jm + security   164

Open Crypto Audit Project: TrueCrypt
phase I, a source code audit by iSEC Partners, is now complete. Bruce Schneier says: "I'm still using it".
encryption  security  crypto  truecrypt  audits  source-code  isec  matthew-green 
yesterday by jm
Akamai's "Secure Heap" patch wasn't good enough
'Having the private keys inaccessible is a good defense in depth move.
For this patch to work you have to make sure all sensitive values are stored in
the secure area, not just check that the area looks inaccessible. You can't do
that by keeping the private key in the same process. A review by a security
engineer would have prevented a false sense of security. A version where the
private key and the calculations are in a separate process would be more
secure. If you decide to write that version, I'll gladly see if I can break
that too.'

Akamai's response: https://blogs.akamai.com/2014/04/heartbleed-update-v3.html -- to their credit, they recognise that they need to take further action.

(via Tony Finch)
via:fanf  cryptography  openssl  heartbleed  akamai  security  ssl  tls 
yesterday by jm
Of Money, Responsibility, and Pride
Steve Marquess of the OpenSSL Foundation on their funding, and lack thereof:
I stand in awe of their talent and dedication, that of Stephen Henson in particular. It takes nerves of steel to work for many years on hundreds of thousands of lines of very complex code, with every line of code you touch visible to the world, knowing that code is used by banks, firewalls, weapons systems, web sites, smart phones, industry, government, everywhere. Knowing that you’ll be ignored and unappreciated until something goes wrong. The combination of the personality to handle that kind of pressure with the relevant technical skills and experience to effectively work on such software is a rare commodity, and those who have it are likely to already be a valued, well-rewarded, and jealously guarded resource of some company or worthy cause. For those reasons OpenSSL will always be undermanned, but the present situation can and should be improved. There should be at least a half dozen full time OpenSSL team members, not just one, able to concentrate on the care and feeding of OpenSSL without having to hustle commercial work. If you’re a corporate or government decision maker in a position to do something about it, give it some thought. Please. I’m getting old and weary and I’d like to retire someday.
funding  open-source  openssl  heartbleed  internet  security  money 
2 days ago by jm
When two-factor authentication is not enough
Fastmail.FM nearly had their domain stolen through an attack exploiting missing 2FA authentication in Gandi.
An important lesson learned is that just because a provider has a checkbox labelled “2 factor authentication” in their feature list, the two factors may not be protecting everything – and they may not even realise that fact themselves. Security risks always come on the unexpected paths – the “off label” uses that you didn’t think about, and the subtle interaction of multiple features which are useful and correct in isolation.
gandi  2fa  fastmail  authentication  security  mfa  two-factor-authentication  mail 
2 days ago by jm
Cloudflare demonstrate Heartbleed key extraction
from nginx. 'Based on the findings, we recommend everyone reissue + revoke their private keys.'
security  nginx  heartbleed  ssl  tls  exploits  private-keys 
2 days ago by jm
Why no SSL ? — Varnish version 4.0.0 documentation
Poul-Henning Kemp details why Varnish doesn't do SSL -- basically due to the quality and complexity of open-source SSL implementations:
There is no other way we can guarantee that secret krypto-bits do not leak anywhere they should not, than by fencing in the code that deals with them in a child process, so the bulk of varnish never gets anywhere near the certificates, not even during a core-dump.


Now looking pretty smart, post-Heartbleed.
ssl  tls  varnish  open-source  poul-henning-kemp  https  http  proxies  security  coding 
3 days ago by jm
Does the heartbleed vulnerability affect clients as severely?
'Yes, clients are vulnerable to attack. A malicious server can use the Heartbleed vulnerability to compromise an affected client.'

Ouch.
openssl  ssl  security  heartbleed  exploits  tls  https 
6 days ago by jm
Mark McLoughlin on Heartbleed
An excellent list of aspects of the Heartbleed OpenSSL bug which need to be thought about/talked about/considered
heartbleed  openssl  bugs  exploits  security  ssl  tls  web  https 
6 days ago by jm
LastPass Sentry Warns You When Your Online Accounts Have Been Breached
This is a brilliant feature. It just sent a warning to a friend about an old account he was no longer using
lastpass  security  passwords  hacking  accounts 
15 days ago by jm
Florida cops used IMSI catchers over 200 times without a warrant
Harris is the leading maker of [IMSI catchers aka "stingrays"] in the U.S., and the ACLU has long suspected that the company has been loaning the devices to police departments throughout the state for product testing and promotional purposes. As the court document notes in the 2008 case, “the Tallahassee Police Department is not the owner of the equipment.”

The ACLU now suspects these police departments may have all signed non-disclosure agreements with the vendor and used the agreement to avoid disclosing their use of the equipment to courts. “The police seem to have interpreted the agreement to bar them even from revealing their use of Stingrays to judges, who we usually rely on to provide oversight of police investigations,” the ACLU writes.
aclu  police  stingrays  imsi-catchers  privacy  cellphones  mobile-phones  security  wired 
5 weeks ago by jm
ImperialViolet - Apple's SSL/TLS bug
as we all know by now, a misplaced "goto fail" caused a critical, huge security flaw in versions of IOS and OSX SSL, since late 2012.

Lessons:

1. unit test the failure cases, particularly for critical security code!
2. use braces.
3. dead-code analysis would have caught this.

I'm not buying the "goto considered harmful" line, though, since any kind of control flow structure would have had the same problem.
coding  apple  osx  ios  crypto  ssl  security  goto-fail  goto  fail  unit-testing  coding-standards 
7 weeks ago by jm
Belkin managed to put their firmware update private key in the distribution
'The firmware updates are encrypted using GPG, which is intended to prevent this issue. Unfortunately, Belkin misuses the GPG asymmetric encryption functionality, forcing it to distribute the firmware-signing key within the WeMo firmware image. Most likely, Belkin intended to use the symmetric encryption with a signature and a shared public key ring. Attackers could leverage the current implementation to easily sign firmware images.'

Using GPG to sign your firmware updates: yay. Accidentally leaving the private key in the distribution: sad trombone.
fail  wemo  belkin  firmware  embedded-systems  security  updates  distribution  gpg  crypto  public-key  pki  home-automation  ioactive 
8 weeks ago by jm
Why dispute resolution is hard
Good stuff (as usual) from Ross Anderson and Stephen Murdoch.

'Today we release a paper on security protocols and evidence which analyses why dispute resolution mechanisms in electronic systems often don’t work very well. On this blog we’ve noted many many problems with EMV (Chip and PIN), as well as other systems from curfew tags to digital tachographs. Time and again we find that electronic systems are truly awful for courts to deal with. Why?
The main reason, we observed, is that their dispute resolution aspects were never properly designed, built and tested. The firms that delivered the main production systems assumed, or hoped, that because some audit data were available, lawyers would be able to use them somehow.
As you’d expect, all sorts of things go wrong. We derive some principles, and show how these are also violated by new systems ranging from phone banking through overlay payments to Bitcoin. We also propose some enhancements to the EMV protocol which would make it easier to resolve disputes over Chip and PIN transactions.'
finance  security  ross-anderson  emv  bitcoin  chip-and-pin  banking  architecture  verification  vvat  logging 
8 weeks ago by jm
193_Cellxion_Brochure_UGX Series 330
The Cellxion UGX Series 330 is a 'transportable Dual GSM/Triple UMTS Firewall and Analysis Tool' -- ie. an IMSI catcher in a briefcase, capable of catching IMSI/IMEIs in 3G. It even supports configurable signal strength. Made in the UK
cellxion  imsi-catchers  imei  surveillance  gsocgate  gsm  3g  mobile-phones  security  spying 
8 weeks ago by jm
Why Mt. Gox is full of shit
leading Bitcoin exchange "Magic The Gatherine Online Exchange" turns out to suffer from crappy code, surprise:
why does Mt. Gox experience this issue? They run a custom Bitcoin daemon, with a custom implementation of the Bitcoin protocol. Their implementation, against all advice, does rely on the transaction ID, which makes this attack possible. They have actually been warned about it months ago by gmaxwell, and have apparently decided to ignore this warning. In other words, this is not a vulnerability in the Bitcoin protocol, but an implementation error in Mt. Gox' custom Bitcoin software.


The rest of the article is eyeopening, including the MySQL injection vulnerabilities and failure to correctly secure a Prolexic-defended server.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7211286 has some other shocking reports of Bitcoin operators being incompetent, including 'Bitomat, the incompetent exchange that deleted their own [sole] amazon instance accidentally which contained all their keys, and thus customer funds'. wtfbbq
mtgox  security  bitcoin  standards  omgwtfbbq  via:hn  bitomat 
9 weeks ago by jm
QuakeNet IRC Network- Article - PRESS RELEASE: IRC NETWORKS UNDER SYSTEMATIC ATTACK FROM GOVERNMENTS
QuakeNet are not happy about GCHQ's DDoS attacks against them.
Yesterday we learned ... that GCHQ, the British intelligence agency, are performing persistent social and technological attacks against IRC networks. These attacks are performed without informing the networks and are targeted at users associated with politically motivated movements such as "Anonymous". While QuakeNet does not condone or endorse and actively forbids any illegal activity on its servers we encourage discussion on all topics including political and social commentary. It is apparent now that engaging in such topics with an opinion contrary to that of the intelligence agencies is sufficient to make people a target for monitoring, coercion and denial of access to communications platforms. The ... documents depict GCHQ operatives engaging in social engineering of IRC users to entrap themselves by encouraging the target to leak details about their location as well as wholesale attacks on the IRC servers hosting the network. These attacks bring down the IRC network entirely affecting every user on the network as well as the company hosting the server. The collateral damage and numbers of innocent people and companies affected by these forms of attack can be huge and it is highly illegal in many jurisdictions including the UK under the Computer Misuse Act.
quakenet  ddos  security  gchq  irc  anonymous 
9 weeks ago by jm
Target Hackers Broke in Via HVAC Company
Avivah Litan, a fraud analyst with Gartner Inc., said that although the current PCI standard does not require organizations to maintain separate networks for payment and non-payment operations (page 7), it does require merchants to incorporate two-factor authentication for remote network access originating from outside the network by personnel and all third parties.


Target shared the same network for outside contractor access and the critical POS devices. fail. (via Joe Feise)
via:joe-feise  hvac  contractors  fraud  malware  2fa  security  networking  payment  pci 
9 weeks ago by jm
A looming breakthrough in indistinguishability obfuscation
'The team’s obfuscator works by transforming a computer program into what Sahai calls a “multilinear jigsaw puzzle.” Each piece of the program gets obfuscated by mixing in random elements that are carefully chosen so that if you run the garbled program in the intended way, the randomness cancels out and the pieces fit together to compute the correct output. But if you try to do anything else with the program, the randomness makes each individual puzzle piece look meaningless. This obfuscation scheme is unbreakable, the team showed, provided that a certain newfangled problem about lattices is as hard to solve as the team thinks it is. Time will tell if this assumption is warranted, but the scheme has already resisted several attempts to crack it, and Sahai, Barak and Garg, together with Yael Tauman Kalai of Microsoft Research New England and Omer Paneth of Boston University, have proved that the most natural types of attacks on the system are guaranteed to fail. And the hard lattice problem, though new, is closely related to a family of hard problems that have stood up to testing and are used in practical encryption schemes.'

(via Tony Finch)
obfuscation  cryptography  via:fanf  security  hard-lattice-problem  crypto  science 
9 weeks ago by jm
GCHQ slide claiming that they DDoS'd anonymous' IRC servers
Mikko Hypponen: "This makes British Government the only Western government known to have launched DDoS attacks."
ddos  history  security  gchq  dos  anonymous  irc  hacking 
10 weeks ago by jm
Chinese Internet Traffic Redirected to Small Wyoming House
'That address — which is home to some 2,000 companies on paper — was the subject of a lengthy 2011 Reuters investigation that found that among the entities registered to the address were a shell company controlled by a jailed former Ukraine prime minister; the owner of a company charged with helping online poker operators evade an Internet gambling ban; and one entity that was banned from government contracts after selling counterfeit truck parts to the Pentagon.'
china  internet  great-firewall  dns  wyoming  attacks  security  not-the-onion 
11 weeks ago by jm
More than 50% of Irish companies have "suffered a data breach" in 2013
The research, conducted among hundreds of Irish companies' IT managers by the Irish Computer Society, reveals that 51 per cent of Irish firms have suffered a data breach over the last year, a jump on 43 per cent recorded in 2012.


Wow, that's high.
hacking  security  ireland  ics  data-breaches 
12 weeks ago by jm
The Target hack and PCI-DSS
Both Heartland Payment Systems and Hannaford Bros. were in fact certified PCI-compliant while the hackers were in their system. In August 2006, Wal-Mart was also certified PCI-compliant while unknown attackers were lurking on its network. [...] “This PCI standard just ain’t working,” says Litan, the Gartner analyst. “I wouldn’t say it’s completely pointless. Because you can’t say security is a bad thing. But they’re trying to patch a really weak [and] insecure payment system [with it].”


Basically, RAM scrapers have been in use in live attacks, sniffing credentials in the clear, since 2007. Ouch.
ram-scrapers  trojans  pins  pci-dss  compliance  security  gartner  walmart  target 
12 weeks ago by jm
Full iSight report on the Kaptoxa attack on Target
'POS malware is becoming increasingly available to cyber criminals' ... 'there is growing demand for [this kind of malware]'. Watch your credit cards...
debit-cards  credit-cards  security  card-present  attacks  kaptoxa  ram-scrapers  trojans  point-of-sale  pos  malware  target 
12 weeks ago by jm
The Malware That Duped Target Has Been Found
a Windows 'RAM scraper' trojan known as Trojan.POSRAM, which was used to attack the Windows-based point-of-sales systems which the POS terminals are connected to. part of an operation called Kaptoxa. 'The code is based on a previous malicious tool known as BlackPOS that is believed to have been developed in 2013 in Russia, though the new variant was highly customized to prevent antivirus programs from detecting it' ... 'The tool monitors memory address spaces used by specific programs, such as payment application programs like pos.exe and PosW32.exe that process the data embossed in the magnetic strip of credit and debit cards data. The tool grabs the data from memory.' ... 'The siphoned data is stored on the system, and then every seven hours the malware checks the local time on the compromised system to see if it’s between the hours of 10 a.m. and 5 p.m. If so, it attempts to send the data over a temporary NetBIOS share to an internal host inside the compromised network so the attackers can then extract the data over an FTP ... connection.'

http://www.pcworld.com/article/2088920/target-credit-card-data-was-sent-to-server-in-russia.html says the data was then transmitted to another US-based server, and from there relayed to Russia, and notes: 'At the time of its discovery, Trojan.POSRAM “had a zero percent antivirus detection rate, which means that fully updated antivirus engines on fully patched computers could not identify the software as malicious,” iSight said.'

Massive AV fail.
kaptoxa  trojans  ram-scrapers  trojan.posram  posram  point-of-sale  security  hacks  target  credit-cards  pin  ftp  netbios  smb 
12 weeks ago by jm
How an emulator-fueled robot reprogrammed Super Mario World on the fly
Suffice it to say that the first minute-and-a-half or so of this [speedrun] is merely an effort to spawn a specific set of sprites into the game's Object Attribute Memory (OAM) buffer in a specific order. The TAS runner then uses a stun glitch to spawn an unused sprite into the game, which in turn causes the system to treat the sprites in that OAM buffer as raw executable code. In this case, that code has been arranged to jump to the memory location for controller data, in essence letting the user insert whatever executable program he or she wants into memory by converting the binary data for precisely ordered button presses into assembly code (interestingly, this data is entered more quickly by simulating the inputs of eight controllers plugged in through simulated multitaps on each controller port).


oh. my. god. This is utterly bananas.
games  hacking  omgwtfbbq  hacks  buffer-overrun  super-mario  snes  security 
january 2014 by jm
Bruce Schneier and Matt Blaze on TAO's Methods
An important point:
As scarily impressive as [NSA's TAO] implant catalog is, it's targeted. We can argue about how it should be targeted -- who counts as a "bad guy" and who doesn't -- but it's much better than the NSA's collecting cell phone location data on everyone on the planet. The more we can deny the NSA the ability to do broad wholesale surveillance on everyone, and force them to do targeted surveillance in individuals and organizations, the safer we all are.
nsa  tao  security  matt-blaze  bruce-schneier  surveillance  tempest 
january 2014 by jm
On Hacking MicroSD Cards
incredible stuff from Bunnie Huang:
Today at the Chaos Computer Congress (30C3), xobs and I disclosed a finding that some SD cards contain vulnerabilities that allow arbitrary code execution — on the memory card itself. On the dark side, code execution on the memory card enables a class of MITM (man-in-the-middle) attacks, where the card seems to be behaving one way, but in fact it does something else. On the light side, it also enables the possibility for hardware enthusiasts to gain access to a very cheap and ubiquitous source of microcontrollers.
security  memory  hacking  hardware  ccc  sd-cards  memory-cards 
december 2013 by jm
xelerance/xl2tpd · GitHub
IRR-recommended self-hosted VPN endpoint implementation
vpn  l2tp  tunneling  internet  privacy  security  xl2tpd  xelerance  via:irr 
december 2013 by jm
SkyJack - autonomous drone hacking
Samy Kamkar strikes again. 'Using a Parrot AR.Drone 2, a Raspberry Pi, a USB battery, an Alfa AWUS036H wireless transmitter, aircrack-ng, node-ar-drone, node.js, and my SkyJack software, I developed a drone that flies around, seeks the wireless signal of any other drone in the area, forcefully disconnects the wireless connection of the true owner of the target drone, then authenticates with the target drone pretending to be its owner, then feeds commands to it and all other possessed zombie drones at my will.'
drones  amazon  hacking  security  samy-kamkar  aircrack  node  raspberry-pi  airborne-zombies 
december 2013 by jm
Who Is Watching the Watch Lists? - NYTimes.com
it might seem that current efforts to identify and track potential terrorists would be approached with caution. Yet the federal government’s main terrorist watch list has grown to at least 700,000 people, with little scrutiny over how the determinations are made or the impact on those marked with the terrorist label.
“If you’ve done the paperwork correctly, then you can effectively enter someone onto the watch list,” said Anya Bernstein, an associate professor at the SUNY Buffalo Law School and author of “The Hidden Costs of Terrorist Watch Lists,” published by the Buffalo Law Review in May. “There’s no indication that agencies undertake any kind of regular retrospective review to assess how good they are at predicting the conduct they’re targeting.”

terrorism  watchlists  blacklists  filtering  safety  air-travel  government  security  dhs  travel 
december 2013 by jm
Newegg trial: Crypto legend takes the stand, goes for knockout patent punch | Ars Technica

"We've heard a good bit in this courtroom about public key encryption," said Albright. "Are you familiar with that?

"Yes, I am," said Diffie, in what surely qualified as the biggest understatement of the trial.

"And how is it that you're familiar with public key encryption?"

"I invented it."


(via burritojustice)
crypto  tech  security  patents  swpats  pki  whitfield-diffie  history  east-texas  newegg  patent-trolls 
november 2013 by jm
The New Threat: Targeted Internet Traffic Misdirection
MITM attacks via BGP route hijacking now relatively commonplace on the internet, with 60 cases observed so far this year by Renesys
bgp  mitm  internet  security  routing  attacks  hijacking 
november 2013 by jm
Software Detection of Currency
Steven J. Murdoch presents some interesting results indicating that the EURion constellation may have been obsoleted:
Recent printers, scanners and image manipulation software identify images of currency, will not process the image and display an error message linking to www.rulesforuse.org. The detection algorithm is not disclosed, however it is possible to test sample images as to whether they are identified as currency. This webpage shows an initial analysis of the algorithm's properties, based on results from the automated generation and testing of images. [...]

Initially it was thought that the "Eurion constellation" was used to identify banknotes in the newly deployed software based system, since this has been confirmed to be the technique used by colour photocopiers, and was both necessary and sufficient to prevent an item being duplicated using the photocopier tested. However further investigation showed that the detection performed by software is different from the system used in colour photocopiers, and the Eurion constellation is neither necessary nor sufficent, and in fact it probably is not even a factor.
eurion  algorithms  photoshop  security  currency  money  euro  copying  obscurity  reversing 
november 2013 by jm
Mike Hearn - Google+ - The packet capture shown in these new NSA slides shows…
The packet capture shown in these new NSA slides shows internal database replication traffic for the anti-hacking system I worked on for over two years. Specifically, it shows a database recording a user login.


This kind of confirms my theory that the majority of interesting traffic for the NSA/GCHQ MUSCULAR sniffing system would have been inter-DC replication. Was, since it sounds like that stuff's all changing now to use end-to-end crypto...
google  crypto  security  muscular  nsa  gchq  mike-hearn  replication  sniffing  spying  surveillance 
november 2013 by jm
Metropolitan police detained David Miranda for promoting 'political' causes | World news | The Observer
"We assess that Miranda is knowingly carrying material [...] the disclosure or threat of disclosure is designed to influence a government, and is made for the purpose of promoting a political or ideological cause. This therefore falls within the definition of terrorism."
security  david-miranda  journalism  censorship  terrorism  the-guardian 
november 2013 by jm
Russia: Hidden chips 'launch malware attacks from irons'
Cyber criminals are planting chips in electric irons and kettles to launch spam [jm: actually, malware] attacks, reports in Russia suggest. State-owned channel Rossiya 24 even showed footage of a technician opening up an iron included in a batch of Chinese imports to find a "spy chip" with what he called "a little microphone". Its correspondent said the hidden devices were mostly being used to spread viruses, by connecting to any computer within a 200m (656ft) radius which were using unprotected Wi-Fi networks. Other products found to have rogue components reportedly included mobile phones and car dashboard cameras.
wifi  viruses  spam  malware  security  russia  china  toasters  kettles  appliances 
october 2013 by jm
Experian Sold Consumer Data to ID Theft Service
This is what happens when you don't have strong controls on data protection/data privacy -- the US experience.
While [posing as a US-based private investigator] may have gotten the [Vietnam-based gang operating the massive identity fraud site Superget.info] past Experian and/or CourtVentures’ screening process, according to Martin there were other signs that should have alerted Experian to potential fraud associated with the account. For example, Martin said the Secret Service told him that the alleged proprietor of Superget.info had paid Experian for his monthly data access charges using wire transfers sent from Singapore.

“The issue in my mind was the fact that this went on for almost a year after Experian did their due diligence and purchased” Court Ventures, Martin said. “Why didn’t they question cash wires coming in every month? Experian portrays themselves as the data-breach experts, and they sell identity theft protection services. How this could go on without them detecting it I don’t know. Our agreement with them was that our information was to be used for fraud prevention and ID verification, and was only to be sold to licensed and credentialed U.S. businesses, not to someone overseas.”


via Simon McGarr
via:tupp_ed  privacy  security  crime  data-protection  data-privacy  experian  data-breaches  courtventures  superget  scams  fraud  identity  identity-theft 
october 2013 by jm
Schneier on Security: Air Gaps
interesting discussion in the comments. "Patricia"'s process is particularly hair-raisingly complex, involving 3 separate machines and a multitude of VMs
air-gaps  security  networking  bruce-schneier  via:adulau 
october 2013 by jm
Reverse Engineering a D-Link Backdoor
Using the correct User-Agent: string, all auth is bypassed on several released models of D-Link and Planex routers. Horrific fail by D-Link
d-link  security  backdoors  authorization  reversing  planex  networking  routers 
october 2013 by jm
Attacking Tor: how the NSA targets users' online anonymity
As part of the Turmoil system, the NSA places secret servers, codenamed Quantum, at key places on the internet backbone. This placement ensures that they can react faster than other websites can. By exploiting that speed difference, these servers can impersonate a visited website to the target before the legitimate website can respond, thereby tricking the target's browser to visit a Foxacid server.


whoa, I missed this before.
nsa  gchq  packet-injection  attacks  security  backbone  http  latency 
october 2013 by jm
Edward Snowden's E-Mail Provider Defied FBI Demands to Turn Over SSL Keys, Documents Show
Levison lost [in secret court against the government's order]. In a work-around, Levison complied the next day by turning over the private SSL keys as an 11 page printout in 4-point type. The government called the printout “illegible” and the court ordered Levison to provide a more useful electronic copy.


Nice try though! Bottom line is they demanded the SSL private key. (via Waxy)
government  privacy  security  ssl  tls  crypto  fbi  via:waxy  secrecy  snooping 
october 2013 by jm
Fingerprints are Usernames, not Passwords
I could see some value, perhaps, in a tablet that I share with my wife, where each of us have our own accounts, with independent configurations, apps, and settings.  We could each conveniently identify ourselves by our fingerprint.  But biometrics cannot, and absolutely must not, be used to authenticate an identity.  For authentication, you need a password or passphrase.  Something that can be independently chosen, changed, and rotated. [...] Once your fingerprint is compromised (and, yes, it almost certainly already is, if you've crossed an international border or registered for a driver's license in most US states), how do you change it?  Are you starting to see why this is a really bad idea?
biometrics  apple  security  fingerprints  passwords  authentication  authorization  identity 
october 2013 by jm
The Best Bike Lock
Interviews with 2 New York bike thieves (one bottom feeder, one professional), reviewing the current batch of bicycle locks. Summary: U-locks are good, when used correctly, particularly the Kryptonite New York Lock ($80). On the other hand, Dublin's recent spate of thefts are largely driven by wide availability of battery-powered angle grinders (thanks Lidl!), which, according to this article, are relatively quiet and extremely fast. :(
bike  review  locks  cycling  u-locks  theft  security 
october 2013 by jm
RSA warns developers not to use RSA products
In case you're missing the story here, Dual_EC_DRBG (which I wrote about yesterday) is the random number generator voted most likely to be backdoored by the NSA. The story here is that -- despite many valid concerns about this generator -- RSA went ahead and made it the default generator used for all cryptography in its flagship cryptography library. The implications for RSA and RSA-based products are staggering. In a modestly bad but by no means worst case, the NSA may be able to intercept SSL/TLS connections made by products implemented with BSafe.
bsafe  rsa  crypto  backdoors  nsa  security  dual_ec_drbg  rngs  randomness 
september 2013 by jm
Biometric authentication failing in Mysore
Biometrics was rolled out for food distribution in order to cut down on fraud, but it's now resulting in a subset of users being unable to authenticate:
The biometric authentication system installed at the PDS outlets fails to establish the identity of many genuine beneficiaries, mostly workers, as their daily grind in the agricultural fields, construction sites or as domestic help have eroded the lines on their thumb resulting in distorted impressions.
fail  risks  biometrics  authentication  mysore  security  india  fingerprinting 
september 2013 by jm
Former NSA and CIA director says terrorists love using Gmail
At one point, Hayden expressed a distaste for online anonymity, saying "The problem I have with the Internet is that it's anonymous." But he noted, there is a struggle over that issue even inside government. The issue came to a head during the Arab Spring movement when the State Department was funding technology [presumably Tor?] to protect the anonymity of activists so governments could not track down or repress their voices.

"We have a very difficult time with this," Hayden said. He then asked, "is our vision of the World Wide Web the global digital commons -- at this point you should see butterflies flying here and soft background meadow-like music -- or a global free fire zone?" Given that Hayden also compared the Internet to the wild west and Somalia, Hayden clearly leans toward the "global free fire zone" vision of the Internet.


well, that's a good analogy for where we're going -- a global free-fire zone.
gmail  cia  nsa  surveillance  michael-hayden  security  snooping  law  tor  arab-spring 
september 2013 by jm
Good SSL for your website is absurdly difficult in practice
Yet again, security software fails on packaging and UI. via Tony Finch
security  ssl  tls  packaging  via:fanf 
september 2013 by jm
FBI Admits It Controlled Tor Servers Behind Mass Malware Attack
The code’s behavior, and the command-and-control server’s Virginia placement, is also consistent with what’s known about the FBI’s “computer and internet protocol address verifier,” or CIPAV, the law enforcement spyware first reported by WIRED in 2007. Court documents and FBI files released under the FOIA have described the CIPAV as software the FBI can deliver through a browser exploit to gather information from the target’s machine and send it to an FBI server in Virginia. The FBI has been using the CIPAV since 2002 against hackers, online sexual predators, extortionists, and others, primarily to identify suspects who are disguising their location using proxy servers or anonymity services, like Tor.

Prior to the Freedom Hosting attack, the code had been used sparingly, which kept it from leaking out and being analyzed.
cipav  fbi  tor  malware  spyware  security  wired 
september 2013 by jm
NSA: Possibly breaking US laws, but still bound by laws of computational complexity
I didn’t clearly explain that there’s an enormous continuum between, on the one hand, a full break of RSA or Diffie-Hellman (which still seems extremely unlikely to me), and on the other, “pure side-channel attacks” involving no new cryptanalytic ideas.  Along that continuum, there are many plausible places where the NSA might be.  For example, imagine that they had a combination of side-channel attacks, novel algorithmic advances, and sheer computing power that enabled them to factor, let’s say, ten 2048-bit RSA keys every year.  In such a case, it would still make perfect sense that they’d want to insert backdoors into software, sneak vulnerabilities into the standards, and do whatever else it took to minimize their need to resort to such expensive attacks.  But the possibility of number-theoretic advances well beyond what the open world knows certainly wouldn’t be ruled out.  Also, as Schneier has emphasized, the fact that NSA has been aggressively pushing elliptic-curve cryptography in recent years invites the obvious speculation that they know something about ECC that the rest of us don’t.
ecc  rsa  crypto  security  nsa  gchq  snooping  sniffing  diffie-hellman  pki  key-length 
september 2013 by jm
Schneier on Security: Excess Automobile Deaths as a Result of 9/11
The inconvenience of extra passenger screening and added costs at airports after 9/11 cause many short-haul passengers to drive to their destination instead, and, since airline travel is far safer than car travel, this has led to an increase of 500 U.S. traffic fatalities per year. Using DHS-mandated value of statistical life at $6.5 million, this equates to a loss of $3.2 billion per year, or $32 billion over the period 2002 to 2011 (Blalock et al. 2007).
risk  security  death  9-11  politics  screening  dhs  air-travel  driving  road-safety 
september 2013 by jm
How the NSA Spies on Smartphones
One of the US agents' tools is the use of backup files established by smartphones. According to one NSA document, these files contain the kind of information that is of particular interest to analysts, such as lists of contacts, call logs and drafts of text messages. To sort out such data, the analysts don't even require access to the iPhone itself, the document indicates. The department merely needs to infiltrate the target's computer, with which the smartphone is synchronized, in advance. Under the heading "iPhone capability," the NSA specialists list the kinds of data they can analyze in these cases. The document notes that there are small NSA programs, known as "scripts," that can perform surveillance on 38 different features of the iPhone 3 and 4 operating systems. They include the mapping feature, voicemail and photos, as well as the Google Earth, Facebook and Yahoo Messenger applications.


and, of course, the alternative means of backup is iCloud.... wonder how secure those backups are.
nsa  surveillance  gchq  iphone  smartphones  backups  icloud  security 
september 2013 by jm
Schneier on Security: The NSA Is Breaking Most Encryption on the Internet
The new Snowden revelations are explosive. Basically, the NSA is able to decrypt most of the Internet. They're doing it primarily by cheating, not by mathematics.
It's joint reporting between the Guardian, the New York Times, and ProPublica.
I have been working with Glenn Greenwald on the Snowden documents, and I have seen a lot of them. These are my two essays on today's revelations.
Remember this: The math is good, but math has no agency. Code has agency, and the code has been subverted.
encryption  communication  government  nsa  security  bruce-schneier  crypto  politics  snooping  gchq  guardian  journalism 
september 2013 by jm
How might the feds have snooped on Lavabit?
"I have been told that they cannot change your fundamental business practices," said Callas, who unlike Levison was able to say SilentCircle has received no NSLs or court orders of any kind. "I presume that would mean things like getting SSL keys because that would mean they could impersonate your servers. That would be like setting up a store front that says your business name and putting [government agents] in your company uniforms." Similarly, he added: "They cannot make changes to existing operating systems. They can't make you change source code." To which [Lavabit's] Levison replied: "That was always my understanding, too. That's why this is so important. Like [Callas] at SilentCircle said, the assumption has been that the government can't force us to change our business practices like that and compromise that information. Like I said, I don't hold those beliefs anymore."
ars-technica  security  privacy  nsls  ssl  silentcircle  jon-callas  crypto 
august 2013 by jm
Nelson's Weblog: tech / bad / failure-of-encryption
One of the great failures of the Internet era has been giving up on end-to-end encryption. PGP dates back to 1991, 22 years ago. It gave us the technical means to have truly secure email between two people. But it was very difficult to use. And in 22 years no one has ever meaningfully made email encryption really usable. [...]

We do have SSL/HTTPS, the only real end-to-end encryption most of us use daily. But the key distribution is hopelessly centralized, authority rooted in 40+ certificates. At least 4 of those certs have been compromised by blackhat hackers in the past few years. How many more have been subverted by government agencies? I believe the SSL Observatory is the only way we’d know.


We do also have SSH. Maybe more services need to adopt that model?
ssh  ssl  tls  pki  crypto  end-to-end  pgp  security  surveillance 
august 2013 by jm
The NSA Is Commandeering the Internet - Bruce Schneier
You, an executive in one of those companies, can fight. You'll probably lose, but you need to take the stand. And you might win. It's time we called the government's actions what it really is: commandeering. Commandeering is a practice we're used to in wartime, where commercial ships are taken for military use, or production lines are converted to military production. But now it's happening in peacetime. Vast swaths of the Internet are being commandeered to support this surveillance state.

If this is happening to your company, do what you can to isolate the actions. Do you have employees with security clearances who can't tell you what they're doing? Cut off all automatic lines of communication with them, and make sure that only specific, required, authorized acts are being taken on behalf of government. Only then can you look your customers and the public in the face and say that you don't know what is going on -- that your company has been commandeered.
nsa  america  politics  privacy  data-protection  data-retention  law  google  microsoft  security  bruce-schneier 
august 2013 by jm
Randomly Failed! The State of Randomness in Current Java Implementations
This would appear to be the paper which sparked off the drama around BitCoin thefts from wallets generated on Android devices:

The SecureRandom PRNG is the primary source of randomness for Java and is used e.g., by cryptographic operations. This underlines its importance regarding security. Some of fallback solutions of the investigated implementations [are] revealed to be weak and predictable or capable of being influenced. Very alarming are the defects found in Apache Harmony, since it is partly used by Android.


More on the BitCoin drama: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=271486.40 , http://bitcoin.org/en/alert/2013-08-11-android
android  java  prng  random  security  bugs  apache-harmony  apache  crypto  bitcoin  papers 
august 2013 by jm
Ivan Ristić: Defending against the BREACH attack
One interesting response to this HTTPS compression-based MITM attack:
The award for least-intrusive and entirely painless mitigation proposal goes to Paul Querna who, on the httpd-dev mailing list, proposed to use the HTTP chunked encoding to randomize response length. Chunked encoding is a HTTP feature that is typically used when the size of the response body is not known in advance; only the size of the next chunk is known. Because chunks carry some additional information, they affect the size of the response, but not the content. By forcing more chunks than necessary, for example, you can increase the length of the response. To the attacker, who can see only the size of the response body, but not anything else, the chunks are invisible. (Assuming they're not sent in individual TCP packets or TLS records, of course.) This mitigation technique is very easy to implement at the web server level, which makes it the least expensive option. There is only a question about its effectiveness. No one has done the maths yet, but most seem to agree that response length randomization slows down the attacker, but does not prevent the attack entirely. But, if the attack can be slowed down significantly, perhaps it will be as good as prevented.
mitm  attacks  hacking  security  compression  http  https  protocols  tls  ssl  tcp  chunked-encoding  apache 
august 2013 by jm
When 'Smart Homes' Get Hacked: I Haunted A Complete Stranger's House Via The Internet - Forbes
Hardware designers do their usual trick -- omit the whole security part:
[Trustwave's Crowley] found security flaws that would allow a digital intruder to take control of a number of sensitive devices beyond the Insteon systems, from the Belkin WeMo Switch to the Satis Smart Toilet. Yes, they found that a toilet was hackable. You only have to have the Android app for the $5,000 toilet on your phone and be close enough to the toilet to communicate with it. “It connects through Bluetooth, with no username or password using the pin ‘0000’,” said Crowley. “So anyone who has the application on their phone and was connected to the network could control anyone else’s toilet. You could turn the bidet on while someone’s in there.”
home  automation  insteon  security  hardware  fail  attacks  bluetooth  han  trustwave  belkin  satis 
july 2013 by jm
Applied Cryptography, Cryptography Engineering, and how they need to be updated
Whoa, I had no idea my knowledge of crypto was so out of date! For example:
ECC is going to replace RSA within the next 10 years. New systems probably shouldn’t use RSA at all.


This blogpost is full of similar useful guidelines and rules of thumb. Here's hoping I don't need to work on a low-level cryptosystem any time soon, as the risk of screwing it up is always high, but if I do this is a good reference for how it needs to be done nowadays.
thomas-ptacek  crypto  cryptography  coding  design  security  aes  cbc  ctr  ecb  hmac  side-channels  rsa  ecc 
july 2013 by jm
Rooting SIM cards
the details of Karsten Nohl's attack against SIM cards, allowing remote-root malware via SMS.
Cracking SIM update keys: [Over The Air] commands, such as software updates, are cryptographically-secured SMS messages, which are delivered directly to the SIM. While the option exists to use state-of-the-art AES or the somewhat outdated 3DES algorithm for OTA, many (if not most) SIM cards still rely on the 70s-era DES cipher. [...] To derive a DES OTA key, an attacker starts by sending a binary SMS to a target device. The SIM does not execute the improperly signed OTA command, but does in many cases respond to the attacker with an error code carrying a cryptographic signature, once again sent over binary SMS. A rainbow table resolves this plaintext-signature tuple to a 56-bit DES key within two minutes on a standard computer.


2 minutes. Sic transit gloria DES. The next step after that is to send a signed request to run a Java applet, then exploit a hole in the JVM sandbox, and the SIM card is rooted.

Looking forward to the full paper on July 31st...
des  3des  crypto  security  sms  sim-cards  smartcards  java  applets  ota  rainbow-tables  cracking  karsten-nohl 
july 2013 by jm
Breakthrough silicon scanning discovers backdoor in military chip [PDF]
Wow, I'd missed this:

This paper is a short summary of the first real world detection of a backdoor in a military grade FPGA. Using an innovative patented technique we were able to detect and analyse in the first documented case of its kind, a backdoor inserted into the Actel/Microsemi ProASIC3 chips for accessing FPGA configuration. The backdoor was
found amongst additional JTAG functionality and exists on the silicon itself, it was not present in any firmware loaded onto the chip. Using Pipeline Emission Analysis (PEA), our pioneered technique, we were able to extract the secret key to activate the backdoor, as well as other security keys such as the AES and the Passkey. This way an attacker can extract all the configuration data from the chip, reprogram crypto and access keys, modify low-level silicon features, access unencrypted configuration bitstream or permanently damage the device. Clearly this
means the device is wide open to intellectual property (IP) theft, fraud, re-programming as well as reverse engineering of the design which allows the introduction of a new backdoor or Trojan. Most concerning, it is
not possible to patch the backdoor in chips already deployed, meaning those using this family of chips have to accept the fact they can be easily compromised or will have to be physically replaced after a redesign of the silicon itself.
chips  hardware  backdoors  security  scanning  pea  jtag  actel  microsemi  silicon  fpga  trojans 
july 2013 by jm
How to secure your webapp
Locking down a webapp with current strict HTTPS policies.
It’s impossible to get to 100% security but there are steps you can take to secure your webapp for your users, to help mitigate against different types of attacks both against you, your webapp and your customers themselves. These are all things we’ve implemented with Server Density v2 to help harden the product as much as possible. These tips are in addition to security best practices such as protecting against SQL injection, filtering, session handling, and XSRF protection. Check out the OWASP cheat sheets and top 10 lists to ensure you’re covered for the basics before implementing the suggestions below.
https  ssl  security  web  webdev  tls 
july 2013 by jm
We interrupt this program to warn the Emergency Alert System is hackable | Ars Technica
Private SSH key included in a firmware update. Oh dear:
The US Emergency Alert System, which interrupts live TV and radio broadcasts with information about national emergencies in progress, is vulnerable to attacks that allow hackers to remotely disseminate bogus reports and tamper with gear, security researchers warned. The remote takeover vulnerability affects the DASDEC-I and DASDEC-II application servers made by a company called Digital Alert Systems. It stems from the a recent firmware update that mistakenly included the private secure shell (SSH) key, according to an advisory published Monday by researchers from security firm IOActive. Administrators use such keys to remotely log in to a server to gain unfettered "root" access. The publication of the key makes it trivial for hackers to gain unauthorized access on Digital Alert System appliances that run default settings on older firmware. "An attacker who gains control of one or more DASDEC systems can disrupt these stations' ability to transmit and could disseminate false emergency information over a large geographic area," the IOActive advisory warned. "In addition, depending on the configuration of this and other devices, these messages could be forwarded and mirrored by other DASDEC systems."
ssh  security  fail  emergency  alert  warning  tv  radio 
july 2013 by jm
SSL/TLS overhead
'The TLS handshake has multiple variations, but let’s pick the most common one – anonymous client and authenticated server (the connections browsers use most of the time).' Works out to 4 packets, in addition to the TCP handshake's 3, and about 6.5k bytes on average.
network  tls  ssl  performance  latency  speed  networking  internet  security  packets  tcp  handshake 
june 2013 by jm
Verified by Visa and MasterCard SecureCode kill 10-12% of your business
As Chris Shiflett noted: not only are they bad for security, they're bad for business too.
12 percent of users consider abandoning [an online shopping transaction] when they see either the Verified by Visa or the American Express SafeKey logos, while 10 percent will consider abandoning when the see the MasterCard Secure card logo.
ecommerce  vbv  online-shopping  mastercard  visa  securecode  security  fail 
june 2013 by jm
Persuading David Simon (Pinboard Blog)
Maciej Ceglowski with a strongly-argued rebuttal of David Simon's post about the NSA's PRISM. This point in particular is key:
The point is, you don't need human investigators to find leads, you can have the algorithms do it [based on the call graph or network of who-calls-who]. They will find people of interest, assemble the watch lists, and flag whomever you like for further tracking. And since the number of actual terrorists is very, very, very small, the output of these algorithms will consist overwhelmingly of false positives.
false-positives  maciej  privacy  security  nsa  prism  david-simon  accuracy  big-data  filtering  anti-spam 
june 2013 by jm
CloudFlare, PRISM, and Securing SSL Ciphers
Matthew Prince of CloudFlare has an interesting theory on the NSA's capabilities:
It is not inconceivable that the NSA has data centers full of specialized hardware optimized for SSL key breaking. According to data shared with us from a survey of SSL keys used by various websites, the majority of web companies were using 1024-bit SSL ciphers and RSA-based encryption through 2012. Given enough specialized hardware, it is within the realm of possibility that the NSA could within a reasonable period of time reverse engineer 1024-bit SSL keys for certain web companies. If they'd been recording the traffic to these web companies, they could then use the broken key to go back and decrypt all the transactions.

While this seems like a compelling theory, ultimately, we remain skeptical this is how the PRISM program described in the slides actually works. Cracking 1024-bit keys would be a big deal and likely involve some cutting-edge cryptography and computational power, even for the NSA. The largest SSL key that is known to have been broken to date is 768 bits long. While that was 4 years ago, and the NSA undoubtedly has some of the best cryptographers in the world, it's still a considerable distance from 768 bits to 1024 bits -- especially given the slide suggests Microsoft's key would have to had been broken back in 2007.

Moreover, the slide showing the dates on which "collection began" for various companies also puts the cost of the program at $20M/year. That may sound like a lot of money, but it is not for an undertaking like this. Just the power necessary to run the server farm needed to break a 1024-bit key would likely cost in excess of $20M/year. While the NSA may have broken 1024-bit SSL keys as part of some other program, if the slide is accurate and complete, we think it's highly unlikely they did so as part of the PRISM program. A not particularly glamorous alternative theory is that the NSA didn't break the SSL key but instead just cajoled rogue employees at firms with access to the private keys -- whether the companies themselves, partners they'd shared the keys with, or the certificate authorities who issued the keys in the first place -- to turn them over. That very well may be possible on a budget of $20M/year.

[....]
Google is a notable anomaly. The company uses a 1024-bit key, but, unlike all the other companies listed above, rather than using a default cipher suite based on the RSA encryption algorithm, they instead prefer the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral (ECDHE) cipher suites. Without going into the technical details, a key difference of ECDHE is that they use a different private key for each user's session. This means that if the NSA, or anyone else, is recording encrypted traffic, they cannot break one private key and read all historical transactions with Google. The NSA would have to break the private key generated for each session, which, in Google's case, is unique to each user and regenerated for each user at least every 28-hours.

While ECDHE arguably already puts Google at the head of the pack for web transaction security, to further augment security Google has publicly announced that they will be increasing their key length to 2048-bit by the end of 2013. Assuming the company continues to prefer the ECDHE cipher suites, this will put Google at the cutting edge of web transaction security.


2048-bit ECDHE sounds like the way to go, and CloudFlare now support that too.
prism  security  nsa  cloudflare  ssl  tls  ecdhe  elliptic-curve  crypto  rsa  key-lengths 
june 2013 by jm
Spamhaus victim of BGP route hijacking
Pretty major hi-jinks. Neil Schwartzman says it didn't go on for long, but still, this is crazy antics.

As can seen from the BGP output, we were using a /32 route going over AS 34109. This was highly suspicious for two reasons. First, a /32 route refers only to a single IP address. Except in special cases, routes are normally /24 (256 hosts) or larger. Second, the AS 34109 belongs to CB3ROB which is an Internet provider that has actually been in conflict with Spamhaus (see: spamhaus; allspammedup; theregister). Certainly they weren’t running a legitimate Spamhaus server. It seems clear that the CB3ROB network hijacked one (or more) of the IP addresses of Spamhaus, and installed a DNS server there which incorrectly returns positive results to every query. The result causes harm to Spamhaus users and their customers, making Spamhaus unusable for anyone unable to correct the problem as we did, and perhaps even undermining the credibility of Spamhaus itself.
spamhaus  security  bgp  peering  internet  routing  hacking  dns  dnsbls  cb3rob  as-34109 
march 2013 by jm
Rails' Insecure Defaults
'13 Security Gotchas You Should Know About'
rails  security  ruby  web  tips 
march 2013 by jm
Romania believes rival nation behind MiniDuke cyber attack | Reuters
"It is a cyber attack ... pursued by an entity that has the characteristics of a state actor," [Romanian secret service] SRI spokesman Sorin Sava told Reuters [...]. "Our estimations show the attack is certainly relevant to Romania's national security taking into account the profile of the compromised entities." [...]

In this case, computer experts say an attacker from the former Soviet Union could be more likely. "MiniDuke" in some ways resembles a banking fraud Trojan dubbed "TinBa" believed to have been created by Russian criminal hackers.
ireland  malware  attacks  pdf  security  espionage  romania  miniduke 
march 2013 by jm
Irish government attacked using 'MiniDuke' PDF malware
although I haven't seen a word of it in the Irish media yet -- wonder if the government have noticed?
Cyber criminals have targeted government officials in more than 20 countries, including Ireland and Romania, in a complex online assault seen rarely since the turn of the millennium. The attack, dubbed "MiniDuke" by researchers, has infected government computers as recently as this week in an attempt to steal geopolitical intelligence, according to security experts.
ireland  malware  attacks  pdf  security  espionage  romania  miniduke 
march 2013 by jm
Bit9's whitelisting keys stolen
Black hats steal code-signing keys from software whitelisting anti-malware firm. Pretty audacious
malware  security  whitelisting  av 
february 2013 by jm
"Security Engineering" now online in full
Ross Anderson says: 'I’m delighted to announce that my book Security Engineering – A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems is now available free online in its entirety. You may download any or all of the chapters from the book’s web page.'
security  books  reference  coding  software  encryption  ross-anderson 
february 2013 by jm
java - Given that HashMaps in jdk1.6 and above cause problems with multi-threading, how should I fix my code - Stack Overflow
Massive Java concurrency fail in recent 1.6 and 1.7 JDK releases -- the java.util.HashMap type now spin-locks on an AtomicLong in its constructor.

Here's the response from the author: 'I'll acknowledge right up front that the initialization of hashSeed is a bottleneck but it is not one we expected to be a problem since it only happens once per Hash Map instance. For this code to be a bottleneck you would have to be creating hundreds or thousands of hash maps per second. This is certainly not typical. Is there really a valid reason for your application to be doing this? How long do these hash maps live?'

Oh dear. Assumptions of "typical" like this are not how you design a fundamental data structure. fail. For now there is a hacky reflection-based workaround, but this is lame and needs to be fixed as soon as possible. (Via cscotta)
java  hashmap  concurrency  bugs  fail  security  hashing  jdk  via:cscotta 
february 2013 by jm
IPMI: Freight Train To Hell
'Intel's Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI), which is implemented and added onto by all server vendors, grant system administrators with a means to manage their hardware in an Out of Band (OOB) or Lights Out Management (LOM) fashion. However there are a series of design, utilization, and vendor issues that cause complex, pervasive, and serious security infrastructure problems.

The BMC is an embedded computer on the motherboard that implements IPMI; it enjoys an asymmetrical relationship with its host, with the BMC able to gain full control of memory and I/O, while the server is both blind and impotent against the BMC. Compromised servers have full access to the private IPMI network

The BMC uses reusable passwords that are infrequently changed, widely shared among servers, and stored in clear text in its storage. The passwords may be disclosed with an attack on the server, over the network network against the BMC, or with a physical attack against the motherboard (including after the server has been decommissioned.)

IT's reliance on IPMI to reduce costs, the near-complete lack of research, 3rd party products, or vendor documentation on IPMI and the BMC security, and the permanent nature of the BMC on the motherboard make it currently very difficult to defend, fix or remediate against these issues.'

(via Tony Finch)
via:fanf  security  ipmi  power-management  hardware  intel  passwords  bios 
february 2013 by jm
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