jm + smartcards   5

Estonia sues Gemalto for 152 mln euros over ID card flaws
Estonia’s Police and Border Guard Board (PPA) said in a statement Gemalto had created private key codes for individual cards, leaving the government IDs vulnerable to external cyber attack, rather than embedding it on the card’s chip as promised. “It turned out that our partner had violated this principle for years, and we see this as a very serious breach of contract,” PPA’s deputy director-general Krista Aas said in the statement.


If true, this is a big problem...
gemalto  fail  security  smartcards  estonia  chip-cards 
10 weeks ago by jm
How a criminal ring defeated the secure chip-and-PIN credit cards | Ars Technica
Ingenious --
The stolen cards were still considered evidence, so the researchers couldn’t do a full tear-down or run any tests that would alter the data on the card, so they used X-ray scans to look at where the chip cards had been tampered with. They also analyzed the way the chips distributed electricity when in use and used read-only programs to see what information the cards sent to a Point of Sale (POS) terminal.

According to the paper, the fraudsters were able to perform a man-in-the-middle attack by programming a second hobbyist chip called a FUN card to accept any PIN entry, and soldering that chip onto the card’s original chip. This increased the thickness of the chip from 0.4mm to 0.7mm, "making insertion into a PoS somewhat uneasy but perfectly feasible,” the researchers write. [....]

The researchers explain that a typical EMV transaction involves three steps: card authentication, cardholder verification, and then transaction authorization. During a transaction using one of the altered cards, the original chip was allowed to respond with the card authentication as normal. Then, during card holder authentication, the POS system would ask for a user’s PIN, the thief would respond with any PIN, and the FUN card would step in and send the POS the code indicating that it was ok to proceed with the transaction because the PIN checked out. During the final transaction authentication phase, the FUN card would relay the transaction data between the POS and the original chip, sending the issuing bank an authorization request cryptogram which the card issuer uses to tell the POS system whether to accept the transaction or not.
security  chip-and-pin  hacking  pos  emv  transactions  credit-cards  debit-cards  hardware  chips  pin  fun-cards  smartcards 
october 2015 by jm
The Great SIM Heist: How Spies Stole the Keys to the Encryption Castle
Holy shit. Gemalto totally rooted.
With [Gemalto's] stolen encryption keys, intelligence agencies can monitor mobile communications without seeking or receiving approval from telecom companies and foreign governments. Possessing the keys also sidesteps the need to get a warrant or a wiretap, while leaving no trace on the wireless provider’s network that the communications were intercepted. Bulk key theft additionally enables the intelligence agencies to unlock any previously encrypted communications they had already intercepted, but did not yet have the ability to decrypt.

[...] According to one secret GCHQ slide, the British intelligence agency penetrated Gemalto’s internal networks, planting malware on several computers, giving GCHQ secret access. We “believe we have their entire network,” the slide’s author boasted about the operation against Gemalto.
encryption  security  crypto  nsa  gchq  gemalto  smartcards  sim-cards  privacy  surveillance  spying 
february 2015 by jm
Rooting SIM cards
the details of Karsten Nohl's attack against SIM cards, allowing remote-root malware via SMS.
Cracking SIM update keys: [Over The Air] commands, such as software updates, are cryptographically-secured SMS messages, which are delivered directly to the SIM. While the option exists to use state-of-the-art AES or the somewhat outdated 3DES algorithm for OTA, many (if not most) SIM cards still rely on the 70s-era DES cipher. [...] To derive a DES OTA key, an attacker starts by sending a binary SMS to a target device. The SIM does not execute the improperly signed OTA command, but does in many cases respond to the attacker with an error code carrying a cryptographic signature, once again sent over binary SMS. A rainbow table resolves this plaintext-signature tuple to a 56-bit DES key within two minutes on a standard computer.


2 minutes. Sic transit gloria DES. The next step after that is to send a signed request to run a Java applet, then exploit a hole in the JVM sandbox, and the SIM card is rooted.

Looking forward to the full paper on July 31st...
des  3des  crypto  security  sms  sim-cards  smartcards  java  applets  ota  rainbow-tables  cracking  karsten-nohl 
july 2013 by jm
Chip and Skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack
Worrying stuff from the LBT team. ATM RNGs are predictable, and can be spoofed by intermediate parties:

'So far we have performed more than 1000 transactions at more than 20 ATMs and a number of POS terminals, and are collating a data set for statistical analysis. We have developed a passive transaction logger which can be integrated into the substrate of a real bank card, which records up to 100 unpredictable numbers in its EEPROM. Our analysis is ongoing but so far we have established non-uniformity of unpredictable numbers in half of the ATMs we have looked at.

First, there is an easier attack than predicting the RNG. Since the unpredictable number is generated by the terminal but the relying party is the issuing bank, any intermediate party – from POS terminal software, to payment switches, or a middleman on the phone line – can intercept and superimpose their own choice of UN. Attacks such as those of Nohl and Roth, and MWR Labs show that POS terminals can be remotely hacked simply by inserting a sabotaged smartcard into the terminal.
atm  banking  security  attack  prngs  spoofing  banks  chip-and-pin  emv  smartcards 
september 2012 by jm

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