jm + biometrics   8

Firms involved in biometric database in India contracted by Irish government
Two tech firms – one owned by businessman Dermot Desmond – involved in the creation of a controversial biometric database in India, are providing services for the Government’s public services card and passports. Known as the Aadhaar project, the Indian scheme is the world’s largest ever biometric database involving 1.2 billion citizens. Initially voluntary, it became mandatory for obtaining state services, for paying taxes and for opening a bank account.

[...]
Dermot Casey, a former chief technology officer of Storyful, said that if the Daon system was used to store the data and carry out the facial matching then the Government “appears to have purchased a biometric database system which can be extended to include voice, fingerprint and iris identification at a moment’s notice”.

Katherine O’Keefe, a data protection consultant with Castlebridge, said if the departments were using images of people’s faces to single out or identify an individual, they were “by legal definition processing biometric data”.
biometrics  databases  aadhar  id-cards  ireland  psc  daon  morpho 
10 weeks ago by jm
Ireland goes Big Brother as police upgrade snooping abilities - The Register
The Garda Síochána has proposed to expand its surveillance on Irish citizens by swelling the amount of data it collects on them through an increase in its CCTV and ANPR set-ups, and will also introduce facial and body-in-a-crowd biometrics technologies. [...] The use of Automated Facial Recognition (AFR) technology is fairly troubled in the UK, with the independent biometrics commissioner warning the government that it was risking inviting a legal challenge back in March. It is no less of an issue in Ireland, where the Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) audited Facebook in 2011 and 2012, and scolded the Zuckerborg over its use of facial recognition technology.
afr  facial-recognition  minority-report  surveillance  ireland  gardai  cctv  anpr  biometrics  privacy 
june 2016 by jm
Data Protection Mishap Leaves 55M Philippine Voters at Risk
Every registered voter in the Philippines is now susceptible to fraud and other risks after a massive data breach leaked the entire database of the Philippines’ Commission on Elections (COMELEC). While initial reports have downplayed the impact of the leak, our investigations showed a huge number of sensitive personally identifiable information (PII)–including passport information and fingerprint data–were included in the data dump. [....]

Based on our investigation, the data dumps include 1.3 million records of overseas Filipino voters, which included passport numbers and expiry dates. What is alarming is that this crucial data is just in plain text and accessible to everyone. Interestingly, we also found a whopping 15.8 million record of fingerprints and a list of people running for office since the 2010 elections.

In addition, among the data leaked were files on all candidates running on the election with the filename VOTESOBTAINED. Based on the filename, it reflects the number of votes obtained by the candidate. Currently, all VOTESOBTAINED file are set to have NULL as figure.

fingerprints  biometrics  philippines  authentication  data-dumps  security  hacks  comelec  e-voting  pii  passports  voting 
april 2016 by jm
Your Relative's DNA Could Turn You Into A Suspect
Familial DNA searching has massive false positives, but is being used to tag suspects:
The bewildered Usry soon learned that he was a suspect in the 1996 murder of an Idaho Falls teenager named Angie Dodge. Though a man had been convicted of that crime after giving an iffy confession, his DNA didn’t match what was found at the crime scene. Detectives had focused on Usry after running a familial DNA search, a technique that allows investigators to identify suspects who don’t have DNA in a law enforcement database but whose close relatives have had their genetic profiles cataloged. In Usry’s case the crime scene DNA bore numerous similarities to that of Usry’s father, who years earlier had donated a DNA sample to a genealogy project through his Mormon church in Mississippi. That project’s database was later purchased by Ancestry, which made it publicly searchable—a decision that didn’t take into account the possibility that cops might someday use it to hunt for genetic leads.

Usry, whose story was first reported in The New Orleans Advocate, was finally cleared after a nerve-racking 33-day wait — the DNA extracted from his cheek cells didn’t match that of Dodge’s killer, whom detectives still seek. But the fact that he fell under suspicion in the first place is the latest sign that it’s time to set ground rules for familial DNA searching, before misuse of the imperfect technology starts ruining lives.
dna  familial-dna  false-positives  law  crime  idaho  murder  mormon  genealogy  ancestry.com  databases  biometrics  privacy  genes 
october 2015 by jm
FBI admits flaws in hair analysis over decades
Wow, this is staggering.
The Justice Department and FBI have formally acknowledged that nearly every examiner in an elite FBI forensic unit gave flawed testimony in almost all trials in which they offered evidence against criminal defendants over more than a two-decade period before 2000. [....]

The review confirmed that FBI experts systematically testified to the near-certainty of “matches” of crime-scene hairs to defendants, backing their claims by citing incomplete or misleading statistics drawn from their case work. In reality, there is no accepted research on how often hair from different people may appear the same. Since 2000, the lab has used visual hair comparison to rule out someone as a possible source of hair or in combination with more accurate DNA testing. Warnings about the problem have been mounting. In 2002, the FBI reported that its own DNA testing found that examiners reported false hair matches more than 11 percent of the time.
fbi  false-positives  hair  dna  biometrics  trials  justice  experts  crime  forensics  inaccuracy  csi 
april 2015 by jm
Madhumita Venkataramanan: My identity for sale (Wired UK)
If the data aggregators know everything about you -- including biometric data, healthcare history, where you live, where you work, what you do at the weekend, what medicines you take, etc. -- and can track you as an individual, does it really matter that they don't know your _name_? They legally track, and sell, everything else.
As the data we generate about ourselves continues to grow exponentially, brokers and aggregators are moving on from real-time profiling -- they're cross-linking data sets to predict our future behaviour. Decisions about what we see and buy and sign up for aren't made by us any more; they were made long before. The aggregate of what's been collected about us previously -- which is near impossible for us to see in its entirety -- defines us to companies we've never met. What I am giving up without consent, then, is not just my anonymity, but also my right to self-determination and free choice. All I get to keep is my name.
wired  privacy  data-aggregation  identity-theft  future  grim  biometrics  opt-out  healthcare  data  data-protection  tracking 
november 2014 by jm
Fingerprints are Usernames, not Passwords
I could see some value, perhaps, in a tablet that I share with my wife, where each of us have our own accounts, with independent configurations, apps, and settings.  We could each conveniently identify ourselves by our fingerprint.  But biometrics cannot, and absolutely must not, be used to authenticate an identity.  For authentication, you need a password or passphrase.  Something that can be independently chosen, changed, and rotated. [...] Once your fingerprint is compromised (and, yes, it almost certainly already is, if you've crossed an international border or registered for a driver's license in most US states), how do you change it?  Are you starting to see why this is a really bad idea?
biometrics  apple  security  fingerprints  passwords  authentication  authorization  identity 
october 2013 by jm
Biometric authentication failing in Mysore
Biometrics was rolled out for food distribution in order to cut down on fraud, but it's now resulting in a subset of users being unable to authenticate:
The biometric authentication system installed at the PDS outlets fails to establish the identity of many genuine beneficiaries, mostly workers, as their daily grind in the agricultural fields, construction sites or as domestic help have eroded the lines on their thumb resulting in distorted impressions.
fail  risks  biometrics  authentication  mysore  security  india  fingerprinting 
september 2013 by jm

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