jm + end-to-end + crypto   2

Google's new end-to-end key distribution proposal
'For End-To-End, our current approach to key distribution, is to use a model similar to Certificate Transparency, and use the email messages themselves as a gossip protocol, which allow the users themselves to keep the centralized authorities honest. This approach allows users to not have to know about keys, but at the same time, be able to make sure that the servers involved aren't doing anything malicious behind the users' back.'
end-to-end  encryption  google  security  email  crypto  key-distribution 
august 2014 by jm
Nelson's Weblog: tech / bad / failure-of-encryption
One of the great failures of the Internet era has been giving up on end-to-end encryption. PGP dates back to 1991, 22 years ago. It gave us the technical means to have truly secure email between two people. But it was very difficult to use. And in 22 years no one has ever meaningfully made email encryption really usable. [...]

We do have SSL/HTTPS, the only real end-to-end encryption most of us use daily. But the key distribution is hopelessly centralized, authority rooted in 40+ certificates. At least 4 of those certs have been compromised by blackhat hackers in the past few years. How many more have been subverted by government agencies? I believe the SSL Observatory is the only way we’d know.


We do also have SSH. Maybe more services need to adopt that model?
ssh  ssl  tls  pki  crypto  end-to-end  pgp  security  surveillance 
august 2013 by jm

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