jm + md5   7

AV vendors still relying on MD5 to identify malware
oh dear. I can see how this happened -- in many cases they may not still have samples to derive new sums from :(
md5  hashing  antivirus  malware  security  via:fanf  bugs 
june 2015 by jm
How I created two images with the same MD5 hash
I found that I was able to run the algorithm in about 10 hours on an AWS large GPU instance bringing it in at about $0.65 plus tax.


Bottom line: MD5 is feasibly attackable by pretty much anyone now.
crypto  images  md5  security  hashing  collisions  ec2  via:hn 
november 2014 by jm
NYC generates hash-anonymised data dump, which gets reversed
There are about 1000*26**3 = 21952000 or 22M possible medallion numbers. So, by calculating the md5 hashes of all these numbers (only 24M!), one can completely deanonymise the entire data. Modern computers are fast: so fast that computing the 24M hashes took less than 2 minutes.


(via Bruce Schneier)

The better fix is a HMAC (see http://benlog.com/2008/06/19/dont-hash-secrets/ ), or just to assign opaque IDs instead of hashing.
hashing  sha1  md5  bruce-schneier  anonymization  deanonymization  security  new-york  nyc  taxis  data  big-data  hmac  keyed-hashing  salting 
june 2014 by jm
Analyzing Flame's MD5 Collision Attack [slides, PDF]
really detailed slide deck by Alex Sotirov, Co-Founder and Chief Scientist, Trail of Bits, Inc. (via Tony Finch) Plenty of security fail by MS, and also: PKI is clearly too hard
via:fanf  flame  security  malware  md5  collisions  hashing  pki  tls  ssl  microsoft 
june 2012 by jm
Stop using unsafe keyed hashes, use HMAC
why HMAC is more secure than secret-suffix and secret-prefix keyed hashing. good to know
hmac  security  crypto  hashing  md5  hashes  sha256  sha1  from delicious
october 2009 by jm

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