and one professional staffer—admissions officers, information technology specialists, and the like—for every fifty students. By 2005, the administrator-to-student ratio had dropped to one administrator for every sixty-eight students while the ratio of professional staffers had dropped to one for every twenty-one students. “

Higher Education In Mass. Enters Full Predatory Mode: http://news.wgbh.org/2016/12/08/local-news/higher-education-mass-enters-full-predatory-mode
academic administrators

I would put the kind of knowledge that you acquire in college into four categories. Obviously majors differ in their mix of these four humours. I’m thinking of economic/GDP/health type impacts.

Things that don’t matter. Like neutral genetic variation.
Things that make you better at doing something useful. Ideally, significantly better – at least better at the task than if you’d just spend an hour or two reading the manual.

Things that make you better at inventing techniques in category 2. What Edison, George Green, or Ramanujan learned in college. Overlaps with #2.

Things that ain’t so. Falsehoods. Ones with practical implications. There are obviously some majors that mostly inculcate falsehoods.

Now some of these can be used for signalling, but the content of education matters (in the broad sense – college but also reading Popular Mechanics). If it didn’t we’d all be living in caves and licking mammoth fat off our fingers.

It can also simply be ignored: lots of Silicon Valley companies give pretty explicit IQ tests without ever bothering to get them approved.

I used to think this, but now I wonder if the degree is used more as a signal of willingness to put up with institutional BS rather than IQ.
Yeah, Griggs is terrible, ham-fisted law, shd be overturned. But overrated as a cause of the edu bubble

- thinks its mostly subsidies not ban on IQ testing
- still getting good tests for cognitive ability plus non-cognitive habits, then moving to new equilibrium should be enough right?

Modern Universities Are An Exercise in Insanity: http://scholars-stage.blogspot.com/2018/01/modern-universities-are-exercise-in.html

My alma mater was Brigham Young University-Hawaii. If you are a member of the LDS church attending the school, then in 2017 your tuition was $3,000 a semester. If you are not a member, it was $5,000 for one semester. The school has a special program where you can graduate in three years by taking three semesters each year, and that costs $8,000 and $16,000 a year for LDS and non-member students respectively.


The average tenure track professor makes $40 an hour. If you were to employ her as a private tutor at the cost of $60 an hour, and had four hours with her a week, and did that for 14 weeks (that's the length of an average college course folks) that is about $3,400.

Were you to employ three such professor-tutors, that would be about $10,200, or a bit over $20,000 a year. In four years you would have racked up $80,000 in costs. But this is still $30,000 less than the total for the 'cost conscious' universities. It is a quarter of what you would pay for Trinity.
west-hunter  rant  education  higher-ed  institutions  government  proposal  discussion  policy  rent-seeking  scitariat  efficiency  cost-disease  counter-revolution  alt-inst  regulation  ideas  multi  unaffiliated  broad-econ  wonkish  other-xtian  debt  cost-benefit  analysis  money  fertility  intervention  hmm  planning  long-term  parenting  knowledge  signaling  human-capital  truth  realness  poast  pro-rata  gender  sv  tech  recruiting  iq  pinker  trends  critique  news  current-events  vampire-squid  org:ngo  academia  technocracy  gnon  right-wing  twitter  social  speculation  roots  malaise  law  business  industrial-org  psychometrics  race  discrimination  diversity  cycles  impetus  chart  sex  sexuality 
january 2017 by nhaliday
Competent Elites - Less Wrong

Cochran: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:d8fc1403ad19

How to Become a C.E.O.? The Quickest Path Is a Winding One: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/upshot/how-to-become-a-ceo-the-quickest-path-is-a-winding-one.html
New evidence shows that a mix of skills, especially technology skills, counts more than simply long experience in one specialty.

What Does a C.E.O. Actually Do?: http://freakonomics.com/podcast/c-e-o-actually/

On empathy: psychopaths, sociopaths and aspies: http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2011/06/on-empathy-psychopaths-sociopaths-and.html
Last week a startup CTO, who didn't know my background, characterized all CEOs as "warm sociopaths" :-) He is at least partly right: many business and political leaders are good at reading other people's thoughts and emotions, but lack genuine concern for their well being. On the other hand, many geeks are very bad at mind reading or emotional perception, yet adhere to a strict moral code.

East Asian sociopaths?: http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2011/06/east-asian-sociopaths.html
Some would assert that CEOs and other people in leadership positions are often warm sociopaths. Interestingly, it is claimed that there is a huge variation between groups in the rate of sociopathy. Perhaps this is related to the under-representation of E. Asians in leadership positions in the West, despite their high educational achievements? (Instead of sociopathy other factors like aggressiveness in interpersonal relationships might play a role.)

THE ILLUSION OF ASIAN SUCCESS: Scant Progress for Minorities in Cracking the Glass Ceiling from 2007–2015: http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.ascendleadership.org/resource/resmgr/research/TheIllusionofAsianSuccess.pdf
Asians are not making it into top ranks at tech firms.
EPI = %exec / %professionals
MPI = %managers / %professionals

CEOs really are worth more than they used to be: https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/economics/ceos-really-are-worth-more-than-they-used-to-be
more: https://twitter.com/s8mb/status/762711050437419008
More silliness on executive pay: https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/yes-chief-executives-really-do-matter
ratty  lesswrong  hmm  impro  high-variance  impact  business  rhetoric  reflection  power  optimate  success  big-yud  multi  hsu  scitariat  signal-noise  leadership  humility  elite  entrepreneurialism  s-factor  organizing  stereotypes  iq  personality  discipline  ability-competence  management  class  strategy  career  planning  data  idk  jobs  long-term  tactics  org:rec  empirical  working-stiff  org:data  progression  knowledge  org:lite  brands  economics  labor  industrial-org  study  summary  audio  podcast  interview  albion  econotariat  nl-and-so-can-you  econometrics  natural-experiment  randy-ayndy  links  twitter  social  discussion  wonkish  chart  winner-take-all  trends  inequality  wealth  compensation  article  org:ngo  org:anglo  random  pdf  white-paper  race  demographics  asia  analysis  visualization  time-series  diversity  commentary  gnon  unaffiliated  right-wing  sv  tech  usa  the-west  california  corporation  psychiatry  socs-and-mops  pop-diff  speculation  psychology  morality  cooperate-defect  explanans  n-factor  disease  self-interest  crooked  vampi 
january 2017 by nhaliday
Common law and the origin of shareholder protection
This paper examines the origins of investor protection under the common law by analysing the development of shareholder protection in Victorian Britain, the home of the common law. In this era, very little was codified, with corporate law simply suggesting a default template of rules. Ultimately, the matter of protection was one for the corporation and its shareholders. Using c.500 articles of association and ownership records of publicly-traded Victorian corporations, we find that corporations afforded investors with just as much protection as is present in modern corporate law and that firms with better shareholder protection had more diffuse ownership.
study  economics  cliometrics  industrial-revolution  law  britain  institutions  anglosphere  business  finance  history  contracts  industrial-org  anglo  wonkish  early-modern  roots  the-great-west-whale  capitalism  broad-econ  political-econ  protocol  pre-ww2  modernity  north-weingast-like  corporation  axioms  organizing  interests 
january 2017 by nhaliday
How Does Hedge Fund Activism Reshape Corporate Innovation?
This paper studies how hedge fund activism reshapes corporate innovation. Firms targeted by hedge fund activists experience an improvement in innovation efficiency during the five-year period following the intervention. Despite a tightening in R&D expenditures, target firms experience increases in innovation output, measured by both patent counts and citations, with stronger effects seen among firms with more diversified innovation portfolios. We also find that the reallocation of innovative resources and the redeployment of human capital contribute to the refocusing of the scope of innovation. Finally, additional tests refute alternative explanations attributing the improvement to mean reversion, sample attrition, management’s voluntary reforms, or activists’ stock-picking abilities.
study  economics  finance  investing  innovation  business  industrial-org  econometrics  wonkish  roots  corporation  success 
december 2016 by nhaliday
Do venture capitalists matter? | MIT News
A new study co-authored by an MIT professor shows that venture capitalists do help startup firms by closely monitoring their development, and that the availability of direct airplane flights between the two parties helps improve that oversight.

Indeed, the introduction of a new airline route directly connecting venture capitalists to fledgling companies in which they have already invested leads to a 3.1 percent increase in the patents those firms are granted, as well as a 5.8 percent increase in the citations those patents receive — compared to equivalent cases where similar investments are made but direct flights never become available.
news  study  summary  economics  business  natural-experiment  venture  startups  innovation  institutions  industrial-org  econometrics  wonkish  org:sci  roots  property-rights 
december 2016 by nhaliday
Schumpeterian Profits in the American Economy: Theory and Measurement
The present study examines the importance of Schumpeterian profits in the United States economy. Schumpeterian profits are defined as those profits that arise when firms are able to appropriate the returns from innovative activity. We first show the underlying equations for Schumpeterian profits. We then estimate the value of these profits for the non-farm business economy. We conclude that only a minuscule fraction of the social returns from technological advances over the 1948-2001 period was captured by producers, indicating that most of the benefits of technological change are passed on to consumers rather than captured by producers.
study  economics  innovation  longitudinal  econ-productivity  usa  history  econometrics  technology  🎩  growth-econ  stylized-facts  industrial-org  anglo  wonkish  mostly-modern  externalities  cjones-like 
december 2016 by nhaliday
How Destructive is Innovation?
We conclude that creative destruction is vital for understanding job destruction and accounts for around one-fourth of growth. Own-product quality improvements by incumbents appear to be the biggest source of growth. Net variety growth contributes much less than quality improvements.
study  economics  innovation  business  econ-productivity  labor  variance-components  causation  🎩  stylized-facts  growth-econ  econometrics  industrial-org  roots  externalities  capital  cjones-like 
december 2016 by nhaliday
Professors Make More Than a Thousand Dollars an Hour Peddling Mega-Mergers | Hacker News
WASHINGTON — In the hours after European antitrust regulators levied a record $2.7 billion fine against Google in late June, an influential Washington think tank learned what can happen when a tech giant that shapes public policy debates with its enormous wealth is criticized.

The New America Foundation has received more than $21 million from Google; its parent company’s executive chairman, Eric Schmidt; and his family’s foundation since the think tank’s founding in 1999. That money helped to establish New America as an elite voice in policy debates on the American left.

But not long after one of New America’s scholars posted a statement on the think tank’s website praising the European Union’s penalty against Google, Mr. Schmidt, who had chaired New America until 2016, communicated his displeasure with the statement to the group’s president, Anne-Marie Slaughter, according to the scholar.
commentary  hn  news  investigative-journo  academia  economics  ethics  business  longform  micro  policy  industrial-org  org:mag  crooked  anomie  multi  org:rec  market-power  google  law  political-econ  regulation  madisonian  property-rights  civil-liberty  censorship  drama  current-events  corruption  media  org:lite  exit-voice  sv  tech  org:data  interview  thiel  barons  facebook  2016-election  trump  org:local 
november 2016 by nhaliday
Overcoming Bias : We Need The Very Rich
Why look at years-to-payback instead of return on investment? A new NBER paper on private vs. public firms makes the answer clear. Unless project gains can be very clearly proven to analysts, or perhaps so small and numerous to allow averaging over them, public firms are basically incapable of taking a loss on earnings this quarter in order to make gains several years later, no matter how big those gains. CEOs are strongly tempted to instead please analysts by grabbing higher short-term quarterly earnings. So we need the very rich to make long-term investments.
hanson  study  economics  micro  investing  finance  econometrics  business  arbitrage  len:short  efficiency  🎩  market-failure  pre-2013  long-short-run  industrial-org  entrepreneurialism  wealth  chart  ratty 
september 2016 by nhaliday
« earlier      
per page:    204080120160

bundles : biznesscoordeconframe

related tags

2016-election  80000-hours  :/  ability-competence  absolute-relative  academia  acemoglu  advertising  advice  africa  age-generation  age-of-discovery  aggregator  aging  agri-mindset  ai  albion  alien-character  alignment  alt-inst  altruism  amazon  analogy  analysis  analytical-holistic  anarcho-tyranny  anglo  anglosphere  anomie  anthropology  antidemos  aphorism  arbitrage  aristos  arrows  article  ascetic  asia  attaq  audio  authoritarianism  autism  automation  autor  axelrod  axioms  backup  bare-hands  barons  beauty  behavioral-econ  behavioral-gen  benevolence  best-practices  biases  big-peeps  big-yud  bio  biodet  biophysical-econ  biotech  blowhards  books  bounded-cognition  branches  brands  britain  broad-econ  business  business-models  c:***  california  canon  capital  capitalism  career  causation  censorship  chan  charity  chart  checklists  chicago  china  christianity  christopher-lasch  civic  civil-liberty  civilization  cjones-like  clarity  class  class-warfare  classic  climate-change  cliometrics  clown-world  coalitions  cocktail  cog-psych  cohesion  cold-war  collaboration  coming-apart  commentary  communication  communism  community  comparison  compensation  competition  complex-systems  composition-decomposition  concept  confluence  confucian  conquest-empire  context  contracts  contrarianism  convexity-curvature  cooperate-defect  coordination  corporation  correlation  corruption  cost-benefit  cost-disease  counter-revolution  counterfactual  courage  cracker-econ  crime  criminal-justice  criminology  critique  crooked  cultural-dynamics  culture  current-events  curvature  cybernetics  cycles  cynicism-idealism  dark-arts  darwinian  data  database  death  debate  debt  decision-making  decision-theory  deep-materialism  defense  definite-planning  degrees-of-freedom  democracy  demographic-transition  demographics  dennett  density  descriptive  developing-world  developmental  direction  discipline  discrimination  discussion  disease  distribution  divergence  diversity  domestication  dominant-minority  douthatish  draft  drama  drugs  duty  dynamical  dysgenics  early-modern  eastern-europe  ecology  econ-metrics  econ-productivity  econometrics  economics  econotariat  education  efficiency  egalitarianism-hierarchy  EGT  eh  elections  elite  embodied  emergent  emotion  empirical  endo-exo  endogenous-exogenous  energy-resources  enhancement  enlightenment-renaissance-restoration-reformation  entrepreneurialism  environment  envy  epidemiology  equilibrium  ergodic  error  essay  estimate  ethanol  ethics  ethnocentrism  EU  europe  events  evidence-based  evolution  evopsych  exit-voice  expansionism  expert  expert-experience  explanans  explanation  exploratory  expression-survival  externalities  facebook  faq  farmers-and-foragers  fashun  fermi  fertility  feudal  fiction  field-study  finance  fitness  flexibility  flux-stasis  foreign-lang  foreign-policy  formal-values  free-riding  frequency  frontier  futurism  gallic  garett-jones  gender  gender-diff  general-survey  generalization  genetic-correlation  genetic-load  genetics  geography  germanic  gibbon  gnon  gnosis-logos  gnxp  good-evil  google  government  grad-school  gray-econ  group-level  group-selection  growth-econ  GT-101  guilt-shame  GWAS  gwern  hanson  hanushek  hard-tech  hari-seldon  harvard  health  healthcare  heavy-industry  heterodox  hidden-motives  high-variance  higher-ed  history  hive-mind  hmm  hn  homo-hetero  honor  housing  hsu  human-capital  humility  hypocrisy  ideas  identity-politics  ideology  idk  iidness  illusion  impact  impetus  impro  incentives  increase-decrease  india  individualism-collectivism  industrial-org  industrial-revolution  inequality  info-dynamics  info-econ  info-foraging  innovation  input-output  insight  instinct  institutions  insurance  integrity  intel  intelligence  interests  internet  intervention  interview  intricacy  invariance  investigative-journo  investing  iq  iron-age  is-ought  islam  isteveish  japan  jobs  journos-pundits  judaism  kinship  knowledge  krugman  labor  large-factor  larry-summers  latin-america  law  leadership  learning  left-wing  legacy  legibility  len:long  len:short  lens  lesswrong  let-me-see  letters  leviathan  life-history  limits  links  list  literature  lived-experience  local-global  lol  long-short-run  long-term  longevity  longform  longitudinal  love-hate  machiavelli  macro  madisonian  magnitude  malaise  management  managerial-state  manifolds  map-territory  maps  marginal  marginal-rev  market-failure  market-power  markets  martial  math  meaningness  measurement  media  medicine  medieval  mediterranean  memes(ew)  MENA  mena4  meta-analysis  meta:medicine  meta:war  metabuch  methodology  metrics  micro  microbiz  microfoundations  migrant-crisis  migration  military  mit  mobility  model-class  model-organism  models  modernity  monetary-fiscal  money  morality  mostly-modern  multi  murray  mutation  n-factor  nascent-state  nationalism-globalism  natural-experiment  nature  near-far  negotiation  network-structure  new-religion  news  nietzschean  nihil  nl-and-so-can-you  noahpinion  noblesse-oblige  nonlinearity  nordic  north-weingast-like  null-result  obesity  objective-measure  objektbuch  occident  old-anglo  open-closed  opioids  optimate  optimism  optimization  order-disorder  ORFE  org:anglo  org:biz  org:bv  org:data  org:davos  org:econlib  org:edu  org:foreign  org:gov  org:junk  org:lite  org:local  org:mag  org:med  org:nat  org:ngo  org:popup  org:rec  org:sci  organizing  orient  orwellian  oscillation  other-xtian  outcome-risk  oxbridge  paleocon  papers  parenting  pareto  paternal-age  path-dependence  patho-altruism  patience  paying-rent  pdf  peace-violence  people  personality  persuasion  perturbation  pessimism  phalanges  pharma  phd  philosophy  pic  piketty  pinker  piracy  planning  plots  poast  podcast  polarization  policy  polis  polisci  political-econ  politics  poll  pop-diff  population  population-genetics  populism  postmortem  postrat  power  pragmatic  pre-2013  pre-ww2  prediction  prediction-markets  preference-falsification  prejudice  prepping  preprint  presentation  primitivism  privacy  pro-rata  problem-solving  profile  programming  progression  propaganda  property-rights  proposal  protestant-catholic  protocol  prudence  pseudoE  psychiatry  psychology  psychometrics  public-goodish  putnam-like  q-n-a  qra  quality  quantitative-qualitative  quixotic  quotes  race  random  randy-ayndy  ranking  rant  rationality  ratty  realness  realpolitik  recommendations  recruiting  redistribution  reference  reflection  regression-to-mean  regularizer  regulation  reinforcement  religion  rent-seeking  responsibility  retention  review  revolution  rhetoric  right-wing  rindermann-thompson  ritual  roots  rot  russia  s-factor  s:*  sanctity-degradation  sapiens  scale  schelling  scholar  science  science-anxiety  scifi-fantasy  scitariat  search  securities  selection  self-control  self-interest  sex  sexuality  shift  short-circuit  sib-study  signal-noise  signaling  simulation  sinosphere  skeleton  skunkworks  sky  slippery-slope  smart-contracts  social  social-capital  social-choice  social-norms  social-psych  social-science  social-structure  sociality  society  sociology  socs-and-mops  software  spatial  speaking  spearhead  speculation  speed  sports  spreading  ssc  stagnation  stanford  startups  stat-power  state-of-art  statesmen  stats  status  stereotypes  stories  strategy  stream  street-fighting  study  studying  stylized-facts  success  sulla  summary  supply-demand  survey  sv  symmetry  synthesis  systematic-ad-hoc  szabo  tactics  tails  tainter  taxes  tech  technocracy  technology  techtariat  temperance  terrorism  the-bones  the-classics  the-devil  the-founding  the-great-west-whale  the-monster  the-south  the-trenches  the-watchers  the-west  the-world-is-just-atoms  theory-of-mind  theos  thiel  things  thinking  time  time-preference  time-series  tocqueville  toolkit  tools  top-n  track-record  trade  tradecraft  tradeoffs  tradition  transportation  trends  tribalism  trivia  troll  trump  trust  truth  turchin  twitter  unaffiliated  uncertainty  unintended-consequences  universalism-particularism  urban  urban-rural  us-them  usa  values  vampire-squid  variance-components  venture  vgr  video  virginia-DC  virtu  visualization  visuo  vitality  volo-avolo  walls  war  wealth  wealth-of-nations  welfare-state  west-hunter  westminster  white-paper  wiki  winner-take-all  wire-guided  wisdom  within-group  within-without  wonkish  working-stiff  world  world-war  X-not-about-Y  yvain  zeitgeist  🌞  🎓  🎩  🐸  👽 

Copy this bookmark: