dunnettreader + tolerance + civic_virtue   5

Colin Kidd - Civil Theology and Church Establishments in Revolutionary America | JSTOR: The Historical Journal, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Dec., 1999), pp. 1007-1026
The discourse of America's founding generation, it is now widely recognized, was rich and variegated in its composition, drawing upon the commonwealth tradition, the English common law, Montesquieu, Locke, Scottish moral philosophy, and the classics. These sources yield significant clues as to how eighteenth-century Americans viewed religious liberty and church-state relations, subjects of the First Amendment to the Constitution. Supplementing the work of legal historians on the religious provisions of the early state constitutions, the study of political ideas suggests the parameters of the eighteenth-century debate over the effects which various types of religious belief and ecclesiastical establishment had upon manners and institutions. It also reveals the ideological underpinnings of the apparently inconsistent legal provisions for religion at the state level, and, far from settling the elusive question of `original intent', highlights the nature of the divisions within the founding generation. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  theology  religious_history  church_history  religious_culture  religion-established  civil_religion  civil_liberties  tolerance  US_constitution  17thC  18thC  British_history  British_politics  US_history  Founders  bill_of_rights  ancient_Rome  ancient_Greece  Commonwealthmen  Locke-religion  Hutcheson  Smith  Montesquieu  civic_virtue  republicanism  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  US_legal_system  US_politics  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Jeremy Waldron - Toleration and Calumny: Bayle, Locke, Montesquie and Voltaire on Religious Hate Speech (2010) :: SSRN
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 10-80 -- There is a considerable literature on the issue of hate speech. And there is a considerable literature on religious toleration (both contemporary and historic). But the two have not been brought into relation with one another. In this paper, I consider how the argument for religious toleration extends beyond a requirement of non-persection and non-establishment. I consider its application to the question of religious vituperation. The focus of the paper is on 17th and 18th century theories. Locke, Bayle and other Enlightenment thinkers imagined a tolerant society as a society free of hate speech: the kind of religious peace that they envisaged was a matter of civility not just non-persecution. The paper also considers the costs of placing limits (legal or social limits) on religious hate-speech: does this interfere with the forceful expression of religious antipathy which (for some people) the acceptance of their creed requires? -- Number of Pages in PDF File: 25 -- Keywords: Bayle, Defamation, Enlightenment, Hate Speech, Locke, Toleration -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  Enlightenment  tolerance  religious_belief  religious_wars  religious_lit  anticlerical  anti-Catholic  persecution  free_speech  civil_society  civic_virtue  politeness  hate_speech  freedom_of_conscience  Bayle  Locke  Locke-religion  Montesquieu  Voltaire  universalism  heresy  politics-and-religion  political_culture  minorities  public_sphere  public_disorder  civility-political  respect  downloaded  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Brian Leiter - Foundations of Religious Liberty: Toleration or Respect? (2010) :: SSRN - Freedom of Conscience symposium, San Diego Law Review, Forthcoming
U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 275 -- Should we think of what I will refer to generically as “the law of religious liberty” as grounded in the moral attitude of respect for religion or in the moral attitude of tolerance of religion? I start with a well-known treatment of the idea of “respect” by the moral philosopher Stephen Darwall. Re toleration, I shall draw on my own earlier discussion, though now emphasizing the features of toleration that set it apart from one kind of respect. In deciding whether “respect” or “toleration” can plausibly serve as the moral foundation for the law of religious liberty we will need to say something about the nature of religion. I shall propose a fairly precise analysis of what makes a belief and a concomitant set of practices “religious” (again drawing on earlier work). That will then bring us to the central question: should our laws reflect “respect” for religion” or only “toleration”? Martha Nussbaum has recently argued for “respect” as the moral foundation of religious liberty, though, as I will suggest, her account is ambiguous between the two senses of respect that emerge from Darwall’s work. In particular, I shall claim that in one “thin” sense of respect, it is compatible with nothing more than toleration of religion; and that in a “thicker” sense (which Nussbaum appears to want to invoke), it could not form the moral basis of a legal regime since religion is not the kind of belief system that could warrant that attitude. To make the latter case, I examine critically a recent attack on the idea of "respect" for religious belief by Simon Blackburn. -- Leiter changed his mind on some of this for his book on Toleration of Religion but discussion of Nussbaum et al looks useful -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  SSRN  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  freedom_of_conscience  religious_belief  tolerance  respect  civic_virtue  civil_liberties  sociology_of_religion  Nussbaum  Darwall  Blackburn  epistemology-moral 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Steven B. Smith - What Is "Right" In Hegel's Philosophy of Right? | JSTOR: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 83, No. 1 (Mar., 1989), pp. 3-18
I provide a thematic reconstruction of Hegel's positive concept of right. Against those who charge that Hegel denies any role to substantive political evaluation, I argue that the Philosophy of Right articulates a notion of the right to recognition (Anerkennung) as the central feature of the modern state. The concept of recognition, I contend, requires not just toleration of others but a more robust notion of respect for the @'free personality@' that is the philosophical ground of right. The right to recognition is, furthermore, intended to provide the foundation for a new form of ethical life (Sittlichkeit), Hegel's modern analogue to classical conceptions of civic virtue. In conclusion I examine briefly two objections that stand in the way of a contemporary rehabilitation of Hegelian political Philosophy.
article  jstor  intellectual_history  19thC  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  Hegel  natural_rights  tolerance  recognition  civic_virtue  civil_liberties  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader

related tags

17thC  18thC  19thC  amazon.com  ancient_Greece  ancient_Rome  anti-Catholic  anticlerical  article  Bayle  bibliography  bill_of_rights  Blackburn  books  British_history  British_politics  church_history  civic_virtue  civility-political  civilizing_process  civil_liberties  civil_religion  civil_society  Commonwealthmen  cultural_history  Darwall  downloaded  Dutch  EF-add  English_lit  Enlightenment  epistemology-moral  Founders  freedom_of_conscience  free_speech  hate_speech  Hegel  heresy  Hutcheson  intellectual_history  irony  jstor  Locke  Locke-religion  luxury  Mandeville  minorities  Montesquieu  moral_philosophy  natural_rights  Nussbaum  paper  persecution  politeness  political_culture  political_economy  political_philosophy  politics-and-religion  public_disorder  public_sphere  recognition  religion-established  religious_belief  religious_culture  religious_history  religious_lit  religious_wars  republicanism  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  respect  reviews  self-interest  Smith  sociology_of_religion  SSRN  theology  tolerance  universalism  US_constitution  US_history  US_legal_system  US_politics  Voltaire 

Copy this bookmark: