jm + wired + nsa   3

The FBI Finally Says How It ‘Legally’ Pinpointed Silk Road’s Server
The answer, according to a new filing by the case’s prosecution, is far more mundane: The FBI claims to have found the server’s location without the NSA’s help, simply by fiddling with the Silk Road’s login page until it leaked its true location.
fbi  nsa  silk-road  tor  opsec  dread-pirate-roberts  wired 
september 2014 by jm
How Advanced Is the NSA's Cryptanalysis — And Can We Resist It?
Bruce Schneier's suggestions:
Assuming the hypothetical NSA breakthroughs don’t totally break public-cryptography — and that’s a very reasonable assumption — it’s pretty easy to stay a few steps ahead of the NSA by using ever-longer keys. We’re already trying to phase out 1024-bit RSA keys in favor of 2048-bit keys. Perhaps we need to jump even further ahead and consider 3072-bit keys. And maybe we should be even more paranoid about elliptic curves and use key lengths above 500 bits.

One last blue-sky possibility: a quantum computer. Quantum computers are still toys in the academic world, but have the theoretical ability to quickly break common public-key algorithms — regardless of key length — and to effectively halve the key length of any symmetric algorithm. I think it extraordinarily unlikely that the NSA has built a quantum computer capable of performing the magnitude of calculation necessary to do this, but it’s possible. The defense is easy, if annoying: stick with symmetric cryptography based on shared secrets, and use 256-bit keys.
bruce-schneier  cryptography  wired  nsa  surveillance  snooping  gchq  cryptanalysis  crypto  future  key-lengths 
september 2013 by jm

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