nhaliday + general-survey   59

SocArXiv Papers | Gender, Religion, and Values: A Cross-National Examination of Moral Justification and Partisanship
Using data from a diverse set of 56 countries in the World Values Survey (N=85,181), I find that religiousness suppresses what would otherwise be larger and more consistent gender differences in values among Christians. Among most other groups, including Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists, and Muslims in non-Muslim contexts, religiousness does not greatly alter gender differences in values. However, among Muslims in Muslim-majority contexts—where men tend to be more religious than women—religiousness amplifies what would otherwise be smaller gender differences in values. Accordingly, gender differences in values tend to be larger among Muslims than Christians. I conclude that religions are complex and powerful social structures that can complicate group differences in values
study  sociology  preprint  general-survey  poll  values  correlation  gender  gender-diff  politics  ideology  religion  christianity  islam  trade  world  developing-world  egalitarianism-hierarchy  inequality  prejudice  westminster  identity-politics  theos  usa  europe  expression-survival  the-great-west-whale  rot  phalanges 
april 2018 by nhaliday
Religiosity and Fertility in the United States: The Role of Fertility Intentions
Using data from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG), we show that women who report that religion is “very important” in their everyday life have both higher fertility and higher intended fertility than those saying religion is “somewhat important” or “not important.” Factors such as unwanted fertility, age at childbearing, or degree of fertility postponement seem not to contribute to religiosity differentials in fertility. This answer prompts more fundamental questions: what is the nature of this greater “religiosity”? And why do the more religious want more children? We show that those saying religion is more important have more traditional gender and family attitudes and that these attitudinal differences account for a substantial part of the fertility differential. We speculate regarding other contributing causes.

Religion, Religiousness and Fertility in the U.S. and in Europe: https://www.demogr.mpg.de/papers/working/wp-2006-013.pdf
2006

RELIGIONS, FERTILITY, AND GROWTH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/iere.12291
Using Southeast Asian censuses, we show empirically that being Catholic, Buddhist, or Muslim significantly raises fertility, especially for couples with intermediate to high education levels. With these estimates, we identify the parameters of a structural model. Catholicism is strongly pro‐child (increasing total spending on children), followed by Buddhism, whereas Islam is more pro‐birth (redirecting spending from quality to quantity). Pro‐child religions depress growth in its early stages by lowering savings and labor supply. In the later stages of growth, pro‐birth religions impede human capital accumulation.
study  sociology  religion  theos  usa  correlation  fertility  eric-kaufmann  causation  general-survey  demographics  phalanges  intervention  gender  tradition  social-norms  parenting  values  politics  ideology  multi  europe  EU  rot  nihil  data  time-series  distribution  christianity  protestant-catholic  other-xtian  the-great-west-whale  occident  expression-survival  poll  inequality  pro-rata  mediterranean  eastern-europe  wealth  econ-metrics  farmers-and-foragers  buddhism  islam  asia  developing-world  human-capital  investing  developmental  number  quantitative-qualitative  quality  world  natural-experiment  field-study 
february 2018 by nhaliday
Effects of Education on Political Opinions: An International Study | International Journal of Public Opinion Research | Oxford Academic
Education and Political Party: The Effects of College or Social Class?: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2778029
The impact of education on political ideology: Evidence from European compulsory education reforms: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775716301704
correlation is with leftism, causal effect is shift to right

Greg thinks there are some effects: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:5adca8f16265

https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/964209775419457536
https://archive.is/oFELz
https://archive.is/f1DBF
https://archive.is/5iiqn

http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2008/12/education_ideol.html

https://twitter.com/pseudoerasmus/status/963451867912130561
https://archive.is/sHI7g
https://archive.is/B5Gdv
https://archive.is/hFERC
https://archive.is/8IUDm
Bryan Caplan has written a very persuasive book suggesting that retention/transfer of learning is very low. how do we know it’s not the same with the “PoMo ethos”
study  polisci  sociology  education  higher-ed  intervention  branches  politics  ideology  world  general-survey  correlation  causation  left-wing  right-wing  phalanges  multi  coalitions  history  mostly-modern  usa  cold-war  europe  EU  natural-experiment  endogenous-exogenous  direction  west-hunter  scitariat  twitter  social  discussion  backup  econotariat  garett-jones  cracker-econ  data  analysis  regression  org:econlib  biodet  behavioral-gen  variance-components  environmental-effects  counter-revolution  strategy  tactics  pseudoE  demographics  race  gender  markets  impetus  roots  explanans  migration  social-norms  persuasion 
february 2018 by nhaliday
Relative Quality of Foreign Nurses in the United States
We find a positive wage premium for nurses educated in the Philippines, but not for foreign nurses educated elsewhere. The premium peaked at 8% in 2000, and decreased to 4% in 2010.
pdf  study  economics  labor  industrial-org  migration  human-capital  healthcare  usa  asia  developing-world  general-survey  compensation  econ-productivity  data  ability-competence  quality 
december 2017 by nhaliday
The Power of Abortion Policy - Marginal REVOLUTION
I provide new evidence on the relative “powers” of contraception and abortion policy in effecting the dramatic social transformations of the 1960s and 1970s. Trends in sexual behavior suggest that young women’s increased access to the birth control pill fueled the sexual revolution, but neither these trends nor difference-in-difference estimates support the view that this also led to substantial changes in family formation. Rather, the estimates robustly suggest that it was liberalized access to abortion that allowed large numbers of women to delay marriage and motherhood.
econotariat  marginal-rev  commentary  study  summary  economics  policy  intervention  sociology  gender  sex  fertility  demographics  demographic-transition  history  mostly-modern  cold-war  rot  roots  explanans  technology  microfoundations  nitty-gritty  sexuality  modernity  the-bones  general-survey  endogenous-exogenous  control  life-history  social-norms  medicine  abortion-contraception-embryo  nascent-state 
december 2017 by nhaliday
Red State Families: Better Than We Knew | Institute for Family Studies
Second, adjusting for education and race/ethnicity transforms the relationship between the Red State Index and marital upbringing from a curvilinear to a linear one. The redder the state, the more likely is a teen to grow up with his or her married birth parents. The relationship is modest but statistically significant. For every ten-point increase in the Red State Index, the proportion of teens living with both parents rises by one percentage point. This suggests that red state family culture is associated with increased odds of being raised in an intact, married family.

http://anepigone.blogspot.com/2017/11/nicholas-kristof-strikes-out.html
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/11/28/no-republicans-arent-hypocrites-on-family-values-215873
http://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/blue-america-more-virtuous-than-red-nope/
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november 2017 by nhaliday
Climate Risk, Cooperation, and the Co-Evolution of Culture and Institutions∗
We test this hypothesis for Europe combining high-resolution climate data for the period 1500-2000 with survey data at the sub-national level. We find that regions with higher inter-annual variability in precipitation and temperature display higher levels of trust. This effect is driven by variability in the growing season months, and by historical rather than recent variability. Regarding possible mechanisms, we show that regions with more variable climate were more closely connected to the Medieval trade network, indicating a higher propensity to engage in inter-community exchange. We also find that these regions were more likely to adopt participatory political institutions earlier on, and are characterized by a higher quality of local governments still today. Our results suggest that, by favoring the emergence of mutually-reinforcing norms and institutions, exposure to environmental risk had a long-lasting impact on human cooperation.
pdf  study  broad-econ  economics  cliometrics  path-dependence  growth-econ  political-econ  institutions  government  social-norms  culture  cultural-dynamics  correlation  history  early-modern  mostly-modern  values  poll  trust  n-factor  cooperate-defect  cohesion  democracy  environment  europe  the-great-west-whale  geography  trade  network-structure  general-survey  outcome-risk  uncertainty  branches  microfoundations  hari-seldon 
november 2017 by nhaliday
Global Evidence on Economic Preferences
- Benjamin Enke et al

This paper studies the global variation in economic preferences. For this purpose, we present the Global Preference Survey (GPS), an experimentally validated survey dataset of time preference, risk preference, positive and negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust from 80,000 individuals in 76 countries. The data reveal substantial heterogeneity in preferences across countries, but even larger within-country heterogeneity. Across individuals, preferences vary with age, gender, and cognitive ability, yet these relationships appear partly country specific. At the country level, the data reveal correlations between preferences and bio-geographic and cultural variables such as agricultural suitability, language structure, and religion. Variation in preferences is also correlated with economic outcomes and behaviors. Within countries and subnational regions, preferences are linked to individual savings decisions, labor market choices, and prosocial behaviors. Across countries, preferences vary with aggregate outcomes ranging from per capita income, to entrepreneurial activities, to the frequency of armed conflicts.

...

This paper explores these questions by making use of the core features of the GPS: (i) coverage of 76 countries that represent approximately 90 percent of the world population; (ii) representative population samples within each country for a total of 80,000 respondents, (iii) measures designed to capture time preference, risk preference, altruism, positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, and trust, based on an ex ante experimental validation procedure (Falk et al., 2016) as well as pre-tests in culturally heterogeneous countries, (iv) standardized elicitation and translation techniques through the pre-existing infrastructure of a global polling institute, Gallup. Upon publication, the data will be made publicly available online. The data on individual preferences are complemented by a comprehensive set of covariates provided by the Gallup World Poll 2012.

...

The GPS preference measures are based on twelve survey items, which were selected in an initial survey validation study (see Falk et al., 2016, for details). The validation procedure involved conducting multiple incentivized choice experiments for each preference, and testing the relative abilities of a wide range of different question wordings and formats to predict behavior in these choice experiments. The particular items used to construct the GPS preference measures were selected based on optimal performance out of menus of alternative items (for details see Falk et al., 2016). Experiments provide a valuable benchmark for selecting survey items, because they can approximate the ideal choice situations, specified in economic theory, in which individuals make choices in controlled decision contexts. Experimental measures are very costly, however, to implement in a globally representative sample, whereas survey measures are much less costly.⁴ Selecting survey measures that can stand in for incentivized revealed preference measures leverages the strengths of both approaches.

The Preference Survey Module: A Validated Instrument for Measuring Risk, Time, and Social Preferences: http://ftp.iza.org/dp9674.pdf

Table 1: Survey items of the GPS

Figure 1: World maps of patience, risk taking, and positive reciprocity.
Figure 2: World maps of negative reciprocity, altruism, and trust.

Figure 3: Gender coefficients by country. For each country, we regress the respective preference on gender, age and its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting gender coefficients as well as their significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the coefficients.

Figure 4: Cognitive ability coefficients by country. For each country, we regress the respective preference on gender, age and its square, and subjective math skills, and plot the resulting coefficients on subjective math skills as well as their significance level. In order to make countries comparable, each preference was standardized (z-scores) within each country before computing the coefficients.

Figure 5: Age profiles by OECD membership.

Table 6: Pairwise correlations between preferences and geographic and cultural variables

Figure 10: Distribution of preferences at individual level.
Figure 11: Distribution of preferences at country level.

interesting digression:
D Discussion of Measurement Error and Within- versus Between-Country Variation
study  dataset  data  database  let-me-see  economics  growth-econ  broad-econ  microfoundations  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  culture  psychology  behavioral-econ  values  🎩  pdf  piracy  world  spearhead  general-survey  poll  group-level  within-group  variance-components  🌞  correlation  demographics  age-generation  gender  iq  cooperate-defect  time-preference  temperance  labor  wealth  wealth-of-nations  entrepreneurialism  outcome-risk  altruism  trust  patience  developing-world  maps  visualization  n-factor  things  phalanges  personality  regression  gender-diff  pop-diff  geography  usa  canada  anglo  europe  the-great-west-whale  nordic  anglosphere  MENA  africa  china  asia  sinosphere  latin-america  self-report  hive-mind  GT-101  realness  long-short-run  endo-exo  signal-noise  communism  japan  korea  methodology  measurement  org:ngo  white-paper  endogenous-exogenous  within-without  hari-seldon 
october 2017 by nhaliday
Returns to skills around the world: Evidence from PIAAC
https://twitter.com/pnin1957/status/918110589578293250
https://archive.is/901g4
Age differences in individual returns to numeracy skills. At age 20-24, a standard deviation higher test score predicts a 7% boost in hourly wages, while at age 40-44 the boost is almost 20%.

only OECD countries

developing world:
The relationship between school performance and future wages in Brazil: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1517758014000265
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october 2017 by nhaliday
Culture, Ethnicity, and Diversity - American Economic Association
We investigate the empirical relationship between ethnicity and culture, defined as a vector of traits reflecting norms, values, and attitudes. Using survey data for 76 countries, we find that ethnic identity is a significant predictor of cultural values, yet that within-group variation in culture trumps between-group variation. Thus, in contrast to a commonly held view, ethnic and cultural diversity are unrelated. Although only a small portion of a country’s overall cultural heterogeneity occurs between groups, we find that various political economy outcomes (such as civil conflict and public goods provision) worsen when there is greater overlap between ethnicity and culture. (JEL D74, H41, J15, O15, O17, Z13)

definition of chi-squared index, etc., under:
II. Measuring Heterogeneity

Table 5—Incidence of Civil Conflict and Diversity
Table 6—Public Goods Provision and Diversity

https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/924002043576115202
https://archive.is/oqMnC
https://archive.is/sBqqo
https://archive.is/1AcXn
χ2 diversity: raising the risk of civil war. Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, Wacziarg, in the American Economic Review (1/N)

What predicts higher χ2 diversity? The authors tell us that, too. Here are all of the variables that have a correlation > 0.4: (7/N)

one of them is UK legal origin...

online appendix (with maps, Figures B1-3): http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty_pages/romain.wacziarg/downloads/2017_culture_appendix.pdf
study  economics  growth-econ  broad-econ  world  developing-world  race  diversity  putnam-like  culture  cultural-dynamics  entropy-like  metrics  within-group  anthropology  microfoundations  political-econ  🎩  🌞  pdf  piracy  public-goodish  general-survey  cohesion  ethnocentrism  tribalism  behavioral-econ  sociology  cooperate-defect  homo-hetero  revolution  war  stylized-facts  econometrics  group-level  variance-components  multi  twitter  social  commentary  spearhead  econotariat  garett-jones  backup  summary  maps  data  visualization  correlation  values  poll  composition-decomposition  concept  conceptual-vocab  definition  intricacy  nonlinearity  anglosphere  regression  law  roots  within-without 
september 2017 by nhaliday
Liberals Possess More National Consensus on Political Attitudes in the United StatesSocial Psychological and Personality Science - Peter Ondish, Chadly Stern, 2017
Using two nationally representative data sets (the General Social Survey and the American National Election Studies), we examined the attitudes of over 80,000 people on more than 400 political issues (e.g., attitudes toward welfare, gun control, same-sex marriage) across approximately 40 years. In both data sets, we found that liberals possessed a larger degree of agreement in their political attitudes than did conservatives. Additionally, both liberals and conservatives possessed more consensus than did political moderates.
study  politics  polisci  sociology  ideology  coalitions  homo-hetero  moments  comparison  left-wing  right-wing  tribalism  us-them  policy  data  analysis  general-survey  stylized-facts  class-warfare  polarization 
september 2017 by nhaliday
PRRI: America’s Changing Religious Identity
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/09/06/the-demographic-change-fueling-the-angst-of-trumps-base/
https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/09/08/as-many-americans-think-the-bible-is-a-book-of-fables-as-that-it-is-the-word-of-god/
America, that is, the United States of America, has long been a huge exception for the secularization model. Basically as a society develops and modernizes it becomes more secular. At least that’s the model.

...

Today everyone is talking about the Pew survey which shows the marginalization of the Anglo-Protestant America which I grew up in. This marginalization is due to secularization broadly, and non-Hispanic whites in particular. You don’t need Pew to tell you this.

...

Note: Robert Putnam’s American Grace is probably the best book which highlights the complex cultural forces which ushered in the second wave of secularization. The short answer is that the culture wars diminished Christianity in the eyes of liberals.

Explaining Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference: Political Backlash and Generational Succession, 1987-2012: https://www.sociologicalscience.com/articles-vol1-24-423/
the causal direction in the rise of the “Nones” likely runs from political identity as a liberal or conservative to religious identity

The Persistent and Exceptional Intensity of American Religion: A Response to Recent Research: https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/xd37b
But we show that rather than religion fading into irrelevance as the secularization thesis would suggest, intense religion—strong affiliation, very frequent practice, literalism, and evangelicalism—is persistent and, in fact, only moderate religion is on the decline in the United States.

https://twitter.com/avermeule/status/913823410609950721
https://archive.is/CiCok
As in the U.K., so now too in America: the left establishment is moving towards an open view that orthodox Christians are unfit for office.
https://twitter.com/avermeule/status/913880665011228673
https://archive.is/LZiyV

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/883764202539798529
https://archive.is/HvVrN
i've had the thought that it's a plausible future where traditional notions of theism become implicitly non-white

https://mereorthodoxy.com/bourgeois-christian-politics/

http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/12/living/pew-religion-study/index.html
http://coldcasechristianity.com/2017/are-young-people-really-leaving-christianity/
Some writers and Christian observers deny the flight of young people altogether, but the growing statistics should alarm us enough as Church leaders to do something about the dilemma. My hope in this post is to simply consolidate some of the research (many of the summaries are directly quoted) so you can decide for yourself. I’m going to organize the recent findings in a way that illuminates the problem:

'Christianity as default is gone': the rise of a non-Christian Europe: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/21/christianity-non-christian-europe-young-people-survey-religion
In the UK, only 7% of young adults identify as Anglican, fewer than the 10% who categorise themselves as Catholic. Young Muslims, at 6%, are on the brink of overtaking those who consider themselves part of the country’s established church.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postchristianity
Other scholars have disputed the global decline of Christianity, and instead hypothesized of an evolution of Christianity which allows it to not only survive, but actively expand its influence in contemporary societies.

Philip Jenkins hypothesized a "Christian Revolution" in the Southern nations, such as Africa, Asia and Latin America, where instead of facing decline, Christianity is actively expanding. The relevance of Christian teachings in the global South will allow the Christian population in these areas to continually increase, and together with the shrinking of the Western Christian population, will form a "new Christendom" in which the majority of the world's Christian population can be found in the South.[9]
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september 2017 by nhaliday
Which industries are the most liberal and most conservative?
How Democratic or Republican is your job? This tool tells you: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/06/03/how-democratic-or-republican-is-your-job-this-tool-tells-you/?utm_term=.e19707abd9f1

http://verdantlabs.com/politics_of_professions/index.html

What you do and how you vote: http://www.pleeps.org/2017/01/07/what-you-do-and-how-you-vote/

trending blue across white-collar professions:
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/opinion/trump-fundraising-donors.html
https://twitter.com/adam_bonica/status/1174536380329803776
https://archive.is/r7YB6

https://twitter.com/whyvert/status/1174735746088996864
https://archive.is/Cwrih
This is partly because the meaning of left and right changed during that period. Left used to about protecting workers. Now it's mainly about increasing the power of the elite class over the working class - thus their increased support.
--
yes, it is a different kind of left now

academia:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_views_of_American_academics

The Legal Academy's Ideological Uniformity: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2953087

Homogenous: The Political Affiliations of Elite Liberal Arts College Faculty: https://sci-hub.tw/10.1007/s12129-018-9700-x
includes crosstab by discipline

https://www.conservativecriminology.com/uploads/5/6/1/7/56173731/lounsbery_9-25.pdf#page=28
Neil Gross, Solon Simmons
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VIEWS OF AMERICAN PROFESSORS

another crosstab
description of data sampling on page 21, meant to be representative of all undergraduate degree-granting institutions

Computer science 32.3 58.1 9.7

It’s finally out–The big review paper on the lack of political diversity in social psychology: https://heterodoxacademy.org/2015/09/14/bbs-paper-on-lack-of-political-diversity/
https://heterodoxacademy.org/2015/09/21/political-diversity-response-to-33-critiques/
http://righteousmind.com/viewpoint-diversity/
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/real-academic-diversity
http://quillette.com/2017/07/06/social-sciences-undergoing-purity-spiral/
What’s interesting about Haidt’s alternative interpretation of the liberal progress narrative is that he mentions two elements central to the narrative—private property and nations. And what has happened to a large extent is that as the failures of communism have become increasingly apparent many on the left—including social scientists—have shifted their activism away from opposing private property and towards other aspects, for example globalism.

But how do we know a similarly disastrous thing is not going to happen with globalism as happened with communism? What if some form of national and ethnic affiliation is a deep-seated part of human nature, and that trying to forcefully suppress it will eventually lead to a disastrous counter-reaction? What if nations don’t create conflict, but alleviate it? What if a decentralised structure is the best way for human society to function?
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september 2017 by nhaliday
The GRE is useful; range restriction is a thing – Gene Expression
As an empirical matter I do think that it is likely many universities will follow the University of Michigan in dropping the GRE as a requirement. There will be some resistance within academia, but there is a lot of reluctance to vocally defend the GRE in public, especially from younger faculty who fear the social and professional repercussions (every time a discussion pops up about the GRE I get a lot of Twitter DMs from people who believe in the utility of the GRE but don’t want to be seen defending it in public because they fear becoming the target of accusations of an -ism). My prediction is that after the GRE is gone people will simply rely on other proxies.
gnxp  scitariat  commentary  trends  academia  grad-school  phd  psychometrics  progression  prediction  hmm  egalitarianism-hierarchy  general-survey 
september 2017 by nhaliday
The Long-Run Weight of Communism or the Weight of LongRun History?
This study provides evidence that culture understood as values and beliefs moves very slowly. Despite massive institutional change, values and beliefs in transition countries have not changed much over the last 20 years. Evidence suggests that culture is affected by the long run historical past, in particular the participation in empires for over 100 years. Current institutional evolutions in transition countries might be more affected by their long run past than by the communist experience of the twentieth century
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august 2017 by nhaliday
Divorce demography - Wikipedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divorce_in_the_United_States#Rates_of_divorce
https://psychcentral.com/lib/the-myth-of-the-high-rate-of-divorce/

Marriage update: less divorce, and less sex: https://familyinequality.wordpress.com/2017/04/14/marriage-update-less-divorce-and-less-sex/

Breaking Up Is Hard to Count: The Rise of Divorce in the United States, 1980–2010: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs13524-013-0270-9
Divorce rates have doubled over the past two decades among persons over age 35. Among the youngest couples, however, divorce rates are stable or declining. If current trends continue, overall age-standardized divorce rates could level off or even decline over the next few decades. We argue that the leveling of divorce among persons born since 1980 probably reflects the increasing selectivity of marriage.
sociology  methodology  demographics  social-science  social-structure  life-history  sex  wiki  reference  pro-rata  metrics  longitudinal  intricacy  multi  org:sci  wonkish  sexuality  trends  data  analysis  general-survey  study  history  mostly-modern  usa  selection  age-generation  chart  beginning-middle-end 
august 2017 by nhaliday
Trust in Large Organizations
We argue that trust should be particularly important for the performance of large organizations. In a cross-section of countries, evidence on government performance, participation in civic and professional societies, importance of large firms, and the performance of social institutions more generally supports this hypothesis. Moreover, trust is lower in countries with dominant hierarchical religions, which may have deterred networks of cooperation trust hold up remarkably well on a cross-section of countries.

The Importance of Trust for Investment: Evidence from Venture Capital: http://www.nber.org/papers/w16923
We examine the effect of trust on financial investment and contracting decisions in a micro-economic environment where trust is exogenous. Using hand-collected data on European venture capital, we show that the Eurobarometer measure of trust among nations significantly affects investment decisions. This holds even after controlling for investor and company fixed effects, geographic distance, information and transaction costs. The national identity of venture capital firms' individual partners further contributes to the effect of trust. Education and work experience reduce the effect of trust but do not eliminate it. We also examine the relationship between trust and sophisticated contracts involving contingent control rights and find that, even after controlling for endogeneity, they are complements, not substitutes.

Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers: http://www.nber.org/papers/w2342
The paper questions the common view that share price increases of firms involved in hostile takeovers measure efficiency gains from acquisitions. Even if such gains exist, most of the increase in the combined value of the target and the acquirer is likely to come from stakeholder wealth losses, such as declines in value of subcontractors' firm-specific capital or employees' human capital. The use of event studies to gauge wealth creation in takeovers is unjustified. The paper also suggests a theory of managerial behavior, in which hiring and entrenching trustworthy managers enables shareholders to commit to upholding implicit contracts with stakeholders. Hostile takeovers are an innovation allowing shareholders to renege on such contracts ex post, against managers' will. On this view, shareholder gains are redistributions from stakeholders, and can in the long run result in deterioration of trust necessary for the functioning of the corporation.

Trust in Public Finance: http://www.nber.org/papers/w9187
Using data on trust and trustworthiness from the 1990 wave of the World Values Survey, I first investigate a model of the extent of tax cheating and the size of government that recognizes the interdependence of the two. The results reveal that tax cheating is lower in countries that exhibit more (not-government-related) trustworthiness. However, holding that constant, tax cheating becomes more acceptable as government grows. All in all, there is some weak evidence that the strong positive cross-country correlation between the size of government and tax cheating masks the fact that big government induces tax cheating while, at the same time, tax cheating constrains big government. I then add to the structural model an equation determining the level of prosperity, allowing prosperity to depend, inter alia, on the level of government and on trust in others. I find some evidence that both prosperity and government involvement are higher in more trusting societies. Moreover, holding these measures of trust constant, the association of government size with prosperity is positive until a level of government spending somewhere between 31% and 38% of GDP, after which its marginal effect is negative. Thus, although a trusting citizenry allows larger government, the tax burden this entails erodes the rule obedience taxpayers exhibit toward government.

Tax cheating among whites: http://anepigone.blogspot.com/2017/04/tax-cheating-among-whites.html
The masses still more or less assume that “against the law” is a synonym for “wrong.” It is known that the criminal law is harsh and full of anomalies and that litigation is so expensive as always to favour the rich against the poor: but there is a general feeling that the law, such as it is, will be scrupulously administered … An Englishman does not believe in his bones, as a Spanish or Italian peasant does, that the law is simply a racket.

The English People, Collins, 1947

WEIRDO societies require WEIRDOs to make them work. The less WEIRDO a society becomes, the more being a WEIRDO--characterized by high social trust, reciprocity, political compromise, generosity to those in need, isonomy, etc--switches from being an advantage to being a disadvantage. Social trust declines, reciprocity disappears, political compromise is replaced by a winner-take-all ethnic spoils system, generosity is exploited to the point that it is seen as an entitlement, and the legal system gets hijacked by racial grievance concepts like "social justice". It's a vicious circle.

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29544
Theodore Roosevelt
Third Annual Message
December 7, 1903

The consistent policy of the National Government, so far as it has the power, is to hold in check the unscrupulous man, whether employer or employee; but to refuse to weaken individual initiative or to hamper or cramp the industrial development of the country. We recognize that this is an era of federation and combination, in which great capitalistic corporations and labor unions have become factors of tremendous importance in all industrial centers. Hearty recognition is given the far-reaching, beneficent work which has been accomplished through both corporations and unions, and the line as between different corporations, as between different unions, is drawn as it is between different individuals; that is, it is drawn on conduct, the effort being to treat both organized capital and organized labor alike; asking nothing save that the interest of each shall be brought into harmony with the interest of the general public, and that the conduct of each shall conform to the fundamental rules of obedience to law, of individual freedom, and of justice and fair dealing towards all. Whenever either corporation, labor union, or individual disregards the law or acts in a spirit of arbitrary and tyrannous interference with the rights of others, whether corporations or individuals, then where the Federal Government has jurisdiction, it will see to it that the misconduct is stopped, paying not the slightest heed to the position or power of the corporation, the union or the individual, but only to one vital fact--that is, the question whether or not the conduct of the individual or aggregate of individuals is in accordance with the law of the land. Every man must be guaranteed his liberty and his right to do as he likes with his property or his labor, so long as he does not infringe the rights of others. _No man is above the law and no man is below it; nor do we ask any man's permission when we require him to obey it. Obedience to the law is demanded as a right; not asked as a favor._
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august 2017 by nhaliday
The Determinants of Trust
Both individual experiences and community characteristics influence how much people trust each other. Using data drawn from US localities we find that the strongest factors that reduce trust are: i) a recent history of traumatic experiences, even though the passage of time reduces this effect fairly rapidly; ii) belonging to a group that historically felt discriminated against, such as minorities (black in particular) and, to a lesser extent, women; iii) being economically unsuccessful in terms of income and education; iv) living in a racially mixed community and/or in one with a high degree of income disparity. Religious beliefs and ethnic origins do not significantly affect trust. The latter result may be an indication that the American melting pot at least up to a point works, in terms of homogenizing attitudes of different cultures, even though racial cleavages leading to low trust are still quite high.

Understanding Trust: http://www.nber.org/papers/w13387
In this paper we resolve this puzzle by recognizing that trust has two components: a belief-based one and a preference based one. While the sender's behavior reflects both, we show that WVS-like measures capture mostly the belief-based component, while questions on past trusting behavior are better at capturing the preference component of trust.

MEASURING TRUST: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/laibson/files/measuring_trust.pdf
We combine two experiments and a survey to measure trust and trustworthiness— two key components of social capital. Standard attitudinal survey questions about trust predict trustworthy behavior in our experiments much better than they predict trusting behavior. Trusting behavior in the experiments is predicted by past trusting behavior outside of the experiments. When individuals are closer socially, both trust and trustworthiness rise. Trustworthiness declines when partners are of different races or nationalities. High status individuals are able to elicit more trustworthiness in others.

What is Social Capital? The Determinants of Trust and Trustworthiness: http://www.nber.org/papers/w7216
Using a sample of Harvard undergraduates, we analyze trust and social capital in two experiments. Trusting behavior and trustworthiness rise with social connection; differences in race and nationality reduce the level of trustworthiness. Certain individuals appear to be persistently more trusting, but these people do not say they are more trusting in surveys. Survey questions about trust predict trustworthiness not trust. Only children are less trustworthy. People behave in a more trustworthy manner towards higher status individuals, and therefore status increases earnings in the experiment. As such, high status persons can be said to have more social capital.

Trust and Cheating: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18509
We find that: i) both parties to a trust exchange have implicit notions of what constitutes cheating even in a context without promises or messages; ii) these notions are not unique - the vast majority of senders would feel cheated by a negative return on their trust/investment, whereas a sizable minority defines cheating according to an equal split rule; iii) these implicit notions affect the behavior of both sides to the exchange in terms of whether to trust or cheat and to what extent. Finally, we show that individual's notions of what constitutes cheating can be traced back to two classes of values instilled by parents: cooperative and competitive. The first class of values tends to soften the notion while the other tightens it.

Nationalism and Ethnic-Based Trust: Evidence from an African Border Region: https://u.osu.edu/robinson.1012/files/2015/12/Robinson_NationalismTrust-1q3q9u1.pdf
These results offer microlevel evidence that a strong and salient national identity can diminish ethnic barriers to trust in diverse societies.

One Team, One Nation: Football, Ethnic Identity, and Conflict in Africa: http://conference.nber.org/confer//2017/SI2017/DEV/Durante_Depetris-Chauvin.pdf
Do collective experiences that prime sentiments of national unity reduce interethnic tensions and conflict? We examine this question by looking at the impact of national football teams’ victories in sub-Saharan Africa. Combining individual survey data with information on over 70 official matches played between 2000 and 2015, we find that individuals interviewed in the days after a victory of their country’s national team are less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity and more likely to trust people of other ethnicities than those interviewed just before. The effect is sizable and robust and is not explained by generic euphoria or optimism. Crucially, national victories do not only affect attitudes but also reduce violence. Indeed, using plausibly exogenous variation from close qualifications to the Africa Cup of Nations, we find that countries that (barely) qualified experience significantly less conflict in the following six months than countries that (barely) did not. Our findings indicate that, even where ethnic tensions have deep historical roots, patriotic shocks can reduce inter-ethnic tensions and have a tangible impact on conflict.

Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?: http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/HHPW.pdf
We identify three families of mechanisms that link diversity to public goods provision—–what we term “preferences,” “technology,” and “strategy selection” mechanisms—–and run a series of experimental games that permit us to compare the explanatory power of distinct mechanisms within each of these three families. Results from games conducted with a random sample of 300 subjects from a slum neighborhood of Kampala, Uganda, suggest that successful public goods provision in homogenous ethnic communities can be attributed to a strategy selection mechanism: in similar settings, co-ethnics play cooperative equilibria, whereas non-co-ethnics do not. In addition, we find evidence for a technology mechanism: co-ethnics are more closely linked on social networks and thus plausibly better able to support cooperation through the threat of social sanction. We find no evidence for prominent preference mechanisms that emphasize the commonality of tastes within ethnic groups or a greater degree of altruism toward co-ethnics, and only weak evidence for technology mechanisms that focus on the impact of shared ethnicity on the productivity of teams.

does it generalize to first world?

Higher Intelligence Groups Have Higher Cooperation Rates in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp8499.html
The initial cooperation rates are similar, it increases in the groups with higher intelligence to reach almost full cooperation, while declining in the groups with lower intelligence. The difference is produced by the cumulation of small but persistent differences in the response to past cooperation of the partner. In higher intelligence subjects, cooperation after the initial stages is immediate and becomes the default mode, defection instead requires more time. For lower intelligence groups this difference is absent. Cooperation of higher intelligence subjects is payoff sensitive, thus not automatic: in a treatment with lower continuation probability there is no difference between different intelligence groups

Why societies cooperate: https://voxeu.org/article/why-societies-cooperate
Three attributes are often suggested to generate cooperative behaviour – a good heart, good norms, and intelligence. This column reports the results of a laboratory experiment in which groups of players benefited from learning to cooperate. It finds overwhelming support for the idea that intelligence is the primary condition for a socially cohesive, cooperative society. Warm feelings towards others and good norms have only a small and transitory effect.

individual payoff, etc.:

Trust, Values and False Consensus: http://www.nber.org/papers/w18460
Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more (less) trustworthy individuals form more optimistic (pessimistic) trust beliefs - and that this tendency continues to color trust beliefs after several rounds of game-play. Moreover, we show that one's own type/trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing. In a second closely-related experiment, we show the economic impact of mis-calibrated trust beliefs stemming from false consensus. Miscalibrated beliefs lower participants' experimental trust game earnings by about 20 percent on average.

The Right Amount of Trust: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15344
We investigate the relationship between individual trust and individual economic performance. We find that individual income is hump-shaped in a measure of intensity of trust beliefs. Our interpretation is that highly trusting individuals tend to assume too much social risk and to be cheated more often, ultimately performing less well than those with a belief close to the mean trustworthiness of the population. On the other hand, individuals with overly pessimistic beliefs avoid being cheated, but give up profitable opportunities, therefore underperforming. The cost of either too much or too little trust is comparable to the income lost by forgoing college.

...

This framework allows us to show that income-maximizing trust typically exceeds the trust level of the average person as well as to estimate the distribution of income lost to trust mistakes. We find that although a majority of individuals has well calibrated beliefs, a non-trivial proportion of the population (10%) has trust beliefs sufficiently poorly calibrated to lower income by more than 13%.

Do Trust and … [more]
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august 2017 by nhaliday
Inherited Trust and Growth - American Economic Association
This paper develops a new method to uncover the causal effect of trust on economic growth by focusing on the inherited component of trust and its time variation. We show that inherited trust of descendants of US immigrants is significantly influenced by the country of origin and the timing of arrival of their forebears. We thus use the inherited trust of descendants of US immigrants as a time-varying measure of inherited trust in their country of origin. This strategy allows to identify the sizeable causal impact of inherited trust on worldwide growth during the twentieth century by controlling for country fixed effects. (JEL N11, N12, N31, N32, O47, Z13)

key data:
Table 1, Figure 1, Figure 3, Figure 4

Trust Assimilation in the United States, Bryan Caplan: http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2017/05/trust_assimilat.html

How Durable are Social Norms? Immigrant Trust and Generosity in 132 Countries: http://www.nber.org/papers/w19855
We find that migrants tend to make social trust assessments that mainly reflect conditions in the country where they now live, but they also reveal a significant influence from their countries of origin. The latter effect is one-third as important as the effect of local conditions. We also find that the altruistic behavior of migrants, as measured by the frequency of their donations in their new countries, is strongly determined by social norms in their new countries, while also retaining some effect of the levels of generosity found in their birth countries. To show that the durability of social norms is not simply due to a failure to recognize new circumstances, we demonstrate that there are no footprint effects for immigrants’ confidence in political institutions. Taken together, these findings support the notion that social norms are deeply rooted in long-standing cultures, yet are nonetheless subject to adaptation when there are major changes in the surrounding circumstances and environment.

The autocratic roots of social distrust: http://sci-hub.tw/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596717300951
This paper identifies a new source of social distrust: an individual’s autocratic
origin.
 Individuals whose ancestors migrated from countries with higher autocracy
levels are less likely to trust others and to vote in presidential elections in the
U.S.
 The impact of autocratic culture on trust lasts for at least three generations
whereas the impact on voting disappears after one generation.
 The results are not driven by selection into migration or other factors such as the
GDP, education, or the strength of family ties in home countries in the U.S.
 Autocratic culture also has similar impacts on trust and voting across Europe.
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july 2017 by nhaliday
Dimensions - Geert Hofstede
http://geerthofstede.com/culture-geert-hofstede-gert-jan-hofstede/6d-model-of-national-culture/

https://www.reddit.com/r/europe/comments/4g88kt/eu28_countries_ranked_by_hofstedes_cultural/
https://archive.is/rXnII

https://hbdchick.wordpress.com/2013/09/07/national-individualism-collectivism-scores/

Individualism and Collectivism in Israeli Society: Comparing Religious and Secular High-School Students: https://sci-hub.tw/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1016945121604
A common collective basis of mutual value consensus was found in the two groups; however, as predicted, there were differences between secular and religious students on the three kinds of items, since the religious scored higher than the secular students on items emphasizing collectivist orientation. The differences, however, do not fit the common theoretical framework of collectivism-individualism, but rather tend to reflect the distinction between in-group and universal collectivism.

Individualism and Collectivism in Two Conflicted Societies: Comparing Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Arab High School Students: https://sci-hub.tw/http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0044118X01033001001
Both groups were found to be more collectivistic than individualistic oriented. However, as predicted, the Palestinians scored higher than the Israeli students on items emphasizing in-group collectivist orientation (my nationality, my country, etc.). The differences between the two groups tended to reflect some subdistinctions such as different elements of individualism and collectivism. Moreover, they reflected the historical context and contemporary influences, such as the stage where each society is at in the nation-making process.

Religion as culture: religious individualism and collectivism among american catholics, jews, and protestants.: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17576356
We propose the theory that religious cultures vary in individualistic and collectivistic aspects of religiousness and spirituality. Study 1 showed that religion for Jews is about community and biological descent but about personal beliefs for Protestants. Intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity were intercorrelated and endorsed differently by Jews, Catholics, and Protestants in a pattern that supports the theory that intrinsic religiosity relates to personal religion, whereas extrinsic religiosity stresses community and ritual (Studies 2 and 3). Important life experiences were likely to be social for Jews but focused on God for Protestants, with Catholics in between (Study 4). We conclude with three perspectives in understanding the complex relationships between religion and culture.

Inglehart–Welzel cultural map of the world: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inglehart%E2%80%93Welzel_cultural_map_of_the_world
Live cultural map over time 1981 to 2015: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ABWYOcru7js

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-materialism

https://ourworldindata.org/materialism-and-post-materialism
By Income of the Country

Most of the low post-materialism, high income countries are East Asian :(. Some decent options: Norway, Netherlands, Iceland (surprising!). Other Euro countries fall into that category but interest me less for other reasons.

https://graphpaperdiaries.com/2016/06/10/materialism-and-post-materialism/

Postmaterialism and the Economic Condition: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111573
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june 2017 by nhaliday
Book Review: Peter Turchin – War and Peace and War
I think Turchin’s book is a good introductory text to the new science of cliodynamics, one he himself did much to found (along with Nefedov and Korotayev). However, though readable – mostly, I suspect, because I am interested in the subject – it is not well-written. The text was too thick, there were too many awkward grammatical constructions, and the quotes are far, far too long.

More importantly, 1) the theory is not internally well-integrated and 2) there isn’t enough emphasis on the fundamental differences separating agrarian from industrial societies. For instance, Turchin makes a lot of the idea that the Italians’ low level of asabiya (“amoral familism”) was responsible for it’s only becoming politically unified in the late 19th century. But why then was it the same for Germany, the bloody frontline for the religious wars of the 17th century? And why was France able to build a huge empire under Napoleon, when it had lost all its “meta-ethnic frontiers” / marches by 1000 AD? For answers to these questions about the genesis of the modern nation-state, one would be much better off by looking at more conventional explanations by the likes of Benedict Anderson, Charles Tilly, or Gabriel Ardant.

Nowadays, modern political technologies – the history textbook, the Monument to the Unknown Soldier, the radio and Internet – have long displaced the meta-ethnic frontier as the main drivers behind the formation of asabiya. Which is certainly not to say that meta-ethnic frontiers are unimportant – they are, especially in the case of Dar al-Islam, which feels itself to be under siege on multiple fronts (the “bloody borders” of clash-of-civilizations-speak), which according to Turchin’s theory should promote a stronger Islamic identity. But their intrinsic importance has been diluted by the influence of modern media.
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june 2017 by nhaliday
An Economic Analysis of the Protestant Reformation
- Ekelund, Hébert, Tollison

This paper seeks to explain the initial successes and failures of Protestantism on economic grounds. It argues that the medieval Roman Catholic Church, through doctrinal manipulation, the exclusion of rivals, and various forms of price discrimination, ultimately placed members seeking the Z good "spiritual services" on the margin of defection. These monopolistic practices encouraged entry by rival firms, some of which were aligned with civil governments. The paper hypothesizes that Protestant entry was facilitated in emergent entrepreneurial societies characterized by the decline of feudalism and relatively unstable distribution of wealth and repressed in more homogeneous, rent-seeking societies that were mostly dissipating rather than creating wealth. In these societies the Roman Church was more able to continue the practice of price discrimination. Informal tests of this proposition are conducted by considering primogeniture and urban growth as proxies for wealth stability.

Causes and Consequences of the Protestant Reformation: https://pseudoerasmus.files.wordpress.com/2017/01/becker-pfaff-rubin-2016.pdf
- Sascha O. Becker, Steven Pfaff, Jared Rubin

The Protestant Reformation is one of the defining events of the last millennium. Nearly 500 years after the Reformation, its causes and consequences have seen a renewed interest in the social sciences. Research in economics, sociology, and political science increasingly uses detailed individual-level, city-level, and regional-level data to identify drivers of the adoption of the Reformation, its diffusion pattern, and its socioeconomic consequences. We take stock of this research, pointing out what we know and what we do not know and suggesting the most promising areas for future research.

Table 1: Studies of the Supply and Demand-Side Factors of the Reformation
Table 2: Studies on the Consequences of the Reformation: Human Capital
Table 3: Studies on the Consequences of the Reformation: Work and Work Ethic
Table 4: Studies on the Consequences of the Reformation: Economic Development
Table 5: Studies on the Consequences of the Reformation: Governance
Table 6: Studies on the “Dark” Consequences of the Reformation

LUTHER AND SULEYMAN: http://www.jstor.org.sci-hub.tw/stable/40506214
- Murat Iyigun

Various historical accounts have suggested that the Ottomans' rise helped the Protestant Reformation as well as its offshoots, such as Zwinglianism, Anabaptism, and Calvinism, survive their infancy and mature. Utilizing a comprehensive data set on violent confrontations for the interval between 1401 and 1700 CE, I show that the incidence of military engagements between the Protestant Reformers and the Counter-Reformation forces between the 1520s and 1650s depended negatively on the Ottomans' military activities in Europe. Furthermore, I document that the impact of the Ottomans on Europe went beyond suppressing ecclesiastical conflicts only: at the turn of the sixteenth century, Ottoman conquests lowered the number of all newly initiated conflicts among the Europeans roughly by 25 percent, while they dampened all longer-running feuds by more than 15 percent. The Ottomans' military activities influenced the length of intra-European feuds too, with each Ottoman-European military engagement shortening the duration of intra-European conflicts by more than 50 percent. Thus, while the Protestant Reformation might have benefited from - and perhaps even capitalized on - the Ottoman advances in Europe, the latter seems to have played some role in reducing conflicts within Europe more generally.

Religious Competition and Reallocation: The Political Economy of Secularization in the Protestant Reformation: http://www.jeremiahdittmar.com/files/RRR_20170919.pdf
- Davide Cantoni, Jeremiah Dittmar, Noam Yuchtman*

Using novel microdata, we document an unintended, first-order consequence of the Protestant Reformation: a massive reallocation of resources from religious to secular purposes. To understand this process, we propose a conceptual framework in which the introduction of religious competition shifts political markets where religious authorities provide legitimacy to rulers in exchange for control over resources. Consistent with our framework, religious competition changed the balance of power between secular and religious elites: secular authorities acquired enormous amounts of wealth from monasteries closed during the Reformation, particularly in Protestant regions. This transfer of resources had important consequences. First, it shifted the allocation of upper-tail human capital. Graduates of Protestant universities increasingly took secular, especially administrative, occupations. Protestant university students increasingly studied secular subjects, especially degrees that prepared students for public sector jobs, rather than church sector-specific theology. Second, it affected the sectoral composition of fixed investment. Particularly in Protestant regions, new construction from religious toward secular purposes, especially the building of palaces and administrative buildings, which reflected the increased wealth and power of secular lords. Reallocation was not driven by pre-existing economic or cultural differences. Our findings indicate that the Reformation played an important causal role in the secularization of the West.

look at Figure 4, holy shit

History: Science and the Reformation: http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v550/n7677/full/550454a.html?WT.mc_id=TWT_NatureNews&sf126429621=1
The scientific and religious revolutions that began 500 years ago were not causally related, but were both stimulated by printing, argues David Wootton.
https://twitter.com/whyvert/status/923940525673103360
https://archive.is/JElPv
No, the Reformation did not cause the scientific revolution. Nice brief article. 👍

No RCT = No causal claims, for or against ;)
Though I'm open to a regression discontinuity design! cc: @pseudoerasmus
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may 2017 by nhaliday
The Audacious Epigone: White despair in the General Social Survey
1/4 WWC report having been depressed, rates still a bit higher for whites among upper classes
Prevalence of Depression by Race/Ethnicity: Findings From the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey III: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1449298/
A Cross-Ethnic Comparison of Lifetime Prevalence Rates of Anxiety Disorders: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2931265/

Racial-Ethnic Differences in Psychiatric Diagnoses and Treatment Across 11 Health Care Systems in the Mental Health Research Network: https://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/full/10.1176/appi.ps.201500217
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may 2017 by nhaliday
The Hand that Rocks the Cradle | Rachel Lu | First Things
Factoring out the differentials in fertility, the sociologists estimated that without them, the American public would be more pro-choice by about 5 percent. That doesn’t fully account for the actual shift in attitudes. But it does suggest that fertility differentials have a real impact on public opinion.
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may 2017 by nhaliday
Growing Collectivism: Irrigation, Group Conformity and Technological Divergence
This paper examines the origins of collectivist cultures that emphasize group conformity over individual autonomy. In line with the hypothesis that collaboration within groups in pre-industrial agriculture favored the emergence of collectivism, I find that societies whose ancestors jointly practiced irrigation agriculture have stronger collectivist norms today. The positive effect of irrigation on contemporary collectivism holds across countries, subnational districts within countries, and migrants. For causal identification, I instrument the historical adoption of irrigation by its geographic suitability. Furthermore, this paper establishes that, by favoring conformity, irrigation agriculture has contributed to the global divergence of technology. I document (i) a negative effect of traditional irrigation agriculture on contemporary innovativeness of countries, cities, and migrants; (ii) a positive effect on selection into routine-intensive occupations; and (iii) that the initial technological advantage of irrigation societies was reversed after 1500.

http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2016/09/varying-rainfall-make-people-collectivists.html
This kind of investigation is always going to be fraught with uncertainty and also controversy, given imperfections of data and methods. Nonetheless I find this one of the more plausible macro-historical hypotheses, perhaps because of my own experience in central Mexico, where varying rainfall still is the most important economic event of the year, though it is rapidly being supplanted by the variability of tourist demand for arts and crafts. And yes, they are largely collectivist, at least at the clan level, with extensive systems of informal social insurance and very high implicit social marginal tax rates on accumulated wealth.

Have you noticed it rains a lot in England?

(lol)

http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2014/05/chinese-wheat-eaters-vs-rice-eaters-speculative.html
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1508726/why-chinas-wheat-growing-north-produces-individualists-and-its-rice
in-depth reflection on agricultural ecologies, Europe vs China, and internal Chinese differences/ethnic identity/relations with barbarians/nomads, etc.: https://www.gnxp.com/blog/2008/08/wealth-of-communities.php

Irrigation and Autocracy: http://www.econ.ku.dk/bentzen/Irrigation_and_Autocracy.pdf
http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2012/08/in-defense-of-the-wittvogel-thesis.html

Emerging evidence of cultural differences linked to rice versus wheat agriculture: https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352250X1930082X
- Historical rice farming linked to interdependent culture.
- Differences tested in China and Japan, as well as in worldwide comparison.
- There is evidence for differences among urbanites with no direct experience farming.
- Rice farming is also linked to holistic thought, fewer patents for inventions.
- Rice cultures are not ‘pro-social’ but rather tight ties, strong division of close versus distant ties.

The agricultural roots of Chinese innovation performance: https://sci-hub.tw/https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292119300893
We provide robust evidence that counties with a legacy of rice cultivation generate fewer patent applications than other counties, and a legacy of wheat production tends to be associated with more patent applications. The results for rice are robust to, e.g., controlling for temperature, precipitation, irrigation, disease burden, religiosity, and corruption, as well as accounting for migration patterns.

Steve Hsu on this stuff:
Genetic variation in Han Chinese population: http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2017/07/genetic-variation-in-han-chinese.html
Largest component of genetic variation is a N-S cline (phenotypic N-S gradient discussed here). Variance accounted for by second (E-W) PC vector is much smaller and the Han population is fairly homogeneous in genetic terms: ...while we revealed East-to-West structure among the Han Chinese, the signal is relatively weak and very little structure is discernible beyond the second PC (p.24).

Neandertal ancestry does not vary significantly across provinces, consistent with admixture prior to the dispersal of modern Han Chinese.

http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2014/01/china-1793.html
My fellow officers informed me, that while the negotiation was going on, the ships were constantly crowded with all kinds of refreshments, and that when they were first boarded by the Chinese they received every attention from them that could be shown; and that the presents received by the different officers belonging to the embassy, were of immense value. That the natives of this part of China were of different complexions and manners from those in and near Canton; their colour being nearly white; and in their manners were much more free and candid; and that they were of a larger stature, and more athletic than the southern Chinese—they were much more sociable, and not so particular respecting their women being seen by the men. And were even fond of receiving the officers into their houses, when on shore, provided it could be done without the knowledge of the mandarins.

http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2014/06/large-scale-psychological-differences.html
The study below discusses a psychological/cognitive/personality gradient between N and S China, possibly driven by a history of wheat vs rice cultivation.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_and_southern_China
http://shanghaiist.com/2015/07/01/average-heights-men-women.php
https://www.quora.com/Why-are-Northern-Chinese-people-generally-taller-than-Southern-Chinese

https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/08/01/the-great-genetic-map-of-china/
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may 2017 by nhaliday
SDA: Survey Documentation and Analysis
preliminary summary of how to use:

Archive -> cumulative datafile
programs:
'Tables' = see frequencies by crosstab
'Means' = see means by crosstab
'Regression' = multivar regression

to subset on range: var(x-y), for more detail, http://sda.berkeley.edu/sdaweb/helpfiles/helpan.htm#filter
recoding: http://sda.berkeley.edu/sdaweb/helpfiles/helpan.htm#recode
computing new variables using arithmetic expressions: http://sda.berkeley.edu/sdaweb/helpfiles/helpnewv.htm#compute

when variables are behaving funkily, can be useful to check out availability by year in the Chicago data explorer: https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org/variables/

IAP = "inapplicable" (not asked that year, or N/A)

how to do line plots: http://www.ssric.org/node/601
use 'bar chart' instead of 'stacked bar chart' to get histogram

Razib: http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/gnxp/2011/08/how-to-use-the-general-social-survey/
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may 2017 by nhaliday
Less intelligent people want to exclude racists from the public square – Gene Expression
Millennials with college degrees don’t favor censorship: http://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/05/03/millennials-with-college-degrees-dont-favor-censorship/
Free Expression on Campus: A Survey of U.S. College Students and U.S. Adults: https://www.knightfoundation.org/media/uploads/publication_pdfs/FreeSpeech_campus.pdf
some scary attitudes toward "hate speech" and anonymous speech
http://www.unz.com/akarlin/future-for-aclu-children/
Ironic joking and SJW meltdowns over photos of White children aside, the politically correct peeps at ACLU (who apologized for their social justice faux pas soon afterwards) were actually far more to the point than they could have possibly imagined.

Opinion polls have shown that in the US, Whites tend to have the greatest respect for freedom of speech.

asians quite low across the board

YouGov | Half of Democrats support a ban on hate speech: https://today.yougov.com/news/2015/05/20/hate-speech/
Americans narrowly support (41%) rather than oppose (37%) criminalizing hate speech

http://www.integrationsfonds.at/publikationen/forschungsberichte/forschungsbericht-muslimische-gruppen-in-oesterreich/
A majority of Austrian Muslims believe making fun of Islam shouldn't be allowed. Somalis, Chechens, Afghans & Syrians feel most strongly (9)

Most Liberals And Smart People Want Racists To Be Allowed To Speak: https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/08/25/189066/
But whenever I look at the General Social Survey I see no great change in support for free speech in terms of the patterns. Perhaps something has changed in the year 2017, but I think what we are seeing are vocal and motivated minorities who are drowning out liberal (in the classical sense) majorities.
https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/08/25/the-less-intelligent-and-uneducated-really-dont-tolerate-unpopular-views/

Freedom Of Thought As A Perpetual Revolution: https://gnxp.nofe.me/2017/09/13/freedom-of-thought-as-a-perpetual-revolution/
I mentioned offhand on Twitter today that I am skeptical of the tendency to brand the classically liberal emphasis on freedom of thought and speech as “centrist.” The implicit idea is that those on the Right and Left for whom liberalism is conditional, and a means at best, are radical and outside the mainstream.

This misleads us in relation to the fact that classical liberalism is the aberration both historically and culturally. Liberty of thought and speech have existed for time immemorial, but they were the luxury goods of the elite salons. Frederick the Great of Prussia had no use for religion personally, and famously patronized heretical philosophers, but he did not disturb the conservative social order of the polity which he inherited. For the masses, the discourse was delimited and regulated to maintain order and reinforce social norms.

The attempt to position the liberal stance as a centrist one is clearly historically and culturally contingent. It reflects the ascendancy of a particular strand of Anglo-American elite culture worldwide. But it is not universal. In the Islamic world and South Asia free expression of skepticism of religious ideas in public are subject to limits explicitly to maintain public order. The Islamic punishments for apostasy have less to do with the sin of individual disbelief and more to do with disruption to public norms and sedition against the state. Similarly, both China and Russia tap deeply into cultural preferences for state and elite paternalism in regards to public freedom of thought.

A chilling study shows how hostile college students are toward free speech: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-chilling-study-shows-how-hostile-college-students-are-toward-free-speech/2017/09/18/cbb1a234-9ca8-11e7-9083-fbfddf6804c2_story.html
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/22/college-free-speech-violence-survey-junk-science

http://anepigone.blogspot.com/2017/09/its-so-pc-its-killing-me.html
Americans chafe under PC oppressiveness. True across all demographics. Alt right can't emphasize free speech enough

A Run on Liberalism?: https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/09/20/a-run-on-liberalism/
- Jason Willick

It’s also about taking a long view of our own self-interests—that is, recognizing that if we agree not to suppress the other tribe, then the other tribe just might agree, as a general rule, to not suppress us. If adhered to, it can be positive sum transaction—the free exchange of ideas ultimately makes life richer and more prosperous for everyone. Liberalism is a bargain between elites to set up institutions that allow this positive-sum process to take place despite all the forces working against it.

https://today.yougov.com/news/2017/10/02/americans-support-free-speech-college-campusmost-t/
In fact, Americans prioritize exposing students to all types of speech on campuses, even if that speech is biased or offensive, to providing a positive learning environment for all students at the risk of barring some types of speech. Sometimes this type of question generates a politicized response, depending on the speech that respondents think may be restricted. The most recent and most publicized college incidents involve conservative speakers who have been shouted down or have had speeches on campuses canceled. On this question Democrats and Republicans may be on different sides, but liberals and conservatives agree.

http://reason.com/blog/2017/10/04/black-lives-matter-students-shut-down-th

http://www.mercurynews.com/2017/09/12/poll-most-california-democrats-want-to-restrict-free-speech-from-white-nationalists/
Poll: Most California Democrats want to restrict free speech from white nationalists

40% non-Hispanic White, 51% Latino, 58% Af-American, 59% Asian-American

America's Many Divides Over Free Speech: https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/a-sneak-peek-at-new-survey-data-on-free-speech/542028/
A new survey explores Americans’ views on hate speech, political correctness, Nazi-punching, job terminations for offensive speech, and much more.
- CONOR FRIEDERSDORF

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/925458956239110145
https://archive.is/ZeY18
Well this explains a lot

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/925504773222293505
https://archive.is/oSjru
Democrats..... lmao 😁

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/925507818802810880
https://archive.is/vSdrZ
> CATO releases its own report showing that blacks & Latinos have the least attachment to libertarian ideas
> they will change nothing

The State of Free Speech and Tolerance in America: https://www.cato.org/survey-reports/state-free-speech-tolerance-america

Free speech and the Coalition of the Fringes: http://anepigone.blogspot.com/2017/11/free-speech-and-coalition-of-fringes.html

Epigonian aesthetics: http://anepigone.blogspot.com/2017/11/epigonian-aesthetics.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/12/us/college-students-free-speech.html

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/973340678104199168
https://archive.is/PMp5S
European-style hate speech laws, and a SCOTUS favorable to them, will increasingly be a key goal of the left
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april 2017 by nhaliday
The Numbers Speak: Foreign Language Requirements Are a Waste of Time and Money, Bryan Caplan | EconLog | Library of Economics and Liberty
25.7% of respondents speak a language other than English. Within this sample, 41.5% claim to speak the other language "very well." Within this sub-sub-sample, just 7.0% say they learned to speak this foreign language in school. If you multiply out these three percentages, you get 0.7%. The marginal product of two years of pain and suffering per high school graduate: less than one student in a hundred acquires fluency. (And that's self-assessed fluency, which people almost surely exaggerate).

If you lower the bar from "very well" to "well" the picture remains grim: merely 2.5% of GSS respondents claimed to reach this level of foreign language competence in school.

confirms my intuition

Language is Culture: https://bloodyshovel.wordpress.com/2017/08/30/language-is-culture/
First of all, LKY, peace be with him, was not a “self-taught linguist”. He’s a guy who learned some languages as an adult. That doesn’t make him a linguist. This makes him a language learner. There’s billions of those across the world. Lee Kuan Yew certainly wasn’t very good at it; the ability to learn foreign languages doesn’t correlate very strongly with IQ.

Mr. Lee held the popular idea that language was a zero-sum game? No, Mr. Lee understood the commonsensical idea that your brain has limited storage capacity. Like anything else. Your brain is made of atoms. It is not made of magic. It is not made of godly dust. It is a material thing. It is, in a sense, a container of information, and information takes space. It obviously does in computers; pray tell, NYT, why the brain should have infinite capacity? It doesn’t make sense.

Now I don’t know if LKY thought of it in these terms. I think that, as a language learner, he went by experience. I guess the more time he spent practicing Mandarin, or Hokkien, or Malay, the worse his English prose got. And that’s exactly how it works. Happens to me all the time, and happens to anyone who uses 2 or more languages regularly. The more different the languages, the less commons structures they share, the more acute the problem. Again, there is no reason why it should not be so. Information takes space. It isn’t hard.

Alas, it is true that academic linguists will not tell you this, even though they probably did in the 1950s. That is not because common sense has been “refuted”. It is because since the 1960s academia has morphed into a worldwide racket of fraud and deceit. If you read this blog you already know that; economics is bogus, climate science is bogus, psychology is bogus; even more than half of medical papers are bogus. Well, surprise surprise, linguistics is also bogus. The language learning industry is huge. There’s a lot of money in telling people that the brain is made of magic dust, that they can learn whatever they want whenever they want, as long as they give you money. 3 languages at the same time? Go for it! Kids are like sponges, they can learn anything. No, they can’t.
econotariat  cracker-econ  org:econlib  language  foreign-lang  education  efficiency  error  data  critique  cost-benefit  analysis  learning  multi  gnon  right-wing  zero-positive-sum  retention  tradeoffs  studying  cynicism-idealism  culture  society  polisci  politics  asia  developing-world  polis  conquest-empire  diversity  general-survey  quixotic 
april 2017 by nhaliday
The Future of Secularism: a Biologically Informed Theory Supplemented with Cross-Cultural Evidence | SpringerLink
While cross-sectional in nature, when our results are combined with evidence that both religiosity and fertility are substantially heritable traits, findings are consistent with view that earlier trends toward secularization (due to science education surrounding advancements in science) are currently being counter-balanced by genetic and reproductive forces. We also propose that the inverse association between intelligence and religiosity, and the inverse correlation between intelligence and fertility lead to predictions of a decline in secularism in the foreseeable future. A contra-secularization hypothesis is proposed and defended in the discussion. It states that secularism is likely to undergo a decline throughout the remainder of the twenty-first century, including Europe and other industrial societies.

Secularism and Fertility Worldwide: https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/pvwpy/
This study hypothesizes a link between societal secularism and fertility. Using country-level data from multiple sources (N=181) and multilevel data from 55 countries in the World Values Survey (N=78,639), I document a strong negative relationship between societal secularism and both country-level and individual-level fertility. Secularism, even in small amounts, is associated with population stagnation or even decline, whereas highly religious countries have higher fertility. This country-level pattern is driven by more than aggregate lower fertility of individual nonreligious people. In fact, secularism is more closely linked to religious than nonreligious people’s fertility and appears to be a function of different cultural values related to gender and reproduction in more secular societies. Beyond its importance for the religious composition of the world population, the societal-level association between secularism and fertility is relevant to key fertility theories and may help account, in part, for below-replacement fertility.
study  psychology  social-psych  anthropology  culture  society  religion  trends  dysgenics  fertility  evopsych  biodet  usa  developing-world  asia  prediction  correlation  recent-selection  sociology  demographic-transition  deep-materialism  new-religion  stylized-facts  expression-survival  individualism-collectivism  theos  zeitgeist  rot  the-bones  eric-kaufmann  modernity  multi  general-survey  preprint  hari-seldon 
march 2017 by nhaliday
Would Clinton have defeated Trump in an epistocracy? | We the Pleeple
Next on the chart are the various epistocratic scenarios. What if we give especially low-knowledge voters only half a vote, or only a third, or bar them completely? What if we use a graduated more-votes-for-more-knowledge system? What if we give especially high-knowledge voters an extra vote, or two, or take epistocracy literally and allow only these high-knowledge folks to vote?

Do any of these proposals improve Clinton’s popular vote margin over Trump? No. In fact, each one would have given Trump a popular vote lead, anywhere from 0.5 points (giving high-knowledge folks a single extra vote) to 4.3 points (letting only high-knowledge folks vote). In an epistocracy of the sort Brennan and others imagine, Trump’s victory over Clinton would have been even more securely won.

contrary update:
ACTUALLY, EPISTOCRACY MIGHT HAVE HELPED CLINTON DEFEAT TRUMP: http://www.pleeps.org/2017/04/11/actually-epistocracy-might-have-helped-clinton-defeat-trump/
But she probably would have been running against President Romney, and might have still lost.

Were Trump Voters Irrational?: http://quillette.com/2017/09/28/trump-voters-irrational/
In addition to being misplaced, leftists never seem to see how insulting this critique of Republican voters is. Their failure to see the insult illustrates precisely what they get wrong in evaluating the rationality of the Trump voters. Consider that these What’s the Matter with Kansas? critiques are written by highly educated left-wing pundits, professors, and advocates. Perhaps we should ask one of them whether their own vote is purely self-interested and for their own monetary benefit. They will say no, of course. And they will deny as well that their vote is irrational. Progressives will say that they often vote against their own monetary interests in order to do good for other people. Or they will say that their vote reflects their values and worldview—that they are concerned about the larger issues that are encompassed by that worldview (abortion legislation or climate change or gun restriction). Leftists seem unable to see that Republican voters—even lower income ones—may be just as attached to their own values and worldviews. The stance of the educated progressive making the What’s the Matter with Kansas? argument seems to be that: “no one else should vote against their monetary interests, but it’s not irrational for me to do so, because I am enlightened.”

...

Progressives tend to deny or obfuscate (just as conservatives obfuscate the research on global warming) the data indicating that single-parent households lead to more behavioral problems among children. Overwhelmingly progressive university schools of education deny the strong scientific consensus that phonics-based reading instruction facilitates most readers, especially those struggling the most. Many progressives find it hard to believe that there is no bias at all in the initial hiring of women for tenure-track university positions in STEM disciplines. Progressives tend to deny the consensus view that genetically modified organisms are safe to consume. Gender feminists routinely deny biological facts about sex differences. Largely Democratic cities and university towns are at the forefront of the anti-vaccine movement which denies a scientific consensus. In the same cities and towns, people find it hard to believe that there is a strong consensus among economists that rent control causes housing shortages and a diminution in the quality of housing. [Research citations for all the above are available from the author here.]

...

More formal studies have indicated that there are few differences in factual knowledge of the world between Republicans and Democrats. The Pew Research Center reported one of its News IQ surveys in 2015 (What the Public Knows, April 28, 2015) and found very few partisan differences. People in the sample answered 12 questions about current events (identifying the route of the Keystone XL pipeline; knowledge of how many Supreme Court justices are women; etc.) and the Republicans outperformed the Democrats on 7 of the 12 items. Democrats outperformed the Republicans on 5 of the items. On average, the Republicans in the sample answered 8.3 items correctly, the Democrats answered 7.9 items correctly, and the independents answered 8.0 items correctly.

...

Measures of so-called “knowledge” in such a domain are easily skewed in a partisan manner by selection effects. This is a version of the “party of science” problem discussed previously. Whether the Democrats or the Republicans are the “party of science” depends entirely on how the issue in question is selected. The 17-item measure used by Klein was relatively balanced (8 items biased against leftists and 9 items biased against conservatives). With all the caveats in place about the difficulty of item matching, the weak conclusion that can be drawn is that existing research provides no evidence for the view that conservatives are deficient in the domain of economic knowledge—a domain critical for rational voting behavior.
politics  polisci  2016-election  government  demographics  data  analysis  social-choice  democracy  trump  clinton  education  org:data  elections  egalitarianism-hierarchy  wonkish  antidemos  class  coalitions  postmortem  general-survey  knowledge  race  class-warfare  poll  values  distribution  multi  obama  news  org:mag  org:popup  biases  sampling-bias  survey  links  study  summary  rationality  epistemic  psychology  social-psych  expert  scitariat  identity-politics  science  social-science  westminster  truth  gender  gender-diff  labor  housing  economics  micro  markets  supply-demand  descriptive  sociology  expert-experience 
january 2017 by nhaliday
How do occupations and industries relate to party identification? | We the Pleeple
Summary: I look at how detailed information on industries and occupations (alongside standard demographics such as race, income, education, gender, etc.) relates to political party identifications. I find that Democratic support is higher for lawyers, social workers, those in art/media/writing industries, and members of labor unions. Republican support is higher for CEOs, financiers, engineers, and police/military. Many other categories that I looked at weren’t big deals—for example, scientists, physicians, tech workers, and accountants don’t lean heavily in either direction, and neither do people in fossil fuel, mining, manufacturing, real estate, healthcare, or various other industry categories.
data  poll  politics  2016-election  hmm  demographics  org:data  labor  heavy-industry  elections  wonkish  dirty-hands  management  finance  class  order-disorder  religion  christianity  race  gender  age-generation  law  higher-ed  general-survey 
january 2017 by nhaliday
The dead weight of culture - The Unz Review
I’ve long observed that the wealthiest regions of Europe are disproportionately those which were long under Habsburg rule. This fact transcends ethnicity and religion. Catholic northern Italy, Catholic southern Germany, as well as Protestant Netherlands, are all notably economically productive, and were long under Habsburg rule or hegemony.

The Fading Shadow of the Habsburgs: https://www.the-american-interest.com/2011/07/20/the-fading-shadow-of-the-habsburgs/
- Peter Berger
gnxp  scitariat  data  europe  maps  speculation  institutions  pseudoE  history  economics  path-dependence  diversity  econ-metrics  early-modern  protestant-catholic  shift  broad-econ  cultural-dynamics  within-group  EU  wealth  leviathan  trivia  cocktail  turchin  political-econ  multi  news  org:mag  org:foreign  microfoundations  geography  general-survey  germanic  eastern-europe  conquest-empire 
january 2017 by nhaliday
Fertility Responses of High-Skilled Native Women to Immigrant Inflows
low-skilled immigration -> cheaper childcare -> higher upper-class fertility

Natives and Migrants in Home Production: The Case of Germany: http://doku.iab.de/discussionpapers/2016/dp2816.pdf

https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/888265995101495297
there's also prob a case to be made that whatever social stigma there was preventing market forces from pushing women into work... was good

not necessarily a contradiction imo. capital relentlessly seeks factor price equalization, needs strong culture/authority to resist such

http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2017/11/sentences-to-ponder-99.html
Policies, such as the minimum wage, that affect the cost of marketization, have a large [negative] effect on the fertility and labor supply of high income women.

Is the Market Pronatalist? Inequality, Differential Fertility, and Growth Revisited: https://www.tau.ac.il/~davidweiss/BHLWZ_October_2017.pdf

Figure 1: Fertility by Income Decile 1980 & 2010. Authors calculations using Census and American Community Survey Data. See Appendix A for more details.
study  economics  fertility  class  regularizer  hmm  nl-and-so-can-you  pdf  policy  🎩  political-econ  econometrics  dysgenics  migration  wonkish  money  sociology  intervention  stylized-facts  education  human-capital  gender  labor  org:ngo  usa  latin-america  chart  vampire-squid  biophysical-econ  broad-econ  modernity  white-paper  multi  org:gov  europe  germanic  twitter  social  gnon  unaffiliated  right-wing  capitalism  capital  microfoundations  markets  regulation  compensation  econotariat  marginal-rev  links  general-survey  correlation  data  visualization  history  mostly-modern  inequality  coming-apart  hari-seldon  endogenous-exogenous 
january 2017 by nhaliday
IQ and National Productivity
National IQ and National Productivity:
The Hive Mind Across Asia: http://mason.gmu.edu/~gjonesb/JonesADR.pdf
Human Capital and National Institutional Quality: Are TIMSS, PISA, and National Average IQ Robust Predictors?: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/102105/1/cesifo_wp4790.pdf
This will allow us to give preliminary tests of three different hypotheses about the link between cognitive skill and institutional outcomes: The weakest link theory, the median voter theory, and the smart fraction theory.

mean:
Table 3: Regression results with standardized beta coefficients. Dependent variable: Overall IPR Index. OLS with classical standard errors. IQ scores.

upper tail:
Table 4: Regression results with standardized beta coefficients. Dependent variable: Overall IPR Index. OLS with classical standard errors. CA scores.
pdf  study  economics  hive-mind  group-level  iq  econ-productivity  growth-econ  spearhead  cracker-econ  time-preference  macro  garett-jones  biodet  sociology  stylized-facts  broad-econ  behavioral-gen  rindermann-thompson  chart  biophysical-econ  wealth-of-nations  microfoundations  multi  🎩  🌞  institutions  human-capital  psychology  cog-psych  psychometrics  government  econometrics  patience  elite  general-survey  political-econ  white-paper  pop-diff  models  comparison  tails  regression  property-rights  hari-seldon 
december 2016 by nhaliday
Rolling Stones – spottedtoad
I’m not 100% convinced that dads make a huge difference to their kid’s individual development; there are of course reasonable arguments on either side. But I’ve become convinced that the end of married fatherhood is a hugely politically and socially destabilizing force, and that the particular form of the married family was deeply important to both the rise of capitalism and the gradual expansion of liberty where and when it occurred. There are multiple reasons to doubt Deirdre McCloskey’s sanguine conclusion that The Great Enrichment of capitalist wealth and political equality will expand to every corner of the globe, but this seems like one of the important ones.

THERE ARE TWO AMERICAS…: https://spottedtoad.wordpress.com/2017/10/18/there-are-two-americas/
…with almost wholly separate life histories:

Age Women Have Children by Marital Status: First Births 2016

https://twitter.com/WilcoxNMP/status/931365452999249921
https://archive.is/t3juH
Now for some good news (of a sort). Changes in family structure for kids have largely ground to a halt.
ratty  unaffiliated  data  trends  society  murray  visualization  wonkish  sociology  gender  current-events  social-capital  social-norms  capitalism  malaise  chart  coming-apart  dignity  life-history  social-structure  zeitgeist  rot  mokyr-allen-mccloskey  microfoundations  multi  distribution  age-generation  pop-structure  demographics  civilization  douthatish  time-series  optimism  twitter  social  commentary  backup  pro-rata  general-survey  sex 
december 2016 by nhaliday
The Financial Burden of Having Children and Fertility Differentials Across Development and Life Stages: Evidence from Satisfaction Data | SpringerLink
To address this challenge, we focus our attention on the peculiar movement of satisfaction in the financial domain of life, which is measured by standardizing financial satisfaction by overall life satisfaction, and perform regression analyses using World and European Integrated Values Survey. The results show that the negative impact of having an additional child on satisfaction becomes particularly greater in the financial domain as income increases and total fertility rate (TFR) decreases. The results also indicate that having children offers a sense of financial security to the elderly in high TFR countries while this is not the case in lower TFR countries. These results support the general idea that the heavier financial burden of having children is a major cause of fertility decline and provide policy implications to find a way out of extremely low fertility.
study  demographics  economics  class  world  comparison  fertility  behavioral-econ  biophysical-econ  legacy  sociology  broad-econ  general-survey  cost-benefit  money  chart  roots  causation  parenting  data  poll  values  nitty-gritty  solid-study  demographic-transition  correlation  marginal  emotion  meaningness  zeitgeist  rot  the-bones  explanation  phalanges  dysgenics  modernity  microfoundations  intervention  wonkish  explanans  hari-seldon  happy-sad  nascent-state  policy 
october 2016 by nhaliday
Say you don’t need no diamond ring – spottedtoad
women almost never marry down

Most of these graphs are for middle aged (40-55 year old) respondents; relative incomes for men and women in 2016 are already much closer to 1 for younger workers, with some surveys suggesting that young women are already exceeding young men in earnings. If the pattern Bertrand and her colleagues observe persists, this would suggest that marriage rates may decline much faster than previously anticipated.

Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households: http://www.nber.org/papers/w19023
We examine causes and consequences of relative income within households. We establish that gender identity - in particular, an aversion to the wife earning more than the husband - impacts marriage formation, the wife's labor force participation, the wife's income conditional on working, marriage satisfaction, likelihood of divorce, and the division of home production. The distribution of the share of household income earned by the wife exhibits a sharp cliff at 0.5, which suggests that a couple is less willing to match if her income exceeds his. Within marriage markets, when a randomly chosen woman becomes more likely to earn more than a randomly chosen man, marriage rates decline. Within couples, if the wife's potential income (based on her demographics) is likely to exceed the husband's, the wife is less likely to be in the labor force and earns less than her potential if she does work. Couples where the wife earns more than the husband are less satisfied with their marriage and are more likely to divorce. Finally, based on time use surveys, the gender gap in non-market work is larger if the wife earns more than the husband.

https://twitter.com/toad_spotted/status/913860206773391360
https://archive.is/9NxIC
Still think falling M:F income ratios important to secular decline in marriage, but seems like Tinderpocalypse might really be happening too

Millennials are still not getting married: http://www.statsblogs.com/2016/10/14/millennials-are-still-not-getting-married/
Percentage of U.S. women never married, by age, 1980 & 2015 [OC]: https://www.reddit.com/r/dataisbeautiful/comments/7b31li/percentage_of_us_women_never_married_by_age_1980/dpevgj6/
https://archive.is/o5Lao

How Many Women Earn More Than Their Husbands?: https://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/how-many-women-earn-more-than-their-husbands/

Trends in Relative Earnings and Marital Dissolution: Are Wives Who Outearn Their Husbands Still More Likely to Divorce?: http://www.rsfjournal.org/doi/full/10.7758/RSF.2016.2.4.08
A: no
likely due to selection...

How Did Marriage Become a Mark of Privilege?: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/upshot/how-did-marriage-become-a-mark-of-privilege.html
Let them become elite.: https://dalrock.wordpress.com/2017/09/26/let-them-become-elite/

https://twitter.com/toad_spotted/status/1176572270136954880
https://archive.is/ds8qp
If you are a young married person, you're probably no more egalitarian in your earnings than you would've been 25 years ago; but you're less likely to be a married person if you're young, probably partially because your earnings are egalitarian
society  sex  gender  money  class  data  spock  ratty  unaffiliated  wonkish  compensation  sociology  age-generation  trends  social-capital  social-norms  chart  coming-apart  dignity  life-history  modernity  multi  study  economics  distribution  shift  general-survey  analysis  twitter  social  discussion  backup  zeitgeist  demographics  labor  news  org:data  optimism  gender-diff  pro-rata  rot  social-structure  malaise  org:rec  gnon  noblesse-oblige  assortative-mating  time-series  reddit  visualization  crosstab  pic  beginning-middle-end 
september 2016 by nhaliday
OSF | Answering Unresolved Questions about the Relationship between Cognitive Ability and Prejudice
Previous research finds that lower cognitive ability predicts greater prejudice (Onraet et al., 2015). We test two unresolved questions about this association using a heterogeneous set of target groups and data from a representative sample of the United States (N=5914). First, we test “who are the targets of prejudice?” We replicate prior negative associations between cognitive ability and prejudice for groups who are perceived as liberal, unconventional, and having lower levels of choice over group membership. We find the opposite(i.e. positive associations), however, for groups perceived as conservative, conventional, and having higher levels of choice over group membership. Second, we test “who shows intergroup bias?” and find that people with both relatively higher and lower levels of cognitive ability show approximately equal levels of intergroup bias, but towards different sets of groups.

https://twitter.com/thomasjwood/status/907707395081752580
https://archive.is/eeqJw
@democracyfund data: @realDonaldTrump and @HillaryClinton voters' evaluations of social groups

Education is Related to Greater Ideological Prejudice: https://academic.oup.com/poq/article-abstract/81/4/930/4652248
Decades of research have shown that education reduces individuals’ prejudices toward people who belong to different groups, but this research has focused predominantly on prejudice toward ethnic/racial groups, immigrant groups, and general nonconformists. However, it is not clear whether education reduces other prejudices against groups along different dimensions, including ideological identification. An analysis of American National Election Studies data from 1964 to 2012 shows that education is related to decreases in interethnic/interracial prejudice, but also to increases in ideological (liberal vs. conservative) prejudice. This finding could not be explained simply by the greater polarization of the American electorate in the past twenty years. The results require rethinking how and why education is associated with reduced prejudice for certain groups but not others.
psychology  study  iq  anthropology  race  politics  field-study  stereotypes  correlation  tribalism  discrimination  us-them  poll  prejudice  polarization  coalitions  identity-politics  ideology  data  visualization  crosstab  religion  christianity  theos  corporation  military  protestant-catholic  class  class-warfare  labor  other-xtian  gender  redistribution  welfare-state  migration  islam  sex  sexuality  asia  latin-america  patho-altruism  ethnocentrism  chart  multi  twitter  social  commentary  emotion  values  trump  clinton  2016-election  backup  pic  phalanges  database  general-survey  polisci  education  higher-ed  human-capital  preprint  hari-seldon  judgement 
july 2016 by nhaliday

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