dunnettreader + wealth   23

Neil Cummins - Longevity and the Rise of the West: Lifespans of the European Elite, 800-1800 (2014)
Longevity and the Rise of the West: Lifespans of the European Elite, 800-1800
I analyze the age at death of 121,524 European nobles from 800 to 1800. Longevity began increasing long before 1800 and the Industrial Revolution, with marked increases around 1400 and again around 1650. Declines in violence contributed to some of this increase, but the majority must reflect other changes in individual behavior. The areas of North-West Europe which later witnessed the Industrial Revolution achieved greater longevity than the rest of Europe even by 1000 AD. The data suggest that the `Rise of the West' originates before the Black Death.
Downloaded WP version via iPhone to DBOX
lifestyle  16thC  10thC  13thC  14thC  17thC  11thC  paper  medieval_history  economic_history  life_expectancy  social_history  downloaded  12thC  elites  warrior_class  feudalism  18thC  British_history  nobles  wealth  Western_Europe  15thC  demography  9thC  landowners 
january 2017 by dunnettreader
Primary and Secondary Markets by Egmont Kakarot-Handtke :: SSRN - Aug 2011, update March 2015
Also Dec 2012 Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper No. 741 -- University of Stuttgart - Institute of Economics and Law -- This paper swaps the standard behavioral axioms for structural axioms and applies the latter to the analysis of the emergence of secondary markets from the flow part of the economy. Real and nominal residuals at first give rise to the accumulation of the stock of money and the stock of commodities. These stocks constitute the demand and supply side of secondary markets. The pricing in these markets is different from the pricing in the primary markets. Realized appreciation in the secondary markets is different from income or profit. To treat primary and secondary markets alike is therefore a category mistake.-- Pages in PDF File: 26 -- Keywords: new framework of concepts, structure-centric, axiom set, residuals, real and monetary stocks, money, credit, financial saving, nonfinancial saving, net worth, financial profit, nonfinancial profit, retained profit, appreciation, wealth -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  economic_theory  macroeconomics  financial_system  markets  markets-structure  primary_markets  secondary_markets  asset_prices  profit  investment  interest_rates  savings  capital_gains  money  wealth  credit  liquidity  downloaded 
september 2015 by dunnettreader
Nancy Fraser: Rethinking Recognition. New Left Review 3, May-June 2000.
Has the liberating charge of struggles for recognition dissolved into pure identity politics? Do these have to sidestep inequalities of wealth and power? Not, Nancy Fraser contends, if recognition is understood as a question of social status rather than existential address. -- interesting fit from a social justice angle of key themes taken up by Jacib Levy in his new book -- downloaded pdf to Note
social_theory  culture_wars  cultural_authority  classes  status  political_participation  minorities  identity  identity_politics  multiculturalism  communitarian  identity-multiple  wealth  inequality-opportunity  inequality  inequality-wealth  redistribution  reification  recognition  Hegel  dialogue  marginalized_groups  downloaded 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Nitzan, Jonathan - From Olson to Veblen: The Stagflationary Rise of Distributional Coalitions (1992) | bnarchives
Paper read at the annual meeting of the History of Economics Society. Fairfax, Virginia. 1-2 June (1992). pp. 1-75. -- This essay deals with the relationship between stagflation and the process of restructuring. The literature dealing with the interaction of stagnation and inflation is invariably based on some explicit or implicit assumptions about economic structure, but there are very few writings which concentrate specifically on the link between the macroeconomic phenomenon of stagflation and the process of structural change. Of the few who dealt with this issue, we have chosen to focus mainly on two important contributors – Mancur Olson and Thorstein Veblen. The first based his theory on neoclassical principles, attempting to demonstrate their universality across time and place. The second was influenced by the historical school and concentrated specifically on the institutional features of modern capitalism. Despite the fundamental differences in their respective frameworks, both writers arrive at a similar conclusion, namely, that the phenomenon of stagflation is inherent in the dynamic evolution of collective economic action, particularly in the rise and consolidation of 'distributional coalitions.' -- Keywords: absentee ownership, intangible assets, big business, bonds, capital, accumulation, capitalism, collective action, collusion, corporation, credit, degree of monopoly, distributional coalitions, excess capacity, finance, immaterial wealth, income distribution, industry, inflation, institutions, interest, labour, liabilities, machine process, material wealth, neoclassical economics, normal rate of return, power, price, profit, productivity, property, sabotage, scarcity, stagnation, stagflation, stocks, tangible assets, technology, United States, value
paper  US_economy  economic_history  economic_theory  institutional_economics  Veblen  political_economy  Olson_Mancur  public_choice  collective_action  capital  capitalism  power  power-asymmetric  business-and-politics  interest_groups  interest_rates  interest_rate-natural  profit  corporate_ownership  managerialism  industry  production  productivity  productivity-labor_share  sabotage-by_business  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  wealth  asset_prices  financial_system  credit  competition  monopolies  oligopoly  prices  inflation  stagnation  property  technology  capital_markets  antitrust  neoclassical_economics  change-economic  change-social  levels_of_analyis  mesolevel  microfoundations  downloaded  EF-add 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Neva Goodwin - How we got here: Adam Smith minus Karl Marx; Keynes tortured by Samuelson (RWER paper) | Real-World Economics Review Blog
C in the second half of that century the field developed almost as though no one aside from Ricardo had ever thought about macro issues until Keynes came along, to prescribe how to get out of the Great Depression of the 1930s. From the point of view of those who began to call themselves neoclassical economists there were some problems with Keynes’ prescriptions. Politically, Keynes was on what came to be the losing side, in his conviction of the importance of government’s role in stabilizing economies. Methodologically as well his approach did not fit the Procrustean bed on which Paul Samuelson laid the thinkers he worked over to come up with his Principles texts. The bits that hung over the bed and had to be chopped off included a belief in the probability of market failures. The bits that were too short and had to be stretched to fit Samuelson’s passion for the tidiness and precision of mathematics were any ideas that could not easily be described in formal models.Thus, if the skeleton of 20th century microeconomics was Adam Smith minus Karl Marx, that of macroeconomics was Keynes tortured by Samuelson. -- downloaded pdf to Note
economic_history  intellectual_history  economic_theory  18thC  19thC  20thC  neoclassical_economics  Keynesian  political_economy  distribution-income  wealth  markets  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Raphaele Chappe - Policy Debates In A Post-Piketty World | Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Research - New School
As the ratio of capital to income (which Piketty terms "beta") increases, Piketty argues there is no natural mechanism that would lead r (the rate of return on capital) to adjust downwards so as to perfectly compensate the impact on the distribution, placing emphasis on policies that might reduce r. Taxation is one way to reduce r and Piketty's proposal is a progressive world-wide tax on wealth although many agree that this may prove politically unfeasible, especially in the absence of international legal cooperation. Other tax possibilities for fighting inequality include increasing tax rates on capital gains and dividends (which have been getting favorable treatment in the tax code as compared with labor income), or simply combating tax evasion for the wealthy (see The Price of Offshore Revisited). [Downloaded] In my own research, I plan to run simulations to test the effectiveness of such tax proposals, and their impact on the wealth distribution. -- According to a study written for the Tax Justice Network by a former chief economist at the consultancy firm McKinsey, a global super-rich elite has accumulated an astronomical amount of financial investments hidden in tax havens, at least $21 trillion and as much as $32 trillion of private offshore wealth (as of the end of 2010).
economic_theory  economic_growth  Piketty  inequality  wealth  taxes  tax_havens  1-percent  labor  wages  profit 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
JW Mason - The Slack Wire: Piketty and the Money View - September 2014
All the empirical material in the book relates to stocks and flows of money. But when he turns to explain the patterns he finds in this data, he does it in terms of physical inputs to physical production. The money wealth present in a country is assumed to correspond to the physical capital goods, somehow converted to a scalar quantity. And the incomes received by wealth owners is assumed to correspond to a physical product somehow attributable to these capital goods. But the production processes that are supposed to explain these shifts are described without any data at all, purely deductively. You would think that if Piketty believed that the share of property income in total income depends on physical production technologies, returns to scale, depreciation, etc., then at least half the book would be taken up with technological history. In fact, of course, these topics are not discussed at all. Terms like “production” and “depreciation” are black boxes, pure mathematical formalism. -- Unfortunately, discussion of the book has been almost entirely about the irrelevant formalism. I think that is why the conversation has been so noisy yet advanced so little. -- the disconnect between the two different Pikettys shows, in a negative way, why what I've been calling the money view is so important. The historical data assembled in Capital in the 21st Century is a magnificent accomplishment and will be drawn on by economic historians for years to come. Many of the concrete observations he makes about this material are original and insightful. But all of this is lost when translated into Piketty's preferred theoretical framework. To make sense of the historical evolution of money payments and claims, we need an approach that takes those payments and claims as objects of study in themselves.
books  Piketty  wealth  capitalism  capital  macroeconomics  economic_theory  economic_models  economic_growth  money  investment  investors  profit  technology  production  productivity  political_economy  financial_economics  financial_system  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Squarely Rooted - I Wrote Way Too Much About “Capital in the Twenty-First Century” — Medium - July 2014
Very thought provoking re changes in the composition and returns to capital -- Depreciation is the great systemic regulator — absent productivity/technology growth, depreciation is an absolute limit on our ability to accumulate capital ad infinitum. Or is it? Depreciation is a law of the physical world, and therefore a limit on the accumulation of physical capital, which many people intensely associate with “capital” in their minds. But it is extremely important not to do so in this context, as Piketty uses capital synonymously with all wealth. And the nature of capital itself is changing What does this mean? It means that the focus on capital as stuff is fundamentally off-base — capital, at least as defined by Piketty, is at least to some degree detached from stuff. This makes more sense when you look at the Q-ratio of many of today’s most valuable firms [Apple et al]. These are all vastly above not just the current national average but the highest the national average has ever been, and by an astonishing amount. But investors believe that these tech companies, which have rapidly become a vast part of the economy, are worth way, way more than the sum of their parts. -- ... all these claims [against assets] are, on a fundamental level, determined by legal and political systems that are mutable by humans. They are not laws of nature. This is most clear in Piketty’s discussion of “Rhenish capitalism,” specifically in the curious phenomenon of the relatively-low levels of German capital relative to income - which vanishes when you compare book value instead of market value of capital - overwhelmingly a Tobin’s Q issue. -- Land, in fact, may be the key to explaining why the returns to capital decline much more slowly than models with traditional assumptions would predict. If you confuse “capital” as Piketty defines it with “machines,” even subconsciously, this would make much less sense. -- Oh, and one last thing — land doesn’t depreciate.
books  reviews  Piketty  economic_history  economic_theory  economic_models  economic_growth  investment  profit  capitalism  inequality  rentiers  landowners  capital  wealth  sovereign_wealth_funds  plutocracy  1-percent  capital_markets  investors  manufacturing  technology  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Brad DeLong - The Four Big Valid Issues People Have with Thomas Piketty's Grand Argument: Friday Focus for June 27, 2014 (Brad DeLong's Grasping Reality...)
I think there are four big valid issues with Thomas Piketty's grand argument: [they're all pretty feeble or wishful thinking unfortunately - DeLong puts too heavy a weight on several of them, producing a guesstimate of 50:50 we will have Piketty world if things left on autopilot] -- see comments, especially Dan Kervick who once again challenges Piketty critics for not reading the last chapters (which don't readily translate into mainstream macro models, so their criticism is generally nonresponsive to Piketty’s historical data and explanations)
Piketty  economic_history  economic_theory  economic_models  capital  wealth  profit  savings  charity  1-percent  economic_culture  status  elite_culture  inequality  political_culture  political_economy  moral_economy  capitalism 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
JW Mason - The Slack Wire: Mehrling on Black on Capital - June 2014
From Mehrking - downloaded pdf to Note -- Black’s emphasis is on the market value of wealth calculated as the expected present value of future income flows, rather than on the quantity of wealth calculated as the historical accumulation of savings minus depreciation. This allows Black to treat knowledge and technology as forms of capital, since their expected effects are included when we measure capital at market value. For Black, the standard aggregative neoclassical production function is inadequate because it obscures sectoral and temporal detail by attributing current output to current inputs of capital and labor, -- It’s familiar math, but the meaning it expresses remains very far from familiar to the trained economist. For one, the labor input has been replaced by human capital so there is no fixed factor. For another, both physical and human capital are measured at market values, and so are supposed to include technological change. This means that the A coefficient is not the usual technology shift factor (the familiar “Solow residual”) but only a multiplier, indeed a kind of inverse price earnings ratio, that converts the stock of effective composite capital into a flow of composite output. -- In retrospect, the most fundamental source of misunderstanding came (and comes still) from the difference between an economics and a finance vision of the nature of the economy. The classical economists habitually thought of the present as determined by the past. The financial point of view, by contrast, sees the present as determined by the future, or rather by our ideas about the future...and the quantity of capital can therefore change without prior saving.
economic_theory  economic_models  economic_growth  macroeconomics  Piketty  neoclassical_economics  financial_economics  capital  wealth  investment  savings  interest_rates  profit  productivity  human_capital  technology  labor  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
BofA Merrill Lynch Backs Piketty - Business Insider June 2014
Ajay Kapur and his team said this in a lengthy report titled, "Piketty and Plutonomy: The revenge of inequality," outlining the impacts of plutonomists, or the super rich, on investors. The skew toward the super-rich makes looking at averages an incomplete exercise: "When wealth and income are as concentrated as they are, and expected (a la Piketty) to get even more so, examining the 'average' consumer or 'average' investor makes little sense. Examining the fat tail – the behavior of the plutonomists, rather than that of the multitudinous many – is more advantageous to investors. Plutonomists determine and dominate spending and investment decisions and their magnitudes. Any analysis that does not tease out the skewed global income and wealth distribution, but focuses on the average is flawed from the start and is incomplete, as we step into its deeper extremes." "Economic and earnings surprises are linked to their behavior," they write. -- charts show the biggest wealth gains in US have been made mostly among the super rich. -- see Kapur papers from 2005 & 2006 on Plutonomy -- downloaded pdfs to Note
Piketty  US_economy  economic_history  economic_growth  economic_sociology  economic_culture  plutocracy  inequality  investment  investors  profit  finance_capital  wealth  downloaded  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Branko Milanovic - globalinequality: Where I disagree and agree with Debraj Ray’s critique of Piketty’s Capital in the 21s Century - June 2014
Debraj’s error consists...in not realizing that normal capitalist relations of production (where capitalists tend to be rich) are forgotten when we look at economic laws in an abstract manner. Not doing that is precisely a great virtue of Piketty’s book. Surely, (a) if capital/labor proportions were the same across income distribution; (b) if, more extremely, capitalists were poor and workers rich; (c) if capital were state-owned, all of these contradictions would disappear. But none of (a)-(c) conditions holds in contemporary capitalism. So Piketty’s economic laws and contradictions of capitalism do exist. Where do I agree wit Debraj? That Kuznets curve cannot be easily dismissed. I am currently working on the idea that we are now witnessing the upswing of the 2nd Kuznets curve since the Industrial revolution. Moreover I believe this is not only the 2nd but perhaps 5th, 6th or 10th curve over the past 1000 years in the West. Does this agreement on Kuznets then, by itself, imply that my defense of Piketty’s mechanism cannot be right or consistent? Not at all. Piketty isolated the key features of capitalist inequality trends when they are left to themselves: the forces of divergence (inequality) will win. But there are also other forces: capital destruction, wars, confiscatory taxation, hyperinflation, pressure of trade unions, high taxation of capital, rising importance of labor and higher wages, that at different times go the other way, and, in a Kuznets-like fashion, drive inequality down. So, I believe, Piketty has beautifully uncovered the forces of divergence, mentioned some of the forces of convergence, but did not lay to rest the ghost of Kuznets inverted U shaped curve
books  reviews  economic_history  economic_theory  political_economy  Piketty  capitalism  wealth  labor  wages  Marx  macroeconomics  economic_growth  inequality  cliometrics  Kuznets_curve  savings  investment  profit  rentiers  consumers  Medieval  Renaissance  Europe-Early_Modern  Great_Divergence  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Per Krusell, Tony Smith - Piketty’s ‘Second Law of Capitalism’ vs. standard macro theory | vox , 1 June 2014
Thomas Piketty’s new book has been widely praised for its empirical contribution, but his prediction of rising inequality rests on economic theory. This column argues that Piketty’s pessimistic forecast is based on an extreme – and unrealistic – assumption about households’ saving behaviour. According to standard theory, the wealth–income ratio would increase only modestly as growth falls, so declining growth would not be a powerful force for generating high inequality. -- my 1st Q does standard theory adequately separate the savings patterns of those with extreme wealth before the advent of slower growth? 2nd Q are they assuming wealth = capital?
Piketty  economic_growth  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  wealth  savings  profit  inequality  wages 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Thomas Palley » The accidental controversialist: deeper reflections on Thomas Piketty’s “Capital” - April 2014
Using a conventional marginal productivity framework, Piketty provides an explanation of rising inequality based on increases in the gap between the marginal product of capital, which determines the rate of profit (r), and the rate of growth (g). Because capital ownership is so concentrated, a higher profit rate or slower growth rate increases inequality as the incomes of the wealthy grow faster than the overall economy. The conventional character of Piketty’s theoretical thinking rears its head in his policy prescriptions. -- Mainstream economists will assert the conventional story about the profit rate being technologically determined. However, as Piketty occasionally hints, in reality the profit rate is politically and socially determined by factors influencing the distribution of economic and political power. Growth is also influenced by policy and institutional choices. That is the place to push the argument....My prediction is “r minus g” arithmetic will make its way into the curriculum, with the profit rate explained as the marginal product of capital; Chicago School economists will counter the economy has mechanisms limiting prolonged wide divergence of r and g; and Harvard and MIT graduate students will have opportunities to do market failure research arguing the opposite. The net result is economics will be left essentially unchanged and even more difficult to change.
books  reviews  Piketty  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  productivity  capital  labor  technology  inequality  wealth  political_economy  profit  capitalism  institutional_economics  laisser-faire  information-asymmetric  competition  education-higher  economic_culture  sociology_of_knowledge  heterodox_economics  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Seth Ackerman - Piketty’s Fair-Weather Friends | Jacobin May 2014
Re Piketty not fitting in MIT-liberal economics -- Piketty “misreads the literature by conflating gross and net returns to capital,” Summers wrote. “I know of no study suggesting that measuring output in net terms, the elasticity of substitution is greater than 1, and I know of quite a few suggesting the contrary.” A reader at this point could be forgiven for feeling confused. Didn’t Piketty gather his own data? He did, of course. --As Piketty makes clear, those data — which he’s made freely available on the internet for anyone to check — are indeed “explained” by a net elasticity of 1.3-1.6, which would indicate an extremely weak force of diminishing returns to capital. Yet it’s also true that this figure is far higher than any found in the existing literature — probably more than twice as high as the highest typical estimates. -- Piketty’s estimate of the elasticity of substitution can’t really be compared with those in the literature. His is based on economy-wide data covering decades and centuries while estimates in the literature typically cover only a few years, and often just a few industries. Moreover, his pertain to all private wealth, while the literature focuses narrowly on production capital. -- But most importantly, given the flawed marginalist theory behind it, and its even more flawed basis of measurement... the elasticity of substitution simply cannot be regarded as a meaningful measure of an economy’s technology (or anything else), or as providing any clue to its future. What’s essential, rather, is Piketty’s empirical demonstration that the rate of return on wealth has been remarkably stable over centuries — and, contra Summers, with no visible tendency to vary in any consistent way against the “supply of capital.”
books  reviews  Piketty  economic_history  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  heterodox_economics  productivity  capital  labor  profit  wages  technology  economic_growth  savings  inheritance  1-percent  inequality  meritocracy  wealth  supermanagers  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  political_economy  economic_culture  economic_sociology  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Suresh Naidu - Capital Eats the World | Jacobin May 2014
A first step could be a multisector model with both a productive sector and an extractive, rent-seeking outlet for investment, so that the rate of return on capital has the potential to be unanchored from the growth of the economy. This model could potentially do a better job of explaining r > g in a world where capital has highly profitable opportunities in rent-seeking ....More fundamentally, a model that started with the financial and firm-level institutions underneath the supply and demand curves for capital, rather than blackboxing them in production and utility functions, could illuminate complementarities among the host of other political demands that would claw back the share taken by capital and lower the amount paid out as profits before the fiscal system gets its take. This is putting meat on what Brad Delong calls the “wedge” between the actual and warranted rate of profit. -- We need even more and even better economics to figure out which of these may get undone via market responses and which won’t, and to think about them jointly with the politics that make each feasible or not. While Piketty’s book diagnoses the problem of capital’s voracious appetite, it would require a different kind of model to take our focus off the nominal quantities registered by state fiscal systems, and instead onto the broader distribution of political power in the world economy.
books  reviews  kindle-available  Piketty  political_economy  economic_theory  heterodox_economics  neoclassical_economics  economic_models  economic_growth  wealth  capital  finance_capital  capitalism  labor  Labor_markets  unemployment  markets_in_everything  tax_havens  investment  investors  savings  inheritance  profit  corporate_governance  corporate_citizenship  inequality  technology  1-percent  rent-seeking  rentiers  class_conflict  oligarchy  taxes  productivity  corporate_finance  property  property_rights  neoliberalism 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Chris Dillow - Stumbling and Mumbling: Housing vs financial wealth - May 2014
Chris Giles deserves great credit for his careful scrutiny of Thomas Piketty's data, and Piketty also deserves credit for the openness of that data and for his generous response to Chris. Like Justin Wolfers and Paul Krugman, though, I wonder just how damaging Chris's critique is of Piketty's central thesis. Chris says that, in the UK, "there seems to be little consistent evidence of any upward trend in wealth inequality of the top 1 percent." He points to ONS data showing that the top 1% owned 12.5% of all wealth in 2010-12. However, this proportion is depressed because house prices are high. These mean that the owner of quite a modest home has substantial wealth which naturally depresses the proportion of wealth held by the really well-off. If we look only at financial wealth, we see a different picture. The top 1% owns 36.4% of all financial wealth, and the top 10% owns 75.9% (table 2.6b of this Excel file). As the ONS points out, the Lorenz curve for financial wealth is much steeper than that for property wealth. If you believe the ONS is under-counting offshore wealth, inequality is even greater. This poses the question: should we conflate housing and financial wealth as Chris and Thomas both do? Perhaps not, because housing wealth might not have as much "wealthiness" as financial wealth, in four senses: [interesting discussion and links]
economic_history  economic_theory  political_economy  Piketty  inequality  UK_economy  wealth  housing  1-percent  capitalism  power  plutocracy  links  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
JW Mason - The Slack Wire: Wealth Distribution and the Puzzle of Germany - April 2014
In other words, one reason household wealth is low in Germany is because German households exercise their claims on the business sector not via financial assets, but as workers. -- It’s not a coincidence that Europe’s dominant economy has the least market wealth. The truth is, success in the world market has depended for a long time now on limiting dependence on asset markets, just as the most successful competitors within national economies are the giant corporations that suppress the market mechanism internally. Germany, as with late industrializers like Japan, Korea, and now China, has succeeded largely by ensuring that investment is not guided by market signals, but through active planning by banks and/or the state. There’s nothing new in the fact that greater real wealth in the sense of productive capacity goes hand hand with less wealth in the sense of claims on the social product capitalized into assets. Only in the poorest and most backward countries does a significant fraction of the claims of working people on the product take the form of asset ownership. The world of small farmers and self-employed artisans isn’t one we can, or should, return to. Perhaps the world of homeowners managing their own retirement savings isn’t one we can, or should, preserve.
economic_history  economic_growth  political_economy  20thC  21stC  development  wealth  inequality  investment  capital_markets  labor  wages  profit  SMEs  Germany  EU  corporate_governance  corporate_finance  working_class  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader

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