nhaliday + biases   136

“Give Anything” | An Algorithmic Lucidity
As a freshman on my high school's cross country team, our captain told me that to be a good runner, you needed to love pain.

I objected: a great runner could love to race, I said, and endure the pain only for the sake of competing and winning.

It's only fifteen years later (practically one foot in the grave), that I now see that I was wrong and he was right.
ratty  techtariat  aphorism  running  fitness  stoic  impetus  ends-means  biases  emotion  endurance 
7 weeks ago by nhaliday
Lateralization of brain function - Wikipedia
Language functions such as grammar, vocabulary and literal meaning are typically lateralized to the left hemisphere, especially in right handed individuals.[3] While language production is left-lateralized in up to 90% of right-handers, it is more bilateral, or even right-lateralized, in approximately 50% of left-handers.[4]

Broca's area and Wernicke's area, two areas associated with the production of speech, are located in the left cerebral hemisphere for about 95% of right-handers, but about 70% of left-handers.[5]:69

Auditory and visual processing
The processing of visual and auditory stimuli, spatial manipulation, facial perception, and artistic ability are represented bilaterally.[4] Numerical estimation, comparison and online calculation depend on bilateral parietal regions[6][7] while exact calculation and fact retrieval are associated with left parietal regions, perhaps due to their ties to linguistic processing.[6][7]


Depression is linked with a hyperactive right hemisphere, with evidence of selective involvement in "processing negative emotions, pessimistic thoughts and unconstructive thinking styles", as well as vigilance, arousal and self-reflection, and a relatively hypoactive left hemisphere, "specifically involved in processing pleasurable experiences" and "relatively more involved in decision-making processes".

Chaos and Order; the right and left hemispheres: https://orthosphere.wordpress.com/2018/05/23/chaos-and-order-the-right-and-left-hemispheres/
In The Master and His Emissary, Iain McGilchrist writes that a creature like a bird needs two types of consciousness simultaneously. It needs to be able to focus on something specific, such as pecking at food, while it also needs to keep an eye out for predators which requires a more general awareness of environment.

These are quite different activities. The Left Hemisphere (LH) is adapted for a narrow focus. The Right Hemisphere (RH) for the broad. The brains of human beings have the same division of function.

The LH governs the right side of the body, the RH, the left side. With birds, the left eye (RH) looks for predators, the right eye (LH) focuses on food and specifics. Since danger can take many forms and is unpredictable, the RH has to be very open-minded.

The LH is for narrow focus, the explicit, the familiar, the literal, tools, mechanism/machines and the man-made. The broad focus of the RH is necessarily more vague and intuitive and handles the anomalous, novel, metaphorical, the living and organic. The LH is high resolution but narrow, the RH low resolution but broad.

The LH exhibits unrealistic optimism and self-belief. The RH has a tendency towards depression and is much more realistic about a person’s own abilities. LH has trouble following narratives because it has a poor sense of “wholes.” In art it favors flatness, abstract and conceptual art, black and white rather than color, simple geometric shapes and multiple perspectives all shoved together, e.g., cubism. Particularly RH paintings emphasize vistas with great depth of field and thus space and time,[1] emotion, figurative painting and scenes related to the life world. In music, LH likes simple, repetitive rhythms. The RH favors melody, harmony and complex rhythms.


Schizophrenia is a disease of extreme LH emphasis. Since empathy is RH and the ability to notice emotional nuance facially, vocally and bodily expressed, schizophrenics tend to be paranoid and are often convinced that the real people they know have been replaced by robotic imposters. This is at least partly because they lose the ability to intuit what other people are thinking and feeling – hence they seem robotic and suspicious.

Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West as well as McGilchrist characterize the West as awash in phenomena associated with an extreme LH emphasis. Spengler argues that Western civilization was originally much more RH (to use McGilchrist’s categories) and that all its most significant artistic (in the broadest sense) achievements were triumphs of RH accentuation.

The RH is where novel experiences and the anomalous are processed and where mathematical, and other, problems are solved. The RH is involved with the natural, the unfamiliar, the unique, emotions, the embodied, music, humor, understanding intonation and emotional nuance of speech, the metaphorical, nuance, and social relations. It has very little speech, but the RH is necessary for processing all the nonlinguistic aspects of speaking, including body language. Understanding what someone means by vocal inflection and facial expressions is an intuitive RH process rather than explicit.


RH is very much the center of lived experience; of the life world with all its depth and richness. The RH is “the master” from the title of McGilchrist’s book. The LH ought to be no more than the emissary; the valued servant of the RH. However, in the last few centuries, the LH, which has tyrannical tendencies, has tried to become the master. The LH is where the ego is predominantly located. In split brain patients where the LH and the RH are surgically divided (this is done sometimes in the case of epileptic patients) one hand will sometimes fight with the other. In one man’s case, one hand would reach out to hug his wife while the other pushed her away. One hand reached for one shirt, the other another shirt. Or a patient will be driving a car and one hand will try to turn the steering wheel in the opposite direction. In these cases, the “naughty” hand is usually the left hand (RH), while the patient tends to identify herself with the right hand governed by the LH. The two hemispheres have quite different personalities.

The connection between LH and ego can also be seen in the fact that the LH is competitive, contentious, and agonistic. It wants to win. It is the part of you that hates to lose arguments.

Using the metaphor of Chaos and Order, the RH deals with Chaos – the unknown, the unfamiliar, the implicit, the emotional, the dark, danger, mystery. The LH is connected with Order – the known, the familiar, the rule-driven, the explicit, and light of day. Learning something means to take something unfamiliar and making it familiar. Since the RH deals with the novel, it is the problem-solving part. Once understood, the results are dealt with by the LH. When learning a new piece on the piano, the RH is involved. Once mastered, the result becomes a LH affair. The muscle memory developed by repetition is processed by the LH. If errors are made, the activity returns to the RH to figure out what went wrong; the activity is repeated until the correct muscle memory is developed in which case it becomes part of the familiar LH.

Science is an attempt to find Order. It would not be necessary if people lived in an entirely orderly, explicit, known world. The lived context of science implies Chaos. Theories are reductive and simplifying and help to pick out salient features of a phenomenon. They are always partial truths, though some are more partial than others. The alternative to a certain level of reductionism or partialness would be to simply reproduce the world which of course would be both impossible and unproductive. The test for whether a theory is sufficiently non-partial is whether it is fit for purpose and whether it contributes to human flourishing.


Analytic philosophers pride themselves on trying to do away with vagueness. To do so, they tend to jettison context which cannot be brought into fine focus. However, in order to understand things and discern their meaning, it is necessary to have the big picture, the overview, as well as the details. There is no point in having details if the subject does not know what they are details of. Such philosophers also tend to leave themselves out of the picture even when what they are thinking about has reflexive implications. John Locke, for instance, tried to banish the RH from reality. All phenomena having to do with subjective experience he deemed unreal and once remarked about metaphors, a RH phenomenon, that they are “perfect cheats.” Analytic philosophers tend to check the logic of the words on the page and not to think about what those words might say about them. The trick is for them to recognize that they and their theories, which exist in minds, are part of reality too.

The RH test for whether someone actually believes something can be found by examining his actions. If he finds that he must regard his own actions as free, and, in order to get along with other people, must also attribute free will to them and treat them as free agents, then he effectively believes in free will – no matter his LH theoretical commitments.


We do not know the origin of life. We do not know how or even if consciousness can emerge from matter. We do not know the nature of 96% of the matter of the universe. Clearly all these things exist. They can provide the subject matter of theories but they continue to exist as theorizing ceases or theories change. Not knowing how something is possible is irrelevant to its actual existence. An inability to explain something is ultimately neither here nor there.

If thought begins and ends with the LH, then thinking has no content – content being provided by experience (RH), and skepticism and nihilism ensue. The LH spins its wheels self-referentially, never referring back to experience. Theory assumes such primacy that it will simply outlaw experiences and data inconsistent with it; a profoundly wrong-headed approach.


Gödel’s Theorem proves that not everything true can be proven to be true. This means there is an ineradicable role for faith, hope and intuition in every moderately complex human intellectual endeavor. There is no one set of consistent axioms from which all other truths can be derived.

Alan Turing’s proof of the halting problem proves that there is no effective procedure for finding effective procedures. Without a mechanical decision procedure, (LH), when it comes to … [more]
gnon  reflection  books  summary  review  neuro  neuro-nitgrit  things  thinking  metabuch  order-disorder  apollonian-dionysian  bio  examples  near-far  symmetry  homo-hetero  logic  inference  intuition  problem-solving  analytical-holistic  n-factor  europe  the-great-west-whale  occident  alien-character  detail-architecture  art  theory-practice  philosophy  being-becoming  essence-existence  language  psychology  cog-psych  egalitarianism-hierarchy  direction  reason  learning  novelty  science  anglo  anglosphere  coarse-fine  neurons  truth  contradiction  matching  empirical  volo-avolo  curiosity  uncertainty  theos  axioms  intricacy  computation  analogy  essay  rhetoric  deep-materialism  new-religion  knowledge  expert-experience  confidence  biases  optimism  pessimism  realness  whole-partial-many  theory-of-mind  values  competition  reduction  subjective-objective  communication  telos-atelos  ends-means  turing  fiction  increase-decrease  innovation  creative  thick-thin  spengler  multi  ratty  hanson  complex-systems  structure  concrete  abstraction  network-s 
september 2018 by nhaliday
Harnessing Evolution - with Bret Weinstein | Virtual Futures Salon - YouTube
- ways to get out of Malthusian conditions: expansion to new frontiers, new technology, redistribution/theft
- some discussion of existential risk
- wants to change humanity's "purpose" to one that would be safe in the long run; important thing is it has to be ESS (maybe he wants a singleton?)
- not too impressed by transhumanism (wouldn't identify with a brain emulation)
video  interview  thiel  expert-experience  evolution  deep-materialism  new-religion  sapiens  cultural-dynamics  anthropology  evopsych  sociality  ecology  flexibility  biodet  behavioral-gen  self-interest  interests  moloch  arms  competition  coordination  cooperate-defect  frontier  expansionism  technology  efficiency  thinking  redistribution  open-closed  zero-positive-sum  peace-violence  war  dominant-minority  hypocrisy  dignity  sanctity-degradation  futurism  environment  climate-change  time-preference  long-short-run  population  scale  earth  hidden-motives  game-theory  GT-101  free-riding  innovation  leviathan  malthus  network-structure  risk  existence  civil-liberty  authoritarianism  tribalism  us-them  identity-politics  externalities  unintended-consequences  internet  social  media  pessimism  universalism-particularism  energy-resources  biophysical-econ  politics  coalitions  incentives  attention  epistemic  biases  blowhards  teaching  education  emotion  impetus  comedy  expression-survival  economics  farmers-and-foragers  ca 
april 2018 by nhaliday
The Hanson-Yudkowsky AI-Foom Debate - Machine Intelligence Research Institute
How Deviant Recent AI Progress Lumpiness?: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2018/03/how-deviant-recent-ai-progress-lumpiness.html
I seem to disagree with most people working on artificial intelligence (AI) risk. While with them I expect rapid change once AI is powerful enough to replace most all human workers, I expect this change to be spread across the world, not concentrated in one main localized AI system. The efforts of AI risk folks to design AI systems whose values won’t drift might stop global AI value drift if there is just one main AI system. But doing so in a world of many AI systems at similar abilities levels requires strong global governance of AI systems, which is a tall order anytime soon. Their continued focus on preventing single system drift suggests that they expect a single main AI system.

The main reason that I understand to expect relatively local AI progress is if AI progress is unusually lumpy, i.e., arriving in unusually fewer larger packages rather than in the usual many smaller packages. If one AI team finds a big lump, it might jump way ahead of the other teams.

However, we have a vast literature on the lumpiness of research and innovation more generally, which clearly says that usually most of the value in innovation is found in many small innovations. We have also so far seen this in computer science (CS) and AI. Even if there have been historical examples where much value was found in particular big innovations, such as nuclear weapons or the origin of humans.

Apparently many people associated with AI risk, including the star machine learning (ML) researchers that they often idolize, find it intuitively plausible that AI and ML progress is exceptionally lumpy. Such researchers often say, “My project is ‘huge’, and will soon do it all!” A decade ago my ex-co-blogger Eliezer Yudkowsky and I argued here on this blog about our differing estimates of AI progress lumpiness. He recently offered Alpha Go Zero as evidence of AI lumpiness:


In this post, let me give another example (beyond two big lumps in a row) of what could change my mind. I offer a clear observable indicator, for which data should have available now: deviant citation lumpiness in recent ML research. One standard measure of research impact is citations; bigger lumpier developments gain more citations that smaller ones. And it turns out that the lumpiness of citations is remarkably constant across research fields! See this March 3 paper in Science:

I Still Don’t Get Foom: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2014/07/30855.html
All of which makes it look like I’m the one with the problem; everyone else gets it. Even so, I’m gonna try to explain my problem again, in the hope that someone can explain where I’m going wrong. Here goes.

“Intelligence” just means an ability to do mental/calculation tasks, averaged over many tasks. I’ve always found it plausible that machines will continue to do more kinds of mental tasks better, and eventually be better at pretty much all of them. But what I’ve found it hard to accept is a “local explosion.” This is where a single machine, built by a single project using only a tiny fraction of world resources, goes in a short time (e.g., weeks) from being so weak that it is usually beat by a single human with the usual tools, to so powerful that it easily takes over the entire world. Yes, smarter machines may greatly increase overall economic growth rates, and yes such growth may be uneven. But this degree of unevenness seems implausibly extreme. Let me explain.

If we count by economic value, humans now do most of the mental tasks worth doing. Evolution has given us a brain chock-full of useful well-honed modules. And the fact that most mental tasks require the use of many modules is enough to explain why some of us are smarter than others. (There’d be a common “g” factor in task performance even with independent module variation.) Our modules aren’t that different from those of other primates, but because ours are different enough to allow lots of cultural transmission of innovation, we’ve out-competed other primates handily.

We’ve had computers for over seventy years, and have slowly build up libraries of software modules for them. Like brains, computers do mental tasks by combining modules. An important mental task is software innovation: improving these modules, adding new ones, and finding new ways to combine them. Ideas for new modules are sometimes inspired by the modules we see in our brains. When an innovation team finds an improvement, they usually sell access to it, which gives them resources for new projects, and lets others take advantage of their innovation.


In Bostrom’s graph above the line for an initially small project and system has a much higher slope, which means that it becomes in a short time vastly better at software innovation. Better than the entire rest of the world put together. And my key question is: how could it plausibly do that? Since the rest of the world is already trying the best it can to usefully innovate, and to abstract to promote such innovation, what exactly gives one small project such a huge advantage to let it innovate so much faster?


In fact, most software innovation seems to be driven by hardware advances, instead of innovator creativity. Apparently, good ideas are available but must usually wait until hardware is cheap enough to support them.

Yes, sometimes architectural choices have wider impacts. But I was an artificial intelligence researcher for nine years, ending twenty years ago, and I never saw an architecture choice make a huge difference, relative to other reasonable architecture choices. For most big systems, overall architecture matters a lot less than getting lots of detail right. Researchers have long wandered the space of architectures, mostly rediscovering variations on what others found before.

Some hope that a small project could be much better at innovation because it specializes in that topic, and much better understands new theoretical insights into the basic nature of innovation or intelligence. But I don’t think those are actually topics where one can usefully specialize much, or where we’ll find much useful new theory. To be much better at learning, the project would instead have to be much better at hundreds of specific kinds of learning. Which is very hard to do in a small project.

What does Bostrom say? Alas, not much. He distinguishes several advantages of digital over human minds, but all software shares those advantages. Bostrom also distinguishes five paths: better software, brain emulation (i.e., ems), biological enhancement of humans, brain-computer interfaces, and better human organizations. He doesn’t think interfaces would work, and sees organizations and better biology as only playing supporting roles.


Similarly, while you might imagine someday standing in awe in front of a super intelligence that embodies all the power of a new age, superintelligence just isn’t the sort of thing that one project could invent. As “intelligence” is just the name we give to being better at many mental tasks by using many good mental modules, there’s no one place to improve it. So I can’t see a plausible way one project could increase its intelligence vastly faster than could the rest of the world.

Takeoff speeds: https://sideways-view.com/2018/02/24/takeoff-speeds/
Futurists have argued for years about whether the development of AGI will look more like a breakthrough within a small group (“fast takeoff”), or a continuous acceleration distributed across the broader economy or a large firm (“slow takeoff”).

I currently think a slow takeoff is significantly more likely. This post explains some of my reasoning and why I think it matters. Mostly the post lists arguments I often hear for a fast takeoff and explains why I don’t find them compelling.

(Note: this is not a post about whether an intelligence explosion will occur. That seems very likely to me. Quantitatively I expect it to go along these lines. So e.g. while I disagree with many of the claims and assumptions in Intelligence Explosion Microeconomics, I don’t disagree with the central thesis or with most of the arguments.)
ratty  lesswrong  subculture  miri-cfar  ai  risk  ai-control  futurism  books  debate  hanson  big-yud  prediction  contrarianism  singularity  local-global  speed  speedometer  time  frontier  distribution  smoothness  shift  pdf  economics  track-record  abstraction  analogy  links  wiki  list  evolution  mutation  selection  optimization  search  iteration-recursion  intelligence  metameta  chart  analysis  number  ems  coordination  cooperate-defect  death  values  formal-values  flux-stasis  philosophy  farmers-and-foragers  malthus  scale  studying  innovation  insight  conceptual-vocab  growth-econ  egalitarianism-hierarchy  inequality  authoritarianism  wealth  near-far  rationality  epistemic  biases  cycles  competition  arms  zero-positive-sum  deterrence  war  peace-violence  winner-take-all  technology  moloch  multi  plots  research  science  publishing  humanity  labor  marginal  urban-rural  structure  composition-decomposition  complex-systems  gregory-clark  decentralized  heavy-industry  magnitude  multiplicative  endogenous-exogenous  models  uncertainty  decision-theory  time-prefer 
april 2018 by nhaliday
"Really six people present": origin of phrase commonly attributed to William James - English Language & Usage Stack Exchange
Whenever two people meet, there are really six people present. There is each man as he sees himself, each man as the other person sees him, and each man as he really is.


Here's a graph of the number of references of the phrase "really six people present" Click on the first range (1800-1017) and you'll see this, which attributes this statement to Oliver Wendell Holmes. What's perhaps relevant is the reference to "John and James"--I'm guessing two placeholder names.
q-n-a  stackex  quotes  aphorism  law  big-peeps  old-anglo  illusion  truth  anthropology  psychology  cog-psych  social-psych  realness  dennett  biases  neurons  rationality  within-without  theory-of-mind  subjective-objective  forms-instances  parallax  the-self 
march 2018 by nhaliday
Overcoming Bias : The Model to Beat: Status Rank
People often presume that policy can mostly ignore income inequality if key individual outcomes like health or happiness depend mainly on individual income. Yes, there’s some room for promoting insurance against income risk, but not much room. However, people often presume that policy should pay a lot more attention to inequality if individual outcomes depend more directly on the income of others, such as via envy or discouragement.

However, there’s a simple and plausible income interdependence scenario where inequality matters little for policy: when outcomes depend on rank. If individual outcomes are a function of each person’s percentile income rank, and if social welfare just adds up those individual outcomes, then income policy becomes irrelevant, because this social welfare sum is guaranteed to always add up to the same constant. Income-related policy may influence outcomes via other channels, but not via this channel. This applies whether the relevant rank is global, comparing each person to the entire world, or local, comparing each person only to a local community.

That 2010 paper, by Christopher Boyce, Gordon Brown, and Simon Moore, makes a strong case that in fact the outcome of life satisfaction depends on the incomes of others only via income rank. (Two followup papers find the same result for outcomes of psychological distress and nine measures of health.) They looked at 87,000 Brits, and found that while income rank strongly predicted outcomes, neither individual (log) income nor an average (log) income of their reference group predicted outcomes, after controlling for rank (and also for age, gender, education, marital status, children, housing ownership, labor-force status, and disabilities). These seem to me remarkably strong and robust results. (Confirmed here.)
ratty  hanson  commentary  study  summary  economics  psychology  social-psych  values  envy  inequality  status  s-factor  absolute-relative  compensation  money  ranking  local-global  emotion  meaningness  planning  long-term  stylized-facts  britain  health  biases  farmers-and-foragers  redistribution  moments  metrics  replication  happy-sad 
march 2018 by nhaliday
Self-Serving Bias | Slate Star Codex
Since reading Tabarrok’s post, I’ve been trying to think of more examples of this sort of thing, especially in medicine. There are way too many discrepancies in approved medications between countries to discuss every one of them, but did you know melatonin is banned in most of Europe? (Europeans: did you know melatonin is sold like candy in the United States?) Did you know most European countries have no such thing as “medical school”, but just have college students major in medicine, and then become doctors once they graduate from college? (Europeans: did you know Americans have to major in some random subject in college, and then go to a separate place called “medical school” for four years to even start learning medicine?) Did you know that in Puerto Rico, you can just walk into a pharmacy and get any non-scheduled drug you want without a doctor’s prescription? (source: my father; I have never heard anyone else talk about this, and nobody else even seems to think it is interesting enough to be worth noting).


And then there’s the discussion from the recent discussion of Madness and Civilization about how 18th century doctors thought hot drinks will destroy masculinity and ruin society. Nothing that’s happened since has really disproved this – indeed, a graph of hot drink consumption, decline of masculinity, and ruinedness of society would probably show a pretty high correlation – it’s just somehow gotten tossed in the bin marked “ridiculous” instead of the bin marked “things we have to worry about”.
ratty  yvain  ssc  commentary  econotariat  marginal-rev  economics  labor  regulation  civil-liberty  randy-ayndy  markets  usa  the-west  comparison  europe  EU  cost-disease  medicine  education  higher-ed  error  gender  rot  lol  aphorism  zeitgeist  rationality  biases  flux-stasis 
january 2018 by nhaliday
Are Sunk Costs Fallacies? - Gwern.net
But to what extent is the sunk cost fallacy a real fallacy?
Below, I argue the following:
1. sunk costs are probably issues in big organizations
- but maybe not ones that can be helped
2. sunk costs are not issues in animals
3. sunk costs appear to exist in children & adults
- but many apparent instances of the fallacy are better explained as part of a learning strategy
- and there’s little evidence sunk cost-like behavior leads to actual problems in individuals
4. much of what we call sunk cost looks like simple carelessness & thoughtlessness
ratty  gwern  analysis  meta-analysis  faq  biases  rationality  decision-making  decision-theory  economics  behavioral-econ  realness  cost-benefit  learning  wire-guided  marginal  age-generation  aging  industrial-org  organizing  coordination  nature  retention  knowledge  iq  education  tainter  management  government  competition  equilibrium  models  roots  chart 
december 2017 by nhaliday
Frontiers | Can We Validate the Results of Twin Studies? A Census-Based Study on the Heritability of Educational Achievement | Genetics
As for most phenotypes, the amount of variance in educational achievement explained by SNPs is lower than the amount of additive genetic variance estimated in twin studies. Twin-based estimates may however be biased because of self-selection and differences in cognitive ability between twins and the rest of the population. Here we compare twin registry based estimates with a census-based heritability estimate, sampling from the same Dutch birth cohort population and using the same standardized measure for educational achievement. Including important covariates (i.e., sex, migration status, school denomination, SES, and group size), we analyzed 893,127 scores from primary school children from the years 2008–2014. For genetic inference, we used pedigree information to construct an additive genetic relationship matrix. Corrected for the covariates, this resulted in an estimate of 85%, which is even higher than based on twin studies using the same cohort and same measure. We therefore conclude that the genetic variance not tagged by SNPs is not an artifact of the twin method itself.
study  biodet  behavioral-gen  iq  psychometrics  psychology  cog-psych  twin-study  methodology  variance-components  state-of-art  🌞  developmental  age-generation  missing-heritability  biases  measurement  sampling-bias  sib-study 
december 2017 by nhaliday
Behaving Discretely: Heuristic Thinking in the Emergency Department
I find compelling evidence of heuristic thinking in this setting: patients arriving in the emergency department just after their 40th birthday are roughly 10% more likely to be tested for and 20% more likely to be diagnosed with ischemic heart disease (IHD) than patients arriving just before this date, despite the fact that the incidence of heart disease increases smoothly with age.

Figure 1: Proportion of ED patients tested for heart attack
pdf  study  economics  behavioral-econ  field-study  biases  heuristic  error  healthcare  medicine  meta:medicine  age-generation  aging  cardio  bounded-cognition  shift  trivia  cocktail  pro-rata 
december 2017 by nhaliday
What era are our intuitions about elites and business adapted to? – Gene Expression
Above natural states are open-access orders, which characterize societies that have market economies and competitive politics. Here access to the elite is open to anyone who can prove themselves worthy — it is not artificially restricted in order to preserve large rents for the incumbents. The pie can be made bigger with more people at the top, since you only get to the top in such societies by making and selling things that people want. Elite members compete against each other based on the quality and price of the goods and services they sell — it’s a mercantile elite — rather than based on who is better at violence than the others. If the elites are flabby, upstarts can readily form their own organizations — as opposed to not having the freedom to do so — that, if better, will dethrone the incumbents. Since violence is no longer part of elite competition, homicide rates are the lowest of all types of societies.

OK, now let’s take a look at just two innate views that most people have about how the business world works or what economic elites are like, and see how these are adaptations to natural states rather than to the very new open-access orders (which have only existed in Western Europe since about 1850 or so). One is the conviction, common even among many businessmen, that market share matters more than making profits — that being more popular trumps being more profitable. The other is most people’s mistrust of companies that dominate their entire industry, like Microsoft in computers.
gnxp  scitariat  reflection  farmers-and-foragers  sapiens  instinct  politics  coalitions  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  political-econ  polisci  leviathan  north-weingast-like  unintended-consequences  open-closed  biases  government  markets  market-power  rent-seeking  capitalism  democracy  roots  EEA  inequality  egalitarianism-hierarchy  business  cost-benefit  interests  elite  hari-seldon 
december 2017 by nhaliday
Understanding differences in life expectancy inequality - Marginal REVOLUTION
The life expectancy gap at age 40 between high income and low income individuals is substantial. I explore how medical expenditures and unhealthy behaviors account for the life expectancy gap. The data reveals the following. First, low income individuals tend to spend more on healthcare than high income individuals at all ages. Moreover, health disparities by income is salient due to differences in unhealthy behaviors such as heavy smoking. To answer how much dierences in access to medical services and unhealthy behaviors can explain in light of these stylized facts, I construct a life cycle model. The distinctive features of the model are that it flexibly incorporates unobserved, potentially correlated initial human and health capital stocks and embed unhealthy behaviors. Furthermore, the model includes two health systems: private health insurance and Medicare. The main findings are i) differences in access to medical care driven by income inequality potentially accounts for 12.5% of the life expectancy gap, ii) health insurance increases longevity for low income individuals, but modestly, iii) the health condition when young shapes the trend in average medical expenditures by income groups and iv) the impact of differences in unhealthy behaviors is predominant in understanding the life expectancy gap.

Health spending negatively correlated with health outcomes: http://www.arnoldkling.com/blog/health-spending-negatively-correlated-with-health-outcomes/
Pointer from Tyler Cowen. In the paper, Katera argues that the lower life expectancy of lower-income individuals reflects differences in their behavior rather than differences in access to medical services. My thoughts:

1. This seems consistent with Hansonian medicine, in which on average the benefits of more health care spending are about zero. But it also could suggest a counter to the Hanson view. That is, it could be that at the margin everyone benefits from more health care spending, but because the people who spend more tend to be people who behave in unhealthy ways, the benefits of more spending are difficult to tease out from the data. It is like trying to measure the relationship between policing and crime. If areas with a lot of crime tend to require more police, then a simple correlation analysis might suggest that adding police does not help to reduce crime.

2. Katera’s findings are not politically correct. I am on the record as saying that academic economics is headed toward a state in which findings like this will make one almost unemployable. Imagine trying to get Katera hired in a sociology department. Katera’s experience as a job candidate will be help to indicate how far along we are on this path.
econotariat  marginal-rev  commentary  links  quotes  study  summary  economics  health  healthcare  inequality  sociology  multi  cracker-econ  prediction  social-science  westminster  censorship  academia  biases  truth  egalitarianism-hierarchy  left-wing  habit 
november 2017 by nhaliday
Use and Interpretation of LD Score Regression
LD Score regression distinguishes confounding from polygenicity in genome-wide association studies: https://sci-hub.bz/10.1038/ng.3211
- Po-Ru Loh, Nick Patterson, et al.


Both polygenicity (i.e. many small genetic effects) and confounding biases, such as cryptic relatedness and population stratification, can yield inflated distributions of test statistics in genome-wide association studies (GWAS). However, current methods cannot distinguish between inflation from bias and true signal from polygenicity. We have developed an approach that quantifies the contributions of each by examining the relationship between test statistics and linkage disequilibrium (LD). We term this approach LD Score regression. LD Score regression provides an upper bound on the contribution of confounding bias to the observed inflation in test statistics and can be used to estimate a more powerful correction factor than genomic control. We find strong evidence that polygenicity accounts for the majority of test statistic inflation in many GWAS of large sample size.

Supplementary Note: https://images.nature.com/original/nature-assets/ng/journal/v47/n3/extref/ng.3211-S1.pdf

An atlas of genetic correlations across human diseases
and traits: https://sci-hub.bz/10.1038/ng.3406


Supplementary Note: https://images.nature.com/original/nature-assets/ng/journal/v47/n11/extref/ng.3406-S1.pdf

ldsc is a command line tool for estimating heritability and genetic correlation from GWAS summary statistics. ldsc also computes LD Scores.
nibble  pdf  slides  talks  bio  biodet  genetics  genomics  GWAS  genetic-correlation  correlation  methodology  bioinformatics  concept  levers  🌞  tutorial  explanation  pop-structure  gene-drift  ideas  multi  study  org:nat  article  repo  software  tools  libraries  stats  hypothesis-testing  biases  confounding  gotchas  QTL  simulation  survey  preprint  population-genetics 
november 2017 by nhaliday
The Same Old Story | West Hunter
People often reinterpret past events, recast them in terms of some contemporary ideology. When historians talk about the Monophysites in Byzantine times, they often suggest that those struggle are a mask for a kind of proto-nationalism. Maybe they were: and maybe nobody involved was thinking anything remotely like that. The Communists tried to come up with Marxist interpretations of ancient history, which led them to spend way too much time talking about Mazdakites in Sassanian Persia and the Zealots of Thessalonika . And Spartacus: but at least Spartacus was cool.

Then there are feminist versions of history. Let us never speak of them again.

Generally, this is all crap. But we could at least hope for something new along these lines: bullshit perhaps, but at least fresh bullshit. Obviously the reality underlying both the Punic Wars and the Crusades is the ancient struggle between EEF and ANE.
west-hunter  scitariat  discussion  rant  troll  letters  academia  politics  ideology  biases  is-ought  history  iron-age  medieval  mediterranean  the-classics  MENA  class  class-warfare  polanyi-marx  communism  gender  europe  war  genetics  genomics  sapiens  pop-structure 
november 2017 by nhaliday
The weirdest people in the world?
Abstract: Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world’s top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers – often implicitly – assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these “standard subjects” are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species – frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior – hence, there are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions of human nature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges.
pdf  study  microfoundations  anthropology  cultural-dynamics  sociology  psychology  social-psych  cog-psych  iq  biodet  behavioral-gen  variance-components  psychometrics  psych-architecture  visuo  spatial  morality  individualism-collectivism  n-factor  justice  egalitarianism-hierarchy  cooperate-defect  outliers  homo-hetero  evopsych  generalization  henrich  europe  the-great-west-whale  occident  organizing  🌞  universalism-particularism  applicability-prereqs  hari-seldon  extrema  comparison  GT-101  ecology  EGT  reinforcement  anglo  language  gavisti  heavy-industry  marginal  absolute-relative  reason  stylized-facts  nature  systematic-ad-hoc  analytical-holistic  science  modernity  behavioral-econ  s:*  illusion  cool  hmm  coordination  self-interest  social-norms  population  density  humanity  sapiens  farmers-and-foragers  free-riding  anglosphere  cost-benefit  china  asia  sinosphere  MENA  world  developing-world  neurons  theory-of-mind  network-structure  nordic  orient  signum  biases  usa  optimism  hypocrisy  humility  within-without  volo-avolo  domes 
november 2017 by nhaliday
Reconsidering the Heritability of Intelligence in Adulthood: Taking Assortative Mating and Cultural Transmission into Account
Heritability estimates of general intelligence in adulthood generally range from 75 to 85%, with all heritability due to additive genetic influences, while genetic dominance and shared environmental factors are absent, or too small to be detected. These estimates are derived from studies based on the classical twin design and are based on the assumption of random mating. Yet, considerable positive assortative mating has been reported for general intelligence. Unmodeled assortative mating may lead to biased estimates of the relative magnitude of genetic and environmental factors.


Under the preferred phenotypic assortment model, the variance of intelligence in adulthood was not only due to non-shared environmental (18%) and additive genetic factors (44%) but also to non-additive genetic factors (27%) and phenotypic assortment (11%).This non-additive nature of genetic influences on intelligence needs to be accommodated in future GWAS studies for intelligence.
study  biodet  behavioral-gen  psychology  cog-psych  iq  twin-study  sib-study  biases  gotchas  models  map-territory  assortative-mating  variance-components  🌞  nonlinearity  regularizer  intricacy 
november 2017 by nhaliday
The Illusion of Moral Superiority - Social Psychological and Personality Science - Ben M. Tappin, Ryan T. McKay, 2017
Participants (N = 270) judged themselves and the average person on traits reflecting the core dimensions of social perception: morality, agency, and sociability. Adapting new methods, we reveal that virtually all individuals irrationally inflated their moral qualities, and the absolute and relative magnitude of this irrationality was greater than that in the other domains of positive self-evaluation. Inconsistent with prevailing theories of overly positive self-belief, irrational moral superiority was not associated with self-esteem. Taken together, these findings suggest that moral superiority is a uniquely strong and prevalent form of “positive illusion,” but the underlying function remains unknown.
study  sociology  psychology  social-psych  poll  descriptive  morality  comparison  biases  rationality  anthropology  realness  hypocrisy 
november 2017 by nhaliday
Taboo Issues in Social Science: Questioning Conventional Wisdom
sample of book

1 Postmodernism, Political Correctness and the Tyranny of the Academy 17
2 Feminism: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 39
3 Whiteness Studies and Racist Amerikkka 59
4 Ideological Battles over Human Nature 79
5 Social Constructionism and Gender 99
6 Race: A Dangerous Concept? 119
7 Politics and Personality: Callous Conservatives and Loving Liberals? 139
8 Capitalism and Socialism: The Devil’s Dung versus Satan’s Spore 161
9 Socioeconomic Success: Talent Plus Effort or White Privilege? 181
10 Cultural Relativism, Multiculturalism, Violence, and Human Rights 201
11 “Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics:” Crime and Justice 223
12 Culture, Constitution, and Government 243
pdf  books  essay  rhetoric  social-science  academia  sociology  criminology  crime  westminster  race  identity-politics  truth  gender  politics  personality  psychology  social-psych  capitalism  communism  left-wing  diversity  absolute-relative  biases  🎩  class  economics  ideology  egalitarianism-hierarchy  envy  biodet  realness  epistemic 
october 2017 by nhaliday
The Function of Reason | Edge.org

How Social Is Reason?: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2017/08/how-social-is-reason.html

Reading The Enigma of Reason. Pretty good so far. Not incredibly surprising to me so far. To be clear, their argument is somewhat orthogonal to the whole ‘rationality’ debate you may be familiar with from Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s work (e.g., see Heuristics and Biases).

One of the major problems in analysis is that rationality, reflection and ratiocination, are slow and error prone. To get a sense of that, just read ancient Greek science. Eratosthenes may have calculated to within 1% of the true circumference of the world, but Aristotle’s speculations on the nature of reproduction were rather off.

You may be as clever as Eratosthenes, but most people are not. But you probably accept that the world is round and 24,901 miles around. If you are not American you probably are vague on miles anyway. But you know what the social consensus is, and you accept it because it seems reasonable.

One of the points in cultural evolution work is that a lot of the time rather than relying on your own intuition and or reason, it is far more effective and cognitively cheaper to follow social norms of your ingroup. I only bring this up because unfortunately many pathologies of our political and intellectual world today are not really pathologies. That is, they’re not bugs, but features.

Finished The Enigma of Reason. The basic thesis that reasoning is a way to convince people after you’ve already come to a conclusion, that is, rationalization, was already one I shared. That makes sense since one of the coauthors, Dan Sperber, has been influential in the “naturalistic” school of anthropology. If you’ve read books like In Gods We Trust The Enigma of Reason goes fast. But it is important to note that the cognitive anthropology perspective is useful in things besides religion. I’m thinking in particular of politics.

My point here is that many of our beliefs are arrived at in an intuitive manner, and we find reasons to justify those beliefs. One of the core insights you’ll get from The Enigma of Reason is that rationalization isn’t that big of a misfire or abuse of our capacities. It’s probably just a natural outcome for what and how we use reason in our natural ecology.

Mercier and Sperber contrast their “interactionist” model of what reason is for with an “intellectualist: model. The intellecutalist model is rather straightforward. It is one where individual reasoning capacities exist so that one may make correct inferences about the world around us, often using methods that mimic those in abstract elucidated systems such as formal logic or Bayesian reasoning. When reasoning doesn’t work right, it’s because people aren’t using it for it’s right reasons. It can be entirely solitary because the tools don’t rely on social input or opinion.

The interactionist model holds that reasoning exists because it is a method of persuasion within social contexts. It is important here to note that the authors do not believe that reasoning is simply a tool for winning debates. That is, increasing your status in a social game. Rather, their overall thesis seems to be in alignment with the idea that cognition of reasoning properly understood is a social process. In this vein they offer evidence of how juries may be superior to judges, and the general examples you find in the “wisdom of the crowds” literature. Overall the authors make a strong case for the importance of diversity of good-faith viewpoints, because they believe that the truth on the whole tends to win out in dialogic formats (that is, if there is a truth; they are rather unclear and muddy about normative disagreements and how those can be resolved).

The major issues tend to crop up when reasoning is used outside of its proper context. One of the literature examples, which you are surely familiar with, in The Enigma of Reason is a psychological experiment where there are two conditions, and the researchers vary the conditions and note wide differences in behavior. In particular, the experiment where psychologists put subjects into a room where someone out of view is screaming for help. When they are alone, they quite often go to see what is wrong immediately. In contrast, when there is a confederate of the psychologists in the room who ignores the screaming, people also tend to ignore the screaming.

The researchers know the cause of the change in behavior. It’s the introduction of the confederate and that person’s behavior. But the subjects when interviewed give a wide range of plausible and possible answers. In other words, they are rationalizing their behavior when called to justify it in some way. This is entirely unexpected, we all know that people are very good at coming up with answers to explain their behavior (often in the best light possible). But that doesn’t mean they truly understanding their internal reasons, which seem to be more about intuition.

But much of The Enigma of Reason also recounts how bad people are at coming up with coherent and well thought out rationalizations. That is, their “reasons” tend to be ad hoc and weak. We’re not very good at formal logic or even simple syllogistic reasoning. The explanation for this seems to be two-fold.


At this point we need to address the elephant in the room: some humans seem extremely good at reasoning in a classical sense. I’m talking about individuals such as Blaise Pascal, Carl Friedrich Gauss, and John von Neumann. Early on in The Enigma of Reason the authors point out the power of reason by alluding to Eratosthenes’s calculation of the circumference of the earth, which was only off by one percent. Myself, I would have mentioned Archimedes, who I suspect was a genius on the same level as the ones mentioned above.

Mercier and Sperber state near the end of the book that math in particular is special and a powerful way to reason. We all know this. In math the axioms are clear, and agreed upon. And one can inspect the chain of propositions in a very transparent manner. Mathematics has guard-rails for any human who attempts to engage in reasoning. By reducing the ability of humans to enter into unforced errors math is the ideal avenue for solitary individual reasoning. But it is exceptional.

Second, though it is not discussed in The Enigma of Reason there does seem to be variation in general and domain specific intelligence within the human population. People who flourish in mathematics usually have high general intelligences, but they also often exhibit a tendency to be able to engage in high levels of visual-spatial conceptualization.

One the whole the more intelligent you are the better you are able to reason. But that does not mean that those with high intelligence are immune from the traps of motivated reasoning or faulty logic. Mercier and Sperber give many examples. There are two. Linus Pauling was indisputably brilliant, but by the end of his life he was consistently pushing Vitamin C quackery (in part through a very selective interpretation of the scientific literature).* They also point out that much of Isaac Newton’s prodigious intellectual output turns out to have been focused on alchemy and esoteric exegesis which is totally impenetrable. Newton undoubtedly had a first class mind, but if the domain it was applied to was garbage, then the output was also garbage.


Overall, the take-homes are:

Reasoning exists to persuade in a group context through dialogue, not individual ratiocination.
Reasoning can give rise to storytelling when prompted, even if the reasons have no relationship to the underlying causality.
Motivated reasoning emerges because we are not skeptical of the reasons we proffer, but highly skeptical of reasons which refute our own.
The “wisdom of the crowds” is not just a curious phenomenon, but one of the primary reasons that humans have become more socially complex and our brains have larger.
Ultimately, if you want to argue someone out of their beliefs…well, good luck with that. But you should read The Enigma of Reason to understand the best strategies (many of them are common sense, and I’ve come to them independently simply through 15 years of having to engage with people of diverse viewpoints).

* R. A. Fisher, who was one of the pioneers of both evolutionary genetics and statistics, famously did not believe there was a connection between smoking and cancer. He himself smoked a pipe regularly.

** From what we know about Blaise Pascal and Isaac Newton, their personalities were such that they’d probably be killed or expelled from a hunter-gatherer band.
books  summary  psychology  social-psych  cog-psych  anthropology  rationality  biases  epistemic  thinking  neurons  realness  truth  info-dynamics  language  speaking  persuasion  dark-arts  impro  roots  ideas  speculation  hypocrisy  intelligence  eden  philosophy  multi  review  critique  ratty  hanson  org:edge  video  interview  communication  insight  impetus  hidden-motives  X-not-about-Y  signaling  🤖  metameta  metabuch  dennett  meta:rhetoric  gnxp  scitariat  open-things  giants  fisher  old-anglo  history  iron-age  mediterranean  the-classics  reason  religion  theos  noble-lie  intuition  instinct  farmers-and-foragers  egalitarianism-hierarchy  early-modern  britain  europe  gallic  hari-seldon  theory-of-mind  parallax  darwinian  evolution  telos-atelos  intricacy  evopsych  chart  traces 
august 2017 by nhaliday
Human Self as Information Agent: Functioning in a Social Environment Based on Shared Meanings — Experts@Minnesota
A neglected aspect of human selfhood is that people are information agents .... We initially assumed that accuracy would be the paramount concern for the information agent... But there are other considerations. Groups benefit from collective action, and so consensual agreement may be a high priority. Consensus may be needed in many situations when the means to verify information’s accuracy are beyond reach... Even if dissenters tum out to have more accurate information, disobedience is punished... Why might evolution have made people willing to sacrifice accuracy in favor of consensus, at least sometimes? Here we speculate that desire for consensus may derive from an innate social motive, whereas accuracy is an epistemic motive that would need to be acquired, and is therefore less deeply rooted and perhaps weaker. There may not be an innate motive to evaluate the truth value of assertions or to appreciate the meaningful difference between truth and falsehood. Hence it may be necessary to leam from experience that accuracy is an informational virtue that confers benefits, whereas consensus may be more closely tied to innate motivations .... The human mind discovers early in life that other minds have different information, which is something most other animals never discover. The desire to share attention and thoughts with others could thus be innate (or innately prepared) whereas the desire to sort truth from fiction may only come along later...The group first builds consensus and only after that is done seeks novel, idiosyncratic input that might increase accuracy. In an important sense, information shared by the group is valued more and perceived as more accurate than unshared information

When shared information coalesces into a collective worldview that includes values, it often has sociopolitical implications. Many groups are committed to particular ideologies or agenda, and information that impugns shared beliefs could be especially unwelcome. Political and religious ideologies have often sustained their power by asserting and enforcing views of questionable truthfulness. Hence individuals and groups may seek to exert control over the shared reality so as to benefit themselves. Thus many individuals will find it more important to get the group to agree with their favored view than to help it reach an objectively correct view. One fascinating question about official falsehoods is whether the ruling elites who propagate such views believe them or not... As an example close to home, psychology today is dominated by a political viewpoint that is progressively liberal, but it seems unlikely that many researchers knowingly assert falsehoods as scientific facts. They do however make publication of some findings much easier than others. The selective critique enables them to believe that the field’s body of knowledge supports their political views more than it does, because contrary facts and findings are suppressed.

Assessing relationships between conformity and meta-traits in an Asch-like paradigm: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15534510.2017.1371639
Replication of unflattering psychology classic: People bow to conformity pressure, mostly independent of personality

Smart Conformists: Children and Adolescents Associate Conformity With Intelligence Across Cultures: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cdev.12935/abstract
Across cultures, children and adolescents viewed high conformity as a sign of intelligence and good behavior.
study  psychology  social-psych  cog-psych  network-structure  social-norms  preference-falsification  is-ought  truth  info-dynamics  pdf  piracy  westminster  multi  twitter  social  commentary  scitariat  quotes  metabuch  stylized-facts  realness  hidden-motives  impetus  neurons  rationality  epistemic  biases  anthropology  local-global  social-science  error  evopsych  EEA  🌞  tribalism  decision-making  spreading  replication  homo-hetero  flux-stasis  reason  noble-lie  reinforcement  memetics 
august 2017 by nhaliday
Fear and Loathing in Psychology - The Unz Review
Warne and Astle looked at 29 best-selling undergraduate textbooks, which is where psychology students learn about intelligence, because less than 10% of graduate courses offer an intelligence option.

3.3% of textbook space is dedicated to intelligence. Given its influence, this is not very much.

The most common topics start well, with IQ and Spearman’s g, but do not go on to the best validated, evidence-led Cattell-Horn-Carol meta-analytic summary, but a side-stream, speculative triarchic theory from Sternberg; and a highly speculative and non-specific sketch of an idea about multiple intelligences Gardner. The last is a particular puzzle, since it really is a whimsical notion that motor skill is no different from analytical problem solving. All must have prizes.
Commonly, environmental influences are discussed, genetic ones rarely.

What Do Undergraduates Learn About Human Intelligence? An Analysis of Introductory Psychology Textbooks: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3c4TxciNeJZOTl3clpiX0JKckk/view

Education or Indoctrination? The Accuracy of Introductory Psychology Textbooks in Covering Controversial Topics and Urban Legends About Psychology: http://sci-hub.la/https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12144-016-9539-7

Twenty-four leading introductory psychology textbooks were surveyed for their coverage of a number of controversial topics (e.g., media violence, narcissism epidemic, multiple intelligences) and scientific urban legends (e.g., Kitty Genovese, Mozart Effect) for their factual accuracy. Results indicated numerous errors of factual reporting across textbooks, particularly related to failing to inform students of the controversial nature of some research fields and repeating some scientific urban legends as if true. Recommendations are made for improving the accuracy of introductory textbooks.

Mapping the scale of the narcissism epidemic: Increases in narcissism 2002–2007 within ethnic groups: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0092656608000949

The increasing numbers of Asian-Americans at the UCs over time may have masked changes in narcissism, as Asian-Americans score lower on the NPI. When examined within ethnic groups, Trzesniewski et al.’s data show that NPI scores increased significantly between 2002 and 2007 at twice the rate of the yearly change found over 24 years in Twenge et al. (2008a). The overall means also show a significant increase 2002–2007. Thus the available evidence suggests that college students are endorsing progressively more narcissistic personality traits over the generations.

Birth Cohort Increases in Narcissistic Personality Traits Among American College Students, 1982–2009: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1948550609355719

Both studies demonstrate significant increases in narcissism over time (Study 1 d = .37, 1982–2008, when campus is controlled; Study 2 d = .37, 1994–2009). These results support a generational differences model of individual personality traits reflecting changes in culture.

could this just be a selection effect (more people attending)?
albion  scitariat  education  higher-ed  academia  social-science  westminster  info-dynamics  psychology  cog-psych  psychometrics  iq  intelligence  realness  biases  commentary  study  summary  meta:science  pinker  multi  pdf  survey  is-ought  truth  culture-war  toxoplasmosis  replication  social-psych  propaganda  madisonian  identity-politics  init  personality  psychiatry  disease  trends  epidemiology  public-health  psych-architecture  dimensionality  confounding  control  age-generation  demographics  race  christopher-lasch  humility  usa  the-west  california  berkeley  asia 
july 2017 by nhaliday
National hiring experiments reveal 2:1 faculty preference for women on STEM tenure track
Here we report five hiring experiments in which faculty evaluated hypothetical female and male applicants, using systematically varied profiles disguising identical scholarship, for assistant professorships in biology, engineering, economics, and psychology. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, men and women faculty members from all four fields preferred female applicants 2:1 over identically qualified males with matching lifestyles (single, married, divorced), with the exception of male economists, who showed no gender preference. Comparing different lifestyles revealed that women preferred divorced mothers to married fathers and that men preferred mothers who took parental leaves to mothers who did not.

Double-blind review favours increased representation of female authors: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0169534707002704
Double-blind peer review, in which neither author nor reviewer identity are revealed, is rarely practised in ecology or evolution journals. However, in 2001, double-blind review was introduced by the journal Behavioral Ecology. Following this policy change, there was a significant increase in female first-authored papers, a pattern not observed in a very similar journal that provides reviewers with author information. No negative effects could be identified, suggesting that double-blind review should be considered by other journals.

Teaching accreditation exams reveal grading biases favor women in male-dominated disciplines in France: http://science.sciencemag.org/content/353/6298/474
This bias turns from 3 to 5 percentile ranks for men in literature and foreign languages to about 10 percentile ranks for women in math, physics, or philosophy.
study  org:nat  science  meta:science  gender  discrimination  career  progression  planning  long-term  values  academia  field-study  null-result  effect-size  🎓  multi  publishing  intervention  biases 
july 2017 by nhaliday
It’s finally out–The big review paper on the lack of political diversity in social psychology | HeterodoxAcademy.org
What’s interesting about Haidt’s alternative interpretation of the liberal progress narrative is that he mentions two elements central to the narrative—private property and nations. And what has happened to a large extent is that as the failures of communism have become increasingly apparent many on the left—including social scientists—have shifted their activism away from opposing private property and towards other aspects, for example globalism.

But how do we know a similarly disastrous thing is not going to happen with globalism as happened with communism? What if some form of national and ethnic affiliation is a deep-seated part of human nature, and that trying to forcefully suppress it will eventually lead to a disastrous counter-reaction? What if nations don’t create conflict, but alleviate it? What if a decentralised structure is the best way for human society to function?
scitariat  haidt  org:ngo  study  summary  commentary  higher-ed  academia  psychology  social-psych  social-science  westminster  politics  ideology  polarization  institutions  roots  chart  discrimination  multi  debate  critique  biases  diversity  homo-hetero  replication  news  org:mag  letters  org:popup  ethnocentrism  error  communism  universalism-particularism  whiggish-hegelian  us-them  tribalism 
july 2017 by nhaliday
The Determinants of Media Bias in China
Based on content analysis, we construct a measure of media bias, which has high predicting power of a newspaper being a strictly controlled party organ and of a newspaperís advertising revenues. We Önd that more-biased newspapers 1) cover more news on political leaders in an o¢ cial way, while more heavily suppress reports that are detrimental to the ideology of the ruling party; and 2) cover more news that is related to the accountability of local government o¢ cials, such as corruption, disasters, and accidents, while reporting less on sports, entertainment, and crimes. These results indicate that the Chinese government not only uses the media to maintain regime stability and enhance top-down policy implementation, but also uses the media as a public signaling device to monitor government o¢ cials and mitigate the distortion of information from bottom up.
pdf  study  economics  econometrics  sociology  polisci  china  asia  sinosphere  media  propaganda  correlation  biases  government  authoritarianism  antidemos  leviathan  info-dynamics  truth  westminster  political-econ  signaling  corruption  🎩  broad-econ  microfoundations  field-study  crooked  anomie  dark-arts  alt-inst  institutions  the-watchers  hari-seldon 
july 2017 by nhaliday
Sorry, Chuck Todd, But Reporters Aren't The Referees Of Politics
This is what really rankles so many conservatives about their alleged media betters. It’s not the bias, at least not by itself. It’s the dishonesty. The smug sanctimony. It’s the refusal of so many of them to openly admit their biases and to admit their motivations: to put a thumb on the scale in favor of one of the competing parties. I want conservatism and limited government to win out in the end. Chuck Todd and many of his friends in media want the opposite. I’m honest about it, but too many of Todd’s colleagues are not.

Chuck Todd isn’t a referee. He’s a hack with a point of view, just like the rest of the us. The only difference is that he won’t admit it.
news  org:mag  right-wing  rhetoric  rant  critique  media  propaganda  institutions  usa  society  universalism-particularism  truth  info-dynamics  biases  absolute-relative 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2017
Section 3.2, p. 39 has polarization data
A new way to chart ideological leanings in news media: https://www.axios.com/a-new-way-to-chart-ideological-leanings-in-news-media-2475716743.html
(using Twitter follows)
Exploring the Ideological Nature of Journalists’ Social Networks on Twitter and Associations with News Story Content: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8CcT_0LwJ8QVnJMR1QzcGNuTkk/view
Visualizing Political Polarization on Twitter: http://www.theoutgroup.org/
Dear Mainstream Media: Why so liberal?: https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2017/01/27/dear-mainstream-media-why-so-liberal/
Political Leanings of US Journalists vs. the Public in 2002

Topline Results: 2017 Texas Media & Society Survey: https://moody.utexas.edu/sites/default/files/TMASS_2017Topline_final.pdf
Some interesting results from a poll about media & polarization that I presented today for @AStraussInst <THREAD>
pdf  news  org:lite  media  database  data  analysis  politics  polarization  poll  values  time-use  world  usa  europe  EU  britain  internet  tv  social  white-paper  org:ngo  org:edu  ideology  multi  visualization  spatial  exploratory  polisci  wonkish  network-structure  twitter  techtariat  ssc  neocons  info-dynamics  project  org:junk  journos-pundits  info-foraging  track-record  objektbuch  chart  commentary  backup  org:rec  distribution  biases  comparison  within-without  input-output  supply-demand 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Overcoming Bias : Conformity Excuses
I picked my likes first, my group second.
I just couldn’t be happy elsewhere.
I actually like small differences.
In future, this will be more popular.
Second tier folks aren’t remotely as good. [isn't this kind of true because of power laws?]
Unpopular things are objectively defective.
ratty  hanson  rationality  neurons  biases  individualism-collectivism  info-dynamics  epistemic  mood-affiliation  preference-falsification  thinking  metabuch  embedded-cognition  water  social-norms  impetus  hidden-motives  homo-hetero  flux-stasis  power-law  heterodox  happy-sad 
june 2017 by nhaliday
Living with Inequality - Reason.com
That's why I propose the creation of the Tenth Commandment Club. The tenth commandment—"You shall not covet"—is a foundation of social peace. The Nobel Laureate economist Vernon Smith noted the tenth commandment along with the eighth (you shall not steal) in his Nobel toast, saying that they "provide the property right foundations for markets, and warned that petty distributional jealousy must not be allowed to destroy" those foundations. If academics, pundits, and columnists would avowedly reject covetousness, would openly reject comparisons between the average (extremely fortunate) American and the average billionaire, would mock people who claimed that frugal billionaires are a systematic threat to modern life, then soon our time could be spent discussing policy issues that really matter.

Enlightenment -> social justice: https://twitter.com/GarettJones/status/866448789825105920
US reconquista: https://twitter.com/AngloRemnant/status/865980569397731329
envy and psychology textbooks: https://twitter.com/tcjfs/status/887115182257917952

various Twitter threads: https://twitter.com/search?q=GarettJones+inequality


Civilization means saying no to the poor: https://bonald.wordpress.com/2017/11/18/civilization-means-saying-no-to-the-poor/
Although I instinctively dislike him, I do agree with Professor Scott on one point: “exploitation” really is the essence of civilization, whether by exploitation one simply means authority as described by those insensible to its moral force or more simply the refusal of elites to divulge their resources to the poor.

In fact, no human creation of lasting worth could ever be made without a willingness to tell the poor to *** off. If we really listened to the demands of social justice, if we really let compassion be our guide, we could have no art, no music, no science, no religion, no philosophy, no architecture beyond the crudest shelters. The poor are before us, their need perpetually urgent. It is inexcusable for us ever to build a sculpture, a cathedral, a particle accelerator. And the poor, we have it on two good authorities (the other being common sense), will be with us always. What we give for their needs today will have disappeared tomorrow, and they will be hungry again. Imagine if some Savonarola had come to Florence a century or two earlier and convinced the Florentine elite to open their hearts and their wallets to the poor in preference for worldly vanities. All that wealth would have been squandered on the poor and would have disappeared without a trace. Instead, we got the Renaissance.

Reward the lawless; punish the law abiding. Complete inversion which will eventually drive us back to the 3rd world darkness whence we came.

This idea that a group is only honorable in virtue of their victimization is such a pernicious one.
for efficiency, just have "Victims of WASPs Day." A kind of All Victims' Day. Otherwise U.S. calendar will be nothing but days of grievance.
Bonald had a good bit on this (of course).
Steve King is supposedly stupid for claiming that Western Civilization is second to none. One might have supposed that Catholics would take some pride as Catholics in Western civilization, a thing that was in no small part our creation. Instead, the only history American Catholics are to remember is being poor and poorly regarded recent immigrants in America.

Don't even bother with the rat race if you value big family. I won the race, & would've been better off as a dentist in Peoria.
.. College prof in Athens, OH. Anesthesiologist in Knoxville. State govt bureaucrat in Helena.
.. This is the formula: Middle America + regulatory capture white-collar job. anyone attempting real work in 2017 america is a RETARD.
.. Also unclear is why anyone in the US would get married. knock your girl up and put that litter on Welfare.
You: keep 50% of your earnings after taxes. 25% is eaten by cost of living. save the last 25%, hope our bankrupt gov doesn't expropriate l8r
The main difference in this country between welfare and 7-figure income is the quality of your kitchen cabinets.

wtf: https://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/dentists.htm
$159,770 per year
$76.81 per hour

18% (Much faster than average)

Admission into dental school is highly competitive. Along with undergraduate performance, students are evaluated for their Dental Admissions Test (DAT) scores. Students have the opportunity to take this test before graduating college. After gaining admission into dental school, students can go on to complete four years of full-time study to earn the Doctor of Dental Surgery or Doctor of Dental Medicine. Students typically spend the first two years learning general and dental science in classroom and laboratory settings. They may take courses like oral anatomy, histology and pathology. In the final years, dental students participate in clinical practicums, gaining supervised, hands-on experience in dental clinics.

Career ideas for the minimally ambitious dissident who wants to coast, shitpost, & live well:
- econ phd -> business school prof
- dentistry
- 2 years of banking/consulting -> F500 corp dev or strategy
- gov't bureaucrat in a state capital
Bad career ideas, for contrast:
- law
- humanities prof
- IT
- anything 'creative'

[ed.: Personally, I'd also throw in 'actuary' (though keep in mind ~20% risk of automation).]
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june 2017 by nhaliday
Logic | West Hunter
All the time I hear some public figure saying that if we ban or allow X, then logically we have to ban or allow Y, even though there are obvious practical reasons for X and obvious practical reasons against Y.

No, we don’t.


compare: https://pinboard.in/u:nhaliday/b:190b299cf04a

Small Change Good, Big Change Bad?: https://www.overcomingbias.com/2018/02/small-change-good-big-change-bad.html
And on reflection it occurs to me that this is actually THE standard debate about change: some see small changes and either like them or aren’t bothered enough to advocate what it would take to reverse them, while others imagine such trends continuing long enough to result in very large and disturbing changes, and then suggest stronger responses.

For example, on increased immigration some point to the many concrete benefits immigrants now provide. Others imagine that large cumulative immigration eventually results in big changes in culture and political equilibria. On fertility, some wonder if civilization can survive in the long run with declining population, while others point out that population should rise for many decades, and few endorse the policies needed to greatly increase fertility. On genetic modification of humans, some ask why not let doctors correct obvious defects, while others imagine parents eventually editing kid genes mainly to max kid career potential. On oil some say that we should start preparing for the fact that we will eventually run out, while others say that we keep finding new reserves to replace the ones we use.


If we consider any parameter, such as typical degree of mind wandering, we are unlikely to see the current value as exactly optimal. So if we give people the benefit of the doubt to make local changes in their interest, we may accept that this may result in a recent net total change we don’t like. We may figure this is the price we pay to get other things we value more, and we we know that it can be very expensive to limit choices severely.

But even though we don’t see the current value as optimal, we also usually see the optimal value as not terribly far from the current value. So if we can imagine current changes as part of a long term trend that eventually produces very large changes, we can become more alarmed and willing to restrict current changes. The key question is: when is that a reasonable response?

First, big concerns about big long term changes only make sense if one actually cares a lot about the long run. Given the usual high rates of return on investment, it is cheap to buy influence on the long term, compared to influence on the short term. Yet few actually devote much of their income to long term investments. This raises doubts about the sincerity of expressed long term concerns.

Second, in our simplest models of the world good local choices also produce good long term choices. So if we presume good local choices, bad long term outcomes require non-simple elements, such as coordination, commitment, or myopia problems. Of course many such problems do exist. Even so, someone who claims to see a long term problem should be expected to identify specifically which such complexities they see at play. It shouldn’t be sufficient to just point to the possibility of such problems.


Fourth, many more processes and factors limit big changes, compared to small changes. For example, in software small changes are often trivial, while larger changes are nearly impossible, at least without starting again from scratch. Similarly, modest changes in mind wandering can be accomplished with minor attitude and habit changes, while extreme changes may require big brain restructuring, which is much harder because brains are complex and opaque. Recent changes in market structure may reduce the number of firms in each industry, but that doesn’t make it remotely plausible that one firm will eventually take over the entire economy. Projections of small changes into large changes need to consider the possibility of many such factors limiting large changes.

Fifth, while it can be reasonably safe to identify short term changes empirically, the longer term a forecast the more one needs to rely on theory, and the more different areas of expertise one must consider when constructing a relevant model of the situation. Beware a mere empirical projection into the long run, or a theory-based projection that relies on theories in only one area.

We should very much be open to the possibility of big bad long term changes, even in areas where we are okay with short term changes, or at least reluctant to sufficiently resist them. But we should also try to hold those who argue for the existence of such problems to relatively high standards. Their analysis should be about future times that we actually care about, and can at least roughly foresee. It should be based on our best theories of relevant subjects, and it should consider the possibility of factors that limit larger changes.

And instead of suggesting big ways to counter short term changes that might lead to long term problems, it is often better to identify markers to warn of larger problems. Then instead of acting in big ways now, we can make sure to track these warning markers, and ready ourselves to act more strongly if they appear.

Growth Is Change. So Is Death.: https://www.overcomingbias.com/2018/03/growth-is-change-so-is-death.html
I see the same pattern when people consider long term futures. People can be quite philosophical about the extinction of humanity, as long as this is due to natural causes. Every species dies; why should humans be different? And few get bothered by humans making modest small-scale short-term modifications to their own lives or environment. We are mostly okay with people using umbrellas when it rains, moving to new towns to take new jobs, etc., digging a flood ditch after our yard floods, and so on. And the net social effect of many small changes is technological progress, economic growth, new fashions, and new social attitudes, all of which we tend to endorse in the short run.

Even regarding big human-caused changes, most don’t worry if changes happen far enough in the future. Few actually care much about the future past the lives of people they’ll meet in their own life. But for changes that happen within someone’s time horizon of caring, the bigger that changes get, and the longer they are expected to last, the more that people worry. And when we get to huge changes, such as taking apart the sun, a population of trillions, lifetimes of millennia, massive genetic modification of humans, robots replacing people, a complete loss of privacy, or revolutions in social attitudes, few are blasé, and most are quite wary.

This differing attitude regarding small local changes versus large global changes makes sense for parameters that tend to revert back to a mean. Extreme values then do justify extra caution, while changes within the usual range don’t merit much notice, and can be safely left to local choice. But many parameters of our world do not mostly revert back to a mean. They drift long distances over long times, in hard to predict ways that can be reasonably modeled as a basic trend plus a random walk.

This different attitude can also make sense for parameters that have two or more very different causes of change, one which creates frequent small changes, and another which creates rare huge changes. (Or perhaps a continuum between such extremes.) If larger sudden changes tend to cause more problems, it can make sense to be more wary of them. However, for most parameters most change results from many small changes, and even then many are quite wary of this accumulating into big change.

For people with a sharp time horizon of caring, they should be more wary of long-drifting parameters the larger the changes that would happen within their horizon time. This perspective predicts that the people who are most wary of big future changes are those with the longest time horizons, and who more expect lumpier change processes. This prediction doesn’t seem to fit well with my experience, however.

Those who most worry about big long term changes usually seem okay with small short term changes. Even when they accept that most change is small and that it accumulates into big change. This seems incoherent to me. It seems like many other near versus far incoherences, like expecting things to be simpler when you are far away from them, and more complex when you are closer. You should either become more wary of short term changes, knowing that this is how big longer term change happens, or you should be more okay with big long term change, seeing that as the legitimate result of the small short term changes you accept.

The point here is the gradual shifts of in-group beliefs are both natural and no big deal. Humans are built to readily do this, and forget they do this. But ultimately it is not a worry or concern.

But radical shifts that are big, whether near or far, portend strife and conflict. Either between groups or within them. If the shift is big enough, our intuition tells us our in-group will be in a fight. Alarms go off.
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may 2017 by nhaliday
The heart trumps the head - Research - Royal Holloway, University of London
We observed a robust desirability bias—individuals updated their beliefs more if the evidence was consistent (versus inconsistent) with their desired outcome. This bias was independent of whether the evidence was consistent or inconsistent with their prior beliefs
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may 2017 by nhaliday
Why I see academic economics moving left | askblog
I have a long essay on the scientific status of economics in National Affairs. A few excerpts from the conclusion:

In the end, can we really have effective theory in economics? If by effective theory we mean theory that is verifiable and reliable for prediction and control, the answer is likely no. Instead, economics deals in speculative interpretations and must continue to do so.

Young economists who employ pluralistic methods to study problems are admired rather than marginalized, as they were in 1980. But economists who question the wisdom of interventionist economic policies seem headed toward the fringes of the profession.

This is my essay in which I say that academic economics is on the road to sociology.

Property Is Only Another Name for Monopoly: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2818494
Hanson's take more positive: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2017/10/for-stability-rents.html

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may 2017 by nhaliday
Solution Aversion: On the Relation Between Ideology and Motivated Disbelief

Believing in climate change, but not behaving sustainably: Evidence from a one-year longitudinal study: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272494418301488
We conducted a one-year longitudinal study in which 600 American adults regularly reported their climate change beliefs, pro-environmental behavior, and other climate-change related measures. Using latent class analyses, we uncovered three clusters of Americans with distinct climate belief trajectories: (1) the “Skeptical,” who believed least in climate change; (2) the “Cautiously Worried,” who had moderate beliefs in climate change; and (3) the “Highly Concerned,” who had the strongest beliefs and concern about climate change. Cluster membership predicted different outcomes: the “Highly Concerned” were most supportive of government climate policies, but least likely to report individual-level actions, whereas the “Skeptical” opposed policy solutions but were most likely to report engaging in individual-level pro-environmental behaviors. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
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april 2017 by nhaliday
Why Have Marriage Rates Declined – spottedtoad
Oh, the Times they are a-Changin: https://spottedtoad.wordpress.com/2017/10/02/oh-the-times-they-are-a-changin/
Is this really because of Tinderpocalypse, or porn, or a second sexual revolution, or the alleged ability of desirable men to avoid commitment because another girl is always a swipe away?

Whatever it is, it seems distinctive and troubling that the marriage rate has generally been dropping more quickly even as the economy has recovered.
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april 2017 by nhaliday
Meta-assessment of bias in science
Science is said to be suffering a reproducibility crisis caused by many biases. How common are these problems, across the wide diversity of research fields? We probed for multiple bias-related patterns in a large random sample of meta-analyses taken from all disciplines. The magnitude of these biases varied widely across fields and was on average relatively small. However, we consistently observed that small, early, highly cited studies published in peer-reviewed journals were likely to overestimate effects. We found little evidence that these biases were related to scientific productivity, and we found no difference between biases in male and female researchers. However, a scientist’s early-career status, isolation, and lack of scientific integrity might be significant risk factors for producing unreliable results.
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march 2017 by nhaliday
huge popularity of "behavioral economics"among powerful people=largely excitement at how much more control they'd exert over stupider people

Time for Behavioral Political Economy? An Analysis of Articles in Behavioral Economics: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1846184
This study analyzes leading research in behavioral economics to see whether it contains advocacy of paternalism and whether it addresses the potential cognitive limitations and biases of the policymakers who are going to implement paternalist policies. The findings reveal that 20.7% of the studied articles in behavioral economics propose paternalist policy action and that 95.5% of these do not contain any analysis of the cognitive ability of policymakers. This suggests that behavioral political economy, in which the analytical tools of behavioral economics are applied to political decision-makers as well, would offer a useful extension of the research program.

Research shows that Americans and conservatives can be less open to cues to change behavior.

It’s For Your Own Good!: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/03/07/its-your-own-good/
- Cass Sunstein

Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism
by Sarah Conly
Cambridge University Press, 206 pp., $95.00

WHO NUDGES THE NUDGERS?: https://jacobitemag.com/2017/10/26/who-nudges-the-nudgers/
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february 2017 by nhaliday
Reporting bias inflates the reputation of medical treatments: A comparison of outcomes in clinical trials and online product reviews
- Why do people overestimate how much a medical treatment will benefit them?
- We compare average outcomes in clinical trials and online product reviews.
- Average outcomes in online reviews are much more positive.
- People who have good outcomes are more likely to write online reviews.
- Beliefs based on (electronic) word-of-mouth will be positively distorte
study  psychology  social-psych  medicine  replication  biases  epistemic  info-foraging  stylized-facts  sampling-bias  info-dynamics 
february 2017 by nhaliday
Irrational decision-making in an amoeboid organism: transitivity and context-dependent preferences. - PubMed - NCBI
Most models of animal foraging and consumer choice assume that individuals make choices based on the absolute value of items and are therefore 'economically rational'. However, frequent violations of rationality by animals, including humans, suggest that animals use comparative valuation rules. Are comparative valuation strategies a consequence of the way brains process information, or are they an intrinsic feature of biological decision-making? Here, we examine the principles of rationality in an organism with radically different information-processing mechanisms: the brainless, unicellular, slime mould Physarum polycephalum. We offered P. polycephalum amoebas a choice between food options that varied in food quality and light exposure (P. polycephalum is photophobic). The use of an absolute valuation rule will lead to two properties: transitivity and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Transitivity is satisfied if preferences have a consistent, linear ordering, while IIA states that a decision maker's preference for an item should not change if the choice set is expanded. A violation of either of these principles suggests the use of comparative rather than absolute valuation rules. Physarum polycephalum satisfied transitivity by having linear preference rankings. However, P. polycephalum's preference for a focal alternative increased when a third, inferior quality option was added to the choice set, thus violating IIA and suggesting the use of a comparative valuation process. The discovery of comparative valuation rules in a unicellular organism suggests that comparative valuation rules are ubiquitous, if not universal, among biological decision makers.
study  bio  economics  interdisciplinary  rationality  biases  eden  cool  lol  decision-making  values  orders  deep-materialism 
february 2017 by nhaliday
Thinking Outside One’s Paradigm | Academically Interesting
I think that as a scientist (or really, even as a citizen) it is important to be able to see outside one’s own paradigm. I currently think that I do a good job of this, but it seems to me that there’s a big danger of becoming more entrenched as I get older. Based on the above experiences, I plan to use the following test: When someone asks me a question about my field, how often have I not thought about it before? How tempted am I to say, “That question isn’t interesting”? If these start to become more common, then I’ll know something has gone wrong.
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january 2017 by nhaliday
Information Processing: Brexit in the Multiverse: Dominic Cummings on the Vote Leave campaign
some other stuff from same post:
Generally the better educated are more prone to irrational political opinions and political hysteria than the worse educated far from power. Why? In the field of political opinion they are more driven by fashion, a gang mentality, and the desire to pose about moral and political questions all of which exacerbate cognitive biases, encourage groupthink, and reduce accuracy. Those on average incomes are less likely to express political views to send signals; political views are much less important for signalling to one’s immediate in-group when you are on 20k a year. The former tend to see such questions in more general and abstract terms, and are more insulated from immediate worries about money. The latter tend to see such questions in more concrete and specific terms and ask ‘how does this affect me?’. The former live amid the emotional waves that ripple around powerful and tightly linked self-reinforcing networks. These waves rarely permeate the barrier around insiders and touch others.
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january 2017 by nhaliday
Public perceptions of expert disagreement: Bias and incompetence or a complex and random world? - Sep 07, 2015
People with low education, or with low self-reported topic knowledge, were most likely to attribute disputes to expert incompetence. People with higher self-reported knowledge tended to attribute disputes to expert bias due to financial or ideological reasons. The more highly educated and cognitively able were most likely to attribute disputes to natural factors, such as the irreducible complexity and randomness of the phenomenon.

reminds me of Hanson's interpretation of political disagreement: poor data, complex phenomena with high causal density
study  psychology  social-psych  rationality  iq  expert  info-foraging  decision-making  epistemic  albion  intricacy  wonkish  biases  self-report  complex-systems  thick-thin  stylized-facts  descriptive  ideology  info-dynamics  chart  truth  expert-experience  reason 
january 2017 by nhaliday
WHAT'S TO KNOW ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS? - Ioannidis - 2013 - Journal of Economic Surveys - Wiley Online Library
Abstract. The scientific credibility of economics is itself a scientific question that can be addressed with both theoretical speculations and empirical data. In this review, we examine the major parameters that are expected to affect the credibility of empirical economics: sample size, magnitude of pursued effects, number and pre-selection of tested relationships, flexibility and lack of standardization in designs, definitions, outcomes and analyses, financial and other interests and prejudices, and the multiplicity and fragmentation of efforts. We summarize and discuss the empirical evidence on the lack of a robust reproducibility culture in economics and business research, the prevalence of potential publication and other selective reporting biases, and other failures and biases in the market of scientific information. Overall, the credibility of the economics literature is likely to be modest or even low.

The Power of Bias in Economics Research: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ecoj.12461/full
We investigate two critical dimensions of the credibility of empirical economics research: statistical power and bias. We survey 159 empirical economics literatures that draw upon 64,076 estimates of economic parameters reported in more than 6,700 empirical studies. Half of the research areas have nearly 90% of their results under-powered. The median statistical power is 18%, or less. A simple weighted average of those reported results that are adequately powered (power ≥ 80%) reveals that nearly 80% of the reported effects in these empirical economics literatures are exaggerated; typically, by a factor of two and with one-third inflated by a factor of four or more.

Economics isn't a bogus science — we just don't use it correctly: http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-ioannidis-economics-is-a-science-20171114-story.html
study  ioannidis  social-science  meta:science  economics  methodology  critique  replication  bounded-cognition  error  stat-power  🎩  🔬  info-dynamics  piracy  empirical  biases  econometrics  effect-size  network-structure  realness  paying-rent  incentives  academia  multi  evidence-based  news  org:rec  rhetoric  contrarianism  backup  cycles  finance  huge-data-the-biggest  org:local 
january 2017 by nhaliday
Why Chinese Speakers Cut Their Hair Before New Year’s
Is the Chinese Language a Superstition Machine?: How ambiguity in language can create unique taboos.
news  org:mag  popsci  china  asia  language  culture  biases  cocktail  org:sci  foreign-lang  sinosphere  embedded-cognition  info-dynamics 
january 2017 by nhaliday
Would Clinton have defeated Trump in an epistocracy? | We the Pleeple
Next on the chart are the various epistocratic scenarios. What if we give especially low-knowledge voters only half a vote, or only a third, or bar them completely? What if we use a graduated more-votes-for-more-knowledge system? What if we give especially high-knowledge voters an extra vote, or two, or take epistocracy literally and allow only these high-knowledge folks to vote?

Do any of these proposals improve Clinton’s popular vote margin over Trump? No. In fact, each one would have given Trump a popular vote lead, anywhere from 0.5 points (giving high-knowledge folks a single extra vote) to 4.3 points (letting only high-knowledge folks vote). In an epistocracy of the sort Brennan and others imagine, Trump’s victory over Clinton would have been even more securely won.

contrary update:
ACTUALLY, EPISTOCRACY MIGHT HAVE HELPED CLINTON DEFEAT TRUMP: http://www.pleeps.org/2017/04/11/actually-epistocracy-might-have-helped-clinton-defeat-trump/
But she probably would have been running against President Romney, and might have still lost.

Were Trump Voters Irrational?: http://quillette.com/2017/09/28/trump-voters-irrational/
In addition to being misplaced, leftists never seem to see how insulting this critique of Republican voters is. Their failure to see the insult illustrates precisely what they get wrong in evaluating the rationality of the Trump voters. Consider that these What’s the Matter with Kansas? critiques are written by highly educated left-wing pundits, professors, and advocates. Perhaps we should ask one of them whether their own vote is purely self-interested and for their own monetary benefit. They will say no, of course. And they will deny as well that their vote is irrational. Progressives will say that they often vote against their own monetary interests in order to do good for other people. Or they will say that their vote reflects their values and worldview—that they are concerned about the larger issues that are encompassed by that worldview (abortion legislation or climate change or gun restriction). Leftists seem unable to see that Republican voters—even lower income ones—may be just as attached to their own values and worldviews. The stance of the educated progressive making the What’s the Matter with Kansas? argument seems to be that: “no one else should vote against their monetary interests, but it’s not irrational for me to do so, because I am enlightened.”


Progressives tend to deny or obfuscate (just as conservatives obfuscate the research on global warming) the data indicating that single-parent households lead to more behavioral problems among children. Overwhelmingly progressive university schools of education deny the strong scientific consensus that phonics-based reading instruction facilitates most readers, especially those struggling the most. Many progressives find it hard to believe that there is no bias at all in the initial hiring of women for tenure-track university positions in STEM disciplines. Progressives tend to deny the consensus view that genetically modified organisms are safe to consume. Gender feminists routinely deny biological facts about sex differences. Largely Democratic cities and university towns are at the forefront of the anti-vaccine movement which denies a scientific consensus. In the same cities and towns, people find it hard to believe that there is a strong consensus among economists that rent control causes housing shortages and a diminution in the quality of housing. [Research citations for all the above are available from the author here.]


More formal studies have indicated that there are few differences in factual knowledge of the world between Republicans and Democrats. The Pew Research Center reported one of its News IQ surveys in 2015 (What the Public Knows, April 28, 2015) and found very few partisan differences. People in the sample answered 12 questions about current events (identifying the route of the Keystone XL pipeline; knowledge of how many Supreme Court justices are women; etc.) and the Republicans outperformed the Democrats on 7 of the 12 items. Democrats outperformed the Republicans on 5 of the items. On average, the Republicans in the sample answered 8.3 items correctly, the Democrats answered 7.9 items correctly, and the independents answered 8.0 items correctly.


Measures of so-called “knowledge” in such a domain are easily skewed in a partisan manner by selection effects. This is a version of the “party of science” problem discussed previously. Whether the Democrats or the Republicans are the “party of science” depends entirely on how the issue in question is selected. The 17-item measure used by Klein was relatively balanced (8 items biased against leftists and 9 items biased against conservatives). With all the caveats in place about the difficulty of item matching, the weak conclusion that can be drawn is that existing research provides no evidence for the view that conservatives are deficient in the domain of economic knowledge—a domain critical for rational voting behavior.
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january 2017 by nhaliday
Gendering gametes: The unequal contributions of sperm and egg donors
This is pretty funny. Given male and female gametes contribute equal genetic variance to pretty much any trait, it's a misfire of the mate-selection circuitry, assuming genes and parental care coming from same place.
study  psychology  social-psych  gender  sex  biases  revealed-preference 
december 2016 by nhaliday
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