jm + traffic   7

Cameras as Traffic Cops – Hacker Noon
Guy trains model on NYC traffic camera video to detect blocked bike lanes and bus stops. Estimates "the number of tickets being given represents less than .0001% of infractions". (via lemonodor)
via:lemonodor  future  tickets  traffic  nyc  cameras  surveillance  bike-lanes  bus-stops  traffic-law 
5 days ago by jm
[1801.02780] Rogue Signs: Deceiving Traffic Sign Recognition with Malicious Ads and Logos
Well, so much for that idea.
We propose a new real-world attack against the computer vision based systems of autonomous vehicles (AVs). Our novel Sign Embedding attack exploits the concept of adversarial examples to modify innocuous signs and advertisements in the environment such that they are classified as the adversary's desired traffic sign with high confidence. Our attack greatly expands the scope of the threat posed to AVs since adversaries are no longer restricted to just modifying existing traffic signs as in previous work. Our attack pipeline generates adversarial samples which are robust to the environmental conditions and noisy image transformations present in the physical world. We ensure this by including a variety of possible image transformations in the optimization problem used to generate adversarial samples. We verify the robustness of the adversarial samples by printing them out and carrying out drive-by tests simulating the conditions under which image capture would occur in a real-world scenario. We experimented with physical attack samples for different distances, lighting conditions, and camera angles. In addition, extensive evaluations were carried out in the virtual setting for a variety of image transformations. The adversarial samples generated using our method have adversarial success rates in excess of 95% in the physical as well as virtual settings.
signs  road-safety  roads  traffic  self-driving-cars  cars  avs  security  machine-learning  computer-vision  ai 
10 weeks ago by jm
Collision Course: Why This Type Of Road Junction Will Keep Killing Cyclists
This aspect of road design had never occurred to me, but once explained it makes sense. Great article on the design of an oblique crossroads junction and how it's unexpectedly dangerous due to human factors and car design.
“Human error” may be real, but so are techniques to mitigate or eliminate its effects — and driver training is poor when it comes to equipping people with those techniques, let alone habituating them. (And let alone reviewing knowledge of those techniques every few years.)
cars  cycling  road-safety  safety  accidents  traffic  junctions  road-design  design  human-error  human-factors 
10 weeks ago by jm
Floating car data
Floating car data (FCD), also known as floating cellular data, is a method to determine the traffic speed on the road network. It is based on the collection of localization data, speed, direction of travel and time information from mobile phones in vehicles that are being driven. These data are the essential source for traffic information and for most intelligent transportation systems (ITS). This means that every vehicle with an active mobile phone acts as a sensor for the road network. Based on these data, traffic congestion can be identified, travel times can be calculated, and traffic reports can be rapidly generated. In contrast to traffic cameras, number plate recognition systems, and induction loops embedded in the roadway, no additional hardware on the road network is necessary.
surveillance  cars  driving  mobile-phones  phones  travel  gsm  monitoring  anpr  alpr  traffic 
november 2015 by jm
Ironman 70.3 Road Closures
plenty of stuff out of bounds in Dublin tomoz
dublin  races  ironman  roads  traffic 
august 2015 by jm
Self-driving cars drive like your grandma
'Honestly, I don't think it will take long for other drivers to realize that self-driving cars are "easy targets" in traffic.' -- also, an insurance expert suggests that self-driving cars won't increase premiums
driving  google  cars  traffic  social  insurance 
july 2015 by jm
One of CloudFlare's upstream providers on the "death of the internet" scare-mongering
Having a bad day on the Internet is nothing new. These are the types
of events we deal with on a regular basis, and most large network
operators are very good at responding quickly to deal with situations like
this. In our case, we worked with Cloudflare to quickly identify the
attack profile, rolled out global filters on our network to limit the
attack traffic without adversely impacting legitimate users, and worked
with our other partner networks (like NTT) to do the same. If the attacks
had stopped here, nobody in the "mainstream media" would have noticed, and
it would have been just another fun day for a few geeks on the Internet.

The next part is where things got interesting, and is the part that nobody
outside of extremely technical circles has actually bothered to try and
understand yet. After attacking Cloudflare and their upstream Internet
providers directly stopped having the desired effect, the attackers turned
to any other interconnection point they could find, and stumbled upon
Internet Exchange Points like LINX (in London), AMS-IX (in Amsterdam), and
DEC-IX (in Frankfurt), three of the largest IXPs in the world. An IXP is
an "interconnection fabric", or essentially just a large switched LAN,
which acts as a common meeting point for different networks to connect and
exchange traffic with each other. One downside to the way this
architecture works is that there is a single big IP block used at each of
these IXPs, where every network who interconnects is given 1 IP address,
and this IP block CAN be globally routable. When the attackers stumbled
upon this, probably by accident, it resulted in a lot of bogus traffic
being injected into the IXP fabrics in an unusual way, until the IXP
operators were able to work with everyone to make certain the IXP IP
blocks weren't being globally re-advertised.

Note that the vast majority of global Internet traffic does NOT travel
over IXPs, but rather goes via direct private interconnections between
specific networks. The IXP traffic represents more of the "long tail" of
Internet traffic exchange, a larger number of smaller networks, which
collectively still adds up to be a pretty big chunk of traffic. So, what
you actually saw in this attack was a larger number of smaller networks
being affected by something which was an completely unrelated and
unintended side-effect of the actual attacks, and thus *poof* you have the
recipe for a lot of people talking about it. :)

Hopefully that clears up a bit of the situation.
bandwidth  internet  gizmodo  traffic  cloudflare  ddos  hacking 
march 2013 by jm

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