jm + vvat   3

How Space Weather Can Influence Elections on Earth - Motherboard
oh, god -- I'm not keen on this take: how's about designing systems that recognise the risks?
"Everything was going fine, but then suddenly, there were an additional 4,000 votes cast. Because it was a local election, which are normally very small, people were surprised and asked, 'how did this happen?'"

The culprit was not voter fraud or hacked machines. It was a single event upset (SEU), a term describing the fallout of an ionizing particle bouncing off a vulnerable node in the machine's register, causing it to flip a bit, and log the additional votes. The Sun may not have been the direct source of the particle—cosmic rays from outside the solar system are also in the mix—but solar-influenced space weather certainly contributes to these SEUs.
bit-flips  science  elections  voting-machines  vvat  belgium  bugs  risks  cosmic-rays 
5 weeks ago by jm
New South Wales Attacks Researchers Who Found Internet Voting Vulnerabilities | Electronic Frontier Foundation
'NSW officials seemed more interested in protecting their reputations than the integrity of elections. They sharply criticized Halderman and Teague, rather than commending them, for their discovery of the FREAK attack vulnerability. The Chief Information Officer of the Electoral Commission, Ian Brightwell, claimed Halderman and Teague’s discovery was part of efforts by “well-funded, well-managed anti-internet voting lobby groups,” an apparent reference to our friends at VerifiedVoting.org, where Halderman and Teague are voluntary Advisory Board members.1 Yet at the same time, Brightwell concluded that it was indeed possible that votes were manipulated.'
freak  security  vulnerabilities  exploits  nsw  australia  internet-voting  vvat  voting  online-voting  eff 
april 2015 by jm
Why dispute resolution is hard
Good stuff (as usual) from Ross Anderson and Stephen Murdoch.

'Today we release a paper on security protocols and evidence which analyses why dispute resolution mechanisms in electronic systems often don’t work very well. On this blog we’ve noted many many problems with EMV (Chip and PIN), as well as other systems from curfew tags to digital tachographs. Time and again we find that electronic systems are truly awful for courts to deal with. Why?
The main reason, we observed, is that their dispute resolution aspects were never properly designed, built and tested. The firms that delivered the main production systems assumed, or hoped, that because some audit data were available, lawyers would be able to use them somehow.
As you’d expect, all sorts of things go wrong. We derive some principles, and show how these are also violated by new systems ranging from phone banking through overlay payments to Bitcoin. We also propose some enhancements to the EMV protocol which would make it easier to resolve disputes over Chip and PIN transactions.'
finance  security  ross-anderson  emv  bitcoin  chip-and-pin  banking  architecture  verification  vvat  logging 
february 2014 by jm

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