jm + ecc   4

ImperialViolet - Juniper: recording some Twitter conversations
Adam Langley on the Juniper VPN-snooping security hole:
... if it wasn't the NSA who did this, we have a case where a US gov­ern­ment back­door ef­fort (Dual-EC) laid the ground­work for some­one else to at­tack US in­ter­ests. Cer­tainly this at­tack would be a lot eas­ier given the pres­ence of a back­door-friendly RNG al­ready in place. And I've not even dis­cussed the SSH back­door. [...]
primes  ecc  security  juniper  holes  exploits  dual-ec-drbg  vpn  networking  crypto  prngs 
december 2015 by jm
Australia tries to ban crypto research – by ACCIDENT • The Register
Researchers are warned off [discussing] 512-bits-plus key lengths, systems “designed or modified to perform cryptanalytic functions, or “designed or modified to use 'quantum cryptography'”. [....] “an email to a fellow academic could land you a 10 year prison sentence”.


https://twitter.com/_miw/status/556023024009224192 notes 'the DSGL 5A002 defines it as >512bit RSA, >512bit DH, >112 bit ECC and >56 bit symmetric ciphers; weak as fuck i say.'
law  australia  crime  crypto  ecc  rsa  stupidity  fail 
january 2015 by jm
NSA: Possibly breaking US laws, but still bound by laws of computational complexity
I didn’t clearly explain that there’s an enormous continuum between, on the one hand, a full break of RSA or Diffie-Hellman (which still seems extremely unlikely to me), and on the other, “pure side-channel attacks” involving no new cryptanalytic ideas.  Along that continuum, there are many plausible places where the NSA might be.  For example, imagine that they had a combination of side-channel attacks, novel algorithmic advances, and sheer computing power that enabled them to factor, let’s say, ten 2048-bit RSA keys every year.  In such a case, it would still make perfect sense that they’d want to insert backdoors into software, sneak vulnerabilities into the standards, and do whatever else it took to minimize their need to resort to such expensive attacks.  But the possibility of number-theoretic advances well beyond what the open world knows certainly wouldn’t be ruled out.  Also, as Schneier has emphasized, the fact that NSA has been aggressively pushing elliptic-curve cryptography in recent years invites the obvious speculation that they know something about ECC that the rest of us don’t.
ecc  rsa  crypto  security  nsa  gchq  snooping  sniffing  diffie-hellman  pki  key-length 
september 2013 by jm
Applied Cryptography, Cryptography Engineering, and how they need to be updated
Whoa, I had no idea my knowledge of crypto was so out of date! For example:
ECC is going to replace RSA within the next 10 years. New systems probably shouldn’t use RSA at all.


This blogpost is full of similar useful guidelines and rules of thumb. Here's hoping I don't need to work on a low-level cryptosystem any time soon, as the risk of screwing it up is always high, but if I do this is a good reference for how it needs to be done nowadays.
thomas-ptacek  crypto  cryptography  coding  design  security  aes  cbc  ctr  ecb  hmac  side-channels  rsa  ecc 
july 2013 by jm

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