jm + key-length   2

s3.amazonaws.com "certificate verification failed" errors due to crappy Verisign certs and overzealous curl policies
Seth Vargo is correct. Its not the bit length of the key which is at issue, its the signature algorithm. The entire keychain for the s3.awsamazon.com key is signed with SHA1withRSA:

https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=s3.amazonaws.com&s=54.231.244.0&hideResults=on

At issue is that the root verisign key has been marked as weak because of SHA1 and taken out of the curl bundle which is widely popular, and this issue will continue to cause more and more issues going forwards as that bundle makes it way into shipping o/s distributions and aws certification verification breaks.


'This is still happening and curl is now failing on my machine causing all sorts of fun issues (including breaking CocoaPods that are using S3 for storage).' -- @jmhodges

This may be a contributory factor to the issue @nelson saw: https://nelsonslog.wordpress.com/2015/04/28/cyberduck-is-responsible-for-my-bad-ssl-certificate/

Curl's ca-certs bundle is also used by Node: https://github.com/joyent/node/issues/8894 and doubtless many other apps and packages.

Here's a mailing list thread discussing the issue: http://curl.haxx.se/mail/archive-2014-10/0066.html -- looks like the curl team aren't too bothered about it.
curl  s3  amazon  aws  ssl  tls  certs  sha1  rsa  key-length  security  cacerts 
april 2015 by jm
NSA: Possibly breaking US laws, but still bound by laws of computational complexity
I didn’t clearly explain that there’s an enormous continuum between, on the one hand, a full break of RSA or Diffie-Hellman (which still seems extremely unlikely to me), and on the other, “pure side-channel attacks” involving no new cryptanalytic ideas.  Along that continuum, there are many plausible places where the NSA might be.  For example, imagine that they had a combination of side-channel attacks, novel algorithmic advances, and sheer computing power that enabled them to factor, let’s say, ten 2048-bit RSA keys every year.  In such a case, it would still make perfect sense that they’d want to insert backdoors into software, sneak vulnerabilities into the standards, and do whatever else it took to minimize their need to resort to such expensive attacks.  But the possibility of number-theoretic advances well beyond what the open world knows certainly wouldn’t be ruled out.  Also, as Schneier has emphasized, the fact that NSA has been aggressively pushing elliptic-curve cryptography in recent years invites the obvious speculation that they know something about ECC that the rest of us don’t.
ecc  rsa  crypto  security  nsa  gchq  snooping  sniffing  diffie-hellman  pki  key-length 
september 2013 by jm

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