jm + data-dumps   3

Data Protection Mishap Leaves 55M Philippine Voters at Risk
Every registered voter in the Philippines is now susceptible to fraud and other risks after a massive data breach leaked the entire database of the Philippines’ Commission on Elections (COMELEC). While initial reports have downplayed the impact of the leak, our investigations showed a huge number of sensitive personally identifiable information (PII)–including passport information and fingerprint data–were included in the data dump. [....]

Based on our investigation, the data dumps include 1.3 million records of overseas Filipino voters, which included passport numbers and expiry dates. What is alarming is that this crucial data is just in plain text and accessible to everyone. Interestingly, we also found a whopping 15.8 million record of fingerprints and a list of people running for office since the 2010 elections.

In addition, among the data leaked were files on all candidates running on the election with the filename VOTESOBTAINED. Based on the filename, it reflects the number of votes obtained by the candidate. Currently, all VOTESOBTAINED file are set to have NULL as figure.

fingerprints  biometrics  philippines  authentication  data-dumps  security  hacks  comelec  e-voting  pii  passports  voting 
april 2016 by jm
HSE data releases may be de-anonymisable
Although the data has been kept anonymous, the increasing sophistication of computer-driven data-mining techniques has led to fears patients could be identified.
A HSE spokesman confirmed yesterday that the office responded to requests for data from a variety of sources, including researchers, the universities, GPs, the media, health insurers and pharmaceutical companies. An average of about two requests a week was received. [...]
The information provided by the HPO has significant patient identifiers removed, such as name and date of birth. According to the HSE spokesman, individual patient information is not provided and, where information is sought for a small group of patients, this is not provided where the number involved is under five. “In such circumstances, it is highly unlikely that anyone could be identified. Nevertheless, we will have another look at data releases from the office,” he said.


I'd say this could be readily reversible, from the sounds of it.
anonymisation  sanitisation  data-dumps  hse  health  privacy  via:tjmcintyre 
june 2014 by jm
'Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets' [pdf]
paper by Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov, 2008.

'We present a new class of statistical de- anonymization attacks against high-dimensional micro-data, such as individual preferences, recommendations, transaction records and so on. Our techniques are robust to perturbation in the data and tolerate some mistakes in the adversary's background knowledge. We apply our de-anonymization methodology to the Netflix Prize dataset, which contains anonymous movie ratings of 500,000 subscribers of Netflix, the world's largest online movie rental service. We demonstrate that an adversary who knows only a little bit about an individual subscriber can easily identify this subscriber's record in the dataset. Using the Internet Movie Database as the source of background knowledge, we successfully identified the Netflix records of known users, uncovering their apparent political preferences and other potentially sensitive information.'
anonymisation  anonymization  sanitisation  databases  data-dumps  privacy  security  papers 
june 2014 by jm

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