dunnettreader + transition_economies   9

Olivier Blanchard & Michael Kremer - Disorganization - Quarterly Journal of Economics (1997)
Under central planning, many firms relied on a single supplier for critical inputs. Transition has led to decentralized bargaining between suppliers and buyers. Under incomplete contracts or asymmetric information, bargaining may inefficiently break down, and if chains of production link many specialized producers, output will decline sharply. Mechanisms that mitigate these problems in the West, such as reputation, can only play a limited role in transition. The empirical evidence suggests that output has fallen farthest for the goods with the most complex production process, and that disorganization has been more important in the former Soviet Union than in Central Europe. - downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
trust  Russia  information-asymmetric  20thC  privatization  industrialization  reputation  Eastern_Europe  risk_management  article  Central_Asia  economic_history  information-markets  transition_economies  supply_chains  manufacturing  downloaded  post-Cold_War 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Must-Read: Sharun Mukand and Dani Rodrik: The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy - Washington Center for Equitable Growth
We distinguish between… property rights, political rights, and civil rights… …Liberal democracy is that it protects civil rights (equality before the law for minorities) in addition to the other two. Democratic transitions are typically the product of a settlement between the elite (who care mostly about property rights) and the majority (who care mostly about political rights). Such settlements rarely produce liberal democracy, as the minority has neither the resources nor the numbers to make a contribution at the bargaining table. We develop a formal model to sharpen the contrast between electoral and liberal democracies…. We discuss… the difference between social mobilizations sparked by industrialization and decolonization. Since the latter revolve around identity cleavages rather than class cleavages, they are less conducive to liberal politics. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  democracy  liberal_democracy  civil_liberties  rights-legal  rights-political  human_rights  democratization  transition_economies  elites-political_influence  property_rights  property-confiscations  identity_politics  decolonization  post-colonial  industrialization  LDCs  emerging_markets  development  economic_growth  political_economy  political_culture  majoritarian  minorities  class_conflict  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Reinier Kraakman, Bernard S. Black - A Self Enforcing Model of Corporate Law :: SSRN - Harvard Law Review, vol. 109, pp. 1911-1982, 1996
This paper develops a "self-enforcing" approach to drafting corporate law for emerging capitalist economies, based on a case study: a model statute that we helped to develop for the Russian Federation, which formed the basis for the recently adopted Russian law on joint-stock companies. The paper describes the contextual features of emerging economies that make importing statutes from developed countries inappropriate, including the prevalence of controlled companies and the weakness of institutional, market, cultural, and legal constraints. Against this backdrop, we argue that the best legal strategy for protecting outside investors in emerging economies while simultaneously preserving the discretion of companies to invest is a self-enforcing model of corporate law. The self-enforcing model structures decisionmaking processes to allow large outside shareholders to protect themselves from insider opportunism with minimal resort to legal authority, including the courts. Among the examples of self-regulatory statutory provisions are a mandatory cumulative voting rule for the selection of directors, which assures that minority blockholders in controlled companies have board representation, and dual shareholder- and board-level approval procedures for self-interested transactions. The paper also examines how one can induce voluntary compliance and structure remedies in emerging economies, as well as the implications of the self-enforcing model for the ongoing debate over the efficiency of corporate law in developed economies. -- PDF File: 73 -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  corporate_law  corporate_governance  investor_protection  investors  capital_markets  emerging_markets  transition_economies  Russia  privatization  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Jack Balkin - Fragile Democracies: An Interview with Sam Issacharoff | Balkinization - June 2015
A bunch of great Qs from HB -- I recently spoke with Sam Issacharoff (NYU Law School) about his new book, Fragile Democracies: Contested Power in the Era of Constitutional Courts (CUP). -- JB: You are one of the foremost experts on American election law. How did you get interested in the constitutional problems of emerging democracies? JB: A key claim of the book is that courts can play an important role in keeping emerging democracies from backsliding into authoritarianism and dictatorship. Why are courts able to do this? -- JB: Critics of judicial review have long argued that it is inconsistent with democracy, and actually undermines it in the long run. How does your argument engage with those critics? SI: We have long debated the issue of judicial review and the countermajoritarian difficulty in the U.S. The new democracies of the 20thC and 21stC uniformly created constitutional courts whose central function was to check the exercise of power by the political branches(..) entrusted to these courts not only the power of judicial review, but the power to be the central administrative body over elections. The gamble is that democracy would be stabilized by guaranteeing limitations on government and repeat elections. (..) I would prefer to see the question whether strong court constitutionalism can sustain democracy in fractured societies as an empirical one-- of "does it work?" If it does, we can indulge the theoretical question of the legitimacy of how judicial power is exercised, but down the road a ways.
Instapaper  books  constitutional_law  constitutions  democratization  transition_economies  post-colonial  limited_government  power-concentration  power-asymmetric  accountability  government-forms  government-roles  checks-and-balances  separation-of-powers  judiciary  judicial_review  elections  voting  corruption  parties  legitimacy  legitimacy-international  authoritarian  one-party_state  democracy_deficit  political_participation  opposition  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Stanley Fischer - Socialist Economy Reform: Lessons of the First Three Years (May, 1993) | JSTOR - The American Economic Review
Stanley Fischer, The American Economic Review, Vol. 83, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (May, 1993), pp. 390-395 -- snapshot of 1st stage of transition economics and state of debates -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  jstor  economic_history  post-Cold_War  transition_economies  political_economy  economic_theory  economic_culture  economic_reform  institutional_economics  institutional_change  industrial_policy  privatization  trade-policy  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Christopher A. Hartwell - Do (successful) stock exchanges support or hinder institutions in transition economies? | Cogent Economics & Finance Volume 2, Issue 1, 2014 - T&F Online
Department of International Management, Kozminski University, Warsaw, Poland -- University of Huddersfield, UK -- A stock exchange and the presence of functioning equity markets are part and parcel of an advanced market-based financial system. Previous research has also established that equity markets function more efficiently in the presence of supporting institutions such as property rights and rule of law. But how do these two aspects of the institutional environment interact? That is, does the performance of a stock exchange support the development of property rights, or can it actually hinder it? Examining monthly data for 21 transition economies over a shifting monthly window from 1989 to 2012, and using a fixed-effects specification with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors, I find support for the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between property rights and stock market performance. While a well-functioning stock market may help reinforce property rights through demonstration effects, a stock market that has become “too successful” may entrench interests and lead to property rights-eroding policies. -- downloaded to iPhone
paper  download  financial_system  property_rights  transition_economies  capital_markets  equity_markets  financial_sector_development  emerging_markets  investors  financial_instiutions  political_economy  privatization  markets-structure  oligarchy 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo - Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution | British Journal of Political Science - Cambridge Journals Online
Inequality and democracy are far more compatible empirically than social conflict theory predicts. This article speaks to this puzzle, identifying the scope conditions under which democratization induces greater redistribution. Because autocrats sometimes have incentives to expropriate economic elites, who lack reliable institutions to protect their rights, elites may prefer democracy to autocratic rule if they can impose roadblocks to redistribution under democracy ex ante. Using global panel data (1972–2008), this study finds that there is a relationship between democracy and redistribution only if elites are politically weak during a transition; for example, when there is revolutionary pressure. Redistribution is also greater if a democratic regime can avoid adopting and operating under a constitution written by outgoing elites and instead create a new constitution that redefines the political game. This finding holds across three different measures of redistribution and instrumental variables estimation. This article also documents the ways in which elites ‘bias’ democratic institutions.
article  paywall  political_science  political_economy  democracy  inequality  elites  redistribution  revolutions  transition_economies  property_rights  economic_culture  economic_reform  political_culture  institutional_change  North-Weingast  Glorious_Revolution  Whig_Junto  Whigs-oligarchy  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Michael Slezak: Fall of USSR locked up world's largest store of carbon - environment - 02 October 2013 - New Scientist
The fall of the Soviet Union created the largest ever human-made carbon sink – abandoned farmland.

In 1991, the USSR formally split into separate republics. The subsequent collapse of industry reduced the amount of greenhouse gas emissions Russia produced – helping it to easily meet the climate targets set by the Kyoto protocol.

But as well as cutting emissions, the fall had another effect. The privatisation of land led to one of the biggest land-use changes of the 20th century. Huge tracts of farmland were abandoned when the collectivised farming system introduced by Stalin collapsed, and farmers simply left the land and headed for the cities.

Ever since, plants have been reclaiming the land and locking in carbon as they grow.
20thC  21stC  Russia  Russian_economy  agriculture  post-Cold_War  transition_economies  climate  energy 
october 2013 by dunnettreader

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