jm + trojans   6

The Target hack and PCI-DSS
Both Heartland Payment Systems and Hannaford Bros. were in fact certified PCI-compliant while the hackers were in their system. In August 2006, Wal-Mart was also certified PCI-compliant while unknown attackers were lurking on its network. [...] “This PCI standard just ain’t working,” says Litan, the Gartner analyst. “I wouldn’t say it’s completely pointless. Because you can’t say security is a bad thing. But they’re trying to patch a really weak [and] insecure payment system [with it].”


Basically, RAM scrapers have been in use in live attacks, sniffing credentials in the clear, since 2007. Ouch.
ram-scrapers  trojans  pins  pci-dss  compliance  security  gartner  walmart  target 
january 2014 by jm
Full iSight report on the Kaptoxa attack on Target
'POS malware is becoming increasingly available to cyber criminals' ... 'there is growing demand for [this kind of malware]'. Watch your credit cards...
debit-cards  credit-cards  security  card-present  attacks  kaptoxa  ram-scrapers  trojans  point-of-sale  pos  malware  target 
january 2014 by jm
The Malware That Duped Target Has Been Found
a Windows 'RAM scraper' trojan known as Trojan.POSRAM, which was used to attack the Windows-based point-of-sales systems which the POS terminals are connected to. part of an operation called Kaptoxa. 'The code is based on a previous malicious tool known as BlackPOS that is believed to have been developed in 2013 in Russia, though the new variant was highly customized to prevent antivirus programs from detecting it' ... 'The tool monitors memory address spaces used by specific programs, such as payment application programs like pos.exe and PosW32.exe that process the data embossed in the magnetic strip of credit and debit cards data. The tool grabs the data from memory.' ... 'The siphoned data is stored on the system, and then every seven hours the malware checks the local time on the compromised system to see if it’s between the hours of 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. If so, it attempts to send the data over a temporary NetBIOS share to an internal host inside the compromised network so the attackers can then extract the data over an FTP ... connection.'

http://www.pcworld.com/article/2088920/target-credit-card-data-was-sent-to-server-in-russia.html says the data was then transmitted to another US-based server, and from there relayed to Russia, and notes: 'At the time of its discovery, Trojan.POSRAM “had a zero percent antivirus detection rate, which means that fully updated antivirus engines on fully patched computers could not identify the software as malicious,” iSight said.'

Massive AV fail.
kaptoxa  trojans  ram-scrapers  trojan.posram  posram  point-of-sale  security  hacks  target  credit-cards  pin  ftp  netbios  smb 
january 2014 by jm
Breakthrough silicon scanning discovers backdoor in military chip [PDF]
Wow, I'd missed this:

This paper is a short summary of the first real world detection of a backdoor in a military grade FPGA. Using an innovative patented technique we were able to detect and analyse in the first documented case of its kind, a backdoor inserted into the Actel/Microsemi ProASIC3 chips for accessing FPGA configuration. The backdoor was
found amongst additional JTAG functionality and exists on the silicon itself, it was not present in any firmware loaded onto the chip. Using Pipeline Emission Analysis (PEA), our pioneered technique, we were able to extract the secret key to activate the backdoor, as well as other security keys such as the AES and the Passkey. This way an attacker can extract all the configuration data from the chip, reprogram crypto and access keys, modify low-level silicon features, access unencrypted configuration bitstream or permanently damage the device. Clearly this
means the device is wide open to intellectual property (IP) theft, fraud, re-programming as well as reverse engineering of the design which allows the introduction of a new backdoor or Trojan. Most concerning, it is
not possible to patch the backdoor in chips already deployed, meaning those using this family of chips have to accept the fact they can be easily compromised or will have to be physically replaced after a redesign of the silicon itself.
chips  hardware  backdoors  security  scanning  pea  jtag  actel  microsemi  silicon  fpga  trojans 
july 2013 by jm
Security Fix - Clampi Trojan: The Rise of Matryoshka Malware
'[Joe] Stewart said the sophistication and stealth of this malware strain has become so bad that it's time for Windows users to start thinking of doing their banking and other sensitive transactions on a dedicated system that is not used for everyday Web surfing.' it's that bad
joe-stewart  secureworks  malware  reverse-engineering  clampi  trojans  banking  security  danger  risks  windows  microsoft  fraud 
august 2009 by jm

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