jm + debit-cards   5

This is how cyber attackers stole £2.26m from Tesco Bank customers | ZDNet
What a shitshow.
Poor design of Tesco Bank debit cards played a significant role in creating security vulnerabilities that led to thousands of customers having their accounts emptied. One of these involved the PAN numbers -- the 16-digit card number sequence used to identify all debit cards.

Tesco Bank inadvertently issued debit cards with sequential PAN numbers. This increased the likelihood that the attackers would find the next PAN number in the sequence.

It took 21 hours after the attack began before Tesco Bank's Fraud Strategy Team was informed about the incident.

Only after what the FCA describes as a "series of errors" -- including Tesco Bank's Financial Crime Operations Team sending an email to the wrong address, instead of making a phone call as procedure requires -- was the fraud team made aware of the attack.

In all that time, nothing had been done to stop the attacks, with fraudulent transactions continuing to siphon money from accounts as the bank received more and more calls from worried customers.
tesco  fail  tesco-bank  banking  pan-numbers  debit-cards  security  fraud  uk 
9 weeks ago by jm
PayWave & PayPass deletion via RFID antenna kill
remove RFID from a payment card with a single drilled hole
rfid  banking  cards  debit-cards  credit-cards 
november 2016 by jm
How a criminal ring defeated the secure chip-and-PIN credit cards | Ars Technica
Ingenious --
The stolen cards were still considered evidence, so the researchers couldn’t do a full tear-down or run any tests that would alter the data on the card, so they used X-ray scans to look at where the chip cards had been tampered with. They also analyzed the way the chips distributed electricity when in use and used read-only programs to see what information the cards sent to a Point of Sale (POS) terminal.

According to the paper, the fraudsters were able to perform a man-in-the-middle attack by programming a second hobbyist chip called a FUN card to accept any PIN entry, and soldering that chip onto the card’s original chip. This increased the thickness of the chip from 0.4mm to 0.7mm, "making insertion into a PoS somewhat uneasy but perfectly feasible,” the researchers write. [....]

The researchers explain that a typical EMV transaction involves three steps: card authentication, cardholder verification, and then transaction authorization. During a transaction using one of the altered cards, the original chip was allowed to respond with the card authentication as normal. Then, during card holder authentication, the POS system would ask for a user’s PIN, the thief would respond with any PIN, and the FUN card would step in and send the POS the code indicating that it was ok to proceed with the transaction because the PIN checked out. During the final transaction authentication phase, the FUN card would relay the transaction data between the POS and the original chip, sending the issuing bank an authorization request cryptogram which the card issuer uses to tell the POS system whether to accept the transaction or not.
security  chip-and-pin  hacking  pos  emv  transactions  credit-cards  debit-cards  hardware  chips  pin  fun-cards  smartcards 
october 2015 by jm
Full iSight report on the Kaptoxa attack on Target
'POS malware is becoming increasingly available to cyber criminals' ... 'there is growing demand for [this kind of malware]'. Watch your credit cards...
debit-cards  credit-cards  security  card-present  attacks  kaptoxa  ram-scrapers  trojans  point-of-sale  pos  malware  target 
january 2014 by jm
IPSO representative trivialising impact of the Loyaltybuild data breach
A very worrying quote from Una Dillon of the Irish Payment Services Organisation in regard to the Loyaltybuild incident:
“I wouldn’t be overly concerned if one of my cards was caught up in this,” Dillon says. “Even in the worst-case scenario – one in which my card was used fraudulently – my card provider will refund me everything that is taken”.


This reflects a deep lack of understanding of (a) how identity fraud works, and (b) how card-fraud refunds in Ireland appear to work.

(a): Direct misuse of credit card data is not always the result. Fraudsters may prefer to instead obtain separate credit through identity theft, ie. using other personal identifying data.

(b): Visa debit cards have no credit limit -- your bank account can be cleared out in its entirety, and refunds can take a long time. For instance, http://www.askaboutmoney.com/showthread.php?t=174482 describes several cases, including one customer who waited 21 days for a refund.

All in all it's trivialising a major risk for consumers. As I understand it, a separate statement from IPSO recommended that all customers of Loyaltybuild schemes need to monitor their bank accounts daily to keep an eye out for fraud, which is pretty absurd. Not impressive at all.
loyaltybuild  ipso  money  cards  credit-cards  visa  debit-cards  payment  fraud  identity-theft  ireland 
november 2013 by jm

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