jm + pgp   6

mozilla/sops: Secrets management stinks, use some sops!
sops is an editor of encrypted files that supports YAML, JSON and BINARY formats and encrypts with AWS KMS and PGP.
secrets  encryption  security  kms  pgp  gpg  editors  configuration 
july 2017 by jm
Stop it with short PGP key IDs!
What happened today? We still don't really know, but it seems we found a first potentially malicious collision — that is, the first "nonacademic" case. Enrico found two keys sharing the 9F6C6333 short ID, apparently belonging to the same person (as would be the case of Asheesh, mentioned above). After contacting Gustavo, though, he does not know about the second — That is, it can be clearly regarded as an impersonation attempt. Besides, what gave away this attempt are the signatures it has: Both keys are signed by what appears to be the same three keys: B29B232A, F2C850CA and 789038F2. Those three keys are not (yet?) uploaded to the keyservers, though... But we can expect them to appear at any point in the future. We don't know who is behind this, or what his purpose is. We just know this looks very evil.
Now, don't panic: Gustavo's key is safe. Same for his certifiers, Marga, Agustín and Maxy. It's just a 32-bit collision. So, in principle, the only parties that could be cheated to trust the attacker are humans, right? Nope.
Enrico tested on the PGP pathfinder & key statistics service, a keyserver that finds trust paths between any two arbitrary keys in the strong set. Surprise: The pathfinder works on the short key IDs, even when supplied full fingerprints. So, it turns out I have three faked trust paths into our impostor.
pgp  gpg  keys  collisions  hashing  security  debian 
june 2016 by jm
Authenticated app packages on Sandstorm with PGP and Keybase
Nice approach to package authentication UX using Keybase/PGP.
When you go to install a package, Sandstorm verifies that the package is correctly signed by the Ed25519 key. It looks for a PGP signature in the metadata, and verifies that the PGP-signed assertion is for the correct app ID and the email address specified in the metadata. It queries the Keybase API to see what accounts the packager has proven ownership of, and lists them with their links on the app install page.
authentication  auth  packages  sandstorm  keybase  pgp  gpg  security 
november 2015 by jm
Nyms Identity Directory
The way that [problems with the PGP bootstrapping] are supposed to be resolved is with an authentication model called the Web of Trust where users sign keys of other users after verifying that they are who they say they are. In theory, if some due diligence is applied in signing other people’s keys and a sufficient number of people participate you’ll be able to follow a short chain of signatures from people you already know and trust to new untrusted keys you download from a key server. In practice this has never worked out very well as it burdens users with the task of manually finding people to sign their keys and even experts find the Web of Trust model difficult to reason about. This also reveals the social graph of certain communities which may place users at risk for their associations. Such signatures also reveal metadata about times and thus places for meetings for key signings.

The Nyms Identity Directory is a replacement for all of this. Keyservers are replaced with an identity directory that gives users full control over publication of their key information and web of trust is replaced with a distributed network of trusted notaries which validate user keys with an email verification protocol.
web-of-trust  directories  nyms  privacy  crypto  identity  trust  pgp  gpg  security  via:ioerror  keyservers  notaries 
august 2014 by jm
Nelson's Weblog: tech / bad / failure-of-encryption
One of the great failures of the Internet era has been giving up on end-to-end encryption. PGP dates back to 1991, 22 years ago. It gave us the technical means to have truly secure email between two people. But it was very difficult to use. And in 22 years no one has ever meaningfully made email encryption really usable. [...]

We do have SSL/HTTPS, the only real end-to-end encryption most of us use daily. But the key distribution is hopelessly centralized, authority rooted in 40+ certificates. At least 4 of those certs have been compromised by blackhat hackers in the past few years. How many more have been subverted by government agencies? I believe the SSL Observatory is the only way we’d know.


We do also have SSH. Maybe more services need to adopt that model?
ssh  ssl  tls  pki  crypto  end-to-end  pgp  security  surveillance 
august 2013 by jm
PGP founder, Navy SEALs uncloak encrypted comms biz • The Register
'The company, called Silent Circle, will launch later this year, when $20 a month will buy you encrypted email, text messages, phone calls, and videoconferencing in a package that looks to be strong enough to have the NSA seriously worried. Zimmermann says that surveillance by the state and others has increased vastly over the last few years, and privacy improvement are again needed. "At the very least I want people, as part of their right in a free society to be able to communicate securely," he said in a promotional video. "I should be able to whisper in your ear, even if your ear is a thousand miles away." [...] While software can handle most of the work, there still needs to be a small backend of servers to handle traffic. The company surveyed the state of privacy laws around the world and found that the top three choices were Switzerland, Iceland, and Canada, so they went for the one within driving distance.'
pgp  phil-zimmermann  privacy  crypto  silent-circle  apps  vc  security 
june 2012 by jm

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