Sherlock’s record is spotty at best when it comes to engagement. Setting aside the 80,680 people who were ignored by the minister, he was hostile and counter productive to debate from the beginning, going so far as to threaten to pull out of a public debate because a campaigner against the ['Irish SOPA'] SI would be in attendance. His habit of blocking people online who publicly ask him tough yet legitimate questions has earned him the nickname “Sherblock”.

In this paper, we have analyzed the performance of TCP in of ShenZhou Online, a commercial, mid-sized MMORPG. Our study indicates that, though TCP is full-fledged and robust, simply transmitting game data over TCP could cause unexpected performance problems. This is due to the following distinctive characteristics of game traffic: 1) tiny packets, 2) low packet rate, 3) application-limited traffic generation, and 4) bi-directional traffic.

We have shown that because TCP was originally designed for unidirectional and network-limited bulk data transfers, it cannot adapt well to MMORPG traffic. In particular, the window-based congestion control mechanism and the fast retransmit algorithm for loss recovery are ineffective. This suggests that the selective acknowledgement option should be enabled whenever TCP is used, as it significantly enhances the loss recovery process. Furthermore, TCP is overkill, as not every game packet needs to be transmitted reliably and processed in an orderly manner. We have also shown that the degraded network performance did impact users' willingness to continue a game. Finally, a number of design guidelines have been proposed by exploiting the unique characteristics of game traffic.

These companies and their technologies are built on data, and the data is us. If we are to have any faith in the Internet, we have to trust them to protect it. That’s a relationship dynamic that will become only more intertwined as the Internet finds its way into more aspects of our daily existences, from phones that talk to us to cars that drive themselves.

The US’s surveillance programs threaten to destroy that trust permanently.

America’s tech companies must stand up to this pervasive and corrosive surveillance system. They must ask that difficult question: “Is it worth it?”

In its early days, there was a lot of talk about the "natural laws of the Internet" and how it would empower the masses, upend traditional power blocks, and spread freedom throughout the world. The international nature of the Internet made a mockery of national laws. Anonymity was easy. Censorship was impossible. Police were clueless about cybercrime. And bigger changes were inevitable. Digital cash would undermine national sovereignty. Citizen journalism would undermine the media, corporate PR, and political parties. Easy copying would destroy the traditional movie and music industries. Web marketing would allow even the smallest companies to compete against corporate giants. It really would be a new world order.
Unfortunately, as we know, that's not how it worked out. Instead, we have seen the rise of the feudal Internet:
Feudal security consolidates power in the hands of the few. These companies [like Google, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook etc.] act in their own self-interest. They use their relationship with us to increase their profits, sometimes at our expense. They act arbitrarily. They make mistakes. They're deliberately changing social norms. Medieval feudalism gave the lords vast powers over the landless peasants; we’re seeing the same thing on the Internet.

Modern telecommunications technology implied the development of modern telecommunications surveillance, because it moved the scope of action from the physical world (where intelligence, generally seen as part of the military mission, had acted) to the virtual world—including the scope of those actions that could threaten state power. While the public line may have been, as US Secretary of State Henry Stimson said in 1929, “gentlemen do not open each other’s mail”, you can bet that they always did keep a keen eye on the comings and goings of each other’s shipping traffic.

The real reason that surveillance in the context of state intelligence was limited until recently was because it was too expensive, and it was too expensive for everyone. The Westphalian compromise demands equality of agency as tied to territory. As soon as one side gains a significant advantage, the structure of sovereignty itself is threatened at a conceptual level — hence Oppenheimer as the death of any hope of international rule of law. Once surveillance became cheap enough, all states were (and will increasingly be) forced to attempt it at scale, as a reaction to this pernicious efficiency. The US may be ahead of the game now, but Moore’s law and productization will work their magic here.

In the fight against the unauthorised sharing of copyright protected material, aka piracy, Dutch Internet Service
Providers have been summoned by courts to block their subscribers’ access to The Pirate Bay (TPB) and related
sites. This paper studies the effectiveness of this approach towards online copyright enforcement, using both a
consumer survey and a newly developed non-infringing technology for BitTorrent monitoring. While a small
group of respondents download less from illegal sources or claim to have stopped, and a small but significant
effect is found on the distribution of Dutch peers, no lasting net impact is found on the percentage of the Dutch
population downloading from illegal sources.

I'm not saying mesh networks don't work ever; the people in the wireless mesh community I've met are all great people doing fantastic work. What I am saying is that unplanned wireless mesh networks never work at scale. I think it's a great problem to think about, but in terms of actual allocation of time and resources I think there are other, more fruitful avenues of action to fight Internet censorship.

There appears to be a problem affecting a number of users where SSL verification errors will be shown saying "pypi.python.org" does not match "addvocate.com". As Best we can tell this appears to be related to the ISP. It seems to be affecting folks using O2 or O2 related companies. We've also reports of it affecting people using Free.

Cause appears to be one of the IP addresses returned in the Geo DNS for Europe returning a certificate for addvocate.com. It's not clear at this time *why* that IP address is returning a certificate for addvocate.com.

The issue of access to age-inappropriate content is not a new matter and it is important not to have “knee-jerk” reactions which don’t solve the perceived problem and have major implications for the public’s right to access information in general. Notably the European Commission, as stated by vice-president Nellie Kroes [jm: sic], has come out strongly against blocking of the Internet, seeing it as an important platform for freedom of speech and she intends to “guarantee access without restriction.”  We in Ireland would do well to consider carefully the impact that any rash adoption or attempted copying of UK measures might have here in the light of current and future EU legislation and policy.

Mr Rabbitte says that legal concerns attached to mandatory filters, as well as a fear of imposing censorship, have persuaded him against trying to force ISPs to impose mandatory pornography-blocking internet filters. "I remain to be convinced that blanket censorship or a default-on blocker is the correct or workable response," he said. "Even if it were possible to ensure that such measures were not easily circumvented or didn't inadvertently block perfectly acceptable content, the principled question of whether the State should be encouraging service providers to filter or block content to all users, regardless of whether there are children resident, would still arise."

When we argued our case to the vendor's representative, he was categorical: any nudity, anywhere on [Boing Boing], makes it into a "nudity site" for the purposes of blocking. The vendor went so far as to state that a single image of Michelangelo's David, on one page among hundreds of thousands on a site, would be sufficient grounds for a nudity classification. I suspect that none of the censorship advocates in the Lords understand that the offshore commercial operators they're proposing to put in charge of the nation's information access apply this kind of homeopathic standard to objectionable material.

Web surfing is putting impulses of packets, without congestion avoidance, into FIFO queues where they do severe collateral damage to anything sharing the link (including itself!). So today’s web behavior incurs huge collateral damage on itself, data centers, the edge of the network, and in particular any application that hopes to have real time behavior. How do we solve this problem?

The reason for the copyright industry to push for surveillance is simple: any digital communications channel can be used for private conversation, but it can also be used to share culture and knowledge that is under copyright monopoly. In order to tell which communications is which, you must sort all of it – and to do that, you must look at all of it. In other words, if enforcing the copyright monopoly is your priority, you need to kill privacy, and specifically anonymity and secrecy of correspondence.

James Welch, Legal Director for Liberty, said:
 
“Those demanding the Snoopers’ Charter seem to have been indulging in out-of-control snooping even without it – exploiting legal loopholes and help from Uncle Sam.
“No-one suggests a completely unpoliced internet but those in power cannot swap targeted investigations for endless monitoring of the entire globe.”

Writing about the new Internet nationalism, I talked about the ITU meeting in Dubai last fall, and the attempt of some countries to wrest control of the Internet from the US. That movement just got a huge PR boost. Now, when countries like Russia and Iran say the US is simply too untrustworthy to manage the Internet, no one will be able to argue. We can't fight for Internet freedom around the world, then turn around and destroy it back home. Even if we don't see the contradiction, the rest of the world does.

Four major music companies have secured court orders requiring six internet service providers to block access by subscribers to various Pirate Bay websites within some 30 days in a bid to prevent illegal downloading of copyright music and other material. [...]

Today, Mr Justice Brian McGovern said he was satisfied to make the order in circumstances including that new copyright laws here and in the EU permitted such orders to be made. He said he fully agreed with a previous High Court judge who had said he would make such blocking orders if the law permitted and noted the law now allowed for such orders. The form of the orders means the music companies will not have to make fresh applications to court if Pirate Bay changes its location on the internet.

On June 3, 2013, trading in SPY exploded at 09:59:59.985, which is 15 milliseconds before the ISM's Manufacturing number released at 10:00:00. Activity in the eMini (traded in Chicago), exploded at 09:59:59.992, which is 8 milliseconds before the news release, but 7 milliseconds after SPY. Note how SPY and the eMini traded within a millisecond for the Consumer Confidence release last week, but the eMini lagged SPY by about 7 milliseconds for the ISM Manufacturing release. The simultaneous trading on Consumer Confidence is because that number is released at the same time in both NYC and Chicago.

The ISM Manufacturing number is probably released on a low latency feed in NYC, and then takes 5-7 milliseconds, due to the speed of light, to reach Chicago. Either the clock used to release the ISM number was 15 milliseconds fast, or someone (correctly) jumped the gun.

Update: [...] The clock used to release the ISM was indeed, 15 milliseconds fast. This could be from using the default setting of many NTP clients, which allows the clock to drift up to about 16 milliseconds before adjusting time.

I wasn’t aware of any datasets describing network behavior both within and across datacenters, so we launched m1.small Amazon EC2 instances in each of the eight geo-distributed “Regions,” across the three us-east “Availability Zones” (three co-located datacenters in Virginia), and within one datacenter (us-east-b). We measured RTTs between hosts for a week at a granularity of one ping per second.

The Bottom Half Of The Internet -- "Racism; typos; filth; spam; ignorance; rage – that's all the bottom half of the internet is good for, right? Rob Manuel wants you to question the internet dictum, most beloved of high-profile columnists, that you should ignore all of the comments all of the time. The 'war on comments', he reckons, might just be an echo of a fourth estate that's having trouble adjusting to the idea of an unwashed public disagreeing with their sacred opinions. Sous les pavés, la plage."

On Tuesday, le cool Dublin & Pilcrow present SPIEL. Rob Manuel is the flashy animator behind B3ta and he's joined by Ed Melvin, who wants to educate you on 'The Unreal Engines' of virtual currencies and economies.

As can seen from the BGP output, we were using a /32 route going over AS 34109. This was highly suspicious for two reasons. First, a /32 route refers only to a single IP address. Except in special cases, routes are normally /24 (256 hosts) or larger. Second, the AS 34109 belongs to CB3ROB which is an Internet provider that has actually been in conflict with Spamhaus (see: spamhaus; allspammedup; theregister). Certainly they weren’t running a legitimate Spamhaus server. It seems clear that the CB3ROB network hijacked one (or more) of the IP addresses of Spamhaus, and installed a DNS server there which incorrectly returns positive results to every query. The result causes harm to Spamhaus users and their customers, making Spamhaus unusable for anyone unable to correct the problem as we did, and perhaps even undermining the credibility of Spamhaus itself.

Having a bad day on the Internet is nothing new. These are the types
of events we deal with on a regular basis, and most large network
operators are very good at responding quickly to deal with situations like
this. In our case, we worked with Cloudflare to quickly identify the
attack profile, rolled out global filters on our network to limit the
attack traffic without adversely impacting legitimate users, and worked
with our other partner networks (like NTT) to do the same. If the attacks
had stopped here, nobody in the "mainstream media" would have noticed, and
it would have been just another fun day for a few geeks on the Internet.

The next part is where things got interesting, and is the part that nobody
outside of extremely technical circles has actually bothered to try and
understand yet. After attacking Cloudflare and their upstream Internet
providers directly stopped having the desired effect, the attackers turned
to any other interconnection point they could find, and stumbled upon
Internet Exchange Points like LINX (in London), AMS-IX (in Amsterdam), and
DEC-IX (in Frankfurt), three of the largest IXPs in the world. An IXP is
an "interconnection fabric", or essentially just a large switched LAN,
which acts as a common meeting point for different networks to connect and
exchange traffic with each other. One downside to the way this
architecture works is that there is a single big IP block used at each of
these IXPs, where every network who interconnects is given 1 IP address,
and this IP block CAN be globally routable. When the attackers stumbled
upon this, probably by accident, it resulted in a lot of bogus traffic
being injected into the IXP fabrics in an unusual way, until the IXP
operators were able to work with everyone to make certain the IXP IP
blocks weren't being globally re-advertised.

Note that the vast majority of global Internet traffic does NOT travel
over IXPs, but rather goes via direct private interconnections between
specific networks. The IXP traffic represents more of the "long tail" of
Internet traffic exchange, a larger number of smaller networks, which
collectively still adds up to be a pretty big chunk of traffic. So, what
you actually saw in this attack was a larger number of smaller networks
being affected by something which was an completely unrelated and
unintended side-effect of the actual attacks, and thus *poof* you have the
recipe for a lot of people talking about it. :)

Hopefully that clears up a bit of the situation.

So, we're done. Welcome to a world where Google knows exactly what sort of porn you all like, and more about your interests than your spouse does. Welcome to a world where your cell phone company knows exactly where you are all the time. Welcome to the end of private conversations, because increasingly your conversations are conducted by e-mail, text, or social networking sites.
And welcome to a world where all of this, and everything else that you do or is done on a computer, is saved, correlated, studied, passed around from company to company without your knowledge or consent; and where the government accesses it at will without a warrant.
Welcome to an Internet without privacy, and we've ended up here with hardly a fight.

Chilling Effects is setup to stop the ‘chilling effects’ of Internet censorship. Google sees this as a good thing and sends takedown requests it receives to be added to the database. Fox sends takedown requests to Google for pages which the company says contain links to material it holds the copyright to. Those pages include those on Chilling Effects which show which links Fox wants taken down. Google delists the Chilling Effects pages from its search engine, thus completing the circle and defeating the very reason Chilling Effects was set up for in the first place.