jm + mobile-phones   18

Stealth Cell Tower
'an antagonistic GSM base station [disguised] in the form of an innocuous office printer. It brings the covert design practice of disguising cellular infrastructure as other things - like trees and lamp-posts - indoors, while mimicking technology used by police and intelligence agencies to surveil mobile phone users.'
gsm  hardware  art  privacy  surveillance  hacks  printers  mobile-phones 
november 2016 by jm
ZIP SIM
Prepaid talk+text+data or data-only mobile SIM cards, delivered to your home or hotel, prior to visiting the US. great service for temporary US business visits
visiting  us  usa  zip-sim  sims  mobile-phones  travel  phones  mobile  travelling  data 
april 2016 by jm
Floating car data
Floating car data (FCD), also known as floating cellular data, is a method to determine the traffic speed on the road network. It is based on the collection of localization data, speed, direction of travel and time information from mobile phones in vehicles that are being driven. These data are the essential source for traffic information and for most intelligent transportation systems (ITS). This means that every vehicle with an active mobile phone acts as a sensor for the road network. Based on these data, traffic congestion can be identified, travel times can be calculated, and traffic reports can be rapidly generated. In contrast to traffic cameras, number plate recognition systems, and induction loops embedded in the roadway, no additional hardware on the road network is necessary.
surveillance  cars  driving  mobile-phones  phones  travel  gsm  monitoring  anpr  alpr  traffic 
november 2015 by jm
London garden bridge users to have mobile phone signals tracked
If it goes ahead, people’s progress across the structure would be tracked by monitors detecting the Wi-Fi signals from their phones, which show up the device’s Mac address, or unique identifying code. The Garden Bridge Trust says it will not store any of this data and is only tracking phones to count numbers and prevent overcrowding.

london  surveillance  mobile-phones  mac-trackers  tracking 
november 2015 by jm
GSMem: Data Exfiltration from Air-Gapped Computers over GSM Frequencies
Holy shit.
Air-gapped networks are isolated, separated both logically and physically from public networks. Although the feasibility of invading such systems has been demonstrated in recent years, exfiltration of data from air-gapped networks is still a challenging task. In this paper we present GSMem, a malware that can exfiltrate data through an air-gap over cellular frequencies. Rogue software on an infected target computer modulates and transmits electromagnetic signals at cellular frequencies by invoking specific memory-related instructions and utilizing the multichannel memory architecture to amplify the transmission. Furthermore, we show that the transmitted signals can be received and demodulated by a rootkit placed in the baseband firmware of a nearby cellular phone.
gsmem  gsm  exfiltration  air-gaps  memory  radio  mobile-phones  security  papers 
august 2015 by jm
KillBiller
Excellent mobile-phone plan comparison site for the Irish market, using apps which you install and which analyse your call history, data usage, etc. over the past month to compute the optimal plan based on your usage. Pretty amazing results in my case!

The only downside is the privacy policy, which allows the company to resell your usage data (anonymised, and in aggregate) -- I'd really prefer if this wasn't the case :(
mobile-phones  shopping  tesco  emobile  3g  4g  ireland  plans  comparison-shopping  killbiller  via:its 
may 2015 by jm
Hanging on the telephone – has anyone got it right on the new ban on text driving?
Some good legal commentary on this new Irish law.
There has been much hand-wringing and concern about whether or not the 2014 Regulations prohibit the use of Google Maps or Hailo, for example. They don’t, but this does not mean that drivers should feel free to use non-texting functions of their phones while driving – holding a mobile phone (which could include a tablet) while driving remains prohibited, whatever the use it is being put to. Moreover, offences of dangerous and careless driving and driving without due care and attention could cover a wide range of bad driving, and could include, for example, driving while zooming in and out of maps on your phone or sending stickers on WhatsApp.
ireland  law  driving  safety  mobile-phones  texting  google-maps  satnav 
may 2014 by jm
Chinese cops cuff 1,500 in fake base station spam raid
The street finds its own uses for things, in this case Stinger/IMSI-catcher-type fake mobile-phone base stations:
Fake base stations are becoming a particularly popular modus operandi. Often concealed in a van or car, they are driven through city streets to spread their messages. The professional spammer in question charged 1,000 yuan (£100) to spam thousands of users in a radius of a few hundred metres. The pseudo-base station used could send out around 6,000 messages in just half an hour, the report said. Often such spammers are hired by local businessmen to promote their wares.


(via Bernard Tyers)
stingers  imsi-catcher  mobile-phones  mobile  cellphones  china  spam  via:bernard-tyers 
march 2014 by jm
Florida cops used IMSI catchers over 200 times without a warrant
Harris is the leading maker of [IMSI catchers aka "stingrays"] in the U.S., and the ACLU has long suspected that the company has been loaning the devices to police departments throughout the state for product testing and promotional purposes. As the court document notes in the 2008 case, “the Tallahassee Police Department is not the owner of the equipment.”

The ACLU now suspects these police departments may have all signed non-disclosure agreements with the vendor and used the agreement to avoid disclosing their use of the equipment to courts. “The police seem to have interpreted the agreement to bar them even from revealing their use of Stingrays to judges, who we usually rely on to provide oversight of police investigations,” the ACLU writes.
aclu  police  stingrays  imsi-catchers  privacy  cellphones  mobile-phones  security  wired 
march 2014 by jm
Beirtear na IMSIs: Ireland's GSOC surveillance inquiry reveals use of mobile phone interception systems | Privacy International
It is interesting to note that the fake UK network was the only one detected by Verrimus. However, given that IMSI Catchers operate multiple fake towers simultaneously, it is highly likely that one or more Irish networks were also being intercepted. Very often a misconfiguration, such as an incorrect country code, is the only evidence available of an IMSI Catcher being deployed when forensic tools are not being used to look for one.
privacy  imsi-catchers  surveillance  bugging  spying  gsocgate  gsoc  ireland  mobile-phones 
february 2014 by jm
193_Cellxion_Brochure_UGX Series 330
The Cellxion UGX Series 330 is a 'transportable Dual GSM/Triple UMTS Firewall and Analysis Tool' -- ie. an IMSI catcher in a briefcase, capable of catching IMSI/IMEIs in 3G. It even supports configurable signal strength. Made in the UK
cellxion  imsi-catchers  imei  surveillance  gsocgate  gsm  3g  mobile-phones  security  spying 
february 2014 by jm
The Spyware That Enables Mobile-Phone Snooping - Bloomberg
More background on IMSI catchers -- looking likely to have been the "government-level technology" used to snoop on the Garda Ombudsman's offices, particularly given the 'detection of an unexpected UK 3G network near the GSOC offices':
The technology involved is called cellular interception. The active variety of this, the “IMSI catcher,” is a portable device that masquerades as a mobile phone tower. Any phone within range (a mile for a low-grade IMSI catcher; as much as 100 miles for a passive interception device with a very large antenna, such as those used in India) automatically checks to see if the device is a tower operated by its carrier, and the false “tower” indicates that it is. It then logs the phone’s International Mobile Subscriber Identity number -- and begins listening in on its calls, texts and data communications. No assistance from any wireless carrier is needed; the phone has been tricked.
[...] “network extender” devices -- personal mobile-phone towers -- sold by the carriers themselves, often called femtocells, can be turned into IMSI catchers.


Via T.J. McIntyre
via:tjmcintyre  imsi-catchers  surveillance  privacy  gsocgate  mobile-phones  spying  imsi 
february 2014 by jm
"IMSI Catcher" used in London
'One case involved Julian Assange's current home at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London, where visitors were surprised to receive welcome messages from a Ugandan telephone company. It turned out the messages were coming from a foreign base station device installed on the roof, masquerading as a cell tower for surveillance purposes. Appelbaum suspects the GCHQ simply forgot to reformat the device from an earlier Ugandan operation.'


via T.J. McIntyre.
surveillance  nsa  privacy  imsi-catchers  gchq  london  uganda  mobile-phones  julian-assange  ecuador  embassies 
february 2014 by jm
Death by Metadata
The side-effects of algorithmic false-positives get worse and worse.
What’s more, he adds, the NSA often locates drone targets by analyzing the activity of a SIM card, rather than the actual content of the calls. Based on his experience, he has come to believe that the drone program amounts to little more than death by unreliable metadata. “People get hung up that there’s a targeted list of people,” he says. “It’s really like we’re targeting a cell phone. We’re not going after people – we’re going after their phones, in the hopes that the person on the other end of that missile is the bad guy.”
false-positives  glenn-greenwald  drones  nsa  death-by-metadata  us-politics  terrorism  sim-cards  phones  mobile-phones 
february 2014 by jm
Ukrainian police use cellphones to track protestors, court order shows
Protesters for weeks had suspected that the government was using location data from cellphones near the demonstration to pinpoint people for political profiling, and they received alarming confirmation when a court formally ordered a telephone company to hand over such data. [...] Three cellphone companies — Kyivstar, MTS and Life — denied that they had provided the location data to the government or had sent the text messages. Kyivstar suggested that it was instead the work of a “pirate” cellphone tower set up in the area. In a ruling made public on Wednesday, a city court ordered Kyivstar to disclose to the police which cellphones were turned on during an antigovernment protest outside the courthouse on Jan. 10.
tech  location-tracking  tracking  privacy  ukraine  cellphones  mobile-phones  civil-liberties 
january 2014 by jm
Ukrainian government targeting protesters using threatening SMS messages
The government’s opponents said three recent actions had been intended to incite the more radical protesters and sow doubt in the minds of moderates: the passing of laws last week circumscribing the right of public assembly, the blocking of a protest march past the Parliament building on Sunday, and the sending of cellphone messages on Tuesday to people standing in the vicinity of the fighting that said, “Dear subscriber, you are registered as a participant in a mass disturbance.” [....]

The phrasing of the message, about participating in a “mass disturbance,” echoed language in a new law making it a crime to participate in a protest deemed violent. The law took effect on Tuesday. And protesters were concerned that the government seemed to be using cutting-edge technology from the advertising industry to pinpoint people for political profiling.

Three cellphone companies in Ukraine — Kyivstar, MTS and Life — denied that they had provided the location data to the government or had sent the text messages, the newspaper Ukrainskaya Pravda reported. Kyivstar suggested that it was instead the work of a “pirate” cellphone tower set up in the area.
targeting  mobile-phones  sms  text-messaging  via:tjmcintyre  geotargeting  protest  ukraine  privacy  surveillance  tech  1984 
january 2014 by jm
drug cartel-controlled mobile comms networks
“The Mexican military has recently broken up several secret telecommunications networks that were built and controlled by drug cartels so they could coordinate drug shipments, monitor their rivals and orchestrate attacks on the security forces. A network that was dismantled just last week provided cartel members with cellphone and radio communications across four northeastern states. The network had coverage along almost 500 miles of the Texas border and extended nearly another 500 miles into Mexico’s interior. Soldiers seized 167 antennas, more than 150 repeaters and thousands of cellphones and radios that operated on the system. Some of the remote antennas and relay stations were powered with solar panels.”
mexico  drugs  networks  mobile-phones  crime 
february 2013 by jm
Cellphones Track Your Every Move, and You May Not Even Know - NYTimes.com
data retention in Germany revealed via FOI: 'in a six-month period — from Aug 31, 2009, to Feb. 28, 2010, Deutsche Telekom had recorded and saved his longitude and latitude coordinates more than 35,000 times. It traced him from a train on the way to Erlangen at the start through to that last night, when he was home in Berlin.'
data-retention  germany  phones  mobile  geolocation  tracking  mobile-phones  surveillance  from delicious
march 2011 by jm

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