dunnettreader + sovereign_debt   121

Flores-Maciss
What determines when states adopt war taxes to finance the cost of conflict? We address this question with a study of war taxes in the United States between 1789 and 2010. Using logit estimation of the determinants of war taxes, an analysis of roll-call votes on war tax legislation, and a historical case study of the Civil War, we provide evidence that partisan fiscal differences account whether the United States finances its conflicts through war taxes or opts for alternatives such as borrowing or expanding the money supply. Because the fiscal policies implemented to raise the revenues for war have considerable and often enduring redistributive impacts, war finance—in particular, war taxation—becomes a high-stakes political opportunity to advance the fiscal interests of core constituencies. Insofar as the alternatives to taxation shroud the actual costs of war, the findings have important implications for democratic accountability and the conduct of conflict. - Downloaded via iphone
US_history  downloaded  politics-and-money  US_military  deficit_finance  sovereign_debt  business_cycles  international_finance  fiscal_policy  Congress  US_foreign_policy  capital_markets  fiscal-military_state  political_history  article  political_economy  monetary_policy  taxes  US_politics  accountability  financial_system  redistribution  business-and-politics 
july 2017 by dunnettreader
Elena Seghezza - Fiscal capacity and the risk of sovereign debt after the Glorious Revolution: A reinterpretation of the North–Weingast hypothesis (2015) — ScienceDirect
European Journal of Political Economy, June 2015, Vol.38:71–81, doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2014.12.002
Dept. of Economics, University of Genoa, Via Vivaldi 5, 16126 Genova, Italy
Several explanations have been given to account for the fact that, in contrast to the claim made by North and Weingast (1989), the decline in interest rates on British sovereign debt did not occur until several years after the Glorious Revolution in 1688. This paper puts forward the hypothesis that the decline in the risk premium on Britain's sovereign debt was due to the significant increase in excise duties in the early part of the eighteenth century. This increase was possible for two reasons. On the one hand, with the Glorious Revolution, parliament no longer had reason to fear that the King would strengthen his political power due to the availability of more fiscal revenue. On the other hand, the new excise taxes were borne mostly by the poor, that is a social class not represented in parliament. The delay in reducing the interest rate on British sovereign debt, following the Glorious Revolution, was, therefore, due to the length of time needed to increase and improve the fiscal bureaucracy responsible for the collection of excise duties.
Keywords -- Glorious Revolution Fiscal capacity Sovereign debt Interest rates
article  paywall  political_economy  institutional_economics  North-Weingast  Glorious_Revolution  fiscal-military_state  fiscal_space  tax_policy  tax_collection  bureaucracy  sovereign_debt  interest_rates  Parliament  Parliamentary_supremacy  interest_groups  inequality  excise  lower_orders  taxes-consumption  landed_interest 
december 2016 by dunnettreader
Joseph Joyce - Capital Flows and Financial Crises | Capital Ebbs and Flows - Oct 2016
Prof at Wellesley. The impact of capital flows on the incidence of financial crises has been recognized since the Asian crisis of 1997-98. Inflows before the crisis contributed to…
Pretty much my position re Chile's controls in 1990s - FDI good, portfolio vulnerable to hot money, bad, especially foreign-denominated debt, but also bank deposits attracted by interest rates but easily reversed. But they're finding that it's not just the flows that are destabilizing -- exchange rate appreciation comes with foreign capital buying debt assets as well. So much for developing local bond markets? -- See links to papers, tracking not just macro level but B-schools looking at firm-level incentives, who goes in for leverage, etc.
economic_history  financial_crisis  financialization  emerging_markets  capital_flows  FDI  capital_markets  sovereign_debt  FX-misalignment  FX  economic_policy  from instapaper
october 2016 by dunnettreader
Vitor Gaspar - The Making of a Continental Financial System; Lessons for Europe from Early American History (2014) IMF working paper
Alexander Hamilton was the first U.S. Treasury Secretary from 1789 to 1795. When he started, the Federal Government was in default. During his tenure, U.S. Treasuries became the ultimate safe asset. He successfully managed expectations, achieved debt service reduction, and stabilized financial panics. He delivered sound public finances and financial stability. In the end, the U.S. possessed a modern financial system able to finance innovation and growth. At a time when Europe is working its way out of the sovereign debt crisis and implementing Banking Union and Financial Union, it is worthwhile to search for lessons from early U.S. history. - downloaded via iPhone to DBOX
paper  capital_markets  18thC  risk_assessment  European_integration  US_economy  sovereign_debt  economic_history  market_integration  Eurozone  political_economy  Germany-Eurozone  governance-regional  asset_prices  downloaded  US_history  Hamilton  federalism  regional_blocs 
october 2016 by dunnettreader
Jean Tirole - Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System (eBook, Paperback 2016 and Hardcover 2002) - Princeton University Press
Written post Asia crisis but eternally applicable - he was focusing on capital flows when it still was heterodoxy -- Once upon a time, economists saw capital account liberalization--the free and unrestricted flow of capital in and out of countries--as unambiguously good. Good for debtor states, good for the world economy. No longer. Spectacular banking and currency crises in recent decades have shattered the consensus. In this remarkably clear and pithy volume, one of Europe's leading economists examines these crises, the reforms being undertaken to prevent them, and how global financial institutions might be restructured to this end. Jean Tirole first analyzes the current views on the crises and on the reform of the international financial architecture. Reform proposals often treat the symptoms rather than the fundamentals, he argues, and sometimes fail to reconcile the objectives of setting effective financing conditions while ensuring that a country "owns" its reform program. A proper identification of market failures is essential to reformulating the mission of an institution such as the IMF, he emphasizes. Next he adapts the basic principles of corporate governance, liquidity provision, and risk management of corporations to the particulars of country borrowing. Building on a "dual- and common-agency perspective," he revisits commonly advocated policies and considers how multilateral organizations can help debtor countries reap enhanced benefits while liberalizing their capital accounts.

Based on the Paolo Baffi Lecture the author delivered at the Bank of Italy, this refreshingly accessible book is teeming with rich insights that researchers, policymakers, and students at all levels will find indispensable. -- downloaded excerpt to Tab S2
books  kindle-available  downloaded  financial_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  banking  capital_adequacy  contagion  sovereign_debt  international_monetary_system  international_finance  international_political_economy  IMF  emerging_markets  globalization  global_governance  global_system 
august 2016 by dunnettreader
Pari Passu Closing Ceremonies Quote Parade - Credit Slips - Feb 2016
Lifting the Argentina injunction - the initial rationale(s) and the rationale(s) for what's changed for all the (old and new "me too" players) that changes the calculation of who's entitled to what equitable relief - like, what took so long?
Pocket  international_finance  capital_markets  sovereign_debt  default  international_law  equitable_relief  judiciary  common_law  common_law-equity  transnational_power  from pocket
february 2016 by dunnettreader
Guillaume Vuillemey, review - Nicolas Buat, John Law: La dette ou comment s’en débarrasser - La Vie des idées - 8 juillet
Recensé : Nicolas Buat, John Law – La dette ou comment s’en débarrasser, Les Belles Lettres, Collection « Penseurs de la liberté », 2015, 272 p., 21 €.
-- Mots-clés : dette | monnaie | banques | XVIIIe siècle -- John Law a laissé son nom associé à un scandale financier considérable. Nicolas Buat retrace sa vie aventureuse, et ses projets ambitieux pour dynamiser l’économie et éteindre la dette de la France. -- Que l’on cherche à tirer de l’histoire de grands enseignements, ou que l’on se satisfasse d’y contempler une galerie de portraits et de tableaux sans conséquences pour notre temps, on ne peut demeurer indifférent au personnage de John Law. Le récent ouvrage biographique de Nicolas Buat – conservateur en chef des Archives de Paris – nous invite à le redécouvrir. S’il s’inscrit dans une série déjà relativement longue de travaux consacrés à Law (dont le plus connu est certainement le livre d’Edgar Faure, La Banqueroute de Law, paru en 1977), son grand mérite est de nous plonger dans l’atmosphère bouillonnante de la Régence, sans perdre le lecteur dans de trop pointilleuses descriptions du « Système » mis en place entre 1716 et 1720. -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  French_language  political_economy  18thC  biography  Law_John  French_government  French_politics  money  monetary_theory  monetary_policy  sovereign_debt  default  Mississippi_Company  bubbles  banking  currency  investors  Regency-France  financial_system  financial_crisis  capital_markets  financial_innovation  downloaded 
october 2015 by dunnettreader
Giuseppe Guarino - response to James K. Galbraith re the "Maastricht coup" thesis - The Future of Europe | The American Prospect - August 2015
Professor Giuseppe Guarino, dean of constitutional scholars and the author of a striking small book (called The Truth about Europe and the Euro: An Essay, available here) on the European treaties and the Euro. Professor Guarino's thesis is the following: “On 1st January 1999 a coup d'état was carried out against the EU member states, their citizens, and the European Union itself. The 'coup' was not exercised by force but by cunning fraud... by means of Regulation 1466/97... The role assigned to the growth objective by the Treaty (Articles 102A, 103 and 104c), to be obtained by the political activity of the member states... is eliminated and replaced by an outcome, namely budgetary balance in the medium term.” -- downloaded pdf from Guarino's site to Note
EU-constitution  EU_governance  elections  political_participation  sovereignty  austerity  democracy  sovereign_debt  subsidiarity  budget_deficit  Maastricht  constitutional_law  representative_institutions  democracy_deficit  Europe-federalism  legitimacy  Germany-Eurozone  downloaded  European_integration 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Timothy W. Guinnane -A pragmatic approach to external debt: The write-down of Germany’s debts in 1953 | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal -13 August 2015
Greece’s crisis has invited comparisons to the 1953 London Debt Agreement, which ended a long period of German default on external debt. This column suggests that looking back, the 1953 agreement was unnecessarily generous given that Germany’s rapid growth lightened the debt repayment burden. Unfortunately for Greece, the motivations driving the 1953 agreement are nearly entirely absent today. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  sovereign_debt  default  20thC  post-WWII  Germany  international_political_economy  international_finance  international_monetary_system  Greece-Troika  creditors  EU_governance  IMF  international_organizations  structural_adjustment  austerity  economic_growth  downloaded 
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Arvind Subramanian - How the IMF Failed Greece | Project Syndicate August 2015
Grexit should have been on the menu as a realistic option, properly supported with financing the transition, instead of the horrifying unknown for Greece and the Eurozone. Better start planning, since it's likely to come up again, certainly for Greece and possibly other EZ members.
Pocket  Eurozone  Eurocrsis  Greece-Troika  EU_governance  IMF  international_organizations  international_political_economy  international_finance  international_monetary_system  sovereign_debt  from pocket
august 2015 by dunnettreader
Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol - La zone euro est-elle viable? Une perspective historique - La Vie des idées - 20 mai 2014
La crise de la zone euro a révélé les faiblesses constitutives de la monnaie unique ; mais les débats portant sur sa viabilité se limitent trop souvent à une vision purement économique de la zone euro. L’histoire complexe de la création de l’euro éclaire les enjeux financiers et politiques internationaux de l’unification monétaire. -- in many ways it's the same-old, same-old -- a group of countries with intense economic interaction that gets whip-sawed by exchange rates in a constantly evolving world that's increasingly globalized, especially capital movements -- under a series of arrangements from Bretton Woods onwards, they've been trying to manage or mitigate the problem, but they never solve it -- he repeatedly notes that the entire EC budget isn't more than 1% of the aggregate GNP of the member states -- useful aide-mémoire for each step in the evolution of the EU and European money arrangements paralled with each modification of the international monetary system -- though he notes repeatedly that finance is extremely mobile, not only within the Eurozone or within the EU but globally, and that labor and fiscal adjustments are extremely immobile within the Eurozone by comparison, he doesn't draw the obvious link of these severe mismatches to the repeated problems the EU has faced re money -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  economic_history  political_history  European_integration  post-WWII  post-Cold_War  international_monetary_system  Bretton_Woods  EU_governance  FX  FX-rate_management  FX-misalignment  Eurozone  Eurocrsis  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  sovereign_debt  Europe-federalism  EU-regulation  cross-border  Labor_markets  banking  ECB  EU-elections  political_participation  EU-Parliament  EU-parties  monetary_union  monetary_theory  international_economics  capital_flows  capital_controls  EU-fiscal_policy  convergence-econimic  fiscal_policy  Maastricht  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Clément Fontan - La BCE et la crise du capitalisme en Europe - La Vie des idées - 24 février 2015
Selon Clément Fontan, la Banque centrale européenne a outrepassé ses prérogatives et a, sans contrôle démocratique, traité de manière trop différenciée l’aide qu’elle apporte aux États et celle qu’elle alloue au système financier. Mots-clés : Europe | banque centrale | capitalisme | Grèce | euro -- quite helpful for details of how the various powers, decision-making processes and authority in the EU, the Eurozone, the member states, and the ECB interact -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  EU_governance  Eurozone  ECB  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  capitalism-systemic_crisis  finance_capital  financialization  Greece-Troika  Eurocrsis  QE  bank_runs  payments_systems  bailouts  Germany-Eurozone  France  accountability  democracy_deficit  austerity  Maastricht  sovereign_debt  sovereignty  Europe-federalism  European_integration  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Financial Market Trends - OECD Journal - Home page | OECD
‌The articles in Financial Market Trends focus on trends and prospects in the international and major domestic financial markets and structural issues and developments in financial markets and the financial sector. This includes financial market regulation, bond markets and public debt management, insurance and private pensions, as well as financial statistics. -- links to the contents of each issue of the journal
journal  website  paper  financial_system  global_economy  global_system  financial_regulation  financial_crisis  capital_markets  risk-systemic  international_finance  banking  NBFI  insurance  markets-structure  risk_assessment  risk_management  sovereign_debt  corporate_finance  corporate_governance  institutional_investors  pensions  consumer_protection  equity-corporate  equity_markets  debt  debt-overhang  leverage  capital_flows  capital_adequacy  financial_economics  financial_innovation  financial_system-government_back-stop  bailouts  too-big-to-fail  cross-border  regulation-harmonization  regulation-costs  statistics 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Brad DeLomg - German Economic Thought and the European Crisis - Washington Center for Equitable Growth - July 2017
It is a commonplace among Anglo-Saxon economists that Saxon-Saxon “ordoliberalism” was a post-World War II success only because somebody else–the United… DeLong remarks on his link to the article on why the European Crisis was inevitable given German economic theory -- that the German economists have attributed the country's economic success to ordoliberalism and German virtue when it was based on an incredibly favorable environment and policy postures by the US as global hegemon. Instapaper
Instapaper  economic_history  Germany  international_monetary_system  global_economy  post-WWII  trade-policy  global_imbalance  hegemony  Marshall_Plan  sovereign_debt  export-led  Germany-Eurozone  ordoliberalism  Keynesianism  austerity  budget_deficit  FX  FX-misalignment  Greece-Troika  economic_theory  economic_culture  economic_policy  macroeconomics  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Stephen Kinsella, Hamid Raza, Gylfi Zoega - Iceland and Ireland: Currency is not destiny | VOX, CEPR’s Policy Portal - 04 July 2015
Iceland and Ireland were both rocked by the fallout of the Global Crisis. This column argues that differences in currency arrangements affected the mechanisms of the boom and the collapse. Iceland’s banks collapsed because they did not have a lender of last resort in euros. Ireland did. But Iceland’s collapse and ensuing capital controls shifted the burden of debt restructuring onto foreign creditors to a much greater extent than in Ireland. -- actually currency is destiny, since Ireland was forced to bear the costs of bailing out private creditors due to membership in Eurozone
paper  financial_crisis  Eurocrsis  Eurozone  sovereign_debt  default  creditors  bailouts  austerity  capital_controls  EU_governance  risk_shifting 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Nicolas Delalande , review - Wolfgang Streeck, Du temps acheté - La Vie des idées - May 2015
Wolfgang Streeck, Du temps acheté. La crise sans cesse ajournée du capitalisme démocratique, Paris, Gallimard, traduit de l’allemand par Frédéric Joly, 2014 [2013], 400 p., 29 €. -- Ce que la crise a révélé, dit W. Streeck, c’est le divorce consommé de longue main entre la démocratie et le capitalisme. Ce dernier s’est tourné depuis les années 1980 vers les marchés financiers et l’endettement n’a fait que masquer le plus longtemps possible la rupture. Seule issue, selon l’auteur de ce noir diagnostic : la sortie de l’euro. -- downloaded pdf to Note
political_economy  Europe  Eurozone  EU  EU_governance  European_integration  financial_crisis  international_political_economy  international_finance  capitalism-systemic_crisis  sovereign_debt  democracy_deficit  monetary_union  austerity  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Jürgen Habermas - Re Wolfgang Streeck - Freedom and Democracy: Democracy or Capitalism? | Reset Dialogues on Civilizations - 1 July 2013
1st of a back-and-forth with Streeck and others -- Freedom and Democracy: Democracy or Capitalism? On the Abject Spectacle of a Capitalistic World Society fragmented along National Lines -- In his book on the deferred crisis of democratic capitalism Wolfgang Streeck develops an unsparing analysis of the origins of the present banking and debt crisis that is spilling over into the real economy. This bold, empirically based study developed out of Adorno Lectures at the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt. At its best—that is, whenever it combines political passion with the eye-opening force of critical factual analysis and telling arguments—it is reminiscent of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon. It takes as its starting point a justified critique of the crisis theory developed by Claus Offe and me in the early 1970s. The Keynesian optimism concerning governance prevalent at the time had inspired our assumption that the economic crisis potential mastered at the political level would be diverted into conflicting demands on an overstrained governmental apparatus and into “cultural contradictions of capitalism” (as Daniel Bell put it a couple of years later) and would find expression in a legitimation crisis. Today we are not (yet?) experiencing a legitimation crisis but we are witnessing a palpable economic crisis.
political_economy  political_philosophy  international_political_economy  capitalism-systemic_crisis  capital_as_power  finance_capital  financialization  Great_Recession  democracy  democracy_deficit  legitimacy  nationalism  financial_crisis  sovereign_debt  social_theory  globalization  global_governance  political_culture  economic_culture  stagnation  economic_sociology  Habermas  post-secular  Eurozone  European_integration  monetary_union  EU_governance  EU  Europe-federalism  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Arthur Goldhammer - The Old Continent Creaks | Democracy Journal: Summer 2015
not so long ago (the EU) was praised by some as a model of ingenious institutional innovation and cooperative transnational governance, while simultaneously denounced by others as an insidious instrument for subjecting ostensibly democratic states to the imperious dictates of capitalism in its latest “neoliberal” form? For 2 generations after World War II, memories of the devastating consequences of nationalism trumped economic rivalries, giving technocrats maneuvering room to devise continental strategies for economic growth that nevertheless enabled member states to maintain sufficient control over social policy to satisfy voter demands. For decades, this arrangement held.By the mid-1980s, however, enormous changes in the global economy forced the European Community to reinvent itself in order to remain competitive. The original balance between national sovereignty and technocratic government at the European level was altered, limiting the ability of member states to set their own economic policy. But today’s convergent crises raise the question of whether the European Union that replaced the European Community needs to reinvent itself yet again. And if so, is reinvention possible at a time when many Europeans, and especially those for whom World War II is a distant memory, feel that the EU is exacerbating nationalist enmities rather than calming them? -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  Europe  20thC  21stC  EU  EU_governance  technocracy  nation-state  nationalism  regional_blocs  sovereignty  democracy_deficit  political_participation  opposition  globalization  competition-interstate  Eurozone  economic_policy  fiscal_policy  monetary_policy  sovereign_debt  downloaded 
july 2015 by dunnettreader
interfluidity » Greece - July 2015
Steve Randy Waldmann -- his 1st take on what's been going on, and how the Eurozone gives all the power to creditors, which produces a bunch of terribly misaligned incentives -- and what business bankruptcy law guards against
Instapaper  EU  EU_governance  Eurozone  ECB  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  Greece-Troika  IMF  bailouts  political_economy  democracy_deficit  austerity  bank_runs  central_banks  lender-of-last-resort  international_organizations  international_finance  creditors  bankruptcy  incentives-distortions  sovereign_debt  default  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Ashoka Mody - In bad faith | Bruegel.org - July 3 2015
On July 2, the IMF released its analysis of whether Greek debt was sustainable or not. The report said that Greek debt was not sustainable and deep debt relief…
Instapaper  Greece-Troika  Eurozone  IMF  sovereign_debt  international_organizations  international_finance  global_governance  austerity  default  bank_runs  ECB  lender-of-last-resort  from instapaper
july 2015 by dunnettreader
Karl Whelan - The Grexit Mechanism: What It Means For The Future Of the Euro | Medium - June 26 2015
Greek crisis exposes cracks in the euro’s design that won’t be fixed by Greece leaving. Despite the euro’s legal status as an irrevocable currency union, the… Nice review of the tangle of economic, political and legal issues -- Default isn't by itself enough to force Grexit, so it's really what political stance the ECB takes, and even with Grexit there are the other members of the Eurozone suffering from similar problems as Greece -- Whelan: In recent years, the single most important factor that has papered over the cracks in the euro has been Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” commitment to preserve the euro. But if whatever-it-takes doesn’t prevent a Greek exit, there would be serious questions about what kind of euro the ECB was actually willing to bother preserving. Worth remembering is that what Draghi actually said was: "Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough." The “within our mandate” bit has provided Draghi with plenty of wiggle room to decide what kind of euro he wants to preserve. It clearly doesn’t have to be one that includes Greece. And there may be others that get jettisoned. Whether this kind of a la carte euro will survive the test of time is highly questionable.
Instapaper  Eurozone  EU  ECB  EU_governance  Europe-federalism  monetary_policy  FX  lender-of-last-resort  Greece  Greece-Troika  IMF  sovereign_debt  banking  bank_runs  austerity  FX-misalignment  Spain  Portugal  Italy  political_economy  international_finance  international_monetary_system  from instapaper
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Diane Coyle - Inventors and manufacturers, and their economics (Version 1.0) | Enlightened Economics - June 2015
Starting from her discovery of writings on new industrialization processes and firms by Babbage, she's collecting cites of works by lesser known authors who were exploring various areas of new economic activity, and inventing new ways of observing, aggregating observations, and analyzing them, including policy recommendations. They include *--* (1) Andrew Yarranton (1619-1684), the metallurgist and civil engineer, has quite an interesting work called “England’s Improvement by Land and Sea: how to Beat the Dutch without Fighting” (2 vols., 1677–81). *--* (2) A lot of people also tend to overlook Richard Price‘s (1723-1791) contributions to economics. They’ve been largely overshadowed by his radical political and theological works. But it was he who originally proposed and then advised on the National Debt sinking fund, as well being the person to promote Bayes’ work on statistics and probabilities. "Observations on Reversionary Payments: On Schemes for Providing Annuities for Widows, and for Persons in Old Age; On the Method of Calculating the Values of Assurances on Lives; And on the National Debt." Also, … a PostScript on the Population of the Kin *--* (3) Another actuarial pioneer, Robert Wallace (1697-1771), was also very prolific writing about demography and political economy. One that sounds quite intriguing is called "Dissertation on the Numbers of Mankind" (1753). -- Her links are to paperback scans, but these should be in Google Books or Internet Archive
books  Google_Books  find  economic_history  economic_theory  political_economy  17thC  18thC  19thC  British_history  mercantilism  Anglo-Dutch  Industrial_Revolution  industrialization  manufacturing  improvement  demography  productivity  sovereign_debt  public_finance  insurance  probability  safety_net  Pocket 
june 2015 by dunnettreader
Edward Hugh - Are The IMF and the EU at Loggerheads Over Greece? - May 2015
Everything has a cost, or so the story goes, especially time. In the Greek case we now know an additional item on the mounting bill: the country is back in…
Eurozone  EU  ECB  Greece-Troika  austerity  sovereign_debt  Instapaper  from instapaper
may 2015 by dunnettreader
Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz - The euro area's debt hangover — Money, Banking and Financial Markets - April 2015
You wouldn’t know it from the record low level of government bond yields, but much of Europe lives under a severe debt burden. Nonfinancial corporate debt exceeds 100 percent of GDP in Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. And, gross government debt (as measured by Eurostat) is close to or exceeds this threshold in Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Debt levels this high have important long-run consequences. (...) they are a drag on growth. High debt means that households have more difficulty maintaining consumption when income falls; firms may be unable to keep up production and investment when revenue dips; and governments are in no position to smooth expenditure when revenue falls. More economic volatility means lower growth. Beyond that, high levels of debt reduce the effectiveness of central bank stimulus. (...) So, what is the euro area to do? We see three paths out of this predicament: (1) breathtaking supply reforms that trigger an investment boom; (2) inflation; or (3) a mix of asset sales and debt relief.The first option is the best. The alternatives would threaten the survival of the euro, undermine the fiscal credibility of major governments, or both. [After pointing out the problems with 1 and 2, they look at how much would sovereign_debt have to be reduced to reach debt sustainability targets embodied in Maastricht] For Greece, the write-down is 71% of face value; for Spain, 63%; and for France 50%. Taken as a whole, meeting the 60% Maastricht criterion (while maintaining bank system capital) would require that (..the) combined debt of [Greece, Spain and France of] €9.36 trillion be written down by a total of €5.07 trillion. As extreme as this sounds, it is, in fact, insufficient. Many euro-area governments also face significant unfunded pension liabilities. (...) The sooner they own up to this, the better for their long-term growth prospects. -- copied to Pocket
EU  Eurozone  debt  debt-overhang  debt-restructuring  sovereign_debt  leverage  deleverage  economic_growth  economic_reform  creditors  default  monetary_policy  ECB  central_banks  interest_rates  investment  deficit_finance  debt_crisis  corporate_finance  demand-side  supply-side  capital_markets  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  financial_system  banking  capital_adequacy  Pocket 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Stéphanie Novak & Will Slauter - Interview with David Stasavage - Small States, Big Credit? | March 2012 - Books & ideas
Tags : state | political representation | the elite | debt | Italy
-- In States of Credit, David Stasavage explains why city-states were able to create long-term debt as early as the 13th century, whereas territorial states began to do so only in the 16th century. This research has major implications for our understanding of state formation and economic growth. Re his book -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  kindle  economic_history  political_economy  political_culture  sovereign_debt  city_states  13thC  property_rights  property-confiscations  default  representative_institutions  state-building  creditors  North-Weingast  institutional_economics  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Ashoka Mody - Living (dangerously) without a fiscal union | Bruegel.org - March 24 2015
The euro area’s political contract requires member nations to rely principally on their own resources when confronted with severe economic distress. Since monetary policy is the same for all, national fiscal austerity is the default response to counter national fiscal stress. Moreover, the monetary policy was itself stodgy in countering the crisis, and banking-sector problems were allowed to fester. And it was considered inappropriate to impose losses on private sector creditors. Thus, the nature of the incomplete monetary union and the self-imposed taboos led deep and persistent fiscal austerity to become the norm. As a consequence, growth was hurt, which undermined the primary objective of lowering the debt burden. To prevent a meltdown, distressed nations were given official loans to repay private creditors. But the stress and instability continued and soon it became necessary to ease the repayment terms on official loans. When even that proved insufficient, the German-inspired fiscal austerity was combined with the deep pockets of the European Central Bank. The ECB’s safety net for insolvent or near-insolvent banks and sovereigns, in effect, substituted for the absent fiscal union and drew the central bank into the political process. -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  Great_Recession  Eurozone  fiscal_policy  monetary_policy  austerity  ECB  banking  financial_system-government_back-stop  financial_crisis  too-big-to-fail  creditors  sovereign_debt  financial_regulation  capital_adequacy  capitalization  bailouts  bail-ins  debt-restructuring  debt  debt_crisis  debt-seniority  deleverage  political_economy  EU_governance  monetary_union  downloaded 
april 2015 by dunnettreader
Liggio, Leonard P. "Richard Cantillon and the French Economists: Distinctive French Contributions to J.B. Say." - The Journal of Libertarian Studies ( 1985) | Mises Institute
Liggio, Leonard P. "Richard Cantillon and the French Economists: Distinctive French Contributions to J.B. Say." Journal of Libertarian Studies 7, No. 2 (1985): 295–304. Richard Cantillon's life and his Essai occurred at a time of transition in European political, economic and intellectual history. The late seventeenth century had experienced the crisis in European thought which paralleled the Scientific Revolution. Accompanying the scientific revolution was a revolution in economic thought. Criticisms of mercantilism began to lay the groundwork for the Economic Revolution of the eighteenth century. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  intellectual_history  17thC  18thC  Europe-Early_Modern  Cantillon  Scientific_Revolution  social_theory  political_economy  IR_theory  mercantilism  economic_theory  economic_growth  methodology-quantitative  political_arithmetick  social_order  financial_system  banking  cross-border  capital_flows  capital_markets  sovereignty  sovereign_debt  downloaded 
february 2015 by dunnettreader
Brad DeLong - Paul de Grauwe: QE and the Euro Zone: The Sad Consequences of the Fear of QE | Equitablog - Jan 2015
Saved de Grauwe's post at The Economist to Instapaper -- Brad's introductory comments to the link to de Grauwe are his take on what would be necessary for QE to be really effective in the Euro Zone (unlikely to make a huge difference in expectations re future inflation) and the small likely effects, with even smaller likely dangers.
Eurozone  ECB  QE  central_banks  inflation-expectations  Germany-Eurozone  economic_growth  fiscal_policy  austerity  sovereign_debt  Instapaper 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
JULIAN GOODARE - The debts of James VI of Scotland | JSTOR - The Economic History Review New Series, Vol. 62, No. 4 (NOVEMBER 2009), pp. 926-952
James VI (1567–1625) was chronically indebted, and this caused him frequent problems. This article presents two series of systematic data that together indicate the main contours of his indebtedness: (1) end-of-year deficits, and (2) hived-off debts which the Crown left unpaid for long periods (sometimes permanently). The hived-off debts, reconstructed individually, constitute a narrative of fiscal policy-making. Instead of a large and catastrophic bankruptcy, James in effect had numerous small bankruptcies. He benefited from an emerging structure of Scottish domestic credit. He eventually repaid many of his debts after succeeding to the English throne in 1603. -- huge bibliography, mostly Scottish history -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  economic_history  political_history  16thC  17thC  James_I  Scotland  Britain  public_finance  fiscal_policy  deficit_finance  sovereign_debt  Crown_finance  financial_system  credit  bankruptcy  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
A. G. R. Smith, review - John Cramsie, Kingship and Crown Finance under James VI and I, 1603-1625 | JSTOR - The Economic History Review Vol. 56, No. 3 (Aug., 2003), pp. 568-569
Mixed review re the book but the short review has some interesting background re James I's finances relative to some of the revisionist historians of the English Civil War etc and some of the difficulties getting a handle on the system of government finance during the period. Downloaded pdf to Note
books  reviews  jstor  economic_history  17thC  British_history  British_politics  James_I  Buckingham_1st_Duke  public_finance  patronage  Crown_finance  Elizabeth  favorites  court_culture  courtiers  nobility  sovereign_debt  revisionism  English_Civil_War  historiography  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
T. G. Otte, review - Martin Horn, Britain, France, and the Financing of the First World War | JSTOR - The Economic History Review Vol. 56, No. 3 (Aug., 2003), pp. 578-579
Gives very high marks to both archival research and analysis - shows governance mechanisms and both cooperation and conflict, which varied over time from early (expectation of a short war) to the latter years when France was done for without external finance. Notes that Horn demolishes one of Niall Ferguson claims - so academic specialists were on to his questionable historiography on the economic policies of British Empire long before he became a joke on macroeconomics. Derives some of the conflict from the very different national objectives for "finance capital" for their respective nations and empires. Doesn't seem to get into the reparations problem. It appears the later part deals some with US loans, but transatlantic isn't a big focus. Also deals with some conflicts over support to specific allies e.g. Russia. Didn't download
books  reviews  jstor  economic_history  20thC  WWI  Britain  British_Empire  British_foreign_policy  France  French_Empire  financial_economics  international_finance  money_market  sovereign_debt  Russian_revolution  US_foreign_policy  financial_centers  financial_centers-London  WWI-finance 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
How the US Resolved Its First Debt Ceiling Crisis | Liberty Street Economics - March 2013
downloaded pdf to iPhone - the post has full text but without the references in the pdf -- In the second half of 1953, the United States, for the first time, risked exceeding the statutory limit on Treasury debt. How did Congress, the White House, and Treasury officials deal with the looming crisis? As related in this post, they responded by deferring and reducing expenditures, by monetizing “free” gold that remained from the devaluation of the dollar in 1934, and ultimately by raising the debt ceiling.
paper  downloaded  post-WWII  US_economy  US_politics  military-industrial_complex  monetary_policy  Bretton_Woods  international_monetary_system  FX  fiscal_policy  budget_deficit  Congress  sovereign_debt 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Kose, Prasad, Rogoff & Wei (2009) - Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal
downloaded to iPhone - see also papers citing this - The literature on the benefits and costs of financial globalization for developing countries has exploded in recent years, but along many disparate channels with a variety of apparently conflicting results. There is still little robust evidence of the growth benefits of broad capital account liberalization, but a number of recent papers in the finance literature report that equity market liberalizations do significantly boost growth. Similarly, evidence based on microeconomic (firm- or industry-level) data shows some benefits of financial integration and the distortionary effects of capital controls, but the macroeconomic evidence remains inconclusive. At the same time, some studies argue that financial globalization enhances macroeconomic stability in developing countries, but others argue the opposite. This paper attempts to provide a unified conceptual framework for organizing this vast and growing literature, particularly emphasizing recent approaches to measuring the catalytic and indirect benefits to financial globalization. Indeed, it argues that the indirect effects of financial globalization on financial sector development, institutions, governance, and macroeconomic stability are likely to be far more important than any direct impact via capital accumulation or portfolio diversification. This perspective explains the failure of research based on cross-country growth regressions to find the expected positive effects of financial globalization and points to newer approaches that are potentially more useful and convincing.
credit  financial_innovation  spreads  financial_crisis  contagion  investment  financial_sector_development  interest_rates  FDI  emerging_markets  download  bubbles  FX  capital_flows  monetary_policy  fiscal_policy  financial_system  IMF  banking  NBFI  business_cycles  sovereign_debt  global_economy  macroeconomics  globalization 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Menzie Chin - The Dollar’s Recent Rise in Perspective | Econbrowser Jan 2015
"My own personal worries revolve around emerging markets. As noted (e.g., [3]), and appreciating dollar implies a deterioration in emerging market firm balance sheets when there are large amounts of dollar debt. Fixed or semi-fixed exchange rates will mitigate this effect if sustainable; otherwise, pernicious feedback loops are going to be established. I particularly worry about the dollar appreciation in conjunction with increasing yields in the US. Rising US yields would likely pull financial capital from emerging markets, with particularly negative effects on growth..." -- Saved to Evernote for charts especially for impact of 1980s strong dollar
global_economy  FX  US_economy  dollar  emerging_markets  sovereign_debt  interest_rates  economic_growth  capital_flows  financial_crisis  central_banks  Fed  QE  contagion  international_political_economy  competitiveness  trade  balance_of_payments  capital_markets  commodities  asset_prices  spreads  20thC  post-WWII  Evernote 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Matthew Yglesias - Vox Jan 2015 - Fair Value Accounting: The obscure rule change that could make student loans more expensive
Proponents of Fair Value Accounting raise a lot of valid concerns about the way the United States Congress handles federal loan programs. To me, trying to resolve those problems with FVA is a cure worse than the disease. (...) But what is fundamentally called for here is political judgment not an accounting rule. It is also true that many — and perhaps most — federal credit programs are somewhat ill-conceived as policy and that it would be easier to get rid of them if we implemented FVA. But the federal government's ability to make affordable loans available in situations that would be too risky for a private bank is a real consequence of its nature as a sovereign state, not some kind of accounting error.
US_government  fiscal_policy  subsidies  Congress  US_politics  austerity  public_finance  sovereign_debt 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Merkel attacks wave of rightwing populism - FT.com Jan 2015
In a hard-hitting new year broadcast, Europe’s most powerful leader led the charge against Europe’s far-right parties, slamming the organisers of recent anti-Islam protests in Germany as having hearts “often full of prejudice, and even hate”. - also tough words for Putin, calling for EU cohesion against Russian aggression - bragging re her government's accomplishments & upbeat re Getmany's domestic situation, she's cashing in that credibility to go after the real threat, which is tight-wing extremism, leading up to ehat will be fifficult negotiations with the Greek left
EU  Eurozone  Germany  Merkel  right-wing  immigration  refugees  Russia  Ukraine  Greece  austerity  sovereign_debt 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Clement Fatovic - Reason and Experience in Alexander Hamilton’s Science of Politics | JSTOR: American Political Thought, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2013), pp. 1-30
Alexander Hamilton is often described as an enterprising modernist who promoted forward-looking reforms that broke with established institutions and ideas. However, the scale and apparent novelty of his reforms have tended to obscure the extent to which those innovations were rooted in a belief that knowledge and practice must be guided by “experience.” This article argues that even Hamilton’s most far-reaching reforms were grounded in a Humean understanding of the limits of rationality in explaining and controlling the world. Hamilton’s agreement with David Hume on the epistemic authority of experience helps explain his positions on constitutional design, executive power, democratic politics, public opinion, and other important political issues. Moreover, the epistemological underpinnings of Hamilton’s political thought are significant because they suggest that a “science of politics” grounded in experience can avoid some of the dangers associated with more rationalistic approaches yet still be quite open to significant innovation in politics. - as much or more Hume's various essays as Hamilton
article  jstor  intellectual_history  political_philosophy  moral_philosophy  18thC  British_history  British_politics  US_history  US_constitution  US_politics  US_economy  political_economy  political_culture  economic_culture  epistemology  epistemology-social  US_government  public_opinion  public_finance  democracy  republicanism  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  fiscal-military_state  sovereign_debt  Hume  Hume-politics  Hamilton  Founders  Early_Republic  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2015 by dunnettreader
Jocelyn Pixley, G.C. Harcourt eds. - Financial crises and the nature of capitalist money: Mutual developments from the work of Geoffrey Ingham (2013) | Palgrave Macmillan
This volume is a debate about a sociology and economics of money: a form of positive trespassing (..) written by scholars of both disciplines (..) starting from the original groundwork laid by Geoffrey Ingham. The contributors look critically at money's institutions and the meanings and history of money-creation and show the cross cutting purposes or incommensurable sides of money and its crises. (...) since money is a promise, understanding this social relation must be a joint though plural task between economics and sociology at the very least. **--** Preface; R. Swedeberg *-* 1. Introduction to Positive Trespassing'; J. F. Pixley and G. C. Harcourt *-* 2. Requirements of a Philosophy of Money and Finance; J. Smithin *-* 3. Ingham and Keynes on the Nature of Money; M. Hayes *-* 4. Money: Instrument of Exchange or Social Institution of Value? A. Orlean and C. Goodhart *-* 5. A New Meme for Money, R. Wray *-* 6. Monetary Surrogates and Money's Dual Nature; D. Woodruff *-* 7. Reforming Money to Exit the Crisis: Examples of Non-capitalist Monetary Systems in Theory and Practice; L. Fantacci *-* 8. The Current Banking Crisis in the UK: an Evolutionary View; V. Chick *-* 9. Money and the State; M. Sawyer *-* 10. The Real (Social) Experience of Monetary Policy; S. Dow *-* 11. Economic Policies of the New Consensus Macroeconomics: A Critical Appraisal; P. Arestis *-* 12. A Socio-economic Systems Model of the 2007+ Global Financial Crisis; T.R. Burns, A. Martinelli and P. Deville *-* 13. Credit Money, Fiat Money and Currency Pyramids: Critical Reflections on the Financial Crisis and Sovereign Debt, B. Jessop *-* 14. Geoffrey Ingham's Theory, Money's Conflicts and Social Change; J. Pixley *-* 15. Reflections on the Two Disciplines' Mutual Work; G. Ingham
books  social_theory  economic_theory  social_sciences  disciplines  money  economic_sociology  economic_culture  macroeconomics  financial_economics  financial_system  banking  financial_crisis  sovereign_debt  monetary_theory  money-Cartelist  money_supply  monetarism  monetary_policy  central_banks  financial_innovation 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Fiscal federalism network - OECD
The OECD Network on Fiscal Relations across Levels of Government provides analysis and statistical underpinnings on the relationship between central and subcentral government, and its impact on efficiency, equity and macroeconomic stability. -- Main page for reports, white papers, guides, articles, links to OECD databases
OECD  website  OECD_economies  taxes  tax_collection  fiscal_policy  state_government  cities  federalism  sovereign_debt  public_finance  statistics  databases  report  links  accountability  reform-economic  reform-finance  reform-legal  comparative_economics  centralization  central_government  center-periphery  local_government  decentralization 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Alain Charlet and Jeffrey Owens - An International Perspective on VAT - Tax Notes International, Sept 2010
An International Perspective on VAT -- by Alain Charlet and Jeffrey Owens -- Tax Notes International, Vol 59, No. 12, pp 943-54 -- September 20, 2010 -- Downloaded pdf from OECD > Centre for Tax Polic...
article  OECD  OECD_economies  taxes  tax_collection  consumers  fiscal_policy  economic_growth  political_economy  political_culture  government_finance  redistribution  sovereign_debt  inequality  downloaded  EF-add  from notes
november 2014 by dunnettreader
OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs - Consultation Papers and Comments Received (regularly updated) | Tax - OECD
The OECD's Committee on Fiscal Affairs consults with business and other interested parties through a variety of means to inform its work in the tax area. One important way of obtaining such input is through the release of papers or discussion drafts for public comment. Below is a list of past discussion drafts for comments: -- list with links to papers and comments regularly updated
OECD  OECD_economies  international_political_economy  global_governance  taxes  tax_havens  tax_collection  governments-information_sharing  fiscal_policy  sovereign_debt  public_finance  regulation-harmonization  regulation-enforcement  regulation-costs  transparency  cross-border  MNCs  international_organizations  international_finance  website  links  report 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Oct 2014 - OECD - Heads of Tax Administration agree global actions | Tax administration - OECD
24/10/2014 - The OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project and the move to automatic exchange of financial account information took centre stage when Heads of Tax Administration met on 23-24 October in Dublin, Ireland. Nearly forty delegations, including international and regional tax organisations, participated in the Ninth Meeting of the OECD Forum on Tax Administration (FTA) and agreed that ever greater co-operation will be necessary to implement the results of the BEPS project and automatic exchange of information. Specifically they agreed: ** A strategy for systematic and enhanced co-operation between tax administrations; ** To invest the resources needed to implement the new standard on automatic exchange of information; and ** To improve the practical operation of the mutual agreement process. The communiqué contains links to the following publications that have just been released by the FTA: ** Increasing Taxpayers’ Use of Self-service Channels ** Working Smarter in Tax Debt Management ** Tax Compliance by Design – Achieving improved SME Tax Compliance by Adopting a System Perspective ** Measures of Tax Compliance Outcomes – A Practical Guide -- The FTA is the leading international body concerned with tax administration, bringing together the heads of tax administrations from the OECD, members of the G20 and large emerging economies.
OECD_economies  emerging_markets  OECD  G20  BEPS  international_political_economy  global_governance  taxes  tax_havens  tax_collection  MNCs  SMEs  fiscal_policy  sovereign_debt  public_finance  regulation-harmonization  regulation-enforcement  regulation-costs  transparency  cross-border  governments-information_sharing  government_finance  government_agencies  administrative_law 
november 2014 by dunnettreader
Nitzan, Jonathan - LSE Public Event: Can Capitalists Afford Recovery? -- Video and Paper (May 2014) | bnarchives
Presentation at the LSE Department of International Relations. 27 May 2014. -- Theorists and policymakers from all directions and of all persuasions remain obsessed with the prospect of recovery. For mainstream economists, the key question is how to bring about such a recovery. For heterodox political economists, the main issue is whether sustained growth is possible to start with. But there is a prior question that nobody seems to ask: can capitalists afford recovery in the first place? If we think of capital not as means of production but as a mode of power, we find that accumulation thrives not on growth and investment, but on unemployment and stagnation. And if accumulation depends on crisis, why should capitalists want to see a recovery? -- Video duration: 2:24 hours -- Keywords: crisis, differential accumulation, economic policy, economic theory, expectations, growth, income distribution, Keynesianism, Marxism, monetarism, neoclassical economics, profit, underconsumption -- Subjects: BN State & Government, BN Power, BN Region - North America, BN Business Enterprise, BN Value & Price, BN Crisis, BN Production, BN Macro, BN Conflict & Violence, BN Money & Finance, BN Ideology, BN Distribution, BN Methodology, BN Capital & Accumulation, BN Policy, BN Class, BN Labour, BN Growth -- links to LSE on YouTube -- downloaded pdf to Note
paper  video  Great_Recession  financial_crisis  economic_growth  capital_as_power  capitalism-systemic_crisis  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  neoclassical_economics  Keynesian  Marxist  monetarism  monetary_policy  fiscal_policy  austerity  sovereign_debt  public_finance  public_policy  productivity  production  consumer_demand  underconsumption  investment  profit  productivity-labor_share  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  finance_capital  financialization  capitalization  accumulation  accumulation-differential  elites-self-destructive  elite_culture  ruling_class  class_conflict  Labor_markets  inequality  unemployment 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
Coppola Comment: Debt hysteria - September 30, 2014
The global debt glut described in the Geneva 16 report, and the global saving glut described by Bernanke, are the same thing. The authors note that growth has been slowing in developed countries since 1980. Indeed it has - and during that time capital ownership and indebtedness have been increasing in tandem, as we might expect since they are opposite sides of the same coin. The report cites numerous analyses that show high debt levels - public AND private - tending to impede growth as resources that could have been turned to productive investment are spent on debt service. Secular stagnation is as much a consequence of over-indebtedness as it is of excess capital. -- When the private sector is highly indebted, saving can take the form of paying off debt. If the government runs a surplus, therefore, it impedes deleveraging in the private sector, and may even force some sectors (typically the poor) to increase debt. Reducing the sovereign debt not only reduces saving in the private sector, it comes at the price of continued and possibly rising indebtedness. The report rightly notes that transferring debt from the private to the public sector, as the US has done, isn't deleveraging. But transferring it back again isn't deleveraging either. And as transferring it back again is likely only to be possible with extensive sovereign guarantees (the UK's Help to Buy, for example), whose debt is it really, anyway? Reports such as this, that look on debt as a problem and ignore the associated savings, fail to address the real issue. The fact is that households, corporations and governments like to have savings and are terrified of loss. Writing down the debt in which people invest their savings means that people must lose their savings. THIS is the real "shock, horror". This is what people fear when they worry about a catastrophic debt default. This is what the world went to great lengths to prevent in 2008. The problem is not the debt, it is the savings.
global_imbalance  global_economy  international_political_economy  international_finance  savings  investment  institutional_investors  debt  debt-restructuring  debtors  credit  creditors  equity  equity-corporate  sovereign_debt  default  risk  risk-systemic  inflation  austerity  economic_growth  stagnation  OECD_economies  emerging_markets  banking  capital_markets  capital_adequacy  government_finance  leverage  deleverage  property_rights  pensions  interest_rates  Evernote 
october 2014 by dunnettreader
ESMA Technical Advice on the feasibility of a network of small and medium-sized CRAs (November 2013) | ESMA
Technical Advice to the European Commission on the feasibility of a network of small and medium sized credit rating agencies in order to increase competition in the market -- The report provides quantitative and qualitative information on small and medium-sized CRAs in the EU, based on the analysis of the periodic reporting obligations of CRAs to ESMA via the central repository CEREP. It also covers possible barriers to entry for companies that wish to conduct rating activity in the EU. The main findings are: • The 22 registered CRAs are established in 11 EU Member States; • None of the small and medium-sized CRAs cover the whole range of the 5 rating classes considered (corporates non-financial, financials, insurance, sovereign and public finance, and structured finance). Whilst 2 CRAs cover 4 and 3 classes respectively, all the remaining small and medium-sized CRAs cover 1 or 2 rating classes only. Fitch, Moody’s and S&P issue ratings for all 5 rating classes; • Small and medium-sized CRAs are mainly active in corporate ratings. Within this rating type, 4 CRAs issue a relatively high number of corporate ratings or financial and insurance ratings; • Only 6 of the small and medium-sized CRAs provide sovereign ratings, whilst only one (DBRS) issues structured finance ratings; • As of end 2012 the majority of small and medium-sized CRAs issued solicited ratings only. 8 issued unsolicited ratings only. 3 small and medium-sized CRAs issued both solicited and unsolicited ratings, as was the case also for Fitch, Moody’s and S&P; <snip> ESMA is not aware of any private networks of small and medium-sized CRAs currently in place -- didn't download
report  EU  ESMA  financial_system  financial_regulation  capital_markets  debt  debtors  corporate_finance  sovereign_debt  competition-financial_sector  rating_agencies 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Sovereign ratings investigation - ESMA’s assessment of governance, conflicts of interest, resourcing adequacy and confidentiality controls (February 2013) | Esma
This report summarises the findings of the ESMA general investigation into sovereign credit ratings issued by Fitch Ratings, Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s which took place between February and October 2013, as indicated in its Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) 2013 Supervision and Policy Work Plan. ESMA describes the observed deficiencies and main concerns while also identifying a number of good practices in the following areas: • the role of senior management and other non-rating functions in the rating process and the actual or potential conflicts of interest which could arise; • the actual or potential conflicts of interests generated by the involvement of sovereign analysts in research and publication activities; • confidentiality of sovereign rating information and controls in place prior to publication of ratings (including IT and access controls to confidential information); • timing of publication of sovereign ratings, including timely disclosure of rating changes; • monitoring of the adequacy and expertise of resources dedicated to sovereign ratings; • preparation of rating committees; and • definitions of roles and responsibilities among different analytical functions. ESMA’s investigation revealed shortcomings in the sovereign ratings process which could pose risks to the quality, independence and integrity of the ratings and of the rating process. As of the date of this document, ESMA has not determined whether any of the observations made in this report constitute serious possibilities of facts likely to constitute infringements of the CRA Regulation. -- didn't download
report  EU  ESMA  financial_system  financial_regulation  international_finance  sovereign_debt  rating_agencies  conflict_of_interest  internal_controls  risk-systemic 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
EU to DO 2015-2019: Memos to the new EU leadership | André Sapir, Guntram B. Wolff, Zsolt Darvas, Silvia Merler, Nicolas Véron, Mario Mariniello, Carlo Altomonte, Reinhilde Veugelers, Rainer Münz, Suparna Karmakar, Georg Zachmann and Jim O‘Neill at B
‘THERE IS NOW A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY that this crisis will be remembered as the occasion when Europe irretrievably lost ground, both economically and politically’. This was the starting sentence of our memos to the new EU leadership five years ago. Five years later, it is fair to say that this possibility has become a reality. Unemployment has reached record levels and growth has disappointed. Meanwhile, the world outside the EU has continued to change rapidly. Emerging markets in particular have increased their weight in the global economy and in decision making. The new EU leadership – the president of the European Commission and his team of commissioners, and the presidents of the European Council and of the European Parliament – will have to address pressing challenges. Despite the significant steps taken by Europe – among them the creation of a European Stability Mechanism, the start of a banking union, the strengthening of fiscal rules and substantial structural reforms in crisis countries – results for citizens are still unsatisfactory. It is impossible to summarise all the memos in this volume but a common theme is the need to focus on pro-growth policies, on a deepening of the single market, on better and more global trade integration. Reverting to national protectionism, more state aid for national or European champions – as frequently argued for by national politicians – will not be the right way out of the crisis. On the contrary, more Europe and deeper economic integration in some crucial areas, such as energy, capital markets and the digital economy, would greatly support the feeble recovery. But in other areas, less Europe would also be a highly welcome signal that the new European leadership is serious about subsidiarity. Internal re-organisation of the European Commission to ensure that it better delivers would also be welcome. -- downloaded pdf to Note
report  EU  Eurozone  Great_Recession  economic_growth  unemployment  capital_markets  energy  financial_regulation  banking  sovereign_debt  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal - Surviving Large Losses: Financial Crises, the Middle Class, and the Development of Capital Markets (2009) | Harvard University Press
Since they're experts on especially French economic history from the 17thC onwards, the political economy approach should be interesting. **--** 1. The Political Economy of Financial Crises. -- 2. Information and Crises. -- 3. Crises and the Middle Class. -- 4. What Happens after Crises. -- 5. Financial Intermediaries and the Demand for Change. -- 6. Governments and the Demand for Reform. -- Conclusion: The Lessons of History
books  kindle-available  economic_history  economic_policy  political_economy  financial_system  financial_crisis  financial_sector_development  capital_markets  banking  middle_class  leverage  debtors  creditors  sovereign_debt  reform-economic  reform-political  distribution-wealth 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Barry Eichengreen - Restructuring Debt Restructuring - Project Syndicate - September 2014
The US courts debacle re Argentina and the vultures which effectively dismantled sovereign debt market rules and access to the US has finally (30 years kate) resulted in collective action clauses that were obviously needed from the 1980s Latin_America debt crisis -- - Eichengreen: In 2003, in an article in the American Economic Review, Ashoka Mody and I made the case for these provisions. They are basically what the International Capital Market Association of leading investors and issuers has now agreed to implement, subject to some additional details that need not be examined here. Why didn’t it happen sooner? The answer is that getting investors to agree is like herding cats. In this case, it required strong behind-the-scenes leadership from the US Treasury. The agreement is not perfect, and problems remain. Because new contractual provisions are not easily retrofitted into old bonds, it will take years before the clauses are included in the entire stock of debt. Establishing an international bankruptcy court would be a far more efficient solution, but that doesn’t make it feasible. Investors were wise to acknowledge that, in international capital markets, the perfect is the enemy of the good.
sovereign_debt  default  debt-restructuring  capital_markets  US_legal_system  US_judiciary  emerging_markets  collective_action  Argentina  Latin_America 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Coen Teulings, Richard Baldwin - Secular stagnation: Facts, causes, and cures – a new Vox eBook | vox 10 September 2014
The CEPR Press eBook on secular stagnation has been viewed over 80,000 times since it was published on 15 August 2014. -- Six years after the Crisis and the recovery is still anaemic despite years of zero interest rates. Is ‘secular stagnation’ to blame? Introduction - Coen Teulings and Richard Baldwin **--** I. Opening the debate -- 1. Reflections on the ‘New Secular Stagnation Hypothesis’, Laurence H Summers. **--** II. Three issues: Potential growth, effective demand, and sclerosis -- 2. Secular stagnation: A review of the issues, Barry Eichengreen -- 3. The turtle’s progress: Secular stagnation meets the headwinds, Robert J Gordon -- 4 Four observations on secular stagnation, Paul Krugman. -- 5. Secular joblessness, Edward L Glaeser. **--** III. Further on potential growth. -- 6. Secular stagnation? Not in your life - Joel Mokyr. -- 7 Secular stagnation: US hypochondria, European disease?, Nicholas Crafts. **--** IV. Further on effective demand. -- 8. A prolonged period of low real interest rates?, Olivier Blanchard, Davide Furceri and Andrea Pescatori. -- 9. On the role of safe asset shortages in secular stagnation, Ricardo J Caballero and Emmanuel Farhi. -- 10. A model of secular stagnation, Gauti B. Eggertsson and Neil Mehrotra. -- 11. Balance sheet recession is the reason for secular stagnation, Richard C Koo. -- 12. Monetary policy cannot solve secular stagnation alone
Guntram B Wolff. **--** V. Further on sclerosis -- 13. Secular stagnation: A view from the Eurozone, Juan F. Jimeno, Frank Smets and Jonathan Yiangou -- downloaded pdf to Note
books  etexts  kindle-available  economic_history  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  economic_theory  economic_growth  Great_Recession  stagnation  international_political_economy  capitalism  financialization  productivity  investment  technology  Labor_markets  unemployment  demand-side  supply-side  infrastructure  welfare_state  sovereign_debt  fiscal_policy  monetary_policy  central_banks  leverage  risk  uncertainty  macroeconomics  macroprudential_policies  international_monetary_system  global_economy  global_imbalance  interest_rates  profit  wages  Eurozone  US_economy  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Paper announcement - Financial Stress, Sovereign Debt and Economic Activity - May 2014 | Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis - New School
The Journal of International Money and Finance, one of the top journals for international finance, published SCEPA economists, Christian R. Proaño, Christian Schoder and Willi Semmler's working paper, 'Financial Stress, Sovereign Debt and Economic Activity in Industrialized Countries: Evidence from Dynamic Threshold Regressions.' This paper is an expansion on their policy note, 'The Role of Financial Stress in Debt and Recovery' which studied the change in the sovereign debt and its impact on economic growth. Their study discovered that national debt was insignificant in determining the level of economic growth a country experiences as long as the financial market was stable. National debt was only detrimental to countries if there were high levels of instability and risk in the financial market. These findings explain why austerity policies have failed to promote economic growth, because economic growth depends first on financial market stability, and is only an issue if financial markets are unstable. -- but what's the sources of financial market instability? Exchange rate - ability to adjust, or volatility? Capital flows? Amount of cross-border exposure of domestic banking system? Contagion? Bond market vigilantes?
paper  economic_history  economic_growth  sovereign_debt  austerity  fiscal_policy  financial_system  capital_markets  Eurozone 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Stephan W. Schill - The Sixth Path: Reforming Investment Law from Within :: SSRN June 4, 2014
Max Planck Institute for International Law -- Fourth Biennial Global Conference of the Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Working Paper No. 2014/02. *--* In reaction to a summary of five different paths for investment law reform made by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in June 2013, which focused on institutional reforms of investor-State dispute settlement, the present paper sketches out a sixth path for investment law reform that is based on a system-internal reconceptualization of investor-State arbitration as a form of public law-based judicial review. It can be reformed, the paper argues, by arbitrators and parties making increasing use of comparative public law methodology that allows them to draw on the experience of more sophisticated systems of public law adjudication at the national and international level without the need for institutional reform to investor-State arbitration. First, the paper points out the benefits of the existing system of investor-State arbitration, in order to show that investor-State arbitration is an institution worth reforming from within. Second, the paper lays out the basic framework to reconceptualize investment law as a system of public law and governance and point out shortcomings in the currently prevailing approaches to understanding investor-State arbitration. Third, the paper indicates the methodological consequences of a reconceptualization of investor-State arbitration as a public law system of governance, namely the need for arbitrators to make increased use of comparative public law in resolving disputes. Finally, the paper shows how public law ideas and comparative public law methodology can be brought into investment arbitration in its present form and why arbitrators have an interest in conforming to these standards even without fundamental institutional reform. - Number of Pages in PDF File: 25 - Keywords: investment treaties, international investment law, investor-state arbitration, investment law - downloaded pdf to Note
paper  SSRN  international_law  international_economics  law-and-economics  international_political_economy  international_finance  capital_markets  investment  sovereign_debt  investor-State_disputes  FDI  dispute_resolution  arbitration  global_governance  comparative_law  legal_system  legal_theory  legal_reasoning  reform-legal  treaties  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Joseph Cottrell - Pari Passu Saga Series - Argentina — whom do you trust? | FT Alphaville - September 4, 2014
Outlines new ootion for non vulture fund investors -- a plan by Adam Lerrick for restructured bondholders to extricate themselves from the default simply by voting to kick Bank of New York out as their trustee. BNY would, under the plan, give way to another (probably Argentine) bank not subject to US jurisdiction. This bank then wouldn’t be bound by Judge Griesa’s order for payments to go through only with holdouts also being paid, thus allowing bondholders to get their coupons. Nor would there be the jiggery-pokery of swapping New York-law bonds for local-law. That would be this plan (click for PDF): Lerrick has a decade of experience with the terms of Argentine debt, having advised European retail bondholders in the restructuring of 2005. Some might kick themselves for not having thought of a few aspects of this plan. Ironically — for a saga which showed how a dormant piece of dry boilerplate became a powerful weapon of enforcement against a sovereign debtor — it works using standard, boilerplate, trust indenture terms. -- didn't download
capital_markets  emerging_markets  international_finance  international_law  sovereign_debt  US_legal_system  US_judiciary  payments_systems  fiduciaries  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
Suzanne J. Konzelmann - The political economics of austerity | Cambridge Journal of Economics 2013
Birkbeck, University of London. -- The 2007/08 financial crisis has reignited the debate about economic austerity. With the aim of understanding why a government would pursue such a policy in the current context of persistent economic recession, this article traces the social, political and economic developments that have together shaped the evolution of ideas about austerity, from the earliest theorising by the classical political economists some 300 years ago. Throughout the historical narrative, important analytical themes revolve around the arguments used to justify austerity—notably appeals to ethics and morality (reinforced by misleading analogies drawn between government budgets and the accounts of firms and households). These include concerns about inflation and the observed relationship between inflation and unemployment; ‘Ricardian equivalence’ and ‘non-Keynesian’ effects of austerity; and the correlation between public debt levels and economic growth. The class analytics of austerity—who bears the burden of austerity and who benefits—and the process by which alternative ideas penetrate the mainstream and reconstitute the conventional wisdom are also important analytical themes. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  intellectual_history  political_economy  economic_theory  economic_sociology  economic_policy  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  Great_Recession  austerity  business_cycles  business-and-politics  ideology  macroeconomics  fiscal_policy  monetary_policy  inflation  unemployment  moral_economy  historical_sociology  class_conflict  public_opinion  public_finance  sovereign_debt  economic_growth  debt  debtors  creditors  intermediation  Labor_markets  downloaded  EF-add 
september 2014 by dunnettreader
PHILIP LOFT -- POLITICAL ARITHMETIC AND THE ENGLISH LAND TAX IN THE REIGN OF WILLIAM III. (2013). | The Historical Journal, 56, pp 321-343. - Cambridge Journals Online - Abstract
PHILIP LOFT - University College London -- This article explores the role of the method of political arithmetic and political arithmeticians in the changing methods of raising finance during the Nine Years War. It discusses the actions of parliament-men in committees and their interaction with reports containing data, and the influence of projectors on the decision to introduce, and later abandon, the pound rate. Throughout this period, political arithmeticians were active participants, providing data, advice, and schemes to the treasury and parliament, and when they were not, ‘country’ MPs, in particular, were active in calling for data and leading its cross-examination. This article suggests that debates on public finance did not occur along party lines, with ‘county communities’ given fresh presence by the quantification of the inequality of the land tax burden. Political arithmetic is shown to have played an important role in the processes and negotiations that occurred over the setting of taxation policy in the ‘long eighteenth century’. -* I thank Julian Hoppit for his generous encouragement and comments on this article. Thanks also to Clare Jackson, Andrew Preston and the anonymous reviewers. - available for download - to Note
article  17thC  18thC  British_history  British_politics  economic_history  political_economy  Glorious_Revolution  William_III  Nine_Years_War  taxes  landed_interest  land_tax  fiscal_policy  fiscal-military_state  political_arithmetick  Parliament  House_of_Commons  Parliamentary_supremacy  Country_Party  oversight-legislature  public_finance  public_policy  partisanship  Whig_Junto  Tories  Whigs-opposition  sovereign_debt  downloaded  EF-add 
august 2014 by dunnettreader
Jeff Frankel -It Takes More than Two to Tango: Cry, But Not for Argentina, nor for the Holdouts | Jeffrey Frankel’s Blog July 2014
No such debtors’ court or body of law exists at the international level. Ambitious proposals to solve it over the years, such as a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism which might be housed at the IMF, have always run into political roadblocks. But incremental steps had been slowly moving the system in the right direction since the 1980s. In the international debt crisis that began in 1982, IMF country adjustment programs went hand in hand with “bailing in” creditor banks through “voluntary” coordinated loan rollovers. After Argentina’s unilateral default in 2001, many borrowers and lenders saw more clearly the need to allow explicitly for less drastic alternatives ahead of time and so incorporated more “Collective Action Clauses”. The incremental steps had created a loose sort of system of debt restructuring. The real danger of the court ruling in the case of the Argentine hold-outs is that, in a parochial instinct to enforce a written contract, it will undermine the possibility of negotiated re-structuring of unsustainable debt burdens in future crises, because free-riding holdouts may be able to prevent it. The court delivered a peculiar interpretation of pari passu -- to mean that creditors who had not agreed to the debt exchange were to be paid 100% of the original claim at the expense of the creditors that had accepted the new bonds. Moreover, the court gave the holdouts a very powerful weapon by holding settlement and clearing institutions in the US and even in Europe responsible for routing any payments of Argentina. Other recent developments have also worked to reverse the progress -- Europe’s handling of the crisis that began with Greece in 2010 was too slow, too optimistic, too reluctant initially to restructure bond-holders, and too enamored of fiscal austerity. The mistakes eventually encompassed even such specific no-nos as a consideration in the Cyprus case of haircutting small bank depositors.
international_finance  international_political_economy  capital_markets  sovereign_debt  IMF  bankruptcy  creditors  Eurozone  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
The Works and Life of Walter Bagehot, vol. 5 (Historical & Financial Essays; The English Constitution) - Online Library of Liberty
A UNIVERSAL MONEY. (1869.) Deals with international exchange, seignorage etc-- *-- HENRY CRABB ROBINSON.1 (1869.) *--* BAD LAWYERS OR GOOD? (1870.) *--* THE EARL OF CLARENDON. (1870.) *--* MR. GROTE. (1870?) *--* ON THE EMOTION OF CONVICTION. (1871.) *--* MR. LOWE AS CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER. (1871.) **--**--**--**-- THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION. (2nd edition)
books  etexts  17thC  18thC  19thC  British_history  British_politics  historiography-17thC  historiography-19thC  historicism  English_Civil_War  English_constitution  political_philosophy  constitutionalism  ancient_history  ancient_Greece  public_finance  sovereign_debt  Clarendon_1st_Earl  historians-and-politics  historiography-Whig  UK_Government  Bagehot  EF-add 
july 2014 by dunnettreader
Mark Kishlansky - Tyranny Denied: Charles I, Attorney General Heath, and the Five Knights' Case | JSTOR: The Historical Journal, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Mar., 1999), pp. 53-83
This article exonerates Charles I and Attorney General Sir Robert Heath from charges that they tampered with the records of the court of King's Bench in the Five Knights' Case. It refutes allegations made by John Selden in the parliament of 1628 and repeated by modern historians. Selden's attack on Heath and the king's government was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of King's Bench enrolments and a radical view of the crown's intentions in imprisoning loan resisters. The view that Charles was attempting to establish the prerogative right to imprison opponents without remedy at common law has no basis in either the arguments presented during the Five Knights' Case or the king's behaviour both before and during the parliament. By accepting the most radical critique of Caroline government at face value, historians have concluded that Charles was attempting to establish a `legal tyranny'. This article rejects these views. -- among other criticisms, notes that historians following Pocock have elevated a "common law mentality" to the heart of 17thC political culture, thereby underestimating the radicalism of Selden, Coke et al in forcing the confrontation that converted the Petition of Right into a non-negotiable statue that was subsequently used in proceedings against the king's actions during Personal Rule -- didn't download
article  jstor  17thC  British_history  British_politics  Charles_I  Parliament  taxes  counselors  Selden  common_law  prerogative  Pocock  ancient_constitution  Coke  political_culture  judiciary  habeas_corpus  sovereign_debt  public_finance  British_foreign_policy  Petition_of_Right  legislation  bibliography  revisionism  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
Matthijs Lof, Tuomas Malinen - The growth and sovereign debt correlation | vox , 25 May 2014
Rogoff and Reinhart not only invented the tipping point, they got the causality backwards so not just no justification for austerity, the case for stimulus is stronger -- Public debt and economic growth are historically negatively correlated. This column discusses new evidence that rejects the debt-to-growth causality. After estimating the effects between debt and growth in both directions, there is no evidence that high indebtedness suppresses economic growth. The effect of growth on debt is the main driver of the negative correlation
paper  economic_theory  economic_models  macroeconomics  econometrics  sovereign_debt  public_finance  economic_growth  austerity  causation  EF-add 
june 2014 by dunnettreader
John A. Shedd - Legalism over Revolution: The Parliamentary Committee for Indemnity and Property Confiscation Disputes, 1647-1655 | JSTOR: The Historical Journal, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Dec., 2000), pp. 1093-1107
Royalists of the Civil War period readily employed the English legal system to recover lost estates, even at the nadir of their political fortunes, namely the years just after the king's defeat. Rather than accept the verdict of a war lost, royalist and Catholic `delinquents' successfully sought their own verdicts at law against former tenants for rents on lands that had been confiscated by parliament. The radical MPs staffing the Indemnity Committee respected the principles of due process of law and, ironically, given the fact that the committee's purpose was to protect parliament's supporters, upheld royalist claims to confiscated lands, thereby assisting the law courts in thwarting parliament's plan to repay war debts with rents collected from losers' property. So pervasive was the legalistic mindset in both the courts and the Indemnity Committee that royalists received favourable rulings against many on the winning side of the conflict, including famous leaders such as Sir William Brereton. -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  legal_history  economic_history  political_history  political_economy  17thC  British_history  British_politics  English_Civil_War  Interregnum  property_rights  landowners  Royalists  Catholics-England  Parliamentarians  property-confiscations  legal_culture  economic_culture  political_culture  sovereign_debt  due_process  civil_liberties  judiciary  downloaded  EF-add 
may 2014 by dunnettreader
Richard Marshall -Perspectives book series review - why fight poverty etc » 3:AM Magazine Feb 2014
Series editor Diane Coyle summarises the series nicely when she writes: ‘Perspectives are essays on big ideas by leading writers, each given free rein and a modest word limit to reframe an issue of great contemporary interest.’ Reading them invites peppy fustigation or pash. *--* (1) Julia Unwin’s ‘Why Fight Poverty’ argues that the UK must solve its poverty crisis and focuses on the emotional and sentimental thinking that ultimately provides obstacles for tackling the problem. This is hard-headed pugnacious stuff. *--* (2) Jim O’Neil’s ‘The BRIC Road to Growth’ warns that emerging markets are not an old story. The shift from the dominance of USA and Europe has happened. *--* (3) Anne Powers ‘Phoenix Cities’ is a study of regeneration ideas from Europe and the USA. Bridget Rosewell writes about ‘Reinventing London.’ *--* (4) Rediscovering Growth: After the Crisis’ by Andrew Sentance begins by asking what has happened to economic growth since the North Atlantic crisis in the stricken economies affected by the crisis. It’s an interesting question, and one that has in the background worries that without growth governments won’t be able to contain public borrowing, reduce their debts nor establish a direction for economic recovery.
books  reviews  public_policy  global_economy  global_governance  Great_Recession  emerging_markets  economic_growth  sovereign_debt  austerity  urban_development  urban_politics  London  education  poverty  Poor_Laws  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Elliott vs Argentina: 3 possible resolutions | Felix Salmon
Argentina, as everybody knew it would, has gone to the Supreme Court to appeal the bad (and ignoble) ruling against the country by New York’s Second Circuit. The most likely final outcome, still, is that Argentina will default, for the reasons (but not with the timing) I gave last year. But, with this petition, Argentina now has three possible outs.

Call them sovereign immunity, pari passu, and the bondholders’ ransom. None of them is particularly likely to happen — but add them all together, and there’s still a glimmer of hope for Argentina.
sovereign_debt  capital_markets 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Robert A. Black and Claire G. Gilmore - Crowding Out during Britain's Industrial Revolution | JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp. 109-131
Contrary to earlier assertions, the historical data for Britain do confirm a (lagged) crowding-out effect during the Industrial Revolution. Heavy government borrowing after 1793 for the wars with France raised interest rates. These results are confirmed with nominal-interest-rate equations rather than with real-rate equations, which impose restrictive assumptions about the adjustment of nominal rates to inflation expectations. We see no reason to abandon the neoclassical, factor-allocation model of saving and investment in favor of a theory asserting that firms accumulate capital for investment independently of household saving decisions. -- 2nd article in to and fro with Mirowski -- didn't download
article  jstor  economic_history  finance_capital  sovereign_debt  crowding_out  capital_markets  fiscal-military_state  Industrial_Revolution  British_history  18thC  19thC  capital_flows  savings  investment  interest_rates  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
Carol E. Heim and Philip Mirowski - Interest Rates and Crowding-Out During Britain's Industrial Revolution | JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 117-139
Available evidence on interest rates and government borrowing during Britain's industrial revolution, while limited, does not support the idea that war spending crowded out private investment. This article demonstrates the importance of using data on net receipts from borrowing, rather than changes in government debt. Weaknesses of the crowding-out model concerning capital markets and investment, openness of the economy, and full employment are identified for the historical case. The case raises broader issues of whether conceptions of saving and investment based in neoclassical supply-constrained models are as appropriate as theories of capital accumulation. -- 1st in series of back and forth articles -- didn't download
article  jstor  economic_history  finance_capital  sovereign_debt  crowding_out  capital_markets  fiscal-military_state  Industrial_Revolution  18thC  19thC  British_history  UK_Government  interest_rates  international_finance  capital_flows  savings  investment  EF-add 
february 2014 by dunnettreader
John Wells and Douglas Wills - Revolution, Restoration, and Debt Repudiation: The Jacobite Threat to England's Institutions and Economic Growth | JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 418-441
This study provides an empirical test of North and Weingast's theory of British capital-market development after the Glorious Revolution. The evidence is consistent with the hypotheses that institutional innovation in the 1690s led to the dramatic growth in London capital markets, and that threats to these institutions caused financial turmoil. We also find the economic motivation for these innovations to be consistent with the work of Ekelund and Tollison. -- they fell for Whig propaganda
article  jstor  economic_history  finance_capital  17thC  18thC  British_politics  North-Weingast  Jacobites  sovereign_debt  interest_rates  institutional_economics  public_choice  interest_groups  Whigs-oligarchy  Bank_of_England  Tories  Hanoverian_Succession  James_III  monied_interest  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Nathan Sussman and Yishay Yafeh - Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and Sovereign Debt: Britain 1690-1790 | JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Dec., 2006), pp. 906-935
We revisit the evidence on the relations between institutions, the cost of government debt, and financial development in Britain (1690-1790) and find that interest rates remained high and volatile for four decades after the Glorious Revolution, partly due to wars and instability; British interest rates co-moved with those in Holland; Debt per capita remained lower in Britain than in Holland until around 1780; and Britain did not borrow at lower rates than European countries with more limited protection of property rights. We conclude that, in the short run, institutional reforms are not rewarded by financial markets. -- reasonably up to date bibliography on institutional_economics, behavioral_economics, financial markets (Shleifer et al), emerging markets, economic history of 17thC 18thC 19thC re industrial revolution, crowding_out and public finance -- downloaded pdf to Note
article  jstor  economic_history  political_history  finance_capital  capital_markets  capital_flows  sovereign_debt  17thC  18thC  British_history  Dutch  France  public_finance  taxes  interest_rates  institutional_economics  institutional_change  North-Weingast  constitutionalism  Absolutism  behavioral_economics  emerging_markets  international_finance  bibliography  downloaded  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Stefan E. Oppers - The Interest Rate Effect of Dutch Money in 18thC Britain | JSTOR: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Mar., 1993), pp. 25-43
An early piece in the financial markets, behavioral_economics, crowding_out debates -- It is generally recognized that the Dutch played a major part in financing British government deficits from the 1720s to the late 1770s. This article argues that even though the Dutch continued to hold large amounts of British debt after 1780, they stopped supplying new capital to the British and started a modest repatriation of some of their previous investments. A comparative econometric study of 3 percent consol yields during the two deficit-inducing wars Britain fought between 1750 and 1795 shows that as a result British interest rates became much more sensitive to increases in government borrowing. -- see bibliography of both primary and secondary literature -- didn't download
article  jstor  economic_history  finance_capital  18thC  British_history  Dutch  sovereign_debt  capital_markets  capital_flows  interest_rates  North-Weingast  crowding_out  French_Revolutionary_Wars  American_Revolution  public_finance  bibliography  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Lucy S. Sutherland and J. Binney - Henry Fox as Paymaster General of the Forces | JSTOR: The English Historical Review, Vol. 70, No. 275 (Apr., 1955), pp. 229-257
Describes the complex system, much imposed by Parliamentary appropriations requirements - the potential fortune to be made in the position, but the huge personal liability it also entailed until a satisfactory audit was finished, the audit being no simple matter. May be useful for Bolingbroke's situation as Secretary for War and relation to the other parts of the Army bureaucracy, with the huge sums sloshing around. -- didn't download
article  jstor  17thC  18thC  British_history  British_Army  UK_Government  government_officials  Bolingbroke  Brydges  places-income  government_finance  capital_markets  money_market  sovereign_debt  Fox_Henry  1760s  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
Richard W. Unger, review - Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815 | JSTOR: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 72, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 239-241
Reviewed work(s): The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815. By Jan de Vries and Ad van der Woude. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xx+767. $89.95. -- Richard W. Unger, University of British Columbia -- The final sixty pages do serve to draw together what has gone before and offer not only an overview of economic and social developments but also a tentative theory about patterns of the rise and fall of modern economies. The authors launch a sustained attack on traditional periodization of economic and, indeed, all history. They find in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century many of the features of nineteenth- and twentieth-century economic growth. They see no reason to look on the English Industrial Revolution as a cataclysmic event. -- There seems to be no doubt that the massive debt run up by the Dutch government in fending off the French threat from 1672 to 1713 burdened the economy so much that it could neither recover earlier levels of growth nor engage in restructuring like that which occurred in the years from 1660 to 1700 in the face of falling food prices, rising real incomes of laborers and craftsmen, and declining land values. Too many people in the eighteenth century—such as government officials and bondholders—lived well thanks to the need to service the debt; these people resisted necessary fiscal reform.
books  reviews  jstor  economic_history  political_economy  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  Dutch  development  modernization  urbanization  agriculture  industry  Industrial_Revolution  foreign_policy  sovereign_debt  rentiers  trading_companies  trade  colonialism  shipping  entrepôts  periodization  EF-add 
january 2014 by dunnettreader
« earlier      
per page:    204080120160

related tags

13thC  15thC  16thC  17thC  18thC  19thC  20thC  21stC  1690s  1710s  1760s  Absolutism  accountability  accumulation  accumulation-differential  administrative_law  agriculture  American_Revolution  ancient_constitution  ancient_Greece  ancient_history  Anglo-Dutch  arbitration  Argentina  article  Asia  asset_prices  austerity  Bagehot  bail-ins  bailouts  balance_of_payments  banking  bankruptcy  Bank_of_England  bank_runs  behavioral_economics  BEPS  bibliography  biography  Bolingbroke  books  bookshelf  Bretton_Woods  Britain  British_Army  British_Empire  British_foreign_policy  British_history  British_politics  Brydges  bubbles  Bubble_Act  Buckingham_1st_Duke  budget_deficit  bureaucracy  business-and-politics  business_cycles  Cantillon  capitalism  capitalism-systemic_crisis  capitalization  capital_adequacy  capital_as_power  capital_controls  capital_flows  capital_markets  Catholics-England  causation  center-periphery  centralization  central_banks  central_government  Charles_I  Charles_V  cities  city_states  civil_liberties  Clarendon_1st_Earl  class_conflict  clientelism  cognition-social  Coke  collective_action  collective_memory  colonialism  commerce  commerce-doux  commodities  common_law  common_law-equity  comparative_economics  comparative_history  comparative_law  competition-financial_sector  competition-interstate  competitiveness  composite_monarchies  conflict_of_interest  Congress  constitutionalism  constitutional_law  consumers  consumer_demand  consumer_protection  contagion  convergence-econimic  corporate_finance  corporate_governance  counselors  Country_Party  courtiers  court_culture  credit  creditors  cross-border  crowding_out  Crown_finance  crown_revenues  currency  databases  debt  debt-overhang  debt-restructuring  debt-seniority  debtors  debt_crisis  decentralization  default  deficit_finance  deleverage  demand-side  democracy  democracy_deficit  demography  development  disciplines  dispute_resolution  distribution-income  distribution-wealth  dollar  download  downloaded  due_process  Dutch  Early_Republic  East_India_Company  ECB  econometrics  economic_culture  economic_growth  economic_history  economic_models  economic_policy  economic_reform  economic_sociology  economic_theory  education  EF-add  elections  elites  elites-self-destructive  elite_culture  Elizabeth  emerging_markets  empires  energy  English_Civil_War  English_constitution  entrepôts  epistemology  epistemology-social  equitable_relief  equity  equity-corporate  equity_markets  ESMA  etexts  EU  EU-constitution  EU-elections  EU-fiscal_policy  EU-Parliament  EU-parties  EU-regulation  Eurocrsis  Europe  Europe-Early_Modern  Europe-federalism  European_integration  Eurozone  EU_governance  Evernote  excise  Excise_Crisis  export-led  fascism  favorites  FDI  Fed  federalism  fiduciaries  finance_capital  financialization  financial_centers  financial_centers-London  financial_crisis  financial_economics  financial_innovation  financial_regulation  financial_repression  financial_sector_development  financial_system  financial_system-government_back-stop  find  firms-theory  fiscal-military_state  fiscal_deficit  fiscal_policy  fiscal_space  fiscal_surplus  foreign_policy  Founders  Fox_Henry  France  French_Empire  French_government  French_language  French_politics  French_Revolution  French_Revolutionary_Wars  FX  FX-misalignment  FX-rate_management  G20  Germany  Germany-Eurozone  globalization  global_economy  global_governance  global_history  global_imbalance  global_system  Glorious_Revolution  gold_standard  Google_Books  governance-regional  government-forms  governments-information_sharing  government_agencies  government_finance  government_officials  Great_Divergence  Great_Recession  Greece  Greece-Troika  habeas_corpus  Habermas  Hamilton  Hanoverian_Succession  Harley  haute_bourgeoisie  hegemony  historians-and-politics  historical_sociology  historicism  historiography  historiography-17thC  historiography-18thC  historiography-19thC  historiography-Whig  House_of_Commons  Hume  Hume-politics  ideology  IMF  immigration  improvement  incentives-distortions  industrialization  Industrial_Revolution  industry  inequality  inflation  inflation-expectations  information  infrastructure  Instapaper  institution-building  institutional_change  institutional_economics  institutional_investors  institutions  insurance  intellectual_history  interest_groups  interest_rates  intermediation  internal_controls  international_economics  international_finance  international_law  international_monetary_system  international_organizations  international_political_economy  international_system  Interregnum  investment  investment-government  investor-State_disputes  investors  IR  IR_theory  Italy  Jacobites  James_I  James_III  journal  jstor  judiciary  Keynesian  Keynesianism  kindle  kindle-available  Labor_markets  landed_interest  landowners  land_tax  Latin_America  law-and-economics  Law_John  legal_culture  legal_history  legal_reasoning  legal_system  legal_theory  legislation  legitimacy  lender-of-last-resort  leverage  links  lit_survey  local_government  London  lost_decade  Louis_XIV  lower_orders  luxury  Maastricht  macroeconomics  macroprudential_policies  manufacturing  markets-structure  market_integration  Marshall_Plan  Marxist  Mediterranean  mercantilism  Merkel  methodology-quantitative  Mexico  middle_class  military-industrial_complex  military_history  Mississippi_Company  MNCs  modernization  monarchy  monetarism  monetary_policy  monetary_theory  monetary_union  money  money-Cartelist  money_market  money_supply  monied_interest  moral_economy  moral_philosophy  Napoleonic_Wars  Napoleonic_Wars-impact  nation-state  nationalism  naval_history  NBFI  neoclassical_economics  networks  Nine_Years_War  nobility  North-Weingast  OECD  OECD_economies  oil_price  opposition  ordoliberalism  oversight-legislature  paper  Paris  Parliament  Parliamentarians  Parliamentary_supremacy  parties  partisanship  Patriots  patronage  payments_systems  paywall  Peace_of_Utrecht  pensions  periodization  Petition_of_Right  Phillip_II  Pitt_the_Elder  places-income  Pocket  Pocock  political_arithmetick  political_culture  political_economy  political_history  political_participation  political_philosophy  political_press  politics-and-money  Poor_Laws  Portugal  post-Cold_War  post-secular  post-WWII  poverty  prerogative  prices  privileges-corporate  probability  production  productivity  productivity-labor_share  profit  property-confiscations  property_rights  public_choice  public_finance  public_opinion  public_policy  public_sphere  QE  rating_agencies  redistribution  reform-economic  reform-finance  reform-legal  reform-political  refugees  Regency-France  regional_blocs  regulation-costs  regulation-enforcement  regulation-harmonization  rentiers  report  representative_institutions  republicanism  republics-Ancient_v_Modern  research  reviews  revisionism  right-wing  risk  risk-systemic  risk_assessment  risk_management  risk_shifting  Royalists  ruling_class  Russia  Russian_revolution  safety_net  savings  Scientific_Revolution  Scotland  Selden  Seven_Years_War  shipping  SMEs  social_order  social_sciences  social_sciences-post-WWII  social_theory  sociology  sovereignty  sovereign_debt  Spain  Spanish_Empire  spreads  SSRN  stagnation  state-building  state-transnatiinal_relations  state_government  statistics  stimulus  structural_adjustment  subsidiarity  subsidies  supply-side  taxes  taxes-consumption  tax_collection  tax_havens  tax_policy  technocracy  technology  too-big-to-fail  Tories  trade  trade-policy  trade_routes  trading_companies  transnational_power  transparency  treaties  Ukraine  UK_economy  UK_Government  UK_government-colonies  uncertainty  underconsumption  unemployment  urbanization  urban_development  urban_politics  US_constitution  US_economy  US_foreign_policy  US_government  US_history  US_judiciary  US_legal_system  US_military  US_politics  video  wages  War_of_Austrian_Succession  War_of_Spanish_Succession  Washington_Consensus  website  welfare_state  Whigs  Whigs-oligarchy  Whigs-opposition  Whig_Junto  William_III  WWI  WWI-finance  WWII 

Copy this bookmark:



description:


tags: