jm + verification   3

UK government planning to require age verification for access to porn
This thread has pointed out the unintentional side effect which I hadn't considered: this database of user auth info and their porn habits will be an incredibly valuable target for foreign governments and hackers, and a single foreign porn company owns the AV service they are potentially planning to use for it.

"if they can't find a way to de-link identities from usage, this is a monumental national security risk and it's beyond insane they're even considering it. "Sorry Prime Minister, Russia now knows what porn every MP, civil servant and clearance holder watches and when, and we don't know how much of it they've given to Wikileaks. In retrospect, having the world's most obvious SIGINT target built in PHP and hosted in the Cayman Islands by an uncleared foreign 25 year old working for a porn company probably wasn't the best idea".'
age  verification  porn  uk  politics  censorship  security  national-security  wikileaks  russia 
13 days ago by jm
Combining static model checking with dynamic enforcement using the Statecall Policy Language
This looks quite nice -- a model-checker "for regular programmers". Example model for ping(1):

<pre>01 automaton ping (int max_count, int count, bool can_timeout) {
02 Initialize;
03 during {
04 count = 0;
05 do {
06 Transmit_Ping;
07 either {
08 Receive_Ping;
09 } or (can_timeout) {
10 Timeout_Ping;
11 };
12 count = count + 1;
13 } until (count &gt;= max_count);
14 } handle {
15 SIGINFO;
16 Print_Summary;
17 };</pre>
ping  model-checking  models  formal-methods  verification  static  dynamic  coding  debugging  testing  distcomp  papers 
march 2015 by jm
Why dispute resolution is hard
Good stuff (as usual) from Ross Anderson and Stephen Murdoch.

'Today we release a paper on security protocols and evidence which analyses why dispute resolution mechanisms in electronic systems often don’t work very well. On this blog we’ve noted many many problems with EMV (Chip and PIN), as well as other systems from curfew tags to digital tachographs. Time and again we find that electronic systems are truly awful for courts to deal with. Why?
The main reason, we observed, is that their dispute resolution aspects were never properly designed, built and tested. The firms that delivered the main production systems assumed, or hoped, that because some audit data were available, lawyers would be able to use them somehow.
As you’d expect, all sorts of things go wrong. We derive some principles, and show how these are also violated by new systems ranging from phone banking through overlay payments to Bitcoin. We also propose some enhancements to the EMV protocol which would make it easier to resolve disputes over Chip and PIN transactions.'
finance  security  ross-anderson  emv  bitcoin  chip-and-pin  banking  architecture  verification  vvat  logging 
february 2014 by jm

Copy this bookmark:



description:


tags: