jm + wired + future   3

25 Years of WIRED Predictions: Why the Future Never Arrives
These early views of the sharing economy were accurate depictions of the moment, but poor visions of the future. Within a few short years, many of those Uber drivers would be stuck paying off their cars in sub-minimum-wage jobs with no benefits. What began as an earnest insight about bits and atoms quickly turned into an arbitrage opportunity for venture capitalists eager to undercut large, lucrative markets by skirting regulations. To meet the growth and monetization demands of investors, yesterday’s sharing economy became today’s gig economy.
advertising  future  technology  futurism  predictions  wired  web2.0  history  1990s  2000s 
21 days ago by jm
Madhumita Venkataramanan: My identity for sale (Wired UK)
If the data aggregators know everything about you -- including biometric data, healthcare history, where you live, where you work, what you do at the weekend, what medicines you take, etc. -- and can track you as an individual, does it really matter that they don't know your _name_? They legally track, and sell, everything else.
As the data we generate about ourselves continues to grow exponentially, brokers and aggregators are moving on from real-time profiling -- they're cross-linking data sets to predict our future behaviour. Decisions about what we see and buy and sign up for aren't made by us any more; they were made long before. The aggregate of what's been collected about us previously -- which is near impossible for us to see in its entirety -- defines us to companies we've never met. What I am giving up without consent, then, is not just my anonymity, but also my right to self-determination and free choice. All I get to keep is my name.
wired  privacy  data-aggregation  identity-theft  future  grim  biometrics  opt-out  healthcare  data  data-protection  tracking 
november 2014 by jm
How Advanced Is the NSA's Cryptanalysis — And Can We Resist It?
Bruce Schneier's suggestions:
Assuming the hypothetical NSA breakthroughs don’t totally break public-cryptography — and that’s a very reasonable assumption — it’s pretty easy to stay a few steps ahead of the NSA by using ever-longer keys. We’re already trying to phase out 1024-bit RSA keys in favor of 2048-bit keys. Perhaps we need to jump even further ahead and consider 3072-bit keys. And maybe we should be even more paranoid about elliptic curves and use key lengths above 500 bits.

One last blue-sky possibility: a quantum computer. Quantum computers are still toys in the academic world, but have the theoretical ability to quickly break common public-key algorithms — regardless of key length — and to effectively halve the key length of any symmetric algorithm. I think it extraordinarily unlikely that the NSA has built a quantum computer capable of performing the magnitude of calculation necessary to do this, but it’s possible. The defense is easy, if annoying: stick with symmetric cryptography based on shared secrets, and use 256-bit keys.
bruce-schneier  cryptography  wired  nsa  surveillance  snooping  gchq  cryptanalysis  crypto  future  key-lengths 
september 2013 by jm

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