dunnettreader + universals   9

John Sellars - Stoic Ontology and Plato's "Sophist" (2010) | Academia.edu
in V. Harte, M.M. McCabe, R.W. Sharples, A. Sheppard, eds, Aristotle and the Stoics Reading Plato, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Suppl. 107 (2010), 185-203 -- Keywords: Metaphysics, Plato, and Stoicism -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  Academia.edu  intellectual_history  Stoicism  metaphysics  ancient_philosophy  ancient_Greece  ontology  Being  nothing  ideas-theories  concepts  universals  categories  Plato  Platonism  Seneca  Zenon_of_Citium  commentaries  late_antiquity  ancient_Rome  bibliography  downloaded 
november 2015 by dunnettreader
Mediaeval Logic and Philosophy - Paul Vincent Spade
Translations, notes, course materials and articles downloadable as pdfs -- he wrote the William of Ockham entry for the Stanford EP, lots if materials on universals, and goes back to Boethius, including B's commentary on Porphyry questions
Neoplatonism  medieval_philosophy  universals  translation  courses  Boethius  logic  website  Ockham  article  etexts  nominalism  Aristotle 
november 2015 by dunnettreader
David Auerbach - Georg Simmel's Philosophy of Money - Waggish - August 2014
Rather than focusing on how people argue over the allocations of values, he looks at how the prior requirement, the nature of valuation itself, influences those discussions. The main themes, as I read them, are the following: 1. Money as a structural metaphor for human existence (almost every aspect of it) 2. The dual nature of the word “value,” moral and monetary 3.The physicalization, universalization, and commodification of value (through money or otherwise) 4. The effects of valuation and commensurability on human relations. The final theme ultimately becomes most important, but Simmel spends time laying the groundwork for it by examining the nature of value and how it is assigned and fixed, before he then moves on to how value is standardized and made portable and universal by money. Simmel’s treatment of “value” is heavily influenced by Kant’s first and third critique, which isn’t too surprising given that Simmel came out of the 19th century neo-Kantian movement which wanted to reclaim Kant’s worth after Hegelianism had petered out. Value, being something not assigned by nature but by creatures, becomes a crucial cognitive category in life, despite being something that each of us has comparatively little control over. (Language is also a category of this sort, though at least in 1900 “value”‘s constructed nature was a bit more clear than that of language.) Simmel makes clear just how philosophical it is by declaring in the introduction that money has attracted his attention because it is the purest and most ubiquitous manifestation of the perennial problem that has vexed philosophers, the relation between the universal and the particular.
intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  social_theory  neo-Kantian  Simmel  moral_psychology  moral_philosophy  values  money  Cassirer  Germany  constructivism  commodification  universals  particulars  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Charles Taliaferro - Dualism and the Problem of Individuation | JSTOR: Religious Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1986), pp. 263-276
Quite helpful review of various metaphysical debates from Descartes onwards, how the "substance" debates have evolved, including the old identity of indiscernables claim that's been thoroughly challenged in post WWII analytical_philosophy. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  20thC  Descartes  Locke  Butler  Reid  metaphysics  ontology  substance  soul  dualism  physicalism  mind-body  consciousness  immortality  universals  particulars  identity  self  analytical_philosophy  logic  Leibniz  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Bix - Raz on Necessity (last revised 2009 ) :: SSRN - Law and Philosophy, vol. 22, pp. 537-559 (2003)
The article uses Joseph Raz's work as the starting point for a general discussion of the role of necessity and essence in jurisprudence. Analytical legal theorists commonly assert (or assume) that they are offering conceptual truths, claims regarding attributes necessarily true of all legal systems. Is it tenable to speak about necessary truths with a humanly created institution like law? Upon closer investigation, the use of necessary truths in writers like Raz and Jules Coleman clearly differs from the way such terms are used in classical metaphysics, and even in contemporary discussions of natural kind terms. Nonetheless, theorists making conceptual statements regarding law are making significant and ambitious claims that need to be defended - for example, against naturalists like Brian Leiter, who doubt the value of conceptual analysis, and normative theorists like Stephen Perry, who argue that assertions about the nature of law require value-laden moral and political choices between tenable alternatives. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  legal_system  legal_theory  analytical_philosophy  concepts  metaphysics  modal_logic  possible_worlds  universalism  universals  natural_kinds  natural_law  moral_philosophy  morality-objective  morality-conventional  normativity  essence  naturalism  legal_realism  philosophy_of_language  Raz  positivism-legal  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Nathan Houser, review - Paul Forster, Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // March 2013
Key ideas and insights from Peirce are frequently featured in contemporary research ranging across much of philosophy, and across other disciplines, yet when these ideas are considered together, it is difficult to see how they can belong to one system of thought. A notable accomplishment of Paul Forster... is that he has achieved a comprehensive account of most of Peirce's leading ideas in a way that gives the reader a grasp of how everything fits together in the context of Peirce's battle against nominalism. This is no mere device for unifying Peirce's wide-ranging ideas; his opposition to nominalism motivated him as nothing else did and, as Forster shows, is central to his philosophical program. While Peirce's argument against nominalism was strictly philosophical, his objection to it extended beyond logic to what he regarded as the undesirable consequences of nominalism for civilization. Peirce understood nominalism in the broad anti-realist sense usually attributed to William of Ockham, as the view that reality consists exclusively of concrete particulars and that universality and generality have to do only with names and their significations. This view relegates properties, abstract entities, kinds, relations, laws of nature, and so on, to a conceptual existence at most. Peirce believed nominalism (including what he referred to as "the daughters of nominalism": sensationalism, phenomenalism, individualism, and materialism) to be seriously flawed and a great threat to the advancement of science and civilization. His alternative was a nuanced realism that distinguished reality from existence and that could admit general and abstract entities as reals without attributing to them direct (efficient) causal powers. Peirce held that these non-existent reals could influence the course of events by means of final causation (conceived somewhat after Aristotle's conception), and that to banish them from ontology, as nominalists require, is virtually to eliminate the ground for scientific prediction as well as to underwrite a skeptical ethos unsupportive of moral agency.
books  reviews  19thC  intellectual_history  Peirce  logic  nominalism  universals  laws_of_nature  kinds  philosophy_of_science  pragmatism  EF-add 
march 2014 by dunnettreader
Nathan Stemmer - On universals: an extensionalist alternative to Quine's resemblance theory | JSTOR: Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, Vol. 38, No. 1 (April, 2007), pp. 75-90
The notion of similarity plays a central role in Quine's theory of Universals and it is with the help of this notion that Quine intends to define the concept of kind which also plays a central role in the theory. But as Quine has admitted, his attempts to define kinds in terms of similarities were unsuccessful and it is mainly because of this shortcoming that Quine's theory has been ignored by several philosophers (see, e.g., Armstrong, D. M. (1978a). Nominalism and realism: Universals and Scientific realism (Vol. I). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). In the present paper, I propose an alternative framework that accounts for the phenomena that Quine intends to explain with his resemblance theory. The framework agrees with Quine's austere ontology; in particular, it does not assume the existence of properties and of possible worlds. (I will mention below Quine's reason for rejecting properties and possible worlds. For a theory of Universals that assumes possible worlds, see, e.g., Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2002). Resemblance nominalism: A solution to the problem of Universals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.) Moreover, the framework is extensionalist since the abstract entities it assumes are classes and these can be individuated extensionally, for classes are identical if their members are identical. Finally, I will refute some of the objections to Quine's approach that have been raised by Armstrong and Oliver [(1996). The metaphysics of properties. Mind, 105, 1-80.] and I will argue that, contrary to what has been claimed by Oliver in a comment on Lewis [(1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.], Quine is able to specify an important set of sparse properties. -- looks helpful re the reemergence of old metaphysics re ontology -- didn't download
article  jstor  intellectual_history  20thC  21stC  Quine  metaphysics  ontology  analytical_philosophy  universals  nominalism  kinds  possible_worlds  properties  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Bence Nanay - Population thinking as trope nominalism | JSTOR: Synthese, Vol. 177, No. 1 (November 2010), pp. 91-109
The concept of population thinking was introduced by Ernst Mayr as the right way of thinking about the biological domain, but it is difficult to find an interpretation of this notion that is both unproblematic and does the theoretical work it was intended to do. I argue that, properly conceived, Mayr's population thinking is a version of trope nominalism: the view that biological property-types do not exist or at least they play no explanatory role. Further, although population thinking has been traditionally used to argue against essentialism about biological kinds, recently it has been suggested that it may be consistent with at least some forms of essentialism—ones that construe essential properties as relational. I argue that if population thinking is a version of trope nominalism, then, as Mayr originally claimed, it rules out any version of essentialism about biological kinds. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  philosophy_of_science  evolution  evolutionary_biology  universals  natural_kinds  essentialism  species  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader

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