dunnettreader + transaction_costs   12

VOX ebook -The Age of Global Value Chains: Maps and Policy Issues | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal -July 2015
João Amador, Filippo di Mauro -- Global value chains (GVCs) - referring to the cross-border flows of goods, investment, services, know-how and people associated with international production networks - have transformed the world. Their emergence has resulted in a complete reconfiguration of world trade, bearing a strong impact on the assessment of competitiveness and economic policy. The contributions to this eBook are based on research carried out within the scope of the Eurosystem Competitiveness Research Network (CompNet), bringing together participants from EU national central banks, universities and international organisations interested in competitiveness issues. The mapping of GVCs and full awareness about their implications are essential to informed public debate and improved economic policy.-- downloaded pdf to Note
books  global_economy  cross-border  globalization  supply_chains  global_value_chains  economic_sociology  trade-policy  competitiveness  competition-interstate  manufacturing  transport  transaction_costs  tax_policy  business_practices  business_processes  economic_policy  development  development-impact  labor_standards  Labor_markets  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Financial Transaction Taxes in Theory and Practice | Brookings Institution - June 30, 2015
By: Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, Sarah Gault, Bryan Kim, Jim Nunns and Steve Rosenthal -- In response to the financial market crisis and Great Recession, there has been a resurgence of interest in financial transaction taxes (FTTs) around the world. We estimate that a well-designed FTT could raise about $50 billion per year in the United States and would be quite progressive. We discuss the effects of an FTT on various dimensions of financial sector behavior and its ambiguous effects on economic efficiency. -- their overview sets up lots of strawmen while acknowledging that FTTs are quite common even in money center markets like London, but they've done some estimates of various types of impacts in the paper -- didn't download
paper  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  financial_transaction_tax  liquidity  volatility  transaction_costs  international_finance 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Lee Anne Fennell, Richard H. McAdams - The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics :: SSRN - Minnesota Law Review, Forthcoming (April 2015)
Lee Anne Fennell, Richard H. McAdams, both University of Chicago Law School -- University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 713 -- Welfarist law and economics ignores the distributive consequences of legal rules to focus solely on efficiency, even though distribution unambiguously affects welfare, the normative maximand. The now-conventional justification for disregarding distribution is the claim of tax superiority: that the best means of influencing or correcting distribution is via tax-and-transfer. Critics have observed that optimal redistribution through tax may be politically infeasible, but have generally overlooked the rejoinder that the same political impediments to redistribution through tax will block redistribution through legal rules. This “invariance hypothesis,” as we label it, holds that there is only one distributive equilibrium and that Congress will offset through tax any deviations from it. We highlight the centrality of invariance to the conventional economic wisdom and assert that it is just as relevantly false as the zero transaction cost assumption. In contexts where political impediments to tax-based redistribution exceed the impediments to doctrinal redistribution, it may be possible to increase welfare by redistributing outside of tax. Welfarists should, therefore, devote as much scholarly attention to the “political action costs” of redistribution as they do to transaction costs.-- PDF File: 65. -- Keywords: redistribution, tax-and-transfer, legal rules, law and economics, welfare economics -- saved to briefcase
article  SSRN  philosophy_of_law  welfare_economics  behavioral_economics  law-and-economics  redistribution  tax_policy  transaction_costs  inequality  inequality-wealth  policymaking  US_politics 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Tom Walker - EconoSpeak: The Hours of Labour and the Problem of Social Cost - Jan 2015
Coase argued that the suggested courses of action in the Pigovian tradition – liability, taxation or regulation – were inappropriate and often undesirable.(..) However, Coase didn't consider the full range of Pigou's examples and analysis. While Coase’s restatement of the problem may have been appropriate to the specific externality problems discussed by Pigou in part II, it entirely overlooked the radically different labour market problem encountered in part III, in which competitive pressure compels an employing firm to inflict harm on both itself and its employees and thus regulatory restraint of the firm (and competing employers) may benefit both. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  economic_theory  economic_sociology  intellectual_history  welfare_economics  institutional_economics  Coase  markets  markets-structure  property_rights  transaction_costs  externalities  competition  Labor_markets  social_costs  cost-benefit  regulation-costs  collective_action  common_good  efficiency  labor_law  wages  labor_standards  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy (Sept 2014) - OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project Tax | OECD
The spread of the digital economy poses challenges for international taxation. This report sets out an analysis of these tax challenges. It notes that because the digital economy is increasingly becoming the economy itself, it would not be feasible to ring-fence the digital economy from the rest of the economy for tax purposes. The report notes, however, that certain business models and key features of the digital economy may exacerbate BEPS risks. These BEPS risks will be addressed by the work on the other Actions in the BEPS Action Plan, which will take the relevant features of the digital economy into account. The report also analyses a number of broader tax challenges raised by the digital economy, and discusses potential options to address them, noting the need for further work during 2015 to evaluate these broader challenges and potential option. - Report can be read online or $ for download
report  OECD  G20  BEPS  21stC  international_political_economy  global_governance  MNCs  taxes  tax_havens  tax_collection  OECD_economies  transfer_pricing  transaction_costs  digital_economy  accounting  firms-structure  IP  profit  arms-length_transactions  treaties  corporate_citizenship  corporate_law  corporate_tax  reform-legal  fiscal_policy 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Oct 2014 - Release of discussion draft on Action 7 of the BEPS Action Plan (Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment Status) | Tax treaties - OECD
The OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, July 2013, identifies 15 actions to address BEPS in a comprehensive manner and sets deadlines to implement these actions. Action 7 – Prevent the Artificial Avoidance of PE (permanent establishment) Status -- including through the use of commissionnaire arrangements and the specific activity exemptions. Work on these issues will also address related profit attribution issues. -- Public comments are invited on a discussion draft which ... includes proposals for changes to the definition of PE in the OECD Model Tax Convention. -- The Action Plan also notes that MNCs may artificially fragment their operations among multiple group entities to qualify for the exceptions to PE status for preparatory and auxiliary activities. -- Further, the Report Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy has identified issues in the digital economy that need to be taken into account in the course of the work on Action 7, namely ensuring that core activities cannot inappropriately benefit from the exception from PE status and that artificial arrangements relating to sales of goods and services cannot be used to avoid PE status.
OECD  OECD_economies  international_political_economy  global_governance  MNCs  taxes  tax_havens  tax_collection  transfer_pricing  treaties  BEPS  accounting  corporate_tax  corporate_citizenship  corporate_law  reform-legal  digital_economy  G20  profit  arms-length_transactions  transaction_costs  firms-structure 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Stephen Nash and Liza Rybak - On Logical Difficulties, Philosophy, and the T.C.E. Explanation of the Firm | JSTOR: Review of Social Economy, Vol. 68, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2010), pp. 339-363
By exploring the implications of the linkage between Knight and Pragmatism, some non-trivial implications can be argued to exist. Specifically, section 2 outlines the T. C. E. literature, and how it exists in an atmosphere mixed with Marshallian competition and Knightian uncertainty. Section 3 then considers the disparate philosophical positions behind the work of Knight and Marshall. Knight's critique of Marshall is seminal, not because of any trivial technical innovations that Knight may have inspired within economic theory, but because Knight grounds his work on a philosophical viewpoint that effectively devastated Hegelian philosophy: American Pragmatism. Section 4 then links together the previous two sections by considering how the T. C. E. literature exhibits a dependency on both Pragmatism and Hegelian philosophy. The non-trivial implications of understanding the T. C. E. literature as a branch of Marshallian economics, which recognises Knightian uncertainty, are developed in section 5. Possible conclusions and a summary of the argument are provided in section 6. -- over 100 references from Kant through the pragmatists, Knight and 20thC economics, variants of neoclassical, and empirical evidence including probability and uncertainty in econometrics with heavy emphasis on theories of the firm, transaction cost analysis, Coase and Williamson, markets and hierarchies-- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  19thC  20thC  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  econometrics  probability  risk  certainty  uncertainty  Kant  Hegel  Hegelian  Marshall  transaction_costs  markets  markets-structure  firms-theory  organizations  hierarchy  management  Knight  Coase  Williamson_O  pragmatism  Peirce  Dewey  economic_sociology  economic_culture  evolution-social  competition  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Douglas W. Allen - In defence of the institutional revolution - Springer
The Review of Austrian Economics
December 2013, Volume 26, Issue 4

I defend my thesis laid out in The Institutional Revolution against the comments made by McCloskey, Espin and Mokyr, and Langlois, who all believe that the weight of the great institutional transition is too great for my theory of measurement, and who all quibble with some aspects of my historical analysis. I argue that some of the comments fail to fully appreciate the Coasean approach, and that most of the historical comments miss the mark. I begin with a short discussion of Coase, and then turn to each author in turn.
books  kindle-available  reviews  economic_history  Great_Divergence  Industrial_Revolution  17thC  18thC  19thC  Britain  institutional_economics  transaction_costs  microeconomics  EF-add 
october 2013 by dunnettreader
Amalia D. Kessler: Enforcing Virtue: Social Norms and Self-Interest in an Eighteenth-Century Merchant Court (2004)
JSTOR: Law and History Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Spring, 2004), pp. 71-118 -- though I don't think she frames it this way the merchant court was a sort of self-regulatory organization that imposed norms of charitable virtue where ordinary contract law would have produced anomalous results -- enforcement of community norms reduced transaction costs and supplemented trust networks which expanded the zone of profitable commerce beyond what Ancien_régime legal system would have produced -- though community norms were Christian the Court and its officials could see themselves as promoting common good as virtuous citizens in contrast with a narrow self-interest of eg caveat emptor or strict contract construction
article  jstor  legal_history  economic_history  18thC  France  commerce  merchants  norms  transaction_costs  contracts  SROs  charity  civic_virtue  bibliography  EF-add 
september 2013 by dunnettreader

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